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Summary 
In theory, for many small and medium-sized enterprises the introduction of per-
formance-related pay might be beneficial: if implemented properly, it could help 
enterprises in selecting, hiring and motivating the right employees for the right 
jobs. So far, however, performance-related pay in SMEs has received little aca-
demic attention. One of the few studies on this topic is that by Roepers and De 
Kok (2007), who explore determinants of performance-related pay amongst 
SMEs. Amongst others, they found support for the presence of gender effects; 
not only regarding the gender of the employees, but also regarding the gender of 
the entrepreneur. 
 
In this paper we further investigate the gender effect in remuneration policies as 
found in Roepers and de Kok (2007). The central idea of this paper is that female 
and male entrepreneurs make different choices regarding their human resource 
management practices, including remuneration policies. These differences can be 
explained by differences in the risk aversion of male and female employees and 
entrepreneurs. Generally speaking, women are more risk averse than men. This 
suggests that men and women have a different valuation of the risks that are as-
sociated with performance-related pay. We hypothesise that these different 
valuations will result in differences in the incidence of performance-related pay. 
This leads to the following five hypotheses: 
 
−  H1: Performance-related pay is less used for female employees than for male 
employees. 
−  H2: Female entrepreneurs are more likely to use performance-related pay 
than male entrepreneurs. 
−  H3: Performance-related pay is most likely to occur in firms with a female en-
trepreneur and a high share of male employees. 
−  H4: Performance-related pay is least likely to occur in firms with a male en-
trepreneurs and a high share of female employees. 
−  H5: The income of the entrepreneur is higher when we observe pay policies 
consistent with efficient risk sharing. 
 
These hypotheses are tested by estimating various probit and OLS regressions, 
using the results of a telephonic questionnaire amongst 369 Dutch entrepreneurs 
with 1 - 100 employees. 
 
At a significance level of 5%, we find partial support for hypothesis H1, but not 
for any of the other hypotheses. One explanation for these findings is that they 
indicate that employees are indeed risk averse (and men more than women) but 
that employers are not; hypothesis H1 is valid but H2 is not. In this case, hy-
potheses H3 and H4 are no longer valid, so the lack of support for hypotheses H3 
and H4 is consistent with the lack of support for H2. The lack of support for the 
fifth hypothesis may be due to the limited size of our sample (approximately 120 
valid observations were available to test this hypothesis). 
 
Another interpretation is that the lack of support for our hypotheses suggests 
that we need to reconsider them, including the basic assumptions on which they 
are based. We use gender as a proxy for the risk aversion of individual employ-
ees, and assume that risk aversion (of employers as well as employees) is in 
turn related to the incidence of performance-related pay. However, it can be ar- 
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gued that this assumption is not correct: the incidence of performance-related 
pay may be related to ambiguity aversion rather than risk aversion. Gender may 
however also serve as a proxy for differences in labour force attachment. Differ-
ences in labour force attachment are likely to be only relevant for employers, not 
for employees, which seems consistent with our lack of empirical support for the 
presence of an entrepreneurial gender effect. 
 
For a better understanding of gender effects in remuneration policies, future 
studies should further develop the relationships between performance-related 
pay, risk aversion and ambiguity aversion and labour force attachment, both 
theoretically and empirically. 
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1  Introduction 
Strong debate on performance-related pay 
Until a few years ago, performance-related pay was becoming more and more 
accepted and used. This changed dramatically when Lehman Brothers went bank-
rupt in September 2008. In a reaction to the crisis that followed, many claimed 
that the practice of performance-related pay in especially the financial sector 
was one of the main causes for the current crisis. The debate on the advantages 
and disadvantages of performance-related pay (and how it should be designed) 
is still ongoing. 
 
This debate tends to focus on large enterprises, where variable payment can ac-
count for a large share of total payment. The situation in small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) tends to be ignored in this discussion. For various rea-
sons, this is not surprising. First of all, relatively little is known about payment 
systems in SMEs. In 2006, the Amsterdam Centre for Entrepreneurship (ACE) 
and EIM conducted a survey amongst 369 Dutch SMEs regarding their remunera-
tion system. This is still one of the few surveys on this subject that includes 
SMEs. Secondly, the variable share of total payment tends to be relatively small 
in SMEs. Amongst others, the EIM - ACE survey included questions on the pay-
ment practices of the best-paid employee within each enterprise. The results in-
dicate that, within the group of best-paid employees that received some form of 
performance-related pay, the variable share of their wage was on average 8% 
(De Kok et al., 2007). 
 
Previous research: determinants of performance-related pay in SMEs 
Van Praag et al. (2006) argue that many small and medium-sized enterprises 
might benefit from the introduction of performance-related pay: if implemented 
properly, it could help enterprises in selecting, hiring and motivating the right 
employees for the right jobs. So far, however, performance-related pay in SMEs 
has received little academic attention. One of the few studies on this topic is that 
by Roepers and De Kok (2007). Using the EIM - ACE survey, they explore deter-
minants of performance-related pay amongst SMEs. In particular, they examined 
whether the incidence of performance-related pay for employees is related to the 
size and ownership structure of the enterprise and to the gender of the entrepre-
neur and the employees. Their results indicate that each of these variables is in-
deed related to the incidence of performance-related pay: larger firms are more 
likely to provide performance-related pay than smaller firms, and firms with a 
single owner and family firms are less likely to provide performance-related pay 
than firms with multiple owners (that are not related to each other). They also 
found a gender effect. 
 
The gender effect that Roepers and De Kok (2007) found was, however, different 
from what they expected. They expected that both the gender of the entrepre-
neur and the gender composition of the workforce would affect the probability of 
performance-related pay, but that these two effects would be independent of 
each other. Instead, they found a close relationship between these two effects. 
For male entrepreneurs, they found that the use of performance-related pay is 
independent of the gender composition of the work force. For female entrepre- 
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neurs, however, they found that the usage of performance-related pay increases 
with the share of male employees. 
 
Objective of the study 
The role of the gender of the manager or (direct) supervisor on wages of subor-
dinates has been considered before (Cohen and Huffman, 2007; Hultin and 
Szulkin, 2003). Likewise, the relationship between employee gender and per-
formance-related pay has been studied before (Geddes and Heywood, 2003). 
However, as far as we know, the paper by Roepers and De Kok (2007) is the 
only paper that considers both the gender of the entrepreneur and the gender 
composition of the workforce. 
 
In this paper we further investigate the gender effect in remuneration policies as 
found in Roepers and de Kok (2007). The central idea of this paper is that female 
and male entrepreneurs make different choices regarding their human resource 
management practices, including remuneration policies (Mukhtar, 2002; Verheul 
et al, 2002). These differences can be explained by differences in the risk aver-
sion of male and female employees and entrepreneurs. We derive several hy-
potheses on how the interaction between the entrepreneurial gender and the 
gender composition of the workforce might affect the incidence of performance-
related pay. These hypotheses are then tested, using the same dataset as 
Roepers and de Kok (2007). 
 
Outline 
In the next chapter we present the theoretical framework for this study and dis-
cuss the hypotheses that we will test. In chapter three we describe the data that 
we use to test these hypotheses. The results are presented in chapter four. As 
we will see, most of our hypotheses cannot be confirmed. Generally speaking, 
the available data does not support our ideas on how differences in risk aversion 
result in gender differences in the incidence of performance-related pay. Chapter 
five therefore starts with a discussion of possible explanations for our lack of 
positive results. After this discussion the main conclusions of our study are pre-
sented. 
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2  Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
2.1  The general case for performance-related pay 
An employment contract is an example of a relationship between a principal and 
an agent, where the principal delegates work to the agent. In such principal-
agent relationships, two types of problems can occur, related to differences in 
goals and risk aversion between the agent and the principal. The first type of 
problem occurs when the principal and agent have different desires or goals and 
when it is difficult or expensive for the principal to monitor the agent's behav-
iour. This goal conflict introduces the risk of moral hazard: the risk that the 
agent may not provide the level of effort that was agreed upon. In this case, the 
agent is shirking. The second problem arises when the principal and the agent 
have different attitudes toward risk. The principal and the agent may prefer dif-
ferent actions while executing the work, because of their different risk prefer-
ences. (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 
These problems may be (partly) solved by using performance-related pay (for 
example, piece rate payment, commissions, bonuses or profit sharing) as a gov-
ernance mechanism. If designed properly, including performance-related pay as 
part of the contract between the principal and the agent may prevent opportun-
istic agent behaviour. This will occur if the preferences of agents and principals 
are realigned in such a way that the rewards for both depend on the same ac-
tions. In such cases, the conflicts of self interest between principal and agent are 
reduced (Eisenhardt, 1989) and the agent is motivated to provide the efforts de-
sired by the principal. In fact, one of the most important objectives of compen-
sation is to provide proper and effective motivation to employees (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1992). 
 
Performance pay and firm size 
In larger firms, shirking is less easy to detect. This increases the risk that shirk-
ing will actually occur (Chang, 2006). Larger firms therefore have more need for 
governance mechanisms to combat moral hazard and shirking. By using per-
formance-related pay, firms can reduce the risk of shirking, because this re-
moves (or reduces) the potential conflicts of self interest between employer and 
employees. The benefits of performance-related pay are therefore likely to in-
crease with firm size. At the same time, the costs (per employee) of developing 
and maintaining performance-related pay system are likely to decrease with firm 
size: Larger firms have a larger demand for human resources, and therefore a 
larger demand for specific HRM practices. This stimulates standardization and 
formalization of these practices. Most formalized HRM practices require consider-
able development costs. This results in a cost advantage for larger firms, which 
is strengthened by the limited supply of financial resources of many small firms 
(De Kok, Uhlaner and Thurik, 2006). 
 
These arguments suggest that the net benefits of performance-related pay will 
increase with firm size. This is consistent with the finding from previous research  
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that performance-related pay is more common amongst large firms than 
amongst SMEs (Van Praag et al., 2006). 
 
Performance pay and risk aversion 
The realignment of the agent's preferences with those of the principal often re-
quires that certain risks are transferred from the principal to the agent (Eisen-
hardt, 1989). This is also the case with performance-related pay, where the risk 
of under-performance is shared between the principal and the agent. The extent 
to which this actually takes place depends on the actual levels of risk aversion of 
the relevant principal and agents. In agency theory it is often assumed that firms 
are risk neutral (e.g. because firms are owned by different investors with well-
diversified portfolios) while individual employees are risk averse (Chang, 2006; 
Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). This creates a stimulus to provide a fixed wage to 
the risk-averse employees: by transferring most of the income risks of employ-
ees to the firm, the employees are better of while the firm is not affected. It is 
doubtful, however, whether this assumption also applies in the case of SMEs. For 
example, the idea that the firm is owned by different investors with well-
diversified portfolios does not apply to the majority of SMEs. Often, SMEs are 
single owned-managed enterprises. In these cases, the level of risk aversion of 
the firm is basically determined by the risk aversion of the entrepreneur. This, in 
turn, may be related to the entrepreneurs' gender. 
2.2  Gender differences in risk attitude: five hypotheses 
It is well established that the risk attitude of individuals is partly related to their 
gender (Bajtelsmit and Bernasek, 1996; Borghans et al., 2009; Dohmen and 
Falk, 2001). It is however difficult to identify the causes of this gender differ-
ence: it is generally only possible to observe the outcomes of decisions, and not 
the decision-making processes themselves. 
 
Borghans et al. (2009) use experiments to examine possible determinants of risk 
aversion. They find that risk aversion is partly determined by psychological traits 
such as the "big 5"
1. Gender differences in these traits explain only a small part 
of gender differences in risk aversion. In the context of financial decisions, risk 
aversion is also related to wealth: in an absolute sense (the amount of money 
invested in risky assets), risk aversion decreases with wealth (Bajtelsmit and 
Bernasek, 1996). Since women have lower wages than men (both in general and 
for comparable positions), this suggests an indirect gender effect on risk aver-
sion. 
 
If female employees are more risk averse then male employees, they require a 
higher risk premium to accept performance-related pay. When comparing a fixed 
wage offer with a performance-related pay offer with a certain risk premium, fe-
male employees will be more likely to prefer the fixed wage offer. This is con-
firmed by an empirical study by Dohmen and Falk (2001). They find that women 
are more risk averse than men, and that this difference in risk preference ex-
 
1 The big 5 represent the following five basic dimensions of personality: openness, conscientious-
ness, extraversion, agreeableness and neuroticism.  
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plains their attitude towards variable pay: 68% of the 119 male participants of 
their study prefer a variable pay, compared to 44% of the 121 women. 
If female employees require a higher risk premium to accept performance-
related pay, this reduces the expected benefits of performance-related pay for 
the entrepreneur. This, in turn, makes it less likely that performance-related pay 
will occur. Thus, we expect that the share of women in the workforce will have a 
negative effect on the probability that a firm will introduce performance-related 
pay. 
 
The causality may also run in the opposite direction. If performance-related pay 
is actually introduced, this may stimulate the outflow of female employees. This 
will occur if the new wage offer (including both a variable and fixed part) is not 
high enough to cover the demanded risk premium. In addition, the presence of 
performance-related pay can stimulate the inflow of male applicants. Thus, the 
presence of performance-related pay can have a negative effect on the share of 
women in the workforce. 
 
Irrespective of the direction of causality, these arguments suggest a negative 
correlation between the share of women in the workforce and the incidence of 
performance-related pay. This leads to our first hypothesis: 
 
H1: Performance-related pay is less used for female employees than 
for male employees 
 
The gender difference in risk aversion does not only apply to the population in 
general, but also to the population of entrepreneurs. Female entrepreneurs tend 
to be more risk averse than male entrepreneurs (ENSR 1996; Verheul and 
Thurik, 2001). This suggests that (ceteris paribus) female entrepreneurs are 
more likely to transfer some of the company risk onto their employees (Chang, 
2006). This can be done by using performance-related pay. This results in the 
second hypothesis of this study: 
 
H2: Female entrepreneurs are more likely to use performance-related 
pay than male entrepreneurs 
 
This hypothesis is supported by gender differences in management style. Verheul 
(2003) has studied the gender effect of management styles in small firms in the 
Netherlands, and found that female entrepreneurs are more likely to use formal 
HRM practices than male entrepreneurs. She distinguishes between commitment 
and control oriented management. The higher the degree to which procedures 
and regulation are formalized, the higher the degree of control over employees 
and the production process is. She finds that female-led firms have a more con-
trol-oriented type of HRM than male-led firms. This result implies that female en-
trepreneurs can be associated with a higher degree of formalization. This is con-
sistent with a higher usage of performance-related pay. 
 
In contrast, Verheul, Risseeuw and Bartelse (2002) suggest that female entre-
preneurs may be more inclined to use non-pecuniary rewards, such as flexibility 
of working hours, childcare facilities and verbal compliments, to motivate their 
employees. Their relatively high attention for non-pecuniary rewards would imply 
that female entrepreneurs would be less likely to use performance-related pay  
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than male entrepreneurs. However, they do not find significant support for the 
assumptions of less performance-related pay. Therefore the expectation remains 
that female entrepreneurs are more likely to use performance-related pay 
schemes. 
 
The first hypothesis is related to the gender composition of the workforce, while 
the second hypothesis is related to the gender of the entrepreneur. We assume 
that these two effects work independently of each other. In that case, the com-
bination of these hypotheses results in the following two additional hypotheses: 
H3: Performance-related pay is most likely to occur in firms with a 
female entrepreneur and a high share of male employees 
H4: Performance-related pay is least likely to occur in firms with a 
male entrepreneurs and a high share of female employees 
 
As we noted before, it is often assumed that firms are risk neutral while individ-
ual employees are risk averse. If this is the case, we should find empirical sup-
port for hypothesis H1 but not for H2 (and therefore also not for H3 and H4). In 
addition, we expect to find support for another hypothesis, concerning the effect 
of performance-related pay on firm profits. Whether or not the usage of per-
formance-related pay will have a positive effect on profits depends on many dif-
ferent factors. One of these factors is the risk premium that the entrepreneur 
has to offer to the employees, in order to make them accept the new system
1. 
This risk premium is higher for female employees than for male employees. 
Hence, if the share of male employees is relatively high, the expected costs of 
using performance-related pay will be relatively low, making it more likely that 
performance-related pay will be beneficial to the overall profits of the firm. Con-
versely, if the share of female employees is relatively high, profits are likely to 
be higher using fixed wages (wages not related to performance) rather than per-
formance-related pay. Formulated differently: we expect that pay policies that 
are consistent with efficient risk sharing vary with the gender composition of the 
workforce. If the share of female employees is low, efficient pay policies involve 
performance-related pay; if the share of female employees is high, efficient pay 
policies involve fixed wages only. 
 
Our final hypothesis is that firms with an efficient pay policy as defined above 
will generate higher profits than firms with an inefficient pay policy. With small 
firms, it is often difficult to differentiate between the entrepreneur's income and 
the profit of the enterprise. This is especially the case if the enterprise has the 
legal form of a sole proprietorship: in this case, the entrepreneur cannot receive 
a wage, so the entrepreneurial income is part of the generated profits. We there-
fore formulate this hypothesis in terms of entrepreneurial income rather than 
profit. This results in the following hypothesis: 
H5: The income of the entrepreneur is higher when we observe pay 
policies consistent with efficient risk sharing 
 
 
1 Often, the entrepreneur of an SME may have the authority to introduce and use a performance-
related pay system without employee approval. Nevertheless, if the entrepreneur wants to retain 
valuable employees and keep them motivated, it is important that the employees feel that they 
are compensated for the financial risk that comes with performance-related pay.  
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3  Research methodology 
3.1  Questionnaire and sampling framework 
The dataset that we use for this study has previously been used by De Kok et al. 
(2007) and Roepers and de Kok (2007). In this section we give a brief descrip-
tion of the questionnaire and the sampling framework. More details can be found 
in De Kok et al. (2007). 
3.1.1 Questionnaire 
The questionnaire was developed by De Kok et al. (2007) based on prior knowl-
edge, in-house expertise and existing questionnaires. The concept questionnaire 
was tested through several pilot interviews. This resulted in a few adjustments in 
the formulation of the survey questions. The final survey focuses on the remu-
neration of the entrepreneur and the best-paid employee. In addition, the ques-
tionnaire also contains questions regarding structural and personal characteris-
tics of the firm and its employees. 
3.1.2 Sample 
The data has been gathered through a telephone survey in June and July 2006. 
The sample is stratified by size (varying from one to 100 employees on the pay-
roll), sector and age, and consists of 369 Dutch SMEs. Table 1 shows the distri-
bution of the sample by size and age. The questions in the survey were answered 
by the independent entrepreneurs (in case of a single owned firm), the major 
business partner (in case of a partnership), or by the general director (in other 
legal structures). 
Table 1  Sampled firms, by reported firm size and firm age 
Age category* 
Number of employees 
0 - 3 years  4 - 9 years  >= 10 years  Total 
1  8  13  7  28 
2 - 9   18  42  69  129 
10 - 49   11  27  80  118 
50 - 99  15  16  63  94 
Total  52  98  219  369 
  * After imputing missing values for 28 observations. 
  Source: EIM and ACE. 
3.2  Dependent variables 
The first four hypotheses concern the usage of performance-related pay within 
small and medium-sized enterprises. Our data set allows us to use two different 
indicators of performance-related pay by employees: a specific indicator con-
cerning performance-related pay for the best-paid employee in the firm, and an 
indicator concerning the application of performance-related pay for employees in  
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general. The fifth hypothesis concerns the entrepreneurial income, for which we 
use a single measure. In this section we describe the three dependent variables 
that are used in our study. 
 
Use of performance-related pay for the best-paid employee 
The remuneration of employees can consist of various components. To determine 
the composition of the remuneration of the best-paid employee, we asked which 
of the following components were actually received by the best-paid employee 
during 2005: 
−  fixed wage; 
−  profit sharing; 
−  bonus; 
−  options (only in case of a limited liability company); 
−  company car, phone or computer. 
 
Since it is not clear if the usage of a company car, phone or computer is related 
to the performance of the employee, we do not include these remuneration com-
ponents in our measurement for performance-related pay for the best-paid em-
ployee. We also decided not to use information on the usage of options, since 
this was mentioned by only three respondents. The resulting indicator for per-
formance-related pay for the best-paid employee thus indicates whether the 
best-paid employee received a share of the profit or a bonus during 2005. This is 
the case for 32% of our observations. 
 
Use of performance-related pay for some or all employees 
The questionnaire includes a single question on performance-based pay for the 
workforce as a whole, asking whether or not the enterprise makes use of per-
formance-related pay for some or all of its employees. This is the case for 34% 
of our observations. 
 
There is a reasonable overlap with the indicator of performance-related pay for 
the best-paid employee, but it is not very strong. About a third of all enterprises 
that use performance-related pay for at least some employees indicate that their 
best-paid employee did not receive a share of the profits or a bonus. What is 
more problematic is that about a third of the enterprises that reported that their 
best-paid employee received a bonus or participated in profit sharing, answered 
'no' to the question whether at least some of their employees received any per-
formance-related pay. If both indicators would indicate the same type of pay-
ment systems, this would not be possible. Presumably, the difference in the 
wording of the questions resulted in a different interpretation by the respondent 
of the specific remuneration components that should be taken into consideration. 
 
Entrepreneurial income 
The annual income of an entrepreneur can also include various components, 
where the choice for specific components depends (amongst others) on fiscal 
legislation and the legal structure of the enterprise. For example, in the Nether-
lands entrepreneurs can only receive a wage if their enterprise is organised as a 
limited liability company, not in case of a sole proprietorship. 
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In the questionnaire, we asked whether the entrepreneur received any of the fol-
lowing income components (and, if so, the level of that component): 
−  fixed wage (including management fee in case of a limited liability company); 
−  profit sharing. In case of a sole proprietorship or partnership, we first asked if 
the respondent would indicate the profit level; we then asked which part of 
this profit was used for private means. In case of a limited liability company 
we directly asked for the amount of profit received by the respondent; 
−  bonus; 
−  shares (only in case of a limited liability company); 
−  options (only in case of a limited liability company). 
 
Of these income components, shares and options were the least common. This is 
partly due to the fact that these components can only occur in the case of a lim-
ited liability company. However, also within this subset of enterprises shares and 
options do not occur often: 27 respondents received shares as part of their in-
come, 7 respondents received options, and only 3 respondents could indicate the 
value of the received shares or options. We therefore decided to exclude shares 
and options from our definition of entrepreneurial income. Hence, we define en-
trepreneurial income as the sum of the received wage, profit sharing or bonuses 
for 2005. 
 
Information on the entrepreneurial income is available for 170 respondents. Of 
these respondents, 25 reported an income equal to zero, another three respon-
dents reported a total annual income of less than € 10 000,-. At the other end of 
the distribution, three entrepreneurs reported an annual income ranging from 
€ 400 000 to € 700 000. Summary statistics are reported in Table 2. These sta-
tistics show a large gender effect. This will be explored further in the next chap-
ter. 
Table 2  Summary statistics: entrepreneurial income by gender of the entrepreneur 
Variable  Mean  Standard deviation 
Number of valid 
observations 
Income level entrepreneur (x € 1.000):       
    male entrepreneurs  77.8  97.2  155 
    female entrepreneurs  32.8  50.2  15 
    all entrepreneurs  73.9  94.8  170 
  Source: EIM and ACE 
  Notes: 1) income is defined as the sum of wages, profit shares, bonuses or gratuities; 
2) "entrepreneur" refers to the respondent of the questionnaire. This is the CEO or general 
manager of the firm. 
3.3  Independent variables 
Characteristics of the firm 
Relevant firm characteristics include sector, firm size and firm age. Sector is rep-
resented by a standard classification into eight different sectors (manufacturing; 
construction; automotive; wholesale; retail; transport and communication; hotels  
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and restaurants; services) and firm size is represented by the number of em-
ployees of the firm. 
 
Regarding firm age, our dataset allows us to differentiate between the legal age 
and the economic age of the organisations. The legal age is the age of the cur-
rent legal form of the organisation. This is the age that is registered at e.g. the 
Chamber of Commerce. An organisation's economic age indicates how long the 
firm has been economically active. De Kok et al. (2007) show that the legal and 
economic age of firms often differ, in which case the economic age generally ex-
ceeds the legal age. A possible explanation for this might be that the legal struc-
ture of the organisation has changed over time. In this study we control for pos-
sible age effects by including the logarithm of the economic age
1. Not all firms 
provided information regarding their age. For 39 firms, missing values were im-
puted. 
 
Some studies report a strong correlation between firm size and firm age (e.g. 
Heyman, 2007). This could make it difficult to distinguish between size and age 
effects. To check whether this is also the case in our sample, we examined the 
correlation between economical age and number of employees. This correlation is 
0.07; if we exclude firms of 75 years or more, the correlation increases some-
what, but is still only 0.15. We therefore conclude that there is no risk that ef-
fects of firm size and firm age cannot be distinguished from each other. 
 
Characteristics of the entrepreneur 
Available information regarding the entrepreneur includes gender, age, educa-
tional level, tenure and experience. 
 
Women make up 15% of the entrepreneurs in our sample (54 out of 369 entre-
preneurs in total). This share is considerably lower than the share of female en-
trepreneurs in Dutch enterprises: 30% of all Dutch entrepreneurs is female
2. The 
relatively low share of female entrepreneurs in our sample may be due to the 
fact that female entrepreneurs tend to employ fewer employees and work fewer 
hours in their enterprise than male employees. Given that we only included firms 
with employees in our sample and that small firms are underrepresented as 
compared to medium-sized enterprises, this would result in a relative low share 
of female entrepreneurs in our sample. This explanation is consistent with the 
results of an exploratory probit regression, where we relate the gender of the 
entrepreneur to firm size and sector dummies. The results indicate a highly sig-
nificant (p<0.001) negative relationship between firm size and the likelihood that 
an entrepreneur is a woman. 
 
Characteristics of the workforce 
The nature of remuneration policies is often related to basic characteristics of the 
workforce such as gender, age and educational level. For this study we have in-
formation about the gender, age and educational decomposition of the work-
force. Summary statistics are included in Table 3. Notice that the gender of the 
 
1 The age variable included in Table 1 also refers to economic age. 
2 Source: ‘demografische aspecten van ondernemers’ (demographic aspects of entrepreneurs), a 
Dutch dataset available at www.entrepreneurship-sme.eu;   
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entrepreneur is related to the gender of the workforce: with male entrepreneurs, 
the majority of employees is male, while with female entrepreneurs the majority 
of employees is female. 
Table 3  Summary statistics: characteristics of the workforce 
Variable  Mean  Standard deviation 
Number of valid 
observations 
gender decomposition of the workforce  
(percentage male employees): 
     
    Within firms with male entrepreneurs  63.5%  31.6  289 
    Within firms with female entrepreneurs  42.3%  34.4  45 
Within all firms  60.6%  32.8  334 
age decomposition of the workforce:       
   share of employees <= 24  27.1%  27.4  336 
   share of employees 25 - 44  53.8%  27.3  336 
   share of elder employees >=45   19.2%  22.3  336 
educational decomposition of workforce:       
   share of low-educated employees  33.5%  34.3  329 
   share of medium-educated employees  45.1%  33.7  329 
   share of high-educated employees  21.4%  30.4  329 
  Source: EIM and ACE. 
Characteristics of the best-paid employee 
41 Respondents could not (or would not) identify the best-paid employee within 
their organisation. Consequently, these respondents could not provide any in-
formation on the remuneration of these employees. This leaves 328 observations 
which can be used to analyse the structure of the remuneration of the best-paid 
employee. 
 
Relevant characteristics of the best-paid employee include gender, age, educa-
tion, occupational level and tenure of the best-paid employee. Summary statis-
tics are presented in Table 4 (variable means) and Table 5 (valid observations).  
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Table 4  Summary statistics for the best-paid employee: variable means, by gender of 
entrepreneur and gender of best-paid employee 
Variable  All  By gender of entrepreneur 
By gender of  
best-paid employee 
    male  female  male  female 
age of the best-paid employee  39.2  39.8  35.3  39.8  36.9 
educational level: share of best-paid 
employees with high education   40%  41%  30%  41%  35% 
tenure of the best-paid employee 
(years)  6.5  6.8  4.8  7.2  4.1 
occupational level: share of best-paid 
employees with management position   48%  51%  26%  55%  24% 
  Source: EIM and ACE. 
Table 5  Summary statistics for the best-paid employee: variable counts (valid observa-
tions), by gender of entrepreneur and gender of best-paid employee 
Variable  All  By gender of entrepreneur 
By gender of  
best-paid employee 
    male  female  male  female 
age of the best-paid employee  326  279  47  254  72 
educational level: share of best-paid 
employees with high education   327  281  47  255  72 
tenure of the best-paid employee 
(years)  326  280  47  254  72 
occupational level: share of best-paid 
employees with management position   327  280  47  255  72 
  Source: EIM and ACE. 
It is interesting to notice that the characteristics of the best-paid employee are 
not only related to the gender of employee, but also to the gender of the entre-
preneur. To a considerable extent, this is because the gender of the entrepre-
neur and of the best-paid employee often coincide: for 78% of the firms in our 
sample, the entrepreneur and the best-paid employee are of the same gender 
(Table 6). In particular, the large majority of male entrepreneurs has a male 
best-paid employee, while for female entrepreneurs the gender of the best-paid 
employee is evenly distributed: 49% of the female entrepreneurs employ a fe-
male as best-paid employee; for male entrepreneurs, this is only 9%
1. 
 
1 Fisher’s exact test rejects the hypothesis that the gender of the entrepreneur and of the best-
paid employee are independent of each other at a significance level of 0.000.  
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Table 6  Gender of the entrepreneur and the best-paid employee 
Gender best-paid employee 
Gender entrepreneur  Male  Female  Total 
Male  231  49  280 
Female  24  23  47 
Total  255  72  327 
  Source: EIM and ACE. 
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4  Results 
In chapter two we formulated five different hypotheses. Our hypotheses involve 
three different dependent variables: the usage of performance-related pay for 
the best-paid employee in the firm, the usage of performance-related pay for the 
workforce in general and entrepreneurial income (as indicator for firm perform-
ance). The first four hypotheses will be tested separately for performance-
related pay for the best-paid employee and for the workforce in general, while 
the fifth hypothesis will be tested on the entrepreneurial income. In this chapter 
we present the results of our analyses for each of these three dependent vari-
ables. 
4.1  Performance-related pay for the best-paid employee 
To test hypotheses H1 to H4 for the case of the best-paid employee, we estimate 
two equations: 
−  Equation 1: an equation that relates the use of performance-related pay for 
the best-paid employee to firm characteristics, entrepreneurial characteristics 
(including a gender dummy) and characteristics of the best-paid employee 
(including a gender dummy). This will be estimated by a probit regression. 
The results will be used to test hypotheses H1 and H2; 
−  Equation 2: as equation 1, replacing the gender dummies for the entrepreneur 
and the best-paid employee with two dummies that indicate the enterprises 
that are assumed to be most likely (firms with a female entrepreneur and a 
male best-paid employee) and least likely (firms with a male entrepreneur and 
a female best paid employee) to apply performance-related pay for the best-
paid employee. This will be estimated by a probit regression. The results will 
be used to test hypotheses H3 and H4. 
 
Ideally, we would have liked to estimate these equations separately for manage-
rial and non-managerial employees. Our sample is, however, too small to limit 
our estimations to either subsample. As a second-best solution, we include a 
dummy for the occupational position of the best-paid employee in the equations 
(see e.g. Brown and Medoff, 2003). 
 
Equations 1 and 2 have been estimated with and without sector dummies. The 
results indicate that including sector dummies does not change any of the rele-
vant findings
1, while it reduces the available degrees of freedom considerably 
(the number of observations is limited). We therefore present the estimation re-
sults for these equations without sector dummies. These results are presented in 
Table 7. 
 
1 Estimating model 1 with sector dummies results in 1 significant sector dummy (retail) and re-
duces the significance of the employer characteristics somewhat; estimating model 2 with sector 
dummies results in 1 significant sector dummies (retail) and reduces the significance of the em-
ployer characteristics somewhat; otherwise, no differences occur.  
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Table 7  Probit regressions on the use of performance-related pay (profit-sharing or bo-
nus) for the best-paid employee. 




value  Sign. level 
Parameter 
value  Sign. level  
Firm characteristics         
firm size (ln)  0.067  0.320  0.087  0.184 
firm age (ln)  -0.23**  0.018  -0.22**  0.022 
Employer characteristics         
age (ln)  0.85*  0.077  0.83*  0.082 
experience (ln)  0.04  0.786  0.08  0.637 
phd degree (dummy)  0.58**  0.014  0.63***  0.008 
Female entrepreneur(dummy)  -0.15  0.545  -   
Characteristics best-paid employee         
age (ln)  -0.26  0.505  -0.23  0.555 
tenure (ln)  0.38***  0.001  0.37***  0.001 
Medium education (dummy)  0.24  0.386  0.22  0.43 
high education (dummy)  0.76***  0.009  0.73**  0.012 
Female employee (dummy)  -0.10  0.657  -   
Management position (dummy)  0.52  0.147  0.53  0.141 
Gender comparison employer/employee         
female entrepreneur, male employee 
(dummy) 
-    0.11  0.723 
male entrepreneur, female employee 
(dummy) 
-    0.08  0.728 
Constant  -3.44*  0.065  -3.65**  0.048 
         
Goodness of Fit Measures         
Pseudo R
2  0.1482    0.1471   
Log likelihood  -172.1    -172.3   
Valid Observations  307    307   
  *; **; *** Denote a significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
The results for both equations are very similar: the likelihood that a firm applies 
performance-related pay for its best-paid employee is higher for younger firms, 
for firms with elder and highly educated entrepreneurs, and for employees with 
high tenure and a high educational level. There is no indication that firm size is 
relevant. More important, there is also no indication of any gender effect: con-
cerning the remuneration of the best-paid employee, we find no support for hy-
potheses H1 to H4. Specifically, the results of equation 1 reject hypotheses H1 
and H2: neither the gender of the entrepreneur nor the gender of the best-paid 
employee are related to the probability that the best-paid employee receives 
performance-related pay. Likewise, the results of equation 2 reject hypotheses 
H3 and H4. This follows from the insignificance of the dummies indicating the  
  23 
firms that are most and least likely to apply performance-related pay for the 
best-paid employee. 
4.2  Performance-related pay for the workforce in general 
Regarding the workforce in general, we use a similar approach to test hypothe-
ses H1 to H4. Again, two equations are estimated: 
−  Equation 3: an equation that relates the use of performance-related pay for 
some or all of the employees to firm characteristics, entrepreneurial charac-
teristics (including a gender dummy) and characteristics of the workforce as a 
whole (including the share of male employees). This will be estimated by a 
probit regression. The results will be used to test hypotheses H1 and H2; 
−  Equation 4: as equation 3, replacing the entrepreneurial gender dummy and 
the share of male employees with two dummies that indicate the enterprises 
that are assumed to be most likely (firms with a female entrepreneur and a 
relatively high share of male employees) and least likely (firms with a male 
entrepreneur and a relatively high share of female employees) to apply per-
formance-related pay to the workforce in general. This will be estimated by a 
probit regression. The results will be used to test hypotheses H3 and H4. 
 
The estimation of equation 4 requires that we classify enterprises into three 
categories, based on the gender of the entrepreneur and whether the share of 
(fe)male employees is relatively high or low. The second criterion can be opera-
tionalised in different ways. A straightforward approach is to determine various 
percentiles of the distribution of the share of male employees, and consider the 
lowest/highest percentiles as those with relatively low/high shares of male em-
ployees. The question then remains, how many percentiles to distinguish. An in-
crease in the number of percentiles may increase the differences between the 
lowest and highest percentiles (thus increasing the likelihood of finding statisti-
cally significant differences), but also decreases the number of observations 
within the percentiles (thus decreasing the likelihood of finding statistically sig-
nificant differences). Since this is an explorative study, we have estimated equa-
tion 4 based on the outcomes of using two, three and four percentiles. In this 
paper, we report the outcomes with the highest significance levels for the vari-
ables of interest. 
 
As it turns out, distinguishing four percentiles provided the highest significance 
levels for the two dummy variables indicating enterprises that are most/least 
likely to apply performance-related pay. In this situation, a 'low share' of male 
employees refers to the 25% enterprises with the lowest shares of male employ-
ees (less than 37%), and a 'high share' refers to the 24% enterprises with the 
highest share of male employees (92.5% or more). Combined with the gender of 
the entrepreneur, this results in a group of 61 enterprises for which perform-
ance-related pay is least likely to occur (a male entrepreneur and a low share of 
male employees) and a group of only 6 enterprises for which performance-
related pay is most likely to occur (a female entrepreneur and a high share of 
male employees). 
 
The results are presented in Table 8, again without including sector dummies.  
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Table 8  Probit regressions on presence of performance-related pay for some or all em-
ployees in the workforce. 




value  Sign. level 
Parameter 
value  Sign. level 
Firm characteristics          
firm size (ln)  0.29***  0.068  0.31***  0.000 
firm age (ln)  -0.05  0.571  -0.04  0.623 
Employer characteristics         
age (ln)  0.82*  0.087  0.81*  0.092 
experience (ln)  -0.14  0.384  -0.10  0.503 
phd degree (dummy)  0.09  0.665  0.14  0.497 
Female entrepreneur (dummy)  -0.09  0.703  -   
Workforce characteristics         
share of highly educated employees  0.0089***  0.001  0.0087***  0.001 
share of elder employees  -0.0097**  0.019  -0.0085**  0.034 
share of male employees   0.005**  0.033  -   
Gender comparison employer/workforce         
female entrepreneur, low share female em-
ployees (dummy) 
-    1.02*  0.065 
male entrepreneur, high share female em-
ployees (dummy) 
-    -0.29  0.136 
constant  -3.78**  0.015  -3.9**  0.013 
         
Goodness of Fit Measures         
Pseudo R
2  0.1072    0.1102   
Log likelihood  -187.0    -186.3   
Valid Observations  321    321   
  *; **; *** denote a significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
The results for equations 3 and 4 are very similar: the likelihood that a firm ap-
plies performance-related pay for some (or all) of its employees is higher for lar-
ger firms, and for firms with a higher share of young and highly educated em-
ployees. Notice that these results are different from the results for equations 1 
and 2: instead of firm age, it is firm size that matters now, and employer charac-
teristics no longer seem to be very important. 
 
Equations 3 and 4 still find no support for hypotheses H2 and H4. The lack of 
support for hypothesis H2 contradicts the earlier findings by Roepers and De 
Kok, who found that female entrepreneurs are (ceteris paribus) more likely to 
provide performance-related pay than male entrepreneurs (Roepers and De Kok, 
2007, page 31). Their study, however, included less control variables. In particu-
lar, they did not control for the educational level of the entrepreneur and the age 
and education of the workforce. Once these control variables are included in the 
model, the significant effect of the gender of the entrepreneur disappears.  
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The positive parameter for the share of male employees in equation 3 supports 
hypothesis H1. In addition, the positive dummy variable that indicates firms with 
a female entrepreneur and a low share of female employees offers some support 
for hypothesis H3 (although it should be noted that this parameter is only signifi-
cant at 10%
1). This is consistent with the results by Roepers and De Kok, who 
found a significant positive effect of the interaction between the gender of the 
entrepreneur and the share of male employees (Roepers and De Kok, 2007, page 
31). 
4.3  Gender, performance-related pay and firm performance 
4.3.1 Controlling for workforce characteristics 
To test the final hypothesis, we estimate various equations with the log of the 
entrepreneurial income as dependent variable. 
−  Equation 5: the starting point is an equation that relates the (log of the) in-
come level of the entrepreneur to several firm characteristics, entrepreneurial 
characteristics and workforce characteristics; 
−  Equation 6: as equation 5, including a dummy variable indicating the use of 
performance-related pay for at least some employees; 
−  Equation 7: as equation 5, including a dummy variable indicating a consistent 
pay policy: this is either a combination of performance-related pay and a high 
share of male employees, or a combination of no performance-related pay and 
a high share of female employees. 
 
Estimating equation 7 requires that we identify firms with a consistent pay pol-
icy. This, in turn, requires that we identify firms with a relatively high share of 
(fe)male employees. We use the same method as discussed in the previous sec-
tion, which is based on the percentiles of the distribution of the share of male 
employees. As is the case with equation 4, we find the best results when we use 
four different percentiles. In this case, 93 firms in the sample have a consistent 
pay policy (66 firms with relatively few male employees without performance-
related pay and 27 firms with relatively many male employees with performance-
related pay). The estimation results are reported in Table 9. 
 
According to the results for equations 5, 6 and 7, entrepreneurial income in-
creases with firm size and with the educational level of the entrepreneur as well 
as the employees. Neither the gender of the entrepreneur nor the gender com-
position of the workforce are significantly related to entrepreneurial income. 
There is also no support for hypothesis H5: while the prevalence of performance-
related pay in general is associated with a higher entrepreneurial income (equa-
tion 6), our indicator for a consistent pay policy is not (equation 7). Apparently, 
the effect of performance-related pay on entrepreneurial income does not de-
 
1 In addition, if sector dummies are included, the significance of this parameter becomes less than 
10%.  
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pend on the gender composition of the workforce; at least not in the way that we 
hypothesised
1. 
Table 9  OLS Regression results on log entrepreneurial income (robust estimators) 













firm characteristics             
firm size (ln)  0.25***  0.000  0.24***  0.000  0.26***  0.000 
firm age (ln)  -0.008  0.875  0.022  0.664  -0.009  0.860 
employer characteristics             
age (ln)  0.43  0.261  0.32  0.417  0.54  0.167 
experience (ln)  0.12  0.337  0.15  0.249  0.08  0.505 
phd degree (dummy)  0.34**  0.014  0.31**  0.024  0.31**  0.027 
Female entrepreneur (dummy)  -0.31  0.214  -0.27  0.233  -0.22  0.313 
Workforce characteristics             
share of highly educated employees  0.006***  0.006  0.006***  0.008  0.006***  0.008 
share of elder employees  -0.003  0.360  -0.002  0.452  -0.003  0.380 
share of male employees   -0.000  0.858  -0.001  0.753  -0.003  0.380 
Performance-related pay for some or 
all employees 
-    0.29***  0.009  -   
consistent pay policy  -    -    -0.23  0.137 
Constant  1.38  0.231  1.54  0.192  1.11  0.345 
             
Goodness of Fit Measures             
R
2  0.37    0.41       
Valid Observations  128    128    128   
  *; **; *** denote a significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
4.3.2 Controlling for characteristics of the best-paid employee 
In the previous section, we examined to which extent characteristics of (per-
formance-related pay for) the workforce could explain entrepreneurial income. In 
this section, we focus on characteristics of (performance-related pay for) the 
best-paid employee. This is done by including characteristics of the best-paid 
employee in equations 5 to 7, and replacing the indicators for performance-
related pay for the workforce with comparable indicators for performance-related 
pay for the best-paid employee. This results in equations 8, 9 and 10 (see Table 
10). 
 
1 Hypothesis H5 implies that for firms with a high share of male employees, performance-related 
pay would have a positive effect on entrepreneurial income; for firms with a low share of male 
employees, performance-related pay would have a negative effect on entrepreneurial income.  
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In equation 10, the dummy variable indicating consistent pay policy refers to 11 
firms with a female best-paid employee that receives no performance-related 
pay, and 47 firms with a male best-paid employee that receives performance-
related pay. 
Table 10  Regression results on firm performance (log entrepreneurial income (OLS, ro-
bust estimators), including characteristics best-paid employee 













firm characteristics             
firm size (ln)  0.28***  0.000  0.27***  0.000  0.27***  0.000 
firm age (ln)  -0.02  0.734  -0.02  0.736  0.002  0.975 
employer characteristics             
age (ln)  0.054  0.903  0.03  0.944  0.056  0.895 
experience (ln)  0.24*  0.084  0.24*  0.094  0.20  0.113 
phd degree (dummy)  0.27*  0.052  0.22  0.147  0.29*  0.059 
Female entrepreneur (dummy)  -0.28  0.292  -0.29  0.246  -0.21  0.414 
Workforce characteristics             
share of highly educated employees  0.007***  0.002  0.006**  0.012  0.008***  0.001 
share of elder employees  -0.005  0.192  -0.004  0.274  -0.005  0.187 
share of male employees   0.002  0.318  0.002  0.378  0.000  0.908 
Characteristics best-paid employee             
Female employee (dummy)  0.30  0.166  0.29  0.185  -   
performance-related pay  -    0.15  0.268  -   
consistent pay policy  -    -    -0.13  0.267 
             
Constant  2.38*  0.083  2.44*  0.086     
             
Goodness of Fit Measures             
R
2  0.3769    0.3859       
Valid Observations  117    117    117   
  *; **; *** denote a significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
The results for equations 8, 9 and 10 are similar to the results for equations 5, 6 
and 7: entrepreneurial income increases with firm size and with the educational 
level of the entrepreneur as well as the employees (although the effect of the 
educational level of the entrepreneur is somewhat lower). None of the included 
gender variables have a significant effect (gender of the entrepreneur, gender 
composition of the workforce and gender of the best-paid employee). Also here, 
there is no support for hypothesis H5: our indicator for a consistent pay policy is 
not only not significant, but even has the wrong sign (equation 10). 
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5  Discussion and conclusions 
In this study we have derived five different hypotheses concerning the gender 
effects in performance-related pay amongst small and medium-sized effects. 
These hypotheses are based on two basic assumptions: the willingness of em-
ployers and employees to accept performance-related pay depends (amongst 
others) on their levels of risk aversion, and risk aversion is gender-related. The 
empirical support for our hypotheses is, however, very limited. In this chapter 
we discuss the estimation results and end with the main conclusions. 
5.1  Discussion 
Partial support for the first hypothesis… 
According to the first hypothesis, performance-related pay would be used less for 
female employees than for male employees. We find empirical support for this 
hypothesis, but only regarding the workforce in general: firms with a larger 
share of male employees are more likely to offer performance-related pay to 
their employees. 
 
When we analyse the remuneration of the best-paid employee, we find no rela-
tionship between the employee's gender and the probability that he or she re-
ceived a share of the profit or a bonus. One explanation for this lack of support 
is that the sample size is not large enough; our data set only contains 72 obser-
vations where the best-paid employee is female. 
 
…and no support for the second hypothesis… 
The second hypothesis states that female entrepreneurs are more likely to use 
performance-related pay than male entrepreneurs. There is no support for this 
hypothesis. The results presented by Roepers and De Kok (2007) seem to sup-
port this hypothesis, but additional analysis has shown that this support is the 
result of a missing variable bias: once additional control variables are added to 
the model by Roepers and De Kok (2007), the effect of the gender of the entre-
preneur is no longer significant. 
 
…so no support for the third and fourth hypothesis should be expected 
Hypotheses H3 and H4 are only valid if the first two hypotheses are. If one of the 
first two hypotheses would not be valid, then hypotheses H3 and H4 should also 
be rejected. At a 5% confidence level, this is indeed the case. The fact that we 
find no support for hypotheses H3 and H4 is thus consistent with the lack of sup-
port for the second hypothesis. 
 
No support for the fifth hypothesis regarding entrepreneurial income 
The results of the first four hypotheses are consistent with the standard assump-
tion that firms are risk neutral while individual employees are risk averse. If this 
is the case, we expected to find support for hypothesis H5: The income of the 
entrepreneur is higher when we observe pay policies consistent with efficient risk  
30   
sharing. We find, however, no support for this hypothesis. Also here, this could 
be due to the limited number of observations (128 or 117 valid observations). 
 
Do we need more data… 
One interpretation of the results of our study, is that the results are largely con-
sistent with the standard assumption that firms are risk neutral while individual 
employees are risk averse. The support is not strong, but this could be explained 
by the relatively limited number of observations. According to this interpretation, 
the main finding of our study is then that we find no support for the expected re-
lationship between the gender of the entrepreneur and the incidence of perform-
ance-related pay. The small size of our sample, however, does not allow for 
strong conclusions. 
 
…or do we need an alternative theory? 
Another interpretation of the results is also possible. The empirical support for 
our hypotheses is so limited, that we should reconsider the two basic assump-
tions that underlie our hypotheses. 
 
The first assumption is that the willingness of employers and employees to ac-
cept performance-related pay depends (amongst others) on their levels of risk 
aversion. This assumption ignores the difference between risk aversion and am-
biguity aversion (Borghans et al., 2009; Machina, 2009). Individuals often find 
themselves in situations where different outcomes may occur. The probabilities 
of these outcomes may either be known or unknown. Risk aversion refers to an 
individual's behaviour in case of know probabilities, while ambiguity aversion re-
fers to an individual's behaviour in case of unknown probabilities. Since the dis-
tribution of the expected performance of employees is not known in advance, the 
incidence of performance-related pay is likely to be related to the ambiguity 
aversion of the employer and employees, rather than their risk aversion. 
 
Borghans et al. (2009) found that risk aversion and ambiguity aversion are em-
pirically distinct individual traits. Regarding risk aversion, they find that women 
are more risk averse than men, and that psychological traits are strongly associ-
ated with risk aversion. Regarding ambiguity aversion, however, they find mark-
edly different results. Men and women show similar marginal valuations of ambi-
guity (with increasing levels of ambiguity), and ambiguity aversion is not related 
to psychological traits. If ambiguity diversion is indeed not gender-related, the 
second basic assumption of our study (risk aversion is gender-related) would not 
apply in the case of ambiguity aversion. 
 
According to this line of argument, differences in risk aversion between men and 
women cannot explain gender differences in the incidence of performance-related 
pay. An alternative explanation for gender differences in the incidence of per-
formance-related pay is that they are partly caused by gender differences in la-
bour force attachment. Various authors have argued that differences in labour 
force attachment between men and women could explain part of the gender 
earnings gap (Kunze, 2005; Nordman and Roubaud, 2005). According to Geddes 
and Heywood (2003), gender differences in labour force attachment may also 
explain differences in the incidence of performance-related pay: on average, 
women have a lower labour force attachment than men, which is in turn related 
to the probability of receiving performance-based pay.  
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5.2  Conclusions 
We have found partial support for the first hypothesis, which states that female 
employees are less likely to receive performance-related pay than male employ-
ees. There is also some support for the third hypothesis, which states that per-
formance-related pay is most likely to occur in firms with a female entrepreneur 
and a high share of male employees. This support is however weak: it is only 
significant at a 10% confidence level, and is furthermore based on the compari-
son of a sample of only 6 firms (with a female entrepreneur and a high share of 
male employees) with the other firms. For the other three hypotheses, there is 
no empirical support. 
 
One interpretation of the results is that they indicate that entrepreneurs are risk 
neutral while employees are risk averse (where female employees are more risk 
averse than male employees). Due to the small sample size, however, this inter-
pretation is only tentative. Additional empirical research on considerable larger 
dataset is required. Perhaps future studies can make use of administrative data 
(e.g. of payrolling companies that target SMEs). 
 
Another interpretation is that the lack of support for our hypotheses suggests 
that we need to reconsider them, including the basic assumptions on which they 
are based. In our study, we have used gender as a proxy for the risk aversion of 
individual entrepreneurs and employees, and assumed that risk aversion (of em-
ployers as well as employees) is in turn related to the incidence of performance-
related pay. However, it can be argued that this assumption is not correct: the 
incidence of performance-related pay may be related to ambiguity aversion 
rather than risk aversion. Gender may however also serve as a proxy for differ-
ences in labour force attachment. Differences in labour force attachment are 
likely to be only relevant for employers, not for employees, which seems consis-
tent with our lack of empirical support for the presence of an entrepreneurial 
gender effect. 
 
For a better understanding of gender effects in remuneration policies, future 
studies should further develop the relationships between performance-related 
pay, risk aversion and ambiguity aversion and labour force attachment, both 
theoretically and empirically. 
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Summary 
In theory, for many small and medium-sized enterprises the introduction of per-
formance-related pay might be beneficial: if implemented properly, it could help 
enterprises in selecting, hiring and motivating the right employees for the right 
jobs. So far, however, performance-related pay in SMEs has received little aca-
demic attention. One of the few studies on this topic is that by Roepers and De 
Kok (2007), who explore determinants of performance-related pay amongst 
SMEs. Amongst others, they found support for the presence of gender effects; 
not only regarding the gender of the employees, but also regarding the gender of 
the entrepreneur. 
 
In this paper we further investigate the gender effect in remuneration policies as 
found in Roepers and de Kok (2007). The central idea of this paper is that female 
and male entrepreneurs make different choices regarding their human resource 
management practices, including remuneration policies. These differences can be 
explained by differences in the risk aversion of male and female employees and 
entrepreneurs. Generally speaking, women are more risk averse than men. This 
suggests that men and women have a different valuation of the risks that are as-
sociated with performance-related pay. We hypothesise that these different 
valuations will result in differences in the incidence of performance-related pay. 
This leads to the following five hypotheses: 
 
−  H1: Performance-related pay is less used for female employees than for male 
employees. 
−  H2: Female entrepreneurs are more likely to use performance-related pay 
than male entrepreneurs. 
−  H3: Performance-related pay is most likely to occur in firms with a female en-
trepreneur and a high share of male employees. 
−  H4: Performance-related pay is least likely to occur in firms with a male en-
trepreneurs and a high share of female employees. 
−  H5: The income of the entrepreneur is higher when we observe pay policies 
consistent with efficient risk sharing. 
 
These hypotheses are tested by estimating various probit and OLS regressions, 
using the results of a telephonic questionnaire amongst 369 Dutch entrepreneurs 
with 1 - 100 employees. 
 
At a significance level of 5%, we find partial support for hypothesis H1, but not 
for any of the other hypotheses. One explanation for these findings is that they 
indicate that employees are indeed risk averse (and men more than women) but 
that employers are not; hypothesis H1 is valid but H2 is not. In this case, hy-
potheses H3 and H4 are no longer valid, so the lack of support for hypotheses H3 
and H4 is consistent with the lack of support for H2. The lack of support for the 
fifth hypothesis may be due to the limited size of our sample (approximately 120 
valid observations were available to test this hypothesis). 
 
Another interpretation is that the lack of support for our hypotheses suggests 
that we need to reconsider them, including the basic assumptions on which they 
are based. We use gender as a proxy for the risk aversion of individual employ-
ees, and assume that risk aversion (of employers as well as employees) is in 
turn related to the incidence of performance-related pay. However, it can be ar- 
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gued that this assumption is not correct: the incidence of performance-related 
pay may be related to ambiguity aversion rather than risk aversion. Gender may 
however also serve as a proxy for differences in labour force attachment. Differ-
ences in labour force attachment are likely to be only relevant for employers, not 
for employees, which seems consistent with our lack of empirical support for the 
presence of an entrepreneurial gender effect. 
 
For a better understanding of gender effects in remuneration policies, future 
studies should further develop the relationships between performance-related 
pay, risk aversion and ambiguity aversion and labour force attachment, both 
theoretically and empirically. 
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1  Introduction 
Strong debate on performance-related pay 
Until a few years ago, performance-related pay was becoming more and more 
accepted and used. This changed dramatically when Lehman Brothers went bank-
rupt in September 2008. In a reaction to the crisis that followed, many claimed 
that the practice of performance-related pay in especially the financial sector 
was one of the main causes for the current crisis. The debate on the advantages 
and disadvantages of performance-related pay (and how it should be designed) 
is still ongoing. 
 
This debate tends to focus on large enterprises, where variable payment can ac-
count for a large share of total payment. The situation in small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) tends to be ignored in this discussion. For various rea-
sons, this is not surprising. First of all, relatively little is known about payment 
systems in SMEs. In 2006, the Amsterdam Centre for Entrepreneurship (ACE) 
and EIM conducted a survey amongst 369 Dutch SMEs regarding their remunera-
tion system. This is still one of the few surveys on this subject that includes 
SMEs. Secondly, the variable share of total payment tends to be relatively small 
in SMEs. Amongst others, the EIM - ACE survey included questions on the pay-
ment practices of the best-paid employee within each enterprise. The results in-
dicate that, within the group of best-paid employees that received some form of 
performance-related pay, the variable share of their wage was on average 8% 
(De Kok et al., 2007). 
 
Previous research: determinants of performance-related pay in SMEs 
Van Praag et al. (2006) argue that many small and medium-sized enterprises 
might benefit from the introduction of performance-related pay: if implemented 
properly, it could help enterprises in selecting, hiring and motivating the right 
employees for the right jobs. So far, however, performance-related pay in SMEs 
has received little academic attention. One of the few studies on this topic is that 
by Roepers and De Kok (2007). Using the EIM - ACE survey, they explore deter-
minants of performance-related pay amongst SMEs. In particular, they examined 
whether the incidence of performance-related pay for employees is related to the 
size and ownership structure of the enterprise and to the gender of the entrepre-
neur and the employees. Their results indicate that each of these variables is in-
deed related to the incidence of performance-related pay: larger firms are more 
likely to provide performance-related pay than smaller firms, and firms with a 
single owner and family firms are less likely to provide performance-related pay 
than firms with multiple owners (that are not related to each other). They also 
found a gender effect. 
 
The gender effect that Roepers and De Kok (2007) found was, however, different 
from what they expected. They expected that both the gender of the entrepre-
neur and the gender composition of the workforce would affect the probability of 
performance-related pay, but that these two effects would be independent of 
each other. Instead, they found a close relationship between these two effects. 
For male entrepreneurs, they found that the use of performance-related pay is 
independent of the gender composition of the work force. For female entrepre- 
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neurs, however, they found that the usage of performance-related pay increases 
with the share of male employees. 
 
Objective of the study 
The role of the gender of the manager or (direct) supervisor on wages of subor-
dinates has been considered before (Cohen and Huffman, 2007; Hultin and 
Szulkin, 2003). Likewise, the relationship between employee gender and per-
formance-related pay has been studied before (Geddes and Heywood, 2003). 
However, as far as we know, the paper by Roepers and De Kok (2007) is the 
only paper that considers both the gender of the entrepreneur and the gender 
composition of the workforce. 
 
In this paper we further investigate the gender effect in remuneration policies as 
found in Roepers and de Kok (2007). The central idea of this paper is that female 
and male entrepreneurs make different choices regarding their human resource 
management practices, including remuneration policies (Mukhtar, 2002; Verheul 
et al, 2002). These differences can be explained by differences in the risk aver-
sion of male and female employees and entrepreneurs. We derive several hy-
potheses on how the interaction between the entrepreneurial gender and the 
gender composition of the workforce might affect the incidence of performance-
related pay. These hypotheses are then tested, using the same dataset as 
Roepers and de Kok (2007). 
 
Outline 
In the next chapter we present the theoretical framework for this study and dis-
cuss the hypotheses that we will test. In chapter three we describe the data that 
we use to test these hypotheses. The results are presented in chapter four. As 
we will see, most of our hypotheses cannot be confirmed. Generally speaking, 
the available data does not support our ideas on how differences in risk aversion 
result in gender differences in the incidence of performance-related pay. Chapter 
five therefore starts with a discussion of possible explanations for our lack of 
positive results. After this discussion the main conclusions of our study are pre-
sented. 
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2  Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
2.1  The general case for performance-related pay 
An employment contract is an example of a relationship between a principal and 
an agent, where the principal delegates work to the agent. In such principal-
agent relationships, two types of problems can occur, related to differences in 
goals and risk aversion between the agent and the principal. The first type of 
problem occurs when the principal and agent have different desires or goals and 
when it is difficult or expensive for the principal to monitor the agent's behav-
iour. This goal conflict introduces the risk of moral hazard: the risk that the 
agent may not provide the level of effort that was agreed upon. In this case, the 
agent is shirking. The second problem arises when the principal and the agent 
have different attitudes toward risk. The principal and the agent may prefer dif-
ferent actions while executing the work, because of their different risk prefer-
ences. (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 
These problems may be (partly) solved by using performance-related pay (for 
example, piece rate payment, commissions, bonuses or profit sharing) as a gov-
ernance mechanism. If designed properly, including performance-related pay as 
part of the contract between the principal and the agent may prevent opportun-
istic agent behaviour. This will occur if the preferences of agents and principals 
are realigned in such a way that the rewards for both depend on the same ac-
tions. In such cases, the conflicts of self interest between principal and agent are 
reduced (Eisenhardt, 1989) and the agent is motivated to provide the efforts de-
sired by the principal. In fact, one of the most important objectives of compen-
sation is to provide proper and effective motivation to employees (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1992). 
 
Performance pay and firm size 
In larger firms, shirking is less easy to detect. This increases the risk that shirk-
ing will actually occur (Chang, 2006). Larger firms therefore have more need for 
governance mechanisms to combat moral hazard and shirking. By using per-
formance-related pay, firms can reduce the risk of shirking, because this re-
moves (or reduces) the potential conflicts of self interest between employer and 
employees. The benefits of performance-related pay are therefore likely to in-
crease with firm size. At the same time, the costs (per employee) of developing 
and maintaining performance-related pay system are likely to decrease with firm 
size: Larger firms have a larger demand for human resources, and therefore a 
larger demand for specific HRM practices. This stimulates standardization and 
formalization of these practices. Most formalized HRM practices require consider-
able development costs. This results in a cost advantage for larger firms, which 
is strengthened by the limited supply of financial resources of many small firms 
(De Kok, Uhlaner and Thurik, 2006). 
 
These arguments suggest that the net benefits of performance-related pay will 
increase with firm size. This is consistent with the finding from previous research  
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that performance-related pay is more common amongst large firms than 
amongst SMEs (Van Praag et al., 2006). 
 
Performance pay and risk aversion 
The realignment of the agent's preferences with those of the principal often re-
quires that certain risks are transferred from the principal to the agent (Eisen-
hardt, 1989). This is also the case with performance-related pay, where the risk 
of under-performance is shared between the principal and the agent. The extent 
to which this actually takes place depends on the actual levels of risk aversion of 
the relevant principal and agents. In agency theory it is often assumed that firms 
are risk neutral (e.g. because firms are owned by different investors with well-
diversified portfolios) while individual employees are risk averse (Chang, 2006; 
Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). This creates a stimulus to provide a fixed wage to 
the risk-averse employees: by transferring most of the income risks of employ-
ees to the firm, the employees are better of while the firm is not affected. It is 
doubtful, however, whether this assumption also applies in the case of SMEs. For 
example, the idea that the firm is owned by different investors with well-
diversified portfolios does not apply to the majority of SMEs. Often, SMEs are 
single owned-managed enterprises. In these cases, the level of risk aversion of 
the firm is basically determined by the risk aversion of the entrepreneur. This, in 
turn, may be related to the entrepreneurs' gender. 
2.2  Gender differences in risk attitude: five hypotheses 
It is well established that the risk attitude of individuals is partly related to their 
gender (Bajtelsmit and Bernasek, 1996; Borghans et al., 2009; Dohmen and 
Falk, 2001). It is however difficult to identify the causes of this gender differ-
ence: it is generally only possible to observe the outcomes of decisions, and not 
the decision-making processes themselves. 
 
Borghans et al. (2009) use experiments to examine possible determinants of risk 
aversion. They find that risk aversion is partly determined by psychological traits 
such as the "big 5"
1. Gender differences in these traits explain only a small part 
of gender differences in risk aversion. In the context of financial decisions, risk 
aversion is also related to wealth: in an absolute sense (the amount of money 
invested in risky assets), risk aversion decreases with wealth (Bajtelsmit and 
Bernasek, 1996). Since women have lower wages than men (both in general and 
for comparable positions), this suggests an indirect gender effect on risk aver-
sion. 
 
If female employees are more risk averse then male employees, they require a 
higher risk premium to accept performance-related pay. When comparing a fixed 
wage offer with a performance-related pay offer with a certain risk premium, fe-
male employees will be more likely to prefer the fixed wage offer. This is con-
firmed by an empirical study by Dohmen and Falk (2001). They find that women 
are more risk averse than men, and that this difference in risk preference ex-
 
1 The big 5 represent the following five basic dimensions of personality: openness, conscientious-
ness, extraversion, agreeableness and neuroticism.  
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plains their attitude towards variable pay: 68% of the 119 male participants of 
their study prefer a variable pay, compared to 44% of the 121 women. 
If female employees require a higher risk premium to accept performance-
related pay, this reduces the expected benefits of performance-related pay for 
the entrepreneur. This, in turn, makes it less likely that performance-related pay 
will occur. Thus, we expect that the share of women in the workforce will have a 
negative effect on the probability that a firm will introduce performance-related 
pay. 
 
The causality may also run in the opposite direction. If performance-related pay 
is actually introduced, this may stimulate the outflow of female employees. This 
will occur if the new wage offer (including both a variable and fixed part) is not 
high enough to cover the demanded risk premium. In addition, the presence of 
performance-related pay can stimulate the inflow of male applicants. Thus, the 
presence of performance-related pay can have a negative effect on the share of 
women in the workforce. 
 
Irrespective of the direction of causality, these arguments suggest a negative 
correlation between the share of women in the workforce and the incidence of 
performance-related pay. This leads to our first hypothesis: 
 
H1: Performance-related pay is less used for female employees than 
for male employees 
 
The gender difference in risk aversion does not only apply to the population in 
general, but also to the population of entrepreneurs. Female entrepreneurs tend 
to be more risk averse than male entrepreneurs (ENSR 1996; Verheul and 
Thurik, 2001). This suggests that (ceteris paribus) female entrepreneurs are 
more likely to transfer some of the company risk onto their employees (Chang, 
2006). This can be done by using performance-related pay. This results in the 
second hypothesis of this study: 
 
H2: Female entrepreneurs are more likely to use performance-related 
pay than male entrepreneurs 
 
This hypothesis is supported by gender differences in management style. Verheul 
(2003) has studied the gender effect of management styles in small firms in the 
Netherlands, and found that female entrepreneurs are more likely to use formal 
HRM practices than male entrepreneurs. She distinguishes between commitment 
and control oriented management. The higher the degree to which procedures 
and regulation are formalized, the higher the degree of control over employees 
and the production process is. She finds that female-led firms have a more con-
trol-oriented type of HRM than male-led firms. This result implies that female en-
trepreneurs can be associated with a higher degree of formalization. This is con-
sistent with a higher usage of performance-related pay. 
 
In contrast, Verheul, Risseeuw and Bartelse (2002) suggest that female entre-
preneurs may be more inclined to use non-pecuniary rewards, such as flexibility 
of working hours, childcare facilities and verbal compliments, to motivate their 
employees. Their relatively high attention for non-pecuniary rewards would imply 
that female entrepreneurs would be less likely to use performance-related pay  
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than male entrepreneurs. However, they do not find significant support for the 
assumptions of less performance-related pay. Therefore the expectation remains 
that female entrepreneurs are more likely to use performance-related pay 
schemes. 
 
The first hypothesis is related to the gender composition of the workforce, while 
the second hypothesis is related to the gender of the entrepreneur. We assume 
that these two effects work independently of each other. In that case, the com-
bination of these hypotheses results in the following two additional hypotheses: 
H3: Performance-related pay is most likely to occur in firms with a 
female entrepreneur and a high share of male employees 
H4: Performance-related pay is least likely to occur in firms with a 
male entrepreneurs and a high share of female employees 
 
As we noted before, it is often assumed that firms are risk neutral while individ-
ual employees are risk averse. If this is the case, we should find empirical sup-
port for hypothesis H1 but not for H2 (and therefore also not for H3 and H4). In 
addition, we expect to find support for another hypothesis, concerning the effect 
of performance-related pay on firm profits. Whether or not the usage of per-
formance-related pay will have a positive effect on profits depends on many dif-
ferent factors. One of these factors is the risk premium that the entrepreneur 
has to offer to the employees, in order to make them accept the new system
1. 
This risk premium is higher for female employees than for male employees. 
Hence, if the share of male employees is relatively high, the expected costs of 
using performance-related pay will be relatively low, making it more likely that 
performance-related pay will be beneficial to the overall profits of the firm. Con-
versely, if the share of female employees is relatively high, profits are likely to 
be higher using fixed wages (wages not related to performance) rather than per-
formance-related pay. Formulated differently: we expect that pay policies that 
are consistent with efficient risk sharing vary with the gender composition of the 
workforce. If the share of female employees is low, efficient pay policies involve 
performance-related pay; if the share of female employees is high, efficient pay 
policies involve fixed wages only. 
 
Our final hypothesis is that firms with an efficient pay policy as defined above 
will generate higher profits than firms with an inefficient pay policy. With small 
firms, it is often difficult to differentiate between the entrepreneur's income and 
the profit of the enterprise. This is especially the case if the enterprise has the 
legal form of a sole proprietorship: in this case, the entrepreneur cannot receive 
a wage, so the entrepreneurial income is part of the generated profits. We there-
fore formulate this hypothesis in terms of entrepreneurial income rather than 
profit. This results in the following hypothesis: 
H5: The income of the entrepreneur is higher when we observe pay 
policies consistent with efficient risk sharing 
 
 
1 Often, the entrepreneur of an SME may have the authority to introduce and use a performance-
related pay system without employee approval. Nevertheless, if the entrepreneur wants to retain 
valuable employees and keep them motivated, it is important that the employees feel that they 
are compensated for the financial risk that comes with performance-related pay.  
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3  Research methodology 
3.1  Questionnaire and sampling framework 
The dataset that we use for this study has previously been used by De Kok et al. 
(2007) and Roepers and de Kok (2007). In this section we give a brief descrip-
tion of the questionnaire and the sampling framework. More details can be found 
in De Kok et al. (2007). 
3.1.1 Questionnaire 
The questionnaire was developed by De Kok et al. (2007) based on prior knowl-
edge, in-house expertise and existing questionnaires. The concept questionnaire 
was tested through several pilot interviews. This resulted in a few adjustments in 
the formulation of the survey questions. The final survey focuses on the remu-
neration of the entrepreneur and the best-paid employee. In addition, the ques-
tionnaire also contains questions regarding structural and personal characteris-
tics of the firm and its employees. 
3.1.2 Sample 
The data has been gathered through a telephone survey in June and July 2006. 
The sample is stratified by size (varying from one to 100 employees on the pay-
roll), sector and age, and consists of 369 Dutch SMEs. Table 1 shows the distri-
bution of the sample by size and age. The questions in the survey were answered 
by the independent entrepreneurs (in case of a single owned firm), the major 
business partner (in case of a partnership), or by the general director (in other 
legal structures). 
Table 1  Sampled firms, by reported firm size and firm age 
Age category* 
Number of employees 
0 - 3 years  4 - 9 years  >= 10 years  Total 
1  8  13  7  28 
2 - 9   18  42  69  129 
10 - 49   11  27  80  118 
50 - 99  15  16  63  94 
Total  52  98  219  369 
  * After imputing missing values for 28 observations. 
  Source: EIM and ACE. 
3.2  Dependent variables 
The first four hypotheses concern the usage of performance-related pay within 
small and medium-sized enterprises. Our data set allows us to use two different 
indicators of performance-related pay by employees: a specific indicator con-
cerning performance-related pay for the best-paid employee in the firm, and an 
indicator concerning the application of performance-related pay for employees in  
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general. The fifth hypothesis concerns the entrepreneurial income, for which we 
use a single measure. In this section we describe the three dependent variables 
that are used in our study. 
 
Use of performance-related pay for the best-paid employee 
The remuneration of employees can consist of various components. To determine 
the composition of the remuneration of the best-paid employee, we asked which 
of the following components were actually received by the best-paid employee 
during 2005: 
−  fixed wage; 
−  profit sharing; 
−  bonus; 
−  options (only in case of a limited liability company); 
−  company car, phone or computer. 
 
Since it is not clear if the usage of a company car, phone or computer is related 
to the performance of the employee, we do not include these remuneration com-
ponents in our measurement for performance-related pay for the best-paid em-
ployee. We also decided not to use information on the usage of options, since 
this was mentioned by only three respondents. The resulting indicator for per-
formance-related pay for the best-paid employee thus indicates whether the 
best-paid employee received a share of the profit or a bonus during 2005. This is 
the case for 32% of our observations. 
 
Use of performance-related pay for some or all employees 
The questionnaire includes a single question on performance-based pay for the 
workforce as a whole, asking whether or not the enterprise makes use of per-
formance-related pay for some or all of its employees. This is the case for 34% 
of our observations. 
 
There is a reasonable overlap with the indicator of performance-related pay for 
the best-paid employee, but it is not very strong. About a third of all enterprises 
that use performance-related pay for at least some employees indicate that their 
best-paid employee did not receive a share of the profits or a bonus. What is 
more problematic is that about a third of the enterprises that reported that their 
best-paid employee received a bonus or participated in profit sharing, answered 
'no' to the question whether at least some of their employees received any per-
formance-related pay. If both indicators would indicate the same type of pay-
ment systems, this would not be possible. Presumably, the difference in the 
wording of the questions resulted in a different interpretation by the respondent 
of the specific remuneration components that should be taken into consideration. 
 
Entrepreneurial income 
The annual income of an entrepreneur can also include various components, 
where the choice for specific components depends (amongst others) on fiscal 
legislation and the legal structure of the enterprise. For example, in the Nether-
lands entrepreneurs can only receive a wage if their enterprise is organised as a 
limited liability company, not in case of a sole proprietorship. 
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In the questionnaire, we asked whether the entrepreneur received any of the fol-
lowing income components (and, if so, the level of that component): 
−  fixed wage (including management fee in case of a limited liability company); 
−  profit sharing. In case of a sole proprietorship or partnership, we first asked if 
the respondent would indicate the profit level; we then asked which part of 
this profit was used for private means. In case of a limited liability company 
we directly asked for the amount of profit received by the respondent; 
−  bonus; 
−  shares (only in case of a limited liability company); 
−  options (only in case of a limited liability company). 
 
Of these income components, shares and options were the least common. This is 
partly due to the fact that these components can only occur in the case of a lim-
ited liability company. However, also within this subset of enterprises shares and 
options do not occur often: 27 respondents received shares as part of their in-
come, 7 respondents received options, and only 3 respondents could indicate the 
value of the received shares or options. We therefore decided to exclude shares 
and options from our definition of entrepreneurial income. Hence, we define en-
trepreneurial income as the sum of the received wage, profit sharing or bonuses 
for 2005. 
 
Information on the entrepreneurial income is available for 170 respondents. Of 
these respondents, 25 reported an income equal to zero, another three respon-
dents reported a total annual income of less than € 10 000,-. At the other end of 
the distribution, three entrepreneurs reported an annual income ranging from 
€ 400 000 to € 700 000. Summary statistics are reported in Table 2. These sta-
tistics show a large gender effect. This will be explored further in the next chap-
ter. 
Table 2  Summary statistics: entrepreneurial income by gender of the entrepreneur 
Variable  Mean  Standard deviation 
Number of valid 
observations 
Income level entrepreneur (x € 1.000):       
    male entrepreneurs  77.8  97.2  155 
    female entrepreneurs  32.8  50.2  15 
    all entrepreneurs  73.9  94.8  170 
  Source: EIM and ACE 
  Notes: 1) income is defined as the sum of wages, profit shares, bonuses or gratuities; 
2) "entrepreneur" refers to the respondent of the questionnaire. This is the CEO or general 
manager of the firm. 
3.3  Independent variables 
Characteristics of the firm 
Relevant firm characteristics include sector, firm size and firm age. Sector is rep-
resented by a standard classification into eight different sectors (manufacturing; 
construction; automotive; wholesale; retail; transport and communication; hotels  
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and restaurants; services) and firm size is represented by the number of em-
ployees of the firm. 
 
Regarding firm age, our dataset allows us to differentiate between the legal age 
and the economic age of the organisations. The legal age is the age of the cur-
rent legal form of the organisation. This is the age that is registered at e.g. the 
Chamber of Commerce. An organisation's economic age indicates how long the 
firm has been economically active. De Kok et al. (2007) show that the legal and 
economic age of firms often differ, in which case the economic age generally ex-
ceeds the legal age. A possible explanation for this might be that the legal struc-
ture of the organisation has changed over time. In this study we control for pos-
sible age effects by including the logarithm of the economic age
1. Not all firms 
provided information regarding their age. For 39 firms, missing values were im-
puted. 
 
Some studies report a strong correlation between firm size and firm age (e.g. 
Heyman, 2007). This could make it difficult to distinguish between size and age 
effects. To check whether this is also the case in our sample, we examined the 
correlation between economical age and number of employees. This correlation is 
0.07; if we exclude firms of 75 years or more, the correlation increases some-
what, but is still only 0.15. We therefore conclude that there is no risk that ef-
fects of firm size and firm age cannot be distinguished from each other. 
 
Characteristics of the entrepreneur 
Available information regarding the entrepreneur includes gender, age, educa-
tional level, tenure and experience. 
 
Women make up 15% of the entrepreneurs in our sample (54 out of 369 entre-
preneurs in total). This share is considerably lower than the share of female en-
trepreneurs in Dutch enterprises: 30% of all Dutch entrepreneurs is female
2. The 
relatively low share of female entrepreneurs in our sample may be due to the 
fact that female entrepreneurs tend to employ fewer employees and work fewer 
hours in their enterprise than male employees. Given that we only included firms 
with employees in our sample and that small firms are underrepresented as 
compared to medium-sized enterprises, this would result in a relative low share 
of female entrepreneurs in our sample. This explanation is consistent with the 
results of an exploratory probit regression, where we relate the gender of the 
entrepreneur to firm size and sector dummies. The results indicate a highly sig-
nificant (p<0.001) negative relationship between firm size and the likelihood that 
an entrepreneur is a woman. 
 
Characteristics of the workforce 
The nature of remuneration policies is often related to basic characteristics of the 
workforce such as gender, age and educational level. For this study we have in-
formation about the gender, age and educational decomposition of the work-
force. Summary statistics are included in Table 3. Notice that the gender of the 
 
1 The age variable included in Table 1 also refers to economic age. 
2 Source: ‘demografische aspecten van ondernemers’ (demographic aspects of entrepreneurs), a 
Dutch dataset available at www.entrepreneurship-sme.eu;   
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entrepreneur is related to the gender of the workforce: with male entrepreneurs, 
the majority of employees is male, while with female entrepreneurs the majority 
of employees is female. 
Table 3  Summary statistics: characteristics of the workforce 
Variable  Mean  Standard deviation 
Number of valid 
observations 
gender decomposition of the workforce  
(percentage male employees): 
     
    Within firms with male entrepreneurs  63.5%  31.6  289 
    Within firms with female entrepreneurs  42.3%  34.4  45 
Within all firms  60.6%  32.8  334 
age decomposition of the workforce:       
   share of employees <= 24  27.1%  27.4  336 
   share of employees 25 - 44  53.8%  27.3  336 
   share of elder employees >=45   19.2%  22.3  336 
educational decomposition of workforce:       
   share of low-educated employees  33.5%  34.3  329 
   share of medium-educated employees  45.1%  33.7  329 
   share of high-educated employees  21.4%  30.4  329 
  Source: EIM and ACE. 
Characteristics of the best-paid employee 
41 Respondents could not (or would not) identify the best-paid employee within 
their organisation. Consequently, these respondents could not provide any in-
formation on the remuneration of these employees. This leaves 328 observations 
which can be used to analyse the structure of the remuneration of the best-paid 
employee. 
 
Relevant characteristics of the best-paid employee include gender, age, educa-
tion, occupational level and tenure of the best-paid employee. Summary statis-
tics are presented in Table 4 (variable means) and Table 5 (valid observations).  
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Table 4  Summary statistics for the best-paid employee: variable means, by gender of 
entrepreneur and gender of best-paid employee 
Variable  All  By gender of entrepreneur 
By gender of  
best-paid employee 
    male  female  male  female 
age of the best-paid employee  39.2  39.8  35.3  39.8  36.9 
educational level: share of best-paid 
employees with high education   40%  41%  30%  41%  35% 
tenure of the best-paid employee 
(years)  6.5  6.8  4.8  7.2  4.1 
occupational level: share of best-paid 
employees with management position   48%  51%  26%  55%  24% 
  Source: EIM and ACE. 
Table 5  Summary statistics for the best-paid employee: variable counts (valid observa-
tions), by gender of entrepreneur and gender of best-paid employee 
Variable  All  By gender of entrepreneur 
By gender of  
best-paid employee 
    male  female  male  female 
age of the best-paid employee  326  279  47  254  72 
educational level: share of best-paid 
employees with high education   327  281  47  255  72 
tenure of the best-paid employee 
(years)  326  280  47  254  72 
occupational level: share of best-paid 
employees with management position   327  280  47  255  72 
  Source: EIM and ACE. 
It is interesting to notice that the characteristics of the best-paid employee are 
not only related to the gender of employee, but also to the gender of the entre-
preneur. To a considerable extent, this is because the gender of the entrepre-
neur and of the best-paid employee often coincide: for 78% of the firms in our 
sample, the entrepreneur and the best-paid employee are of the same gender 
(Table 6). In particular, the large majority of male entrepreneurs has a male 
best-paid employee, while for female entrepreneurs the gender of the best-paid 
employee is evenly distributed: 49% of the female entrepreneurs employ a fe-
male as best-paid employee; for male entrepreneurs, this is only 9%
1. 
 
1 Fisher’s exact test rejects the hypothesis that the gender of the entrepreneur and of the best-
paid employee are independent of each other at a significance level of 0.000.  
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Table 6  Gender of the entrepreneur and the best-paid employee 
Gender best-paid employee 
Gender entrepreneur  Male  Female  Total 
Male  231  49  280 
Female  24  23  47 
Total  255  72  327 
  Source: EIM and ACE. 
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4  Results 
In chapter two we formulated five different hypotheses. Our hypotheses involve 
three different dependent variables: the usage of performance-related pay for 
the best-paid employee in the firm, the usage of performance-related pay for the 
workforce in general and entrepreneurial income (as indicator for firm perform-
ance). The first four hypotheses will be tested separately for performance-
related pay for the best-paid employee and for the workforce in general, while 
the fifth hypothesis will be tested on the entrepreneurial income. In this chapter 
we present the results of our analyses for each of these three dependent vari-
ables. 
4.1  Performance-related pay for the best-paid employee 
To test hypotheses H1 to H4 for the case of the best-paid employee, we estimate 
two equations: 
−  Equation 1: an equation that relates the use of performance-related pay for 
the best-paid employee to firm characteristics, entrepreneurial characteristics 
(including a gender dummy) and characteristics of the best-paid employee 
(including a gender dummy). This will be estimated by a probit regression. 
The results will be used to test hypotheses H1 and H2; 
−  Equation 2: as equation 1, replacing the gender dummies for the entrepreneur 
and the best-paid employee with two dummies that indicate the enterprises 
that are assumed to be most likely (firms with a female entrepreneur and a 
male best-paid employee) and least likely (firms with a male entrepreneur and 
a female best paid employee) to apply performance-related pay for the best-
paid employee. This will be estimated by a probit regression. The results will 
be used to test hypotheses H3 and H4. 
 
Ideally, we would have liked to estimate these equations separately for manage-
rial and non-managerial employees. Our sample is, however, too small to limit 
our estimations to either subsample. As a second-best solution, we include a 
dummy for the occupational position of the best-paid employee in the equations 
(see e.g. Brown and Medoff, 2003). 
 
Equations 1 and 2 have been estimated with and without sector dummies. The 
results indicate that including sector dummies does not change any of the rele-
vant findings
1, while it reduces the available degrees of freedom considerably 
(the number of observations is limited). We therefore present the estimation re-
sults for these equations without sector dummies. These results are presented in 
Table 7. 
 
1 Estimating model 1 with sector dummies results in 1 significant sector dummy (retail) and re-
duces the significance of the employer characteristics somewhat; estimating model 2 with sector 
dummies results in 1 significant sector dummies (retail) and reduces the significance of the em-
ployer characteristics somewhat; otherwise, no differences occur.  
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Table 7  Probit regressions on the use of performance-related pay (profit-sharing or bo-
nus) for the best-paid employee. 




value  Sign. level 
Parameter 
value  Sign. level  
Firm characteristics         
firm size (ln)  0.067  0.320  0.087  0.184 
firm age (ln)  -0.23**  0.018  -0.22**  0.022 
Employer characteristics         
age (ln)  0.85*  0.077  0.83*  0.082 
experience (ln)  0.04  0.786  0.08  0.637 
phd degree (dummy)  0.58**  0.014  0.63***  0.008 
Female entrepreneur(dummy)  -0.15  0.545  -   
Characteristics best-paid employee         
age (ln)  -0.26  0.505  -0.23  0.555 
tenure (ln)  0.38***  0.001  0.37***  0.001 
Medium education (dummy)  0.24  0.386  0.22  0.43 
high education (dummy)  0.76***  0.009  0.73**  0.012 
Female employee (dummy)  -0.10  0.657  -   
Management position (dummy)  0.52  0.147  0.53  0.141 
Gender comparison employer/employee         
female entrepreneur, male employee 
(dummy) 
-    0.11  0.723 
male entrepreneur, female employee 
(dummy) 
-    0.08  0.728 
Constant  -3.44*  0.065  -3.65**  0.048 
         
Goodness of Fit Measures         
Pseudo R
2  0.1482    0.1471   
Log likelihood  -172.1    -172.3   
Valid Observations  307    307   
  *; **; *** Denote a significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
The results for both equations are very similar: the likelihood that a firm applies 
performance-related pay for its best-paid employee is higher for younger firms, 
for firms with elder and highly educated entrepreneurs, and for employees with 
high tenure and a high educational level. There is no indication that firm size is 
relevant. More important, there is also no indication of any gender effect: con-
cerning the remuneration of the best-paid employee, we find no support for hy-
potheses H1 to H4. Specifically, the results of equation 1 reject hypotheses H1 
and H2: neither the gender of the entrepreneur nor the gender of the best-paid 
employee are related to the probability that the best-paid employee receives 
performance-related pay. Likewise, the results of equation 2 reject hypotheses 
H3 and H4. This follows from the insignificance of the dummies indicating the  
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firms that are most and least likely to apply performance-related pay for the 
best-paid employee. 
4.2  Performance-related pay for the workforce in general 
Regarding the workforce in general, we use a similar approach to test hypothe-
ses H1 to H4. Again, two equations are estimated: 
−  Equation 3: an equation that relates the use of performance-related pay for 
some or all of the employees to firm characteristics, entrepreneurial charac-
teristics (including a gender dummy) and characteristics of the workforce as a 
whole (including the share of male employees). This will be estimated by a 
probit regression. The results will be used to test hypotheses H1 and H2; 
−  Equation 4: as equation 3, replacing the entrepreneurial gender dummy and 
the share of male employees with two dummies that indicate the enterprises 
that are assumed to be most likely (firms with a female entrepreneur and a 
relatively high share of male employees) and least likely (firms with a male 
entrepreneur and a relatively high share of female employees) to apply per-
formance-related pay to the workforce in general. This will be estimated by a 
probit regression. The results will be used to test hypotheses H3 and H4. 
 
The estimation of equation 4 requires that we classify enterprises into three 
categories, based on the gender of the entrepreneur and whether the share of 
(fe)male employees is relatively high or low. The second criterion can be opera-
tionalised in different ways. A straightforward approach is to determine various 
percentiles of the distribution of the share of male employees, and consider the 
lowest/highest percentiles as those with relatively low/high shares of male em-
ployees. The question then remains, how many percentiles to distinguish. An in-
crease in the number of percentiles may increase the differences between the 
lowest and highest percentiles (thus increasing the likelihood of finding statisti-
cally significant differences), but also decreases the number of observations 
within the percentiles (thus decreasing the likelihood of finding statistically sig-
nificant differences). Since this is an explorative study, we have estimated equa-
tion 4 based on the outcomes of using two, three and four percentiles. In this 
paper, we report the outcomes with the highest significance levels for the vari-
ables of interest. 
 
As it turns out, distinguishing four percentiles provided the highest significance 
levels for the two dummy variables indicating enterprises that are most/least 
likely to apply performance-related pay. In this situation, a 'low share' of male 
employees refers to the 25% enterprises with the lowest shares of male employ-
ees (less than 37%), and a 'high share' refers to the 24% enterprises with the 
highest share of male employees (92.5% or more). Combined with the gender of 
the entrepreneur, this results in a group of 61 enterprises for which perform-
ance-related pay is least likely to occur (a male entrepreneur and a low share of 
male employees) and a group of only 6 enterprises for which performance-
related pay is most likely to occur (a female entrepreneur and a high share of 
male employees). 
 
The results are presented in Table 8, again without including sector dummies.  
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Table 8  Probit regressions on presence of performance-related pay for some or all em-
ployees in the workforce. 




value  Sign. level 
Parameter 
value  Sign. level 
Firm characteristics          
firm size (ln)  0.29***  0.068  0.31***  0.000 
firm age (ln)  -0.05  0.571  -0.04  0.623 
Employer characteristics         
age (ln)  0.82*  0.087  0.81*  0.092 
experience (ln)  -0.14  0.384  -0.10  0.503 
phd degree (dummy)  0.09  0.665  0.14  0.497 
Female entrepreneur (dummy)  -0.09  0.703  -   
Workforce characteristics         
share of highly educated employees  0.0089***  0.001  0.0087***  0.001 
share of elder employees  -0.0097**  0.019  -0.0085**  0.034 
share of male employees   0.005**  0.033  -   
Gender comparison employer/workforce         
female entrepreneur, low share female em-
ployees (dummy) 
-    1.02*  0.065 
male entrepreneur, high share female em-
ployees (dummy) 
-    -0.29  0.136 
constant  -3.78**  0.015  -3.9**  0.013 
         
Goodness of Fit Measures         
Pseudo R
2  0.1072    0.1102   
Log likelihood  -187.0    -186.3   
Valid Observations  321    321   
  *; **; *** denote a significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
The results for equations 3 and 4 are very similar: the likelihood that a firm ap-
plies performance-related pay for some (or all) of its employees is higher for lar-
ger firms, and for firms with a higher share of young and highly educated em-
ployees. Notice that these results are different from the results for equations 1 
and 2: instead of firm age, it is firm size that matters now, and employer charac-
teristics no longer seem to be very important. 
 
Equations 3 and 4 still find no support for hypotheses H2 and H4. The lack of 
support for hypothesis H2 contradicts the earlier findings by Roepers and De 
Kok, who found that female entrepreneurs are (ceteris paribus) more likely to 
provide performance-related pay than male entrepreneurs (Roepers and De Kok, 
2007, page 31). Their study, however, included less control variables. In particu-
lar, they did not control for the educational level of the entrepreneur and the age 
and education of the workforce. Once these control variables are included in the 
model, the significant effect of the gender of the entrepreneur disappears.  
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The positive parameter for the share of male employees in equation 3 supports 
hypothesis H1. In addition, the positive dummy variable that indicates firms with 
a female entrepreneur and a low share of female employees offers some support 
for hypothesis H3 (although it should be noted that this parameter is only signifi-
cant at 10%
1). This is consistent with the results by Roepers and De Kok, who 
found a significant positive effect of the interaction between the gender of the 
entrepreneur and the share of male employees (Roepers and De Kok, 2007, page 
31). 
4.3  Gender, performance-related pay and firm performance 
4.3.1 Controlling for workforce characteristics 
To test the final hypothesis, we estimate various equations with the log of the 
entrepreneurial income as dependent variable. 
−  Equation 5: the starting point is an equation that relates the (log of the) in-
come level of the entrepreneur to several firm characteristics, entrepreneurial 
characteristics and workforce characteristics; 
−  Equation 6: as equation 5, including a dummy variable indicating the use of 
performance-related pay for at least some employees; 
−  Equation 7: as equation 5, including a dummy variable indicating a consistent 
pay policy: this is either a combination of performance-related pay and a high 
share of male employees, or a combination of no performance-related pay and 
a high share of female employees. 
 
Estimating equation 7 requires that we identify firms with a consistent pay pol-
icy. This, in turn, requires that we identify firms with a relatively high share of 
(fe)male employees. We use the same method as discussed in the previous sec-
tion, which is based on the percentiles of the distribution of the share of male 
employees. As is the case with equation 4, we find the best results when we use 
four different percentiles. In this case, 93 firms in the sample have a consistent 
pay policy (66 firms with relatively few male employees without performance-
related pay and 27 firms with relatively many male employees with performance-
related pay). The estimation results are reported in Table 9. 
 
According to the results for equations 5, 6 and 7, entrepreneurial income in-
creases with firm size and with the educational level of the entrepreneur as well 
as the employees. Neither the gender of the entrepreneur nor the gender com-
position of the workforce are significantly related to entrepreneurial income. 
There is also no support for hypothesis H5: while the prevalence of performance-
related pay in general is associated with a higher entrepreneurial income (equa-
tion 6), our indicator for a consistent pay policy is not (equation 7). Apparently, 
the effect of performance-related pay on entrepreneurial income does not de-
 
1 In addition, if sector dummies are included, the significance of this parameter becomes less than 
10%.  
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pend on the gender composition of the workforce; at least not in the way that we 
hypothesised
1. 
Table 9  OLS Regression results on log entrepreneurial income (robust estimators) 













firm characteristics             
firm size (ln)  0.25***  0.000  0.24***  0.000  0.26***  0.000 
firm age (ln)  -0.008  0.875  0.022  0.664  -0.009  0.860 
employer characteristics             
age (ln)  0.43  0.261  0.32  0.417  0.54  0.167 
experience (ln)  0.12  0.337  0.15  0.249  0.08  0.505 
phd degree (dummy)  0.34**  0.014  0.31**  0.024  0.31**  0.027 
Female entrepreneur (dummy)  -0.31  0.214  -0.27  0.233  -0.22  0.313 
Workforce characteristics             
share of highly educated employees  0.006***  0.006  0.006***  0.008  0.006***  0.008 
share of elder employees  -0.003  0.360  -0.002  0.452  -0.003  0.380 
share of male employees   -0.000  0.858  -0.001  0.753  -0.003  0.380 
Performance-related pay for some or 
all employees 
-    0.29***  0.009  -   
consistent pay policy  -    -    -0.23  0.137 
Constant  1.38  0.231  1.54  0.192  1.11  0.345 
             
Goodness of Fit Measures             
R
2  0.37    0.41       
Valid Observations  128    128    128   
  *; **; *** denote a significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
4.3.2 Controlling for characteristics of the best-paid employee 
In the previous section, we examined to which extent characteristics of (per-
formance-related pay for) the workforce could explain entrepreneurial income. In 
this section, we focus on characteristics of (performance-related pay for) the 
best-paid employee. This is done by including characteristics of the best-paid 
employee in equations 5 to 7, and replacing the indicators for performance-
related pay for the workforce with comparable indicators for performance-related 
pay for the best-paid employee. This results in equations 8, 9 and 10 (see Table 
10). 
 
1 Hypothesis H5 implies that for firms with a high share of male employees, performance-related 
pay would have a positive effect on entrepreneurial income; for firms with a low share of male 
employees, performance-related pay would have a negative effect on entrepreneurial income.  
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In equation 10, the dummy variable indicating consistent pay policy refers to 11 
firms with a female best-paid employee that receives no performance-related 
pay, and 47 firms with a male best-paid employee that receives performance-
related pay. 
Table 10  Regression results on firm performance (log entrepreneurial income (OLS, ro-
bust estimators), including characteristics best-paid employee 













firm characteristics             
firm size (ln)  0.28***  0.000  0.27***  0.000  0.27***  0.000 
firm age (ln)  -0.02  0.734  -0.02  0.736  0.002  0.975 
employer characteristics             
age (ln)  0.054  0.903  0.03  0.944  0.056  0.895 
experience (ln)  0.24*  0.084  0.24*  0.094  0.20  0.113 
phd degree (dummy)  0.27*  0.052  0.22  0.147  0.29*  0.059 
Female entrepreneur (dummy)  -0.28  0.292  -0.29  0.246  -0.21  0.414 
Workforce characteristics             
share of highly educated employees  0.007***  0.002  0.006**  0.012  0.008***  0.001 
share of elder employees  -0.005  0.192  -0.004  0.274  -0.005  0.187 
share of male employees   0.002  0.318  0.002  0.378  0.000  0.908 
Characteristics best-paid employee             
Female employee (dummy)  0.30  0.166  0.29  0.185  -   
performance-related pay  -    0.15  0.268  -   
consistent pay policy  -    -    -0.13  0.267 
             
Constant  2.38*  0.083  2.44*  0.086     
             
Goodness of Fit Measures             
R
2  0.3769    0.3859       
Valid Observations  117    117    117   
  *; **; *** denote a significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
The results for equations 8, 9 and 10 are similar to the results for equations 5, 6 
and 7: entrepreneurial income increases with firm size and with the educational 
level of the entrepreneur as well as the employees (although the effect of the 
educational level of the entrepreneur is somewhat lower). None of the included 
gender variables have a significant effect (gender of the entrepreneur, gender 
composition of the workforce and gender of the best-paid employee). Also here, 
there is no support for hypothesis H5: our indicator for a consistent pay policy is 
not only not significant, but even has the wrong sign (equation 10). 
  
  29 
5  Discussion and conclusions 
In this study we have derived five different hypotheses concerning the gender 
effects in performance-related pay amongst small and medium-sized effects. 
These hypotheses are based on two basic assumptions: the willingness of em-
ployers and employees to accept performance-related pay depends (amongst 
others) on their levels of risk aversion, and risk aversion is gender-related. The 
empirical support for our hypotheses is, however, very limited. In this chapter 
we discuss the estimation results and end with the main conclusions. 
5.1  Discussion 
Partial support for the first hypothesis… 
According to the first hypothesis, performance-related pay would be used less for 
female employees than for male employees. We find empirical support for this 
hypothesis, but only regarding the workforce in general: firms with a larger 
share of male employees are more likely to offer performance-related pay to 
their employees. 
 
When we analyse the remuneration of the best-paid employee, we find no rela-
tionship between the employee's gender and the probability that he or she re-
ceived a share of the profit or a bonus. One explanation for this lack of support 
is that the sample size is not large enough; our data set only contains 72 obser-
vations where the best-paid employee is female. 
 
…and no support for the second hypothesis… 
The second hypothesis states that female entrepreneurs are more likely to use 
performance-related pay than male entrepreneurs. There is no support for this 
hypothesis. The results presented by Roepers and De Kok (2007) seem to sup-
port this hypothesis, but additional analysis has shown that this support is the 
result of a missing variable bias: once additional control variables are added to 
the model by Roepers and De Kok (2007), the effect of the gender of the entre-
preneur is no longer significant. 
 
…so no support for the third and fourth hypothesis should be expected 
Hypotheses H3 and H4 are only valid if the first two hypotheses are. If one of the 
first two hypotheses would not be valid, then hypotheses H3 and H4 should also 
be rejected. At a 5% confidence level, this is indeed the case. The fact that we 
find no support for hypotheses H3 and H4 is thus consistent with the lack of sup-
port for the second hypothesis. 
 
No support for the fifth hypothesis regarding entrepreneurial income 
The results of the first four hypotheses are consistent with the standard assump-
tion that firms are risk neutral while individual employees are risk averse. If this 
is the case, we expected to find support for hypothesis H5: The income of the 
entrepreneur is higher when we observe pay policies consistent with efficient risk  
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sharing. We find, however, no support for this hypothesis. Also here, this could 
be due to the limited number of observations (128 or 117 valid observations). 
 
Do we need more data… 
One interpretation of the results of our study, is that the results are largely con-
sistent with the standard assumption that firms are risk neutral while individual 
employees are risk averse. The support is not strong, but this could be explained 
by the relatively limited number of observations. According to this interpretation, 
the main finding of our study is then that we find no support for the expected re-
lationship between the gender of the entrepreneur and the incidence of perform-
ance-related pay. The small size of our sample, however, does not allow for 
strong conclusions. 
 
…or do we need an alternative theory? 
Another interpretation of the results is also possible. The empirical support for 
our hypotheses is so limited, that we should reconsider the two basic assump-
tions that underlie our hypotheses. 
 
The first assumption is that the willingness of employers and employees to ac-
cept performance-related pay depends (amongst others) on their levels of risk 
aversion. This assumption ignores the difference between risk aversion and am-
biguity aversion (Borghans et al., 2009; Machina, 2009). Individuals often find 
themselves in situations where different outcomes may occur. The probabilities 
of these outcomes may either be known or unknown. Risk aversion refers to an 
individual's behaviour in case of know probabilities, while ambiguity aversion re-
fers to an individual's behaviour in case of unknown probabilities. Since the dis-
tribution of the expected performance of employees is not known in advance, the 
incidence of performance-related pay is likely to be related to the ambiguity 
aversion of the employer and employees, rather than their risk aversion. 
 
Borghans et al. (2009) found that risk aversion and ambiguity aversion are em-
pirically distinct individual traits. Regarding risk aversion, they find that women 
are more risk averse than men, and that psychological traits are strongly associ-
ated with risk aversion. Regarding ambiguity aversion, however, they find mark-
edly different results. Men and women show similar marginal valuations of ambi-
guity (with increasing levels of ambiguity), and ambiguity aversion is not related 
to psychological traits. If ambiguity diversion is indeed not gender-related, the 
second basic assumption of our study (risk aversion is gender-related) would not 
apply in the case of ambiguity aversion. 
 
According to this line of argument, differences in risk aversion between men and 
women cannot explain gender differences in the incidence of performance-related 
pay. An alternative explanation for gender differences in the incidence of per-
formance-related pay is that they are partly caused by gender differences in la-
bour force attachment. Various authors have argued that differences in labour 
force attachment between men and women could explain part of the gender 
earnings gap (Kunze, 2005; Nordman and Roubaud, 2005). According to Geddes 
and Heywood (2003), gender differences in labour force attachment may also 
explain differences in the incidence of performance-related pay: on average, 
women have a lower labour force attachment than men, which is in turn related 
to the probability of receiving performance-based pay.  
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5.2  Conclusions 
We have found partial support for the first hypothesis, which states that female 
employees are less likely to receive performance-related pay than male employ-
ees. There is also some support for the third hypothesis, which states that per-
formance-related pay is most likely to occur in firms with a female entrepreneur 
and a high share of male employees. This support is however weak: it is only 
significant at a 10% confidence level, and is furthermore based on the compari-
son of a sample of only 6 firms (with a female entrepreneur and a high share of 
male employees) with the other firms. For the other three hypotheses, there is 
no empirical support. 
 
One interpretation of the results is that they indicate that entrepreneurs are risk 
neutral while employees are risk averse (where female employees are more risk 
averse than male employees). Due to the small sample size, however, this inter-
pretation is only tentative. Additional empirical research on considerable larger 
dataset is required. Perhaps future studies can make use of administrative data 
(e.g. of payrolling companies that target SMEs). 
 
Another interpretation is that the lack of support for our hypotheses suggests 
that we need to reconsider them, including the basic assumptions on which they 
are based. In our study, we have used gender as a proxy for the risk aversion of 
individual entrepreneurs and employees, and assumed that risk aversion (of em-
ployers as well as employees) is in turn related to the incidence of performance-
related pay. However, it can be argued that this assumption is not correct: the 
incidence of performance-related pay may be related to ambiguity aversion 
rather than risk aversion. Gender may however also serve as a proxy for differ-
ences in labour force attachment. Differences in labour force attachment are 
likely to be only relevant for employers, not for employees, which seems consis-
tent with our lack of empirical support for the presence of an entrepreneurial 
gender effect. 
 
For a better understanding of gender effects in remuneration policies, future 
studies should further develop the relationships between performance-related 
pay, risk aversion and ambiguity aversion and labour force attachment, both 
theoretically and empirically. 
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Summary 
In theory, for many small and medium-sized enterprises the introduction of per-
formance-related pay might be beneficial: if implemented properly, it could help 
enterprises in selecting, hiring and motivating the right employees for the right 
jobs. So far, however, performance-related pay in SMEs has received little aca-
demic attention. One of the few studies on this topic is that by Roepers and De 
Kok (2007), who explore determinants of performance-related pay amongst 
SMEs. Amongst others, they found support for the presence of gender effects; 
not only regarding the gender of the employees, but also regarding the gender of 
the entrepreneur. 
 
In this paper we further investigate the gender effect in remuneration policies as 
found in Roepers and de Kok (2007). The central idea of this paper is that female 
and male entrepreneurs make different choices regarding their human resource 
management practices, including remuneration policies. These differences can be 
explained by differences in the risk aversion of male and female employees and 
entrepreneurs. Generally speaking, women are more risk averse than men. This 
suggests that men and women have a different valuation of the risks that are as-
sociated with performance-related pay. We hypothesise that these different 
valuations will result in differences in the incidence of performance-related pay. 
This leads to the following five hypotheses: 
 
−  H1: Performance-related pay is less used for female employees than for male 
employees. 
−  H2: Female entrepreneurs are more likely to use performance-related pay 
than male entrepreneurs. 
−  H3: Performance-related pay is most likely to occur in firms with a female en-
trepreneur and a high share of male employees. 
−  H4: Performance-related pay is least likely to occur in firms with a male en-
trepreneurs and a high share of female employees. 
−  H5: The income of the entrepreneur is higher when we observe pay policies 
consistent with efficient risk sharing. 
 
These hypotheses are tested by estimating various probit and OLS regressions, 
using the results of a telephonic questionnaire amongst 369 Dutch entrepreneurs 
with 1 - 100 employees. 
 
At a significance level of 5%, we find partial support for hypothesis H1, but not 
for any of the other hypotheses. One explanation for these findings is that they 
indicate that employees are indeed risk averse (and men more than women) but 
that employers are not; hypothesis H1 is valid but H2 is not. In this case, hy-
potheses H3 and H4 are no longer valid, so the lack of support for hypotheses H3 
and H4 is consistent with the lack of support for H2. The lack of support for the 
fifth hypothesis may be due to the limited size of our sample (approximately 120 
valid observations were available to test this hypothesis). 
 
Another interpretation is that the lack of support for our hypotheses suggests 
that we need to reconsider them, including the basic assumptions on which they 
are based. We use gender as a proxy for the risk aversion of individual employ-
ees, and assume that risk aversion (of employers as well as employees) is in 
turn related to the incidence of performance-related pay. However, it can be ar- 
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gued that this assumption is not correct: the incidence of performance-related 
pay may be related to ambiguity aversion rather than risk aversion. Gender may 
however also serve as a proxy for differences in labour force attachment. Differ-
ences in labour force attachment are likely to be only relevant for employers, not 
for employees, which seems consistent with our lack of empirical support for the 
presence of an entrepreneurial gender effect. 
 
For a better understanding of gender effects in remuneration policies, future 
studies should further develop the relationships between performance-related 
pay, risk aversion and ambiguity aversion and labour force attachment, both 
theoretically and empirically. 
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1  Introduction 
Strong debate on performance-related pay 
Until a few years ago, performance-related pay was becoming more and more 
accepted and used. This changed dramatically when Lehman Brothers went bank-
rupt in September 2008. In a reaction to the crisis that followed, many claimed 
that the practice of performance-related pay in especially the financial sector 
was one of the main causes for the current crisis. The debate on the advantages 
and disadvantages of performance-related pay (and how it should be designed) 
is still ongoing. 
 
This debate tends to focus on large enterprises, where variable payment can ac-
count for a large share of total payment. The situation in small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) tends to be ignored in this discussion. For various rea-
sons, this is not surprising. First of all, relatively little is known about payment 
systems in SMEs. In 2006, the Amsterdam Centre for Entrepreneurship (ACE) 
and EIM conducted a survey amongst 369 Dutch SMEs regarding their remunera-
tion system. This is still one of the few surveys on this subject that includes 
SMEs. Secondly, the variable share of total payment tends to be relatively small 
in SMEs. Amongst others, the EIM - ACE survey included questions on the pay-
ment practices of the best-paid employee within each enterprise. The results in-
dicate that, within the group of best-paid employees that received some form of 
performance-related pay, the variable share of their wage was on average 8% 
(De Kok et al., 2007). 
 
Previous research: determinants of performance-related pay in SMEs 
Van Praag et al. (2006) argue that many small and medium-sized enterprises 
might benefit from the introduction of performance-related pay: if implemented 
properly, it could help enterprises in selecting, hiring and motivating the right 
employees for the right jobs. So far, however, performance-related pay in SMEs 
has received little academic attention. One of the few studies on this topic is that 
by Roepers and De Kok (2007). Using the EIM - ACE survey, they explore deter-
minants of performance-related pay amongst SMEs. In particular, they examined 
whether the incidence of performance-related pay for employees is related to the 
size and ownership structure of the enterprise and to the gender of the entrepre-
neur and the employees. Their results indicate that each of these variables is in-
deed related to the incidence of performance-related pay: larger firms are more 
likely to provide performance-related pay than smaller firms, and firms with a 
single owner and family firms are less likely to provide performance-related pay 
than firms with multiple owners (that are not related to each other). They also 
found a gender effect. 
 
The gender effect that Roepers and De Kok (2007) found was, however, different 
from what they expected. They expected that both the gender of the entrepre-
neur and the gender composition of the workforce would affect the probability of 
performance-related pay, but that these two effects would be independent of 
each other. Instead, they found a close relationship between these two effects. 
For male entrepreneurs, they found that the use of performance-related pay is 
independent of the gender composition of the work force. For female entrepre- 
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neurs, however, they found that the usage of performance-related pay increases 
with the share of male employees. 
 
Objective of the study 
The role of the gender of the manager or (direct) supervisor on wages of subor-
dinates has been considered before (Cohen and Huffman, 2007; Hultin and 
Szulkin, 2003). Likewise, the relationship between employee gender and per-
formance-related pay has been studied before (Geddes and Heywood, 2003). 
However, as far as we know, the paper by Roepers and De Kok (2007) is the 
only paper that considers both the gender of the entrepreneur and the gender 
composition of the workforce. 
 
In this paper we further investigate the gender effect in remuneration policies as 
found in Roepers and de Kok (2007). The central idea of this paper is that female 
and male entrepreneurs make different choices regarding their human resource 
management practices, including remuneration policies (Mukhtar, 2002; Verheul 
et al, 2002). These differences can be explained by differences in the risk aver-
sion of male and female employees and entrepreneurs. We derive several hy-
potheses on how the interaction between the entrepreneurial gender and the 
gender composition of the workforce might affect the incidence of performance-
related pay. These hypotheses are then tested, using the same dataset as 
Roepers and de Kok (2007). 
 
Outline 
In the next chapter we present the theoretical framework for this study and dis-
cuss the hypotheses that we will test. In chapter three we describe the data that 
we use to test these hypotheses. The results are presented in chapter four. As 
we will see, most of our hypotheses cannot be confirmed. Generally speaking, 
the available data does not support our ideas on how differences in risk aversion 
result in gender differences in the incidence of performance-related pay. Chapter 
five therefore starts with a discussion of possible explanations for our lack of 
positive results. After this discussion the main conclusions of our study are pre-
sented. 
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2  Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
2.1  The general case for performance-related pay 
An employment contract is an example of a relationship between a principal and 
an agent, where the principal delegates work to the agent. In such principal-
agent relationships, two types of problems can occur, related to differences in 
goals and risk aversion between the agent and the principal. The first type of 
problem occurs when the principal and agent have different desires or goals and 
when it is difficult or expensive for the principal to monitor the agent's behav-
iour. This goal conflict introduces the risk of moral hazard: the risk that the 
agent may not provide the level of effort that was agreed upon. In this case, the 
agent is shirking. The second problem arises when the principal and the agent 
have different attitudes toward risk. The principal and the agent may prefer dif-
ferent actions while executing the work, because of their different risk prefer-
ences. (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 
These problems may be (partly) solved by using performance-related pay (for 
example, piece rate payment, commissions, bonuses or profit sharing) as a gov-
ernance mechanism. If designed properly, including performance-related pay as 
part of the contract between the principal and the agent may prevent opportun-
istic agent behaviour. This will occur if the preferences of agents and principals 
are realigned in such a way that the rewards for both depend on the same ac-
tions. In such cases, the conflicts of self interest between principal and agent are 
reduced (Eisenhardt, 1989) and the agent is motivated to provide the efforts de-
sired by the principal. In fact, one of the most important objectives of compen-
sation is to provide proper and effective motivation to employees (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1992). 
 
Performance pay and firm size 
In larger firms, shirking is less easy to detect. This increases the risk that shirk-
ing will actually occur (Chang, 2006). Larger firms therefore have more need for 
governance mechanisms to combat moral hazard and shirking. By using per-
formance-related pay, firms can reduce the risk of shirking, because this re-
moves (or reduces) the potential conflicts of self interest between employer and 
employees. The benefits of performance-related pay are therefore likely to in-
crease with firm size. At the same time, the costs (per employee) of developing 
and maintaining performance-related pay system are likely to decrease with firm 
size: Larger firms have a larger demand for human resources, and therefore a 
larger demand for specific HRM practices. This stimulates standardization and 
formalization of these practices. Most formalized HRM practices require consider-
able development costs. This results in a cost advantage for larger firms, which 
is strengthened by the limited supply of financial resources of many small firms 
(De Kok, Uhlaner and Thurik, 2006). 
 
These arguments suggest that the net benefits of performance-related pay will 
increase with firm size. This is consistent with the finding from previous research  
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that performance-related pay is more common amongst large firms than 
amongst SMEs (Van Praag et al., 2006). 
 
Performance pay and risk aversion 
The realignment of the agent's preferences with those of the principal often re-
quires that certain risks are transferred from the principal to the agent (Eisen-
hardt, 1989). This is also the case with performance-related pay, where the risk 
of under-performance is shared between the principal and the agent. The extent 
to which this actually takes place depends on the actual levels of risk aversion of 
the relevant principal and agents. In agency theory it is often assumed that firms 
are risk neutral (e.g. because firms are owned by different investors with well-
diversified portfolios) while individual employees are risk averse (Chang, 2006; 
Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). This creates a stimulus to provide a fixed wage to 
the risk-averse employees: by transferring most of the income risks of employ-
ees to the firm, the employees are better of while the firm is not affected. It is 
doubtful, however, whether this assumption also applies in the case of SMEs. For 
example, the idea that the firm is owned by different investors with well-
diversified portfolios does not apply to the majority of SMEs. Often, SMEs are 
single owned-managed enterprises. In these cases, the level of risk aversion of 
the firm is basically determined by the risk aversion of the entrepreneur. This, in 
turn, may be related to the entrepreneurs' gender. 
2.2  Gender differences in risk attitude: five hypotheses 
It is well established that the risk attitude of individuals is partly related to their 
gender (Bajtelsmit and Bernasek, 1996; Borghans et al., 2009; Dohmen and 
Falk, 2001). It is however difficult to identify the causes of this gender differ-
ence: it is generally only possible to observe the outcomes of decisions, and not 
the decision-making processes themselves. 
 
Borghans et al. (2009) use experiments to examine possible determinants of risk 
aversion. They find that risk aversion is partly determined by psychological traits 
such as the "big 5"
1. Gender differences in these traits explain only a small part 
of gender differences in risk aversion. In the context of financial decisions, risk 
aversion is also related to wealth: in an absolute sense (the amount of money 
invested in risky assets), risk aversion decreases with wealth (Bajtelsmit and 
Bernasek, 1996). Since women have lower wages than men (both in general and 
for comparable positions), this suggests an indirect gender effect on risk aver-
sion. 
 
If female employees are more risk averse then male employees, they require a 
higher risk premium to accept performance-related pay. When comparing a fixed 
wage offer with a performance-related pay offer with a certain risk premium, fe-
male employees will be more likely to prefer the fixed wage offer. This is con-
firmed by an empirical study by Dohmen and Falk (2001). They find that women 
are more risk averse than men, and that this difference in risk preference ex-
 
1 The big 5 represent the following five basic dimensions of personality: openness, conscientious-
ness, extraversion, agreeableness and neuroticism.  
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plains their attitude towards variable pay: 68% of the 119 male participants of 
their study prefer a variable pay, compared to 44% of the 121 women. 
If female employees require a higher risk premium to accept performance-
related pay, this reduces the expected benefits of performance-related pay for 
the entrepreneur. This, in turn, makes it less likely that performance-related pay 
will occur. Thus, we expect that the share of women in the workforce will have a 
negative effect on the probability that a firm will introduce performance-related 
pay. 
 
The causality may also run in the opposite direction. If performance-related pay 
is actually introduced, this may stimulate the outflow of female employees. This 
will occur if the new wage offer (including both a variable and fixed part) is not 
high enough to cover the demanded risk premium. In addition, the presence of 
performance-related pay can stimulate the inflow of male applicants. Thus, the 
presence of performance-related pay can have a negative effect on the share of 
women in the workforce. 
 
Irrespective of the direction of causality, these arguments suggest a negative 
correlation between the share of women in the workforce and the incidence of 
performance-related pay. This leads to our first hypothesis: 
 
H1: Performance-related pay is less used for female employees than 
for male employees 
 
The gender difference in risk aversion does not only apply to the population in 
general, but also to the population of entrepreneurs. Female entrepreneurs tend 
to be more risk averse than male entrepreneurs (ENSR 1996; Verheul and 
Thurik, 2001). This suggests that (ceteris paribus) female entrepreneurs are 
more likely to transfer some of the company risk onto their employees (Chang, 
2006). This can be done by using performance-related pay. This results in the 
second hypothesis of this study: 
 
H2: Female entrepreneurs are more likely to use performance-related 
pay than male entrepreneurs 
 
This hypothesis is supported by gender differences in management style. Verheul 
(2003) has studied the gender effect of management styles in small firms in the 
Netherlands, and found that female entrepreneurs are more likely to use formal 
HRM practices than male entrepreneurs. She distinguishes between commitment 
and control oriented management. The higher the degree to which procedures 
and regulation are formalized, the higher the degree of control over employees 
and the production process is. She finds that female-led firms have a more con-
trol-oriented type of HRM than male-led firms. This result implies that female en-
trepreneurs can be associated with a higher degree of formalization. This is con-
sistent with a higher usage of performance-related pay. 
 
In contrast, Verheul, Risseeuw and Bartelse (2002) suggest that female entre-
preneurs may be more inclined to use non-pecuniary rewards, such as flexibility 
of working hours, childcare facilities and verbal compliments, to motivate their 
employees. Their relatively high attention for non-pecuniary rewards would imply 
that female entrepreneurs would be less likely to use performance-related pay  
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than male entrepreneurs. However, they do not find significant support for the 
assumptions of less performance-related pay. Therefore the expectation remains 
that female entrepreneurs are more likely to use performance-related pay 
schemes. 
 
The first hypothesis is related to the gender composition of the workforce, while 
the second hypothesis is related to the gender of the entrepreneur. We assume 
that these two effects work independently of each other. In that case, the com-
bination of these hypotheses results in the following two additional hypotheses: 
H3: Performance-related pay is most likely to occur in firms with a 
female entrepreneur and a high share of male employees 
H4: Performance-related pay is least likely to occur in firms with a 
male entrepreneurs and a high share of female employees 
 
As we noted before, it is often assumed that firms are risk neutral while individ-
ual employees are risk averse. If this is the case, we should find empirical sup-
port for hypothesis H1 but not for H2 (and therefore also not for H3 and H4). In 
addition, we expect to find support for another hypothesis, concerning the effect 
of performance-related pay on firm profits. Whether or not the usage of per-
formance-related pay will have a positive effect on profits depends on many dif-
ferent factors. One of these factors is the risk premium that the entrepreneur 
has to offer to the employees, in order to make them accept the new system
1. 
This risk premium is higher for female employees than for male employees. 
Hence, if the share of male employees is relatively high, the expected costs of 
using performance-related pay will be relatively low, making it more likely that 
performance-related pay will be beneficial to the overall profits of the firm. Con-
versely, if the share of female employees is relatively high, profits are likely to 
be higher using fixed wages (wages not related to performance) rather than per-
formance-related pay. Formulated differently: we expect that pay policies that 
are consistent with efficient risk sharing vary with the gender composition of the 
workforce. If the share of female employees is low, efficient pay policies involve 
performance-related pay; if the share of female employees is high, efficient pay 
policies involve fixed wages only. 
 
Our final hypothesis is that firms with an efficient pay policy as defined above 
will generate higher profits than firms with an inefficient pay policy. With small 
firms, it is often difficult to differentiate between the entrepreneur's income and 
the profit of the enterprise. This is especially the case if the enterprise has the 
legal form of a sole proprietorship: in this case, the entrepreneur cannot receive 
a wage, so the entrepreneurial income is part of the generated profits. We there-
fore formulate this hypothesis in terms of entrepreneurial income rather than 
profit. This results in the following hypothesis: 
H5: The income of the entrepreneur is higher when we observe pay 
policies consistent with efficient risk sharing 
 
 
1 Often, the entrepreneur of an SME may have the authority to introduce and use a performance-
related pay system without employee approval. Nevertheless, if the entrepreneur wants to retain 
valuable employees and keep them motivated, it is important that the employees feel that they 
are compensated for the financial risk that comes with performance-related pay.  
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3  Research methodology 
3.1  Questionnaire and sampling framework 
The dataset that we use for this study has previously been used by De Kok et al. 
(2007) and Roepers and de Kok (2007). In this section we give a brief descrip-
tion of the questionnaire and the sampling framework. More details can be found 
in De Kok et al. (2007). 
3.1.1 Questionnaire 
The questionnaire was developed by De Kok et al. (2007) based on prior knowl-
edge, in-house expertise and existing questionnaires. The concept questionnaire 
was tested through several pilot interviews. This resulted in a few adjustments in 
the formulation of the survey questions. The final survey focuses on the remu-
neration of the entrepreneur and the best-paid employee. In addition, the ques-
tionnaire also contains questions regarding structural and personal characteris-
tics of the firm and its employees. 
3.1.2 Sample 
The data has been gathered through a telephone survey in June and July 2006. 
The sample is stratified by size (varying from one to 100 employees on the pay-
roll), sector and age, and consists of 369 Dutch SMEs. Table 1 shows the distri-
bution of the sample by size and age. The questions in the survey were answered 
by the independent entrepreneurs (in case of a single owned firm), the major 
business partner (in case of a partnership), or by the general director (in other 
legal structures). 
Table 1  Sampled firms, by reported firm size and firm age 
Age category* 
Number of employees 
0 - 3 years  4 - 9 years  >= 10 years  Total 
1  8  13  7  28 
2 - 9   18  42  69  129 
10 - 49   11  27  80  118 
50 - 99  15  16  63  94 
Total  52  98  219  369 
  * After imputing missing values for 28 observations. 
  Source: EIM and ACE. 
3.2  Dependent variables 
The first four hypotheses concern the usage of performance-related pay within 
small and medium-sized enterprises. Our data set allows us to use two different 
indicators of performance-related pay by employees: a specific indicator con-
cerning performance-related pay for the best-paid employee in the firm, and an 
indicator concerning the application of performance-related pay for employees in  
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general. The fifth hypothesis concerns the entrepreneurial income, for which we 
use a single measure. In this section we describe the three dependent variables 
that are used in our study. 
 
Use of performance-related pay for the best-paid employee 
The remuneration of employees can consist of various components. To determine 
the composition of the remuneration of the best-paid employee, we asked which 
of the following components were actually received by the best-paid employee 
during 2005: 
−  fixed wage; 
−  profit sharing; 
−  bonus; 
−  options (only in case of a limited liability company); 
−  company car, phone or computer. 
 
Since it is not clear if the usage of a company car, phone or computer is related 
to the performance of the employee, we do not include these remuneration com-
ponents in our measurement for performance-related pay for the best-paid em-
ployee. We also decided not to use information on the usage of options, since 
this was mentioned by only three respondents. The resulting indicator for per-
formance-related pay for the best-paid employee thus indicates whether the 
best-paid employee received a share of the profit or a bonus during 2005. This is 
the case for 32% of our observations. 
 
Use of performance-related pay for some or all employees 
The questionnaire includes a single question on performance-based pay for the 
workforce as a whole, asking whether or not the enterprise makes use of per-
formance-related pay for some or all of its employees. This is the case for 34% 
of our observations. 
 
There is a reasonable overlap with the indicator of performance-related pay for 
the best-paid employee, but it is not very strong. About a third of all enterprises 
that use performance-related pay for at least some employees indicate that their 
best-paid employee did not receive a share of the profits or a bonus. What is 
more problematic is that about a third of the enterprises that reported that their 
best-paid employee received a bonus or participated in profit sharing, answered 
'no' to the question whether at least some of their employees received any per-
formance-related pay. If both indicators would indicate the same type of pay-
ment systems, this would not be possible. Presumably, the difference in the 
wording of the questions resulted in a different interpretation by the respondent 
of the specific remuneration components that should be taken into consideration. 
 
Entrepreneurial income 
The annual income of an entrepreneur can also include various components, 
where the choice for specific components depends (amongst others) on fiscal 
legislation and the legal structure of the enterprise. For example, in the Nether-
lands entrepreneurs can only receive a wage if their enterprise is organised as a 
limited liability company, not in case of a sole proprietorship. 
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In the questionnaire, we asked whether the entrepreneur received any of the fol-
lowing income components (and, if so, the level of that component): 
−  fixed wage (including management fee in case of a limited liability company); 
−  profit sharing. In case of a sole proprietorship or partnership, we first asked if 
the respondent would indicate the profit level; we then asked which part of 
this profit was used for private means. In case of a limited liability company 
we directly asked for the amount of profit received by the respondent; 
−  bonus; 
−  shares (only in case of a limited liability company); 
−  options (only in case of a limited liability company). 
 
Of these income components, shares and options were the least common. This is 
partly due to the fact that these components can only occur in the case of a lim-
ited liability company. However, also within this subset of enterprises shares and 
options do not occur often: 27 respondents received shares as part of their in-
come, 7 respondents received options, and only 3 respondents could indicate the 
value of the received shares or options. We therefore decided to exclude shares 
and options from our definition of entrepreneurial income. Hence, we define en-
trepreneurial income as the sum of the received wage, profit sharing or bonuses 
for 2005. 
 
Information on the entrepreneurial income is available for 170 respondents. Of 
these respondents, 25 reported an income equal to zero, another three respon-
dents reported a total annual income of less than € 10 000,-. At the other end of 
the distribution, three entrepreneurs reported an annual income ranging from 
€ 400 000 to € 700 000. Summary statistics are reported in Table 2. These sta-
tistics show a large gender effect. This will be explored further in the next chap-
ter. 
Table 2  Summary statistics: entrepreneurial income by gender of the entrepreneur 
Variable  Mean  Standard deviation 
Number of valid 
observations 
Income level entrepreneur (x € 1.000):       
    male entrepreneurs  77.8  97.2  155 
    female entrepreneurs  32.8  50.2  15 
    all entrepreneurs  73.9  94.8  170 
  Source: EIM and ACE 
  Notes: 1) income is defined as the sum of wages, profit shares, bonuses or gratuities; 
2) "entrepreneur" refers to the respondent of the questionnaire. This is the CEO or general 
manager of the firm. 
3.3  Independent variables 
Characteristics of the firm 
Relevant firm characteristics include sector, firm size and firm age. Sector is rep-
resented by a standard classification into eight different sectors (manufacturing; 
construction; automotive; wholesale; retail; transport and communication; hotels  
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and restaurants; services) and firm size is represented by the number of em-
ployees of the firm. 
 
Regarding firm age, our dataset allows us to differentiate between the legal age 
and the economic age of the organisations. The legal age is the age of the cur-
rent legal form of the organisation. This is the age that is registered at e.g. the 
Chamber of Commerce. An organisation's economic age indicates how long the 
firm has been economically active. De Kok et al. (2007) show that the legal and 
economic age of firms often differ, in which case the economic age generally ex-
ceeds the legal age. A possible explanation for this might be that the legal struc-
ture of the organisation has changed over time. In this study we control for pos-
sible age effects by including the logarithm of the economic age
1. Not all firms 
provided information regarding their age. For 39 firms, missing values were im-
puted. 
 
Some studies report a strong correlation between firm size and firm age (e.g. 
Heyman, 2007). This could make it difficult to distinguish between size and age 
effects. To check whether this is also the case in our sample, we examined the 
correlation between economical age and number of employees. This correlation is 
0.07; if we exclude firms of 75 years or more, the correlation increases some-
what, but is still only 0.15. We therefore conclude that there is no risk that ef-
fects of firm size and firm age cannot be distinguished from each other. 
 
Characteristics of the entrepreneur 
Available information regarding the entrepreneur includes gender, age, educa-
tional level, tenure and experience. 
 
Women make up 15% of the entrepreneurs in our sample (54 out of 369 entre-
preneurs in total). This share is considerably lower than the share of female en-
trepreneurs in Dutch enterprises: 30% of all Dutch entrepreneurs is female
2. The 
relatively low share of female entrepreneurs in our sample may be due to the 
fact that female entrepreneurs tend to employ fewer employees and work fewer 
hours in their enterprise than male employees. Given that we only included firms 
with employees in our sample and that small firms are underrepresented as 
compared to medium-sized enterprises, this would result in a relative low share 
of female entrepreneurs in our sample. This explanation is consistent with the 
results of an exploratory probit regression, where we relate the gender of the 
entrepreneur to firm size and sector dummies. The results indicate a highly sig-
nificant (p<0.001) negative relationship between firm size and the likelihood that 
an entrepreneur is a woman. 
 
Characteristics of the workforce 
The nature of remuneration policies is often related to basic characteristics of the 
workforce such as gender, age and educational level. For this study we have in-
formation about the gender, age and educational decomposition of the work-
force. Summary statistics are included in Table 3. Notice that the gender of the 
 
1 The age variable included in Table 1 also refers to economic age. 
2 Source: ‘demografische aspecten van ondernemers’ (demographic aspects of entrepreneurs), a 
Dutch dataset available at www.entrepreneurship-sme.eu;   
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entrepreneur is related to the gender of the workforce: with male entrepreneurs, 
the majority of employees is male, while with female entrepreneurs the majority 
of employees is female. 
Table 3  Summary statistics: characteristics of the workforce 
Variable  Mean  Standard deviation 
Number of valid 
observations 
gender decomposition of the workforce  
(percentage male employees): 
     
    Within firms with male entrepreneurs  63.5%  31.6  289 
    Within firms with female entrepreneurs  42.3%  34.4  45 
Within all firms  60.6%  32.8  334 
age decomposition of the workforce:       
   share of employees <= 24  27.1%  27.4  336 
   share of employees 25 - 44  53.8%  27.3  336 
   share of elder employees >=45   19.2%  22.3  336 
educational decomposition of workforce:       
   share of low-educated employees  33.5%  34.3  329 
   share of medium-educated employees  45.1%  33.7  329 
   share of high-educated employees  21.4%  30.4  329 
  Source: EIM and ACE. 
Characteristics of the best-paid employee 
41 Respondents could not (or would not) identify the best-paid employee within 
their organisation. Consequently, these respondents could not provide any in-
formation on the remuneration of these employees. This leaves 328 observations 
which can be used to analyse the structure of the remuneration of the best-paid 
employee. 
 
Relevant characteristics of the best-paid employee include gender, age, educa-
tion, occupational level and tenure of the best-paid employee. Summary statis-
tics are presented in Table 4 (variable means) and Table 5 (valid observations).  
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Table 4  Summary statistics for the best-paid employee: variable means, by gender of 
entrepreneur and gender of best-paid employee 
Variable  All  By gender of entrepreneur 
By gender of  
best-paid employee 
    male  female  male  female 
age of the best-paid employee  39.2  39.8  35.3  39.8  36.9 
educational level: share of best-paid 
employees with high education   40%  41%  30%  41%  35% 
tenure of the best-paid employee 
(years)  6.5  6.8  4.8  7.2  4.1 
occupational level: share of best-paid 
employees with management position   48%  51%  26%  55%  24% 
  Source: EIM and ACE. 
Table 5  Summary statistics for the best-paid employee: variable counts (valid observa-
tions), by gender of entrepreneur and gender of best-paid employee 
Variable  All  By gender of entrepreneur 
By gender of  
best-paid employee 
    male  female  male  female 
age of the best-paid employee  326  279  47  254  72 
educational level: share of best-paid 
employees with high education   327  281  47  255  72 
tenure of the best-paid employee 
(years)  326  280  47  254  72 
occupational level: share of best-paid 
employees with management position   327  280  47  255  72 
  Source: EIM and ACE. 
It is interesting to notice that the characteristics of the best-paid employee are 
not only related to the gender of employee, but also to the gender of the entre-
preneur. To a considerable extent, this is because the gender of the entrepre-
neur and of the best-paid employee often coincide: for 78% of the firms in our 
sample, the entrepreneur and the best-paid employee are of the same gender 
(Table 6). In particular, the large majority of male entrepreneurs has a male 
best-paid employee, while for female entrepreneurs the gender of the best-paid 
employee is evenly distributed: 49% of the female entrepreneurs employ a fe-
male as best-paid employee; for male entrepreneurs, this is only 9%
1. 
 
1 Fisher’s exact test rejects the hypothesis that the gender of the entrepreneur and of the best-
paid employee are independent of each other at a significance level of 0.000.  
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Table 6  Gender of the entrepreneur and the best-paid employee 
Gender best-paid employee 
Gender entrepreneur  Male  Female  Total 
Male  231  49  280 
Female  24  23  47 
Total  255  72  327 
  Source: EIM and ACE. 
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4  Results 
In chapter two we formulated five different hypotheses. Our hypotheses involve 
three different dependent variables: the usage of performance-related pay for 
the best-paid employee in the firm, the usage of performance-related pay for the 
workforce in general and entrepreneurial income (as indicator for firm perform-
ance). The first four hypotheses will be tested separately for performance-
related pay for the best-paid employee and for the workforce in general, while 
the fifth hypothesis will be tested on the entrepreneurial income. In this chapter 
we present the results of our analyses for each of these three dependent vari-
ables. 
4.1  Performance-related pay for the best-paid employee 
To test hypotheses H1 to H4 for the case of the best-paid employee, we estimate 
two equations: 
−  Equation 1: an equation that relates the use of performance-related pay for 
the best-paid employee to firm characteristics, entrepreneurial characteristics 
(including a gender dummy) and characteristics of the best-paid employee 
(including a gender dummy). This will be estimated by a probit regression. 
The results will be used to test hypotheses H1 and H2; 
−  Equation 2: as equation 1, replacing the gender dummies for the entrepreneur 
and the best-paid employee with two dummies that indicate the enterprises 
that are assumed to be most likely (firms with a female entrepreneur and a 
male best-paid employee) and least likely (firms with a male entrepreneur and 
a female best paid employee) to apply performance-related pay for the best-
paid employee. This will be estimated by a probit regression. The results will 
be used to test hypotheses H3 and H4. 
 
Ideally, we would have liked to estimate these equations separately for manage-
rial and non-managerial employees. Our sample is, however, too small to limit 
our estimations to either subsample. As a second-best solution, we include a 
dummy for the occupational position of the best-paid employee in the equations 
(see e.g. Brown and Medoff, 2003). 
 
Equations 1 and 2 have been estimated with and without sector dummies. The 
results indicate that including sector dummies does not change any of the rele-
vant findings
1, while it reduces the available degrees of freedom considerably 
(the number of observations is limited). We therefore present the estimation re-
sults for these equations without sector dummies. These results are presented in 
Table 7. 
 
1 Estimating model 1 with sector dummies results in 1 significant sector dummy (retail) and re-
duces the significance of the employer characteristics somewhat; estimating model 2 with sector 
dummies results in 1 significant sector dummies (retail) and reduces the significance of the em-
ployer characteristics somewhat; otherwise, no differences occur.  
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Table 7  Probit regressions on the use of performance-related pay (profit-sharing or bo-
nus) for the best-paid employee. 




value  Sign. level 
Parameter 
value  Sign. level  
Firm characteristics         
firm size (ln)  0.067  0.320  0.087  0.184 
firm age (ln)  -0.23**  0.018  -0.22**  0.022 
Employer characteristics         
age (ln)  0.85*  0.077  0.83*  0.082 
experience (ln)  0.04  0.786  0.08  0.637 
phd degree (dummy)  0.58**  0.014  0.63***  0.008 
Female entrepreneur(dummy)  -0.15  0.545  -   
Characteristics best-paid employee         
age (ln)  -0.26  0.505  -0.23  0.555 
tenure (ln)  0.38***  0.001  0.37***  0.001 
Medium education (dummy)  0.24  0.386  0.22  0.43 
high education (dummy)  0.76***  0.009  0.73**  0.012 
Female employee (dummy)  -0.10  0.657  -   
Management position (dummy)  0.52  0.147  0.53  0.141 
Gender comparison employer/employee         
female entrepreneur, male employee 
(dummy) 
-    0.11  0.723 
male entrepreneur, female employee 
(dummy) 
-    0.08  0.728 
Constant  -3.44*  0.065  -3.65**  0.048 
         
Goodness of Fit Measures         
Pseudo R
2  0.1482    0.1471   
Log likelihood  -172.1    -172.3   
Valid Observations  307    307   
  *; **; *** Denote a significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
The results for both equations are very similar: the likelihood that a firm applies 
performance-related pay for its best-paid employee is higher for younger firms, 
for firms with elder and highly educated entrepreneurs, and for employees with 
high tenure and a high educational level. There is no indication that firm size is 
relevant. More important, there is also no indication of any gender effect: con-
cerning the remuneration of the best-paid employee, we find no support for hy-
potheses H1 to H4. Specifically, the results of equation 1 reject hypotheses H1 
and H2: neither the gender of the entrepreneur nor the gender of the best-paid 
employee are related to the probability that the best-paid employee receives 
performance-related pay. Likewise, the results of equation 2 reject hypotheses 
H3 and H4. This follows from the insignificance of the dummies indicating the  
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firms that are most and least likely to apply performance-related pay for the 
best-paid employee. 
4.2  Performance-related pay for the workforce in general 
Regarding the workforce in general, we use a similar approach to test hypothe-
ses H1 to H4. Again, two equations are estimated: 
−  Equation 3: an equation that relates the use of performance-related pay for 
some or all of the employees to firm characteristics, entrepreneurial charac-
teristics (including a gender dummy) and characteristics of the workforce as a 
whole (including the share of male employees). This will be estimated by a 
probit regression. The results will be used to test hypotheses H1 and H2; 
−  Equation 4: as equation 3, replacing the entrepreneurial gender dummy and 
the share of male employees with two dummies that indicate the enterprises 
that are assumed to be most likely (firms with a female entrepreneur and a 
relatively high share of male employees) and least likely (firms with a male 
entrepreneur and a relatively high share of female employees) to apply per-
formance-related pay to the workforce in general. This will be estimated by a 
probit regression. The results will be used to test hypotheses H3 and H4. 
 
The estimation of equation 4 requires that we classify enterprises into three 
categories, based on the gender of the entrepreneur and whether the share of 
(fe)male employees is relatively high or low. The second criterion can be opera-
tionalised in different ways. A straightforward approach is to determine various 
percentiles of the distribution of the share of male employees, and consider the 
lowest/highest percentiles as those with relatively low/high shares of male em-
ployees. The question then remains, how many percentiles to distinguish. An in-
crease in the number of percentiles may increase the differences between the 
lowest and highest percentiles (thus increasing the likelihood of finding statisti-
cally significant differences), but also decreases the number of observations 
within the percentiles (thus decreasing the likelihood of finding statistically sig-
nificant differences). Since this is an explorative study, we have estimated equa-
tion 4 based on the outcomes of using two, three and four percentiles. In this 
paper, we report the outcomes with the highest significance levels for the vari-
ables of interest. 
 
As it turns out, distinguishing four percentiles provided the highest significance 
levels for the two dummy variables indicating enterprises that are most/least 
likely to apply performance-related pay. In this situation, a 'low share' of male 
employees refers to the 25% enterprises with the lowest shares of male employ-
ees (less than 37%), and a 'high share' refers to the 24% enterprises with the 
highest share of male employees (92.5% or more). Combined with the gender of 
the entrepreneur, this results in a group of 61 enterprises for which perform-
ance-related pay is least likely to occur (a male entrepreneur and a low share of 
male employees) and a group of only 6 enterprises for which performance-
related pay is most likely to occur (a female entrepreneur and a high share of 
male employees). 
 
The results are presented in Table 8, again without including sector dummies.  
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Table 8  Probit regressions on presence of performance-related pay for some or all em-
ployees in the workforce. 




value  Sign. level 
Parameter 
value  Sign. level 
Firm characteristics          
firm size (ln)  0.29***  0.068  0.31***  0.000 
firm age (ln)  -0.05  0.571  -0.04  0.623 
Employer characteristics         
age (ln)  0.82*  0.087  0.81*  0.092 
experience (ln)  -0.14  0.384  -0.10  0.503 
phd degree (dummy)  0.09  0.665  0.14  0.497 
Female entrepreneur (dummy)  -0.09  0.703  -   
Workforce characteristics         
share of highly educated employees  0.0089***  0.001  0.0087***  0.001 
share of elder employees  -0.0097**  0.019  -0.0085**  0.034 
share of male employees   0.005**  0.033  -   
Gender comparison employer/workforce         
female entrepreneur, low share female em-
ployees (dummy) 
-    1.02*  0.065 
male entrepreneur, high share female em-
ployees (dummy) 
-    -0.29  0.136 
constant  -3.78**  0.015  -3.9**  0.013 
         
Goodness of Fit Measures         
Pseudo R
2  0.1072    0.1102   
Log likelihood  -187.0    -186.3   
Valid Observations  321    321   
  *; **; *** denote a significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
The results for equations 3 and 4 are very similar: the likelihood that a firm ap-
plies performance-related pay for some (or all) of its employees is higher for lar-
ger firms, and for firms with a higher share of young and highly educated em-
ployees. Notice that these results are different from the results for equations 1 
and 2: instead of firm age, it is firm size that matters now, and employer charac-
teristics no longer seem to be very important. 
 
Equations 3 and 4 still find no support for hypotheses H2 and H4. The lack of 
support for hypothesis H2 contradicts the earlier findings by Roepers and De 
Kok, who found that female entrepreneurs are (ceteris paribus) more likely to 
provide performance-related pay than male entrepreneurs (Roepers and De Kok, 
2007, page 31). Their study, however, included less control variables. In particu-
lar, they did not control for the educational level of the entrepreneur and the age 
and education of the workforce. Once these control variables are included in the 
model, the significant effect of the gender of the entrepreneur disappears.  
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The positive parameter for the share of male employees in equation 3 supports 
hypothesis H1. In addition, the positive dummy variable that indicates firms with 
a female entrepreneur and a low share of female employees offers some support 
for hypothesis H3 (although it should be noted that this parameter is only signifi-
cant at 10%
1). This is consistent with the results by Roepers and De Kok, who 
found a significant positive effect of the interaction between the gender of the 
entrepreneur and the share of male employees (Roepers and De Kok, 2007, page 
31). 
4.3  Gender, performance-related pay and firm performance 
4.3.1 Controlling for workforce characteristics 
To test the final hypothesis, we estimate various equations with the log of the 
entrepreneurial income as dependent variable. 
−  Equation 5: the starting point is an equation that relates the (log of the) in-
come level of the entrepreneur to several firm characteristics, entrepreneurial 
characteristics and workforce characteristics; 
−  Equation 6: as equation 5, including a dummy variable indicating the use of 
performance-related pay for at least some employees; 
−  Equation 7: as equation 5, including a dummy variable indicating a consistent 
pay policy: this is either a combination of performance-related pay and a high 
share of male employees, or a combination of no performance-related pay and 
a high share of female employees. 
 
Estimating equation 7 requires that we identify firms with a consistent pay pol-
icy. This, in turn, requires that we identify firms with a relatively high share of 
(fe)male employees. We use the same method as discussed in the previous sec-
tion, which is based on the percentiles of the distribution of the share of male 
employees. As is the case with equation 4, we find the best results when we use 
four different percentiles. In this case, 93 firms in the sample have a consistent 
pay policy (66 firms with relatively few male employees without performance-
related pay and 27 firms with relatively many male employees with performance-
related pay). The estimation results are reported in Table 9. 
 
According to the results for equations 5, 6 and 7, entrepreneurial income in-
creases with firm size and with the educational level of the entrepreneur as well 
as the employees. Neither the gender of the entrepreneur nor the gender com-
position of the workforce are significantly related to entrepreneurial income. 
There is also no support for hypothesis H5: while the prevalence of performance-
related pay in general is associated with a higher entrepreneurial income (equa-
tion 6), our indicator for a consistent pay policy is not (equation 7). Apparently, 
the effect of performance-related pay on entrepreneurial income does not de-
 
1 In addition, if sector dummies are included, the significance of this parameter becomes less than 
10%.  
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pend on the gender composition of the workforce; at least not in the way that we 
hypothesised
1. 
Table 9  OLS Regression results on log entrepreneurial income (robust estimators) 













firm characteristics             
firm size (ln)  0.25***  0.000  0.24***  0.000  0.26***  0.000 
firm age (ln)  -0.008  0.875  0.022  0.664  -0.009  0.860 
employer characteristics             
age (ln)  0.43  0.261  0.32  0.417  0.54  0.167 
experience (ln)  0.12  0.337  0.15  0.249  0.08  0.505 
phd degree (dummy)  0.34**  0.014  0.31**  0.024  0.31**  0.027 
Female entrepreneur (dummy)  -0.31  0.214  -0.27  0.233  -0.22  0.313 
Workforce characteristics             
share of highly educated employees  0.006***  0.006  0.006***  0.008  0.006***  0.008 
share of elder employees  -0.003  0.360  -0.002  0.452  -0.003  0.380 
share of male employees   -0.000  0.858  -0.001  0.753  -0.003  0.380 
Performance-related pay for some or 
all employees 
-    0.29***  0.009  -   
consistent pay policy  -    -    -0.23  0.137 
Constant  1.38  0.231  1.54  0.192  1.11  0.345 
             
Goodness of Fit Measures             
R
2  0.37    0.41       
Valid Observations  128    128    128   
  *; **; *** denote a significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
4.3.2 Controlling for characteristics of the best-paid employee 
In the previous section, we examined to which extent characteristics of (per-
formance-related pay for) the workforce could explain entrepreneurial income. In 
this section, we focus on characteristics of (performance-related pay for) the 
best-paid employee. This is done by including characteristics of the best-paid 
employee in equations 5 to 7, and replacing the indicators for performance-
related pay for the workforce with comparable indicators for performance-related 
pay for the best-paid employee. This results in equations 8, 9 and 10 (see Table 
10). 
 
1 Hypothesis H5 implies that for firms with a high share of male employees, performance-related 
pay would have a positive effect on entrepreneurial income; for firms with a low share of male 
employees, performance-related pay would have a negative effect on entrepreneurial income.  
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In equation 10, the dummy variable indicating consistent pay policy refers to 11 
firms with a female best-paid employee that receives no performance-related 
pay, and 47 firms with a male best-paid employee that receives performance-
related pay. 
Table 10  Regression results on firm performance (log entrepreneurial income (OLS, ro-
bust estimators), including characteristics best-paid employee 













firm characteristics             
firm size (ln)  0.28***  0.000  0.27***  0.000  0.27***  0.000 
firm age (ln)  -0.02  0.734  -0.02  0.736  0.002  0.975 
employer characteristics             
age (ln)  0.054  0.903  0.03  0.944  0.056  0.895 
experience (ln)  0.24*  0.084  0.24*  0.094  0.20  0.113 
phd degree (dummy)  0.27*  0.052  0.22  0.147  0.29*  0.059 
Female entrepreneur (dummy)  -0.28  0.292  -0.29  0.246  -0.21  0.414 
Workforce characteristics             
share of highly educated employees  0.007***  0.002  0.006**  0.012  0.008***  0.001 
share of elder employees  -0.005  0.192  -0.004  0.274  -0.005  0.187 
share of male employees   0.002  0.318  0.002  0.378  0.000  0.908 
Characteristics best-paid employee             
Female employee (dummy)  0.30  0.166  0.29  0.185  -   
performance-related pay  -    0.15  0.268  -   
consistent pay policy  -    -    -0.13  0.267 
             
Constant  2.38*  0.083  2.44*  0.086     
             
Goodness of Fit Measures             
R
2  0.3769    0.3859       
Valid Observations  117    117    117   
  *; **; *** denote a significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
The results for equations 8, 9 and 10 are similar to the results for equations 5, 6 
and 7: entrepreneurial income increases with firm size and with the educational 
level of the entrepreneur as well as the employees (although the effect of the 
educational level of the entrepreneur is somewhat lower). None of the included 
gender variables have a significant effect (gender of the entrepreneur, gender 
composition of the workforce and gender of the best-paid employee). Also here, 
there is no support for hypothesis H5: our indicator for a consistent pay policy is 
not only not significant, but even has the wrong sign (equation 10). 
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5  Discussion and conclusions 
In this study we have derived five different hypotheses concerning the gender 
effects in performance-related pay amongst small and medium-sized effects. 
These hypotheses are based on two basic assumptions: the willingness of em-
ployers and employees to accept performance-related pay depends (amongst 
others) on their levels of risk aversion, and risk aversion is gender-related. The 
empirical support for our hypotheses is, however, very limited. In this chapter 
we discuss the estimation results and end with the main conclusions. 
5.1  Discussion 
Partial support for the first hypothesis… 
According to the first hypothesis, performance-related pay would be used less for 
female employees than for male employees. We find empirical support for this 
hypothesis, but only regarding the workforce in general: firms with a larger 
share of male employees are more likely to offer performance-related pay to 
their employees. 
 
When we analyse the remuneration of the best-paid employee, we find no rela-
tionship between the employee's gender and the probability that he or she re-
ceived a share of the profit or a bonus. One explanation for this lack of support 
is that the sample size is not large enough; our data set only contains 72 obser-
vations where the best-paid employee is female. 
 
…and no support for the second hypothesis… 
The second hypothesis states that female entrepreneurs are more likely to use 
performance-related pay than male entrepreneurs. There is no support for this 
hypothesis. The results presented by Roepers and De Kok (2007) seem to sup-
port this hypothesis, but additional analysis has shown that this support is the 
result of a missing variable bias: once additional control variables are added to 
the model by Roepers and De Kok (2007), the effect of the gender of the entre-
preneur is no longer significant. 
 
…so no support for the third and fourth hypothesis should be expected 
Hypotheses H3 and H4 are only valid if the first two hypotheses are. If one of the 
first two hypotheses would not be valid, then hypotheses H3 and H4 should also 
be rejected. At a 5% confidence level, this is indeed the case. The fact that we 
find no support for hypotheses H3 and H4 is thus consistent with the lack of sup-
port for the second hypothesis. 
 
No support for the fifth hypothesis regarding entrepreneurial income 
The results of the first four hypotheses are consistent with the standard assump-
tion that firms are risk neutral while individual employees are risk averse. If this 
is the case, we expected to find support for hypothesis H5: The income of the 
entrepreneur is higher when we observe pay policies consistent with efficient risk  
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sharing. We find, however, no support for this hypothesis. Also here, this could 
be due to the limited number of observations (128 or 117 valid observations). 
 
Do we need more data… 
One interpretation of the results of our study, is that the results are largely con-
sistent with the standard assumption that firms are risk neutral while individual 
employees are risk averse. The support is not strong, but this could be explained 
by the relatively limited number of observations. According to this interpretation, 
the main finding of our study is then that we find no support for the expected re-
lationship between the gender of the entrepreneur and the incidence of perform-
ance-related pay. The small size of our sample, however, does not allow for 
strong conclusions. 
 
…or do we need an alternative theory? 
Another interpretation of the results is also possible. The empirical support for 
our hypotheses is so limited, that we should reconsider the two basic assump-
tions that underlie our hypotheses. 
 
The first assumption is that the willingness of employers and employees to ac-
cept performance-related pay depends (amongst others) on their levels of risk 
aversion. This assumption ignores the difference between risk aversion and am-
biguity aversion (Borghans et al., 2009; Machina, 2009). Individuals often find 
themselves in situations where different outcomes may occur. The probabilities 
of these outcomes may either be known or unknown. Risk aversion refers to an 
individual's behaviour in case of know probabilities, while ambiguity aversion re-
fers to an individual's behaviour in case of unknown probabilities. Since the dis-
tribution of the expected performance of employees is not known in advance, the 
incidence of performance-related pay is likely to be related to the ambiguity 
aversion of the employer and employees, rather than their risk aversion. 
 
Borghans et al. (2009) found that risk aversion and ambiguity aversion are em-
pirically distinct individual traits. Regarding risk aversion, they find that women 
are more risk averse than men, and that psychological traits are strongly associ-
ated with risk aversion. Regarding ambiguity aversion, however, they find mark-
edly different results. Men and women show similar marginal valuations of ambi-
guity (with increasing levels of ambiguity), and ambiguity aversion is not related 
to psychological traits. If ambiguity diversion is indeed not gender-related, the 
second basic assumption of our study (risk aversion is gender-related) would not 
apply in the case of ambiguity aversion. 
 
According to this line of argument, differences in risk aversion between men and 
women cannot explain gender differences in the incidence of performance-related 
pay. An alternative explanation for gender differences in the incidence of per-
formance-related pay is that they are partly caused by gender differences in la-
bour force attachment. Various authors have argued that differences in labour 
force attachment between men and women could explain part of the gender 
earnings gap (Kunze, 2005; Nordman and Roubaud, 2005). According to Geddes 
and Heywood (2003), gender differences in labour force attachment may also 
explain differences in the incidence of performance-related pay: on average, 
women have a lower labour force attachment than men, which is in turn related 
to the probability of receiving performance-based pay.  
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5.2  Conclusions 
We have found partial support for the first hypothesis, which states that female 
employees are less likely to receive performance-related pay than male employ-
ees. There is also some support for the third hypothesis, which states that per-
formance-related pay is most likely to occur in firms with a female entrepreneur 
and a high share of male employees. This support is however weak: it is only 
significant at a 10% confidence level, and is furthermore based on the compari-
son of a sample of only 6 firms (with a female entrepreneur and a high share of 
male employees) with the other firms. For the other three hypotheses, there is 
no empirical support. 
 
One interpretation of the results is that they indicate that entrepreneurs are risk 
neutral while employees are risk averse (where female employees are more risk 
averse than male employees). Due to the small sample size, however, this inter-
pretation is only tentative. Additional empirical research on considerable larger 
dataset is required. Perhaps future studies can make use of administrative data 
(e.g. of payrolling companies that target SMEs). 
 
Another interpretation is that the lack of support for our hypotheses suggests 
that we need to reconsider them, including the basic assumptions on which they 
are based. In our study, we have used gender as a proxy for the risk aversion of 
individual entrepreneurs and employees, and assumed that risk aversion (of em-
ployers as well as employees) is in turn related to the incidence of performance-
related pay. However, it can be argued that this assumption is not correct: the 
incidence of performance-related pay may be related to ambiguity aversion 
rather than risk aversion. Gender may however also serve as a proxy for differ-
ences in labour force attachment. Differences in labour force attachment are 
likely to be only relevant for employers, not for employees, which seems consis-
tent with our lack of empirical support for the presence of an entrepreneurial 
gender effect. 
 
For a better understanding of gender effects in remuneration policies, future 
studies should further develop the relationships between performance-related 
pay, risk aversion and ambiguity aversion and labour force attachment, both 
theoretically and empirically. 
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Summary 
In theory, for many small and medium-sized enterprises the introduction of per-
formance-related pay might be beneficial: if implemented properly, it could help 
enterprises in selecting, hiring and motivating the right employees for the right 
jobs. So far, however, performance-related pay in SMEs has received little aca-
demic attention. One of the few studies on this topic is that by Roepers and De 
Kok (2007), who explore determinants of performance-related pay amongst 
SMEs. Amongst others, they found support for the presence of gender effects; 
not only regarding the gender of the employees, but also regarding the gender of 
the entrepreneur. 
 
In this paper we further investigate the gender effect in remuneration policies as 
found in Roepers and de Kok (2007). The central idea of this paper is that female 
and male entrepreneurs make different choices regarding their human resource 
management practices, including remuneration policies. These differences can be 
explained by differences in the risk aversion of male and female employees and 
entrepreneurs. Generally speaking, women are more risk averse than men. This 
suggests that men and women have a different valuation of the risks that are as-
sociated with performance-related pay. We hypothesise that these different 
valuations will result in differences in the incidence of performance-related pay. 
This leads to the following five hypotheses: 
 
−  H1: Performance-related pay is less used for female employees than for male 
employees. 
−  H2: Female entrepreneurs are more likely to use performance-related pay 
than male entrepreneurs. 
−  H3: Performance-related pay is most likely to occur in firms with a female en-
trepreneur and a high share of male employees. 
−  H4: Performance-related pay is least likely to occur in firms with a male en-
trepreneurs and a high share of female employees. 
−  H5: The income of the entrepreneur is higher when we observe pay policies 
consistent with efficient risk sharing. 
 
These hypotheses are tested by estimating various probit and OLS regressions, 
using the results of a telephonic questionnaire amongst 369 Dutch entrepreneurs 
with 1 - 100 employees. 
 
At a significance level of 5%, we find partial support for hypothesis H1, but not 
for any of the other hypotheses. One explanation for these findings is that they 
indicate that employees are indeed risk averse (and men more than women) but 
that employers are not; hypothesis H1 is valid but H2 is not. In this case, hy-
potheses H3 and H4 are no longer valid, so the lack of support for hypotheses H3 
and H4 is consistent with the lack of support for H2. The lack of support for the 
fifth hypothesis may be due to the limited size of our sample (approximately 120 
valid observations were available to test this hypothesis). 
 
Another interpretation is that the lack of support for our hypotheses suggests 
that we need to reconsider them, including the basic assumptions on which they 
are based. We use gender as a proxy for the risk aversion of individual employ-
ees, and assume that risk aversion (of employers as well as employees) is in 
turn related to the incidence of performance-related pay. However, it can be ar- 
6   
gued that this assumption is not correct: the incidence of performance-related 
pay may be related to ambiguity aversion rather than risk aversion. Gender may 
however also serve as a proxy for differences in labour force attachment. Differ-
ences in labour force attachment are likely to be only relevant for employers, not 
for employees, which seems consistent with our lack of empirical support for the 
presence of an entrepreneurial gender effect. 
 
For a better understanding of gender effects in remuneration policies, future 
studies should further develop the relationships between performance-related 
pay, risk aversion and ambiguity aversion and labour force attachment, both 
theoretically and empirically. 
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1  Introduction 
Strong debate on performance-related pay 
Until a few years ago, performance-related pay was becoming more and more 
accepted and used. This changed dramatically when Lehman Brothers went bank-
rupt in September 2008. In a reaction to the crisis that followed, many claimed 
that the practice of performance-related pay in especially the financial sector 
was one of the main causes for the current crisis. The debate on the advantages 
and disadvantages of performance-related pay (and how it should be designed) 
is still ongoing. 
 
This debate tends to focus on large enterprises, where variable payment can ac-
count for a large share of total payment. The situation in small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) tends to be ignored in this discussion. For various rea-
sons, this is not surprising. First of all, relatively little is known about payment 
systems in SMEs. In 2006, the Amsterdam Centre for Entrepreneurship (ACE) 
and EIM conducted a survey amongst 369 Dutch SMEs regarding their remunera-
tion system. This is still one of the few surveys on this subject that includes 
SMEs. Secondly, the variable share of total payment tends to be relatively small 
in SMEs. Amongst others, the EIM - ACE survey included questions on the pay-
ment practices of the best-paid employee within each enterprise. The results in-
dicate that, within the group of best-paid employees that received some form of 
performance-related pay, the variable share of their wage was on average 8% 
(De Kok et al., 2007). 
 
Previous research: determinants of performance-related pay in SMEs 
Van Praag et al. (2006) argue that many small and medium-sized enterprises 
might benefit from the introduction of performance-related pay: if implemented 
properly, it could help enterprises in selecting, hiring and motivating the right 
employees for the right jobs. So far, however, performance-related pay in SMEs 
has received little academic attention. One of the few studies on this topic is that 
by Roepers and De Kok (2007). Using the EIM - ACE survey, they explore deter-
minants of performance-related pay amongst SMEs. In particular, they examined 
whether the incidence of performance-related pay for employees is related to the 
size and ownership structure of the enterprise and to the gender of the entrepre-
neur and the employees. Their results indicate that each of these variables is in-
deed related to the incidence of performance-related pay: larger firms are more 
likely to provide performance-related pay than smaller firms, and firms with a 
single owner and family firms are less likely to provide performance-related pay 
than firms with multiple owners (that are not related to each other). They also 
found a gender effect. 
 
The gender effect that Roepers and De Kok (2007) found was, however, different 
from what they expected. They expected that both the gender of the entrepre-
neur and the gender composition of the workforce would affect the probability of 
performance-related pay, but that these two effects would be independent of 
each other. Instead, they found a close relationship between these two effects. 
For male entrepreneurs, they found that the use of performance-related pay is 
independent of the gender composition of the work force. For female entrepre- 
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neurs, however, they found that the usage of performance-related pay increases 
with the share of male employees. 
 
Objective of the study 
The role of the gender of the manager or (direct) supervisor on wages of subor-
dinates has been considered before (Cohen and Huffman, 2007; Hultin and 
Szulkin, 2003). Likewise, the relationship between employee gender and per-
formance-related pay has been studied before (Geddes and Heywood, 2003). 
However, as far as we know, the paper by Roepers and De Kok (2007) is the 
only paper that considers both the gender of the entrepreneur and the gender 
composition of the workforce. 
 
In this paper we further investigate the gender effect in remuneration policies as 
found in Roepers and de Kok (2007). The central idea of this paper is that female 
and male entrepreneurs make different choices regarding their human resource 
management practices, including remuneration policies (Mukhtar, 2002; Verheul 
et al, 2002). These differences can be explained by differences in the risk aver-
sion of male and female employees and entrepreneurs. We derive several hy-
potheses on how the interaction between the entrepreneurial gender and the 
gender composition of the workforce might affect the incidence of performance-
related pay. These hypotheses are then tested, using the same dataset as 
Roepers and de Kok (2007). 
 
Outline 
In the next chapter we present the theoretical framework for this study and dis-
cuss the hypotheses that we will test. In chapter three we describe the data that 
we use to test these hypotheses. The results are presented in chapter four. As 
we will see, most of our hypotheses cannot be confirmed. Generally speaking, 
the available data does not support our ideas on how differences in risk aversion 
result in gender differences in the incidence of performance-related pay. Chapter 
five therefore starts with a discussion of possible explanations for our lack of 
positive results. After this discussion the main conclusions of our study are pre-
sented. 
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2  Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
2.1  The general case for performance-related pay 
An employment contract is an example of a relationship between a principal and 
an agent, where the principal delegates work to the agent. In such principal-
agent relationships, two types of problems can occur, related to differences in 
goals and risk aversion between the agent and the principal. The first type of 
problem occurs when the principal and agent have different desires or goals and 
when it is difficult or expensive for the principal to monitor the agent's behav-
iour. This goal conflict introduces the risk of moral hazard: the risk that the 
agent may not provide the level of effort that was agreed upon. In this case, the 
agent is shirking. The second problem arises when the principal and the agent 
have different attitudes toward risk. The principal and the agent may prefer dif-
ferent actions while executing the work, because of their different risk prefer-
ences. (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 
These problems may be (partly) solved by using performance-related pay (for 
example, piece rate payment, commissions, bonuses or profit sharing) as a gov-
ernance mechanism. If designed properly, including performance-related pay as 
part of the contract between the principal and the agent may prevent opportun-
istic agent behaviour. This will occur if the preferences of agents and principals 
are realigned in such a way that the rewards for both depend on the same ac-
tions. In such cases, the conflicts of self interest between principal and agent are 
reduced (Eisenhardt, 1989) and the agent is motivated to provide the efforts de-
sired by the principal. In fact, one of the most important objectives of compen-
sation is to provide proper and effective motivation to employees (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1992). 
 
Performance pay and firm size 
In larger firms, shirking is less easy to detect. This increases the risk that shirk-
ing will actually occur (Chang, 2006). Larger firms therefore have more need for 
governance mechanisms to combat moral hazard and shirking. By using per-
formance-related pay, firms can reduce the risk of shirking, because this re-
moves (or reduces) the potential conflicts of self interest between employer and 
employees. The benefits of performance-related pay are therefore likely to in-
crease with firm size. At the same time, the costs (per employee) of developing 
and maintaining performance-related pay system are likely to decrease with firm 
size: Larger firms have a larger demand for human resources, and therefore a 
larger demand for specific HRM practices. This stimulates standardization and 
formalization of these practices. Most formalized HRM practices require consider-
able development costs. This results in a cost advantage for larger firms, which 
is strengthened by the limited supply of financial resources of many small firms 
(De Kok, Uhlaner and Thurik, 2006). 
 
These arguments suggest that the net benefits of performance-related pay will 
increase with firm size. This is consistent with the finding from previous research  
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that performance-related pay is more common amongst large firms than 
amongst SMEs (Van Praag et al., 2006). 
 
Performance pay and risk aversion 
The realignment of the agent's preferences with those of the principal often re-
quires that certain risks are transferred from the principal to the agent (Eisen-
hardt, 1989). This is also the case with performance-related pay, where the risk 
of under-performance is shared between the principal and the agent. The extent 
to which this actually takes place depends on the actual levels of risk aversion of 
the relevant principal and agents. In agency theory it is often assumed that firms 
are risk neutral (e.g. because firms are owned by different investors with well-
diversified portfolios) while individual employees are risk averse (Chang, 2006; 
Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). This creates a stimulus to provide a fixed wage to 
the risk-averse employees: by transferring most of the income risks of employ-
ees to the firm, the employees are better of while the firm is not affected. It is 
doubtful, however, whether this assumption also applies in the case of SMEs. For 
example, the idea that the firm is owned by different investors with well-
diversified portfolios does not apply to the majority of SMEs. Often, SMEs are 
single owned-managed enterprises. In these cases, the level of risk aversion of 
the firm is basically determined by the risk aversion of the entrepreneur. This, in 
turn, may be related to the entrepreneurs' gender. 
2.2  Gender differences in risk attitude: five hypotheses 
It is well established that the risk attitude of individuals is partly related to their 
gender (Bajtelsmit and Bernasek, 1996; Borghans et al., 2009; Dohmen and 
Falk, 2001). It is however difficult to identify the causes of this gender differ-
ence: it is generally only possible to observe the outcomes of decisions, and not 
the decision-making processes themselves. 
 
Borghans et al. (2009) use experiments to examine possible determinants of risk 
aversion. They find that risk aversion is partly determined by psychological traits 
such as the "big 5"
1. Gender differences in these traits explain only a small part 
of gender differences in risk aversion. In the context of financial decisions, risk 
aversion is also related to wealth: in an absolute sense (the amount of money 
invested in risky assets), risk aversion decreases with wealth (Bajtelsmit and 
Bernasek, 1996). Since women have lower wages than men (both in general and 
for comparable positions), this suggests an indirect gender effect on risk aver-
sion. 
 
If female employees are more risk averse then male employees, they require a 
higher risk premium to accept performance-related pay. When comparing a fixed 
wage offer with a performance-related pay offer with a certain risk premium, fe-
male employees will be more likely to prefer the fixed wage offer. This is con-
firmed by an empirical study by Dohmen and Falk (2001). They find that women 
are more risk averse than men, and that this difference in risk preference ex-
 
1 The big 5 represent the following five basic dimensions of personality: openness, conscientious-
ness, extraversion, agreeableness and neuroticism.  
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plains their attitude towards variable pay: 68% of the 119 male participants of 
their study prefer a variable pay, compared to 44% of the 121 women. 
If female employees require a higher risk premium to accept performance-
related pay, this reduces the expected benefits of performance-related pay for 
the entrepreneur. This, in turn, makes it less likely that performance-related pay 
will occur. Thus, we expect that the share of women in the workforce will have a 
negative effect on the probability that a firm will introduce performance-related 
pay. 
 
The causality may also run in the opposite direction. If performance-related pay 
is actually introduced, this may stimulate the outflow of female employees. This 
will occur if the new wage offer (including both a variable and fixed part) is not 
high enough to cover the demanded risk premium. In addition, the presence of 
performance-related pay can stimulate the inflow of male applicants. Thus, the 
presence of performance-related pay can have a negative effect on the share of 
women in the workforce. 
 
Irrespective of the direction of causality, these arguments suggest a negative 
correlation between the share of women in the workforce and the incidence of 
performance-related pay. This leads to our first hypothesis: 
 
H1: Performance-related pay is less used for female employees than 
for male employees 
 
The gender difference in risk aversion does not only apply to the population in 
general, but also to the population of entrepreneurs. Female entrepreneurs tend 
to be more risk averse than male entrepreneurs (ENSR 1996; Verheul and 
Thurik, 2001). This suggests that (ceteris paribus) female entrepreneurs are 
more likely to transfer some of the company risk onto their employees (Chang, 
2006). This can be done by using performance-related pay. This results in the 
second hypothesis of this study: 
 
H2: Female entrepreneurs are more likely to use performance-related 
pay than male entrepreneurs 
 
This hypothesis is supported by gender differences in management style. Verheul 
(2003) has studied the gender effect of management styles in small firms in the 
Netherlands, and found that female entrepreneurs are more likely to use formal 
HRM practices than male entrepreneurs. She distinguishes between commitment 
and control oriented management. The higher the degree to which procedures 
and regulation are formalized, the higher the degree of control over employees 
and the production process is. She finds that female-led firms have a more con-
trol-oriented type of HRM than male-led firms. This result implies that female en-
trepreneurs can be associated with a higher degree of formalization. This is con-
sistent with a higher usage of performance-related pay. 
 
In contrast, Verheul, Risseeuw and Bartelse (2002) suggest that female entre-
preneurs may be more inclined to use non-pecuniary rewards, such as flexibility 
of working hours, childcare facilities and verbal compliments, to motivate their 
employees. Their relatively high attention for non-pecuniary rewards would imply 
that female entrepreneurs would be less likely to use performance-related pay  
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than male entrepreneurs. However, they do not find significant support for the 
assumptions of less performance-related pay. Therefore the expectation remains 
that female entrepreneurs are more likely to use performance-related pay 
schemes. 
 
The first hypothesis is related to the gender composition of the workforce, while 
the second hypothesis is related to the gender of the entrepreneur. We assume 
that these two effects work independently of each other. In that case, the com-
bination of these hypotheses results in the following two additional hypotheses: 
H3: Performance-related pay is most likely to occur in firms with a 
female entrepreneur and a high share of male employees 
H4: Performance-related pay is least likely to occur in firms with a 
male entrepreneurs and a high share of female employees 
 
As we noted before, it is often assumed that firms are risk neutral while individ-
ual employees are risk averse. If this is the case, we should find empirical sup-
port for hypothesis H1 but not for H2 (and therefore also not for H3 and H4). In 
addition, we expect to find support for another hypothesis, concerning the effect 
of performance-related pay on firm profits. Whether or not the usage of per-
formance-related pay will have a positive effect on profits depends on many dif-
ferent factors. One of these factors is the risk premium that the entrepreneur 
has to offer to the employees, in order to make them accept the new system
1. 
This risk premium is higher for female employees than for male employees. 
Hence, if the share of male employees is relatively high, the expected costs of 
using performance-related pay will be relatively low, making it more likely that 
performance-related pay will be beneficial to the overall profits of the firm. Con-
versely, if the share of female employees is relatively high, profits are likely to 
be higher using fixed wages (wages not related to performance) rather than per-
formance-related pay. Formulated differently: we expect that pay policies that 
are consistent with efficient risk sharing vary with the gender composition of the 
workforce. If the share of female employees is low, efficient pay policies involve 
performance-related pay; if the share of female employees is high, efficient pay 
policies involve fixed wages only. 
 
Our final hypothesis is that firms with an efficient pay policy as defined above 
will generate higher profits than firms with an inefficient pay policy. With small 
firms, it is often difficult to differentiate between the entrepreneur's income and 
the profit of the enterprise. This is especially the case if the enterprise has the 
legal form of a sole proprietorship: in this case, the entrepreneur cannot receive 
a wage, so the entrepreneurial income is part of the generated profits. We there-
fore formulate this hypothesis in terms of entrepreneurial income rather than 
profit. This results in the following hypothesis: 
H5: The income of the entrepreneur is higher when we observe pay 
policies consistent with efficient risk sharing 
 
 
1 Often, the entrepreneur of an SME may have the authority to introduce and use a performance-
related pay system without employee approval. Nevertheless, if the entrepreneur wants to retain 
valuable employees and keep them motivated, it is important that the employees feel that they 
are compensated for the financial risk that comes with performance-related pay.  
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3  Research methodology 
3.1  Questionnaire and sampling framework 
The dataset that we use for this study has previously been used by De Kok et al. 
(2007) and Roepers and de Kok (2007). In this section we give a brief descrip-
tion of the questionnaire and the sampling framework. More details can be found 
in De Kok et al. (2007). 
3.1.1 Questionnaire 
The questionnaire was developed by De Kok et al. (2007) based on prior knowl-
edge, in-house expertise and existing questionnaires. The concept questionnaire 
was tested through several pilot interviews. This resulted in a few adjustments in 
the formulation of the survey questions. The final survey focuses on the remu-
neration of the entrepreneur and the best-paid employee. In addition, the ques-
tionnaire also contains questions regarding structural and personal characteris-
tics of the firm and its employees. 
3.1.2 Sample 
The data has been gathered through a telephone survey in June and July 2006. 
The sample is stratified by size (varying from one to 100 employees on the pay-
roll), sector and age, and consists of 369 Dutch SMEs. Table 1 shows the distri-
bution of the sample by size and age. The questions in the survey were answered 
by the independent entrepreneurs (in case of a single owned firm), the major 
business partner (in case of a partnership), or by the general director (in other 
legal structures). 
Table 1  Sampled firms, by reported firm size and firm age 
Age category* 
Number of employees 
0 - 3 years  4 - 9 years  >= 10 years  Total 
1  8  13  7  28 
2 - 9   18  42  69  129 
10 - 49   11  27  80  118 
50 - 99  15  16  63  94 
Total  52  98  219  369 
  * After imputing missing values for 28 observations. 
  Source: EIM and ACE. 
3.2  Dependent variables 
The first four hypotheses concern the usage of performance-related pay within 
small and medium-sized enterprises. Our data set allows us to use two different 
indicators of performance-related pay by employees: a specific indicator con-
cerning performance-related pay for the best-paid employee in the firm, and an 
indicator concerning the application of performance-related pay for employees in  
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general. The fifth hypothesis concerns the entrepreneurial income, for which we 
use a single measure. In this section we describe the three dependent variables 
that are used in our study. 
 
Use of performance-related pay for the best-paid employee 
The remuneration of employees can consist of various components. To determine 
the composition of the remuneration of the best-paid employee, we asked which 
of the following components were actually received by the best-paid employee 
during 2005: 
−  fixed wage; 
−  profit sharing; 
−  bonus; 
−  options (only in case of a limited liability company); 
−  company car, phone or computer. 
 
Since it is not clear if the usage of a company car, phone or computer is related 
to the performance of the employee, we do not include these remuneration com-
ponents in our measurement for performance-related pay for the best-paid em-
ployee. We also decided not to use information on the usage of options, since 
this was mentioned by only three respondents. The resulting indicator for per-
formance-related pay for the best-paid employee thus indicates whether the 
best-paid employee received a share of the profit or a bonus during 2005. This is 
the case for 32% of our observations. 
 
Use of performance-related pay for some or all employees 
The questionnaire includes a single question on performance-based pay for the 
workforce as a whole, asking whether or not the enterprise makes use of per-
formance-related pay for some or all of its employees. This is the case for 34% 
of our observations. 
 
There is a reasonable overlap with the indicator of performance-related pay for 
the best-paid employee, but it is not very strong. About a third of all enterprises 
that use performance-related pay for at least some employees indicate that their 
best-paid employee did not receive a share of the profits or a bonus. What is 
more problematic is that about a third of the enterprises that reported that their 
best-paid employee received a bonus or participated in profit sharing, answered 
'no' to the question whether at least some of their employees received any per-
formance-related pay. If both indicators would indicate the same type of pay-
ment systems, this would not be possible. Presumably, the difference in the 
wording of the questions resulted in a different interpretation by the respondent 
of the specific remuneration components that should be taken into consideration. 
 
Entrepreneurial income 
The annual income of an entrepreneur can also include various components, 
where the choice for specific components depends (amongst others) on fiscal 
legislation and the legal structure of the enterprise. For example, in the Nether-
lands entrepreneurs can only receive a wage if their enterprise is organised as a 
limited liability company, not in case of a sole proprietorship. 
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In the questionnaire, we asked whether the entrepreneur received any of the fol-
lowing income components (and, if so, the level of that component): 
−  fixed wage (including management fee in case of a limited liability company); 
−  profit sharing. In case of a sole proprietorship or partnership, we first asked if 
the respondent would indicate the profit level; we then asked which part of 
this profit was used for private means. In case of a limited liability company 
we directly asked for the amount of profit received by the respondent; 
−  bonus; 
−  shares (only in case of a limited liability company); 
−  options (only in case of a limited liability company). 
 
Of these income components, shares and options were the least common. This is 
partly due to the fact that these components can only occur in the case of a lim-
ited liability company. However, also within this subset of enterprises shares and 
options do not occur often: 27 respondents received shares as part of their in-
come, 7 respondents received options, and only 3 respondents could indicate the 
value of the received shares or options. We therefore decided to exclude shares 
and options from our definition of entrepreneurial income. Hence, we define en-
trepreneurial income as the sum of the received wage, profit sharing or bonuses 
for 2005. 
 
Information on the entrepreneurial income is available for 170 respondents. Of 
these respondents, 25 reported an income equal to zero, another three respon-
dents reported a total annual income of less than € 10 000,-. At the other end of 
the distribution, three entrepreneurs reported an annual income ranging from 
€ 400 000 to € 700 000. Summary statistics are reported in Table 2. These sta-
tistics show a large gender effect. This will be explored further in the next chap-
ter. 
Table 2  Summary statistics: entrepreneurial income by gender of the entrepreneur 
Variable  Mean  Standard deviation 
Number of valid 
observations 
Income level entrepreneur (x € 1.000):       
    male entrepreneurs  77.8  97.2  155 
    female entrepreneurs  32.8  50.2  15 
    all entrepreneurs  73.9  94.8  170 
  Source: EIM and ACE 
  Notes: 1) income is defined as the sum of wages, profit shares, bonuses or gratuities; 
2) "entrepreneur" refers to the respondent of the questionnaire. This is the CEO or general 
manager of the firm. 
3.3  Independent variables 
Characteristics of the firm 
Relevant firm characteristics include sector, firm size and firm age. Sector is rep-
resented by a standard classification into eight different sectors (manufacturing; 
construction; automotive; wholesale; retail; transport and communication; hotels  
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and restaurants; services) and firm size is represented by the number of em-
ployees of the firm. 
 
Regarding firm age, our dataset allows us to differentiate between the legal age 
and the economic age of the organisations. The legal age is the age of the cur-
rent legal form of the organisation. This is the age that is registered at e.g. the 
Chamber of Commerce. An organisation's economic age indicates how long the 
firm has been economically active. De Kok et al. (2007) show that the legal and 
economic age of firms often differ, in which case the economic age generally ex-
ceeds the legal age. A possible explanation for this might be that the legal struc-
ture of the organisation has changed over time. In this study we control for pos-
sible age effects by including the logarithm of the economic age
1. Not all firms 
provided information regarding their age. For 39 firms, missing values were im-
puted. 
 
Some studies report a strong correlation between firm size and firm age (e.g. 
Heyman, 2007). This could make it difficult to distinguish between size and age 
effects. To check whether this is also the case in our sample, we examined the 
correlation between economical age and number of employees. This correlation is 
0.07; if we exclude firms of 75 years or more, the correlation increases some-
what, but is still only 0.15. We therefore conclude that there is no risk that ef-
fects of firm size and firm age cannot be distinguished from each other. 
 
Characteristics of the entrepreneur 
Available information regarding the entrepreneur includes gender, age, educa-
tional level, tenure and experience. 
 
Women make up 15% of the entrepreneurs in our sample (54 out of 369 entre-
preneurs in total). This share is considerably lower than the share of female en-
trepreneurs in Dutch enterprises: 30% of all Dutch entrepreneurs is female
2. The 
relatively low share of female entrepreneurs in our sample may be due to the 
fact that female entrepreneurs tend to employ fewer employees and work fewer 
hours in their enterprise than male employees. Given that we only included firms 
with employees in our sample and that small firms are underrepresented as 
compared to medium-sized enterprises, this would result in a relative low share 
of female entrepreneurs in our sample. This explanation is consistent with the 
results of an exploratory probit regression, where we relate the gender of the 
entrepreneur to firm size and sector dummies. The results indicate a highly sig-
nificant (p<0.001) negative relationship between firm size and the likelihood that 
an entrepreneur is a woman. 
 
Characteristics of the workforce 
The nature of remuneration policies is often related to basic characteristics of the 
workforce such as gender, age and educational level. For this study we have in-
formation about the gender, age and educational decomposition of the work-
force. Summary statistics are included in Table 3. Notice that the gender of the 
 
1 The age variable included in Table 1 also refers to economic age. 
2 Source: ‘demografische aspecten van ondernemers’ (demographic aspects of entrepreneurs), a 
Dutch dataset available at www.entrepreneurship-sme.eu;   
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entrepreneur is related to the gender of the workforce: with male entrepreneurs, 
the majority of employees is male, while with female entrepreneurs the majority 
of employees is female. 
Table 3  Summary statistics: characteristics of the workforce 
Variable  Mean  Standard deviation 
Number of valid 
observations 
gender decomposition of the workforce  
(percentage male employees): 
     
    Within firms with male entrepreneurs  63.5%  31.6  289 
    Within firms with female entrepreneurs  42.3%  34.4  45 
Within all firms  60.6%  32.8  334 
age decomposition of the workforce:       
   share of employees <= 24  27.1%  27.4  336 
   share of employees 25 - 44  53.8%  27.3  336 
   share of elder employees >=45   19.2%  22.3  336 
educational decomposition of workforce:       
   share of low-educated employees  33.5%  34.3  329 
   share of medium-educated employees  45.1%  33.7  329 
   share of high-educated employees  21.4%  30.4  329 
  Source: EIM and ACE. 
Characteristics of the best-paid employee 
41 Respondents could not (or would not) identify the best-paid employee within 
their organisation. Consequently, these respondents could not provide any in-
formation on the remuneration of these employees. This leaves 328 observations 
which can be used to analyse the structure of the remuneration of the best-paid 
employee. 
 
Relevant characteristics of the best-paid employee include gender, age, educa-
tion, occupational level and tenure of the best-paid employee. Summary statis-
tics are presented in Table 4 (variable means) and Table 5 (valid observations).  
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Table 4  Summary statistics for the best-paid employee: variable means, by gender of 
entrepreneur and gender of best-paid employee 
Variable  All  By gender of entrepreneur 
By gender of  
best-paid employee 
    male  female  male  female 
age of the best-paid employee  39.2  39.8  35.3  39.8  36.9 
educational level: share of best-paid 
employees with high education   40%  41%  30%  41%  35% 
tenure of the best-paid employee 
(years)  6.5  6.8  4.8  7.2  4.1 
occupational level: share of best-paid 
employees with management position   48%  51%  26%  55%  24% 
  Source: EIM and ACE. 
Table 5  Summary statistics for the best-paid employee: variable counts (valid observa-
tions), by gender of entrepreneur and gender of best-paid employee 
Variable  All  By gender of entrepreneur 
By gender of  
best-paid employee 
    male  female  male  female 
age of the best-paid employee  326  279  47  254  72 
educational level: share of best-paid 
employees with high education   327  281  47  255  72 
tenure of the best-paid employee 
(years)  326  280  47  254  72 
occupational level: share of best-paid 
employees with management position   327  280  47  255  72 
  Source: EIM and ACE. 
It is interesting to notice that the characteristics of the best-paid employee are 
not only related to the gender of employee, but also to the gender of the entre-
preneur. To a considerable extent, this is because the gender of the entrepre-
neur and of the best-paid employee often coincide: for 78% of the firms in our 
sample, the entrepreneur and the best-paid employee are of the same gender 
(Table 6). In particular, the large majority of male entrepreneurs has a male 
best-paid employee, while for female entrepreneurs the gender of the best-paid 
employee is evenly distributed: 49% of the female entrepreneurs employ a fe-
male as best-paid employee; for male entrepreneurs, this is only 9%
1. 
 
1 Fisher’s exact test rejects the hypothesis that the gender of the entrepreneur and of the best-
paid employee are independent of each other at a significance level of 0.000.  
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Table 6  Gender of the entrepreneur and the best-paid employee 
Gender best-paid employee 
Gender entrepreneur  Male  Female  Total 
Male  231  49  280 
Female  24  23  47 
Total  255  72  327 
  Source: EIM and ACE. 
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4  Results 
In chapter two we formulated five different hypotheses. Our hypotheses involve 
three different dependent variables: the usage of performance-related pay for 
the best-paid employee in the firm, the usage of performance-related pay for the 
workforce in general and entrepreneurial income (as indicator for firm perform-
ance). The first four hypotheses will be tested separately for performance-
related pay for the best-paid employee and for the workforce in general, while 
the fifth hypothesis will be tested on the entrepreneurial income. In this chapter 
we present the results of our analyses for each of these three dependent vari-
ables. 
4.1  Performance-related pay for the best-paid employee 
To test hypotheses H1 to H4 for the case of the best-paid employee, we estimate 
two equations: 
−  Equation 1: an equation that relates the use of performance-related pay for 
the best-paid employee to firm characteristics, entrepreneurial characteristics 
(including a gender dummy) and characteristics of the best-paid employee 
(including a gender dummy). This will be estimated by a probit regression. 
The results will be used to test hypotheses H1 and H2; 
−  Equation 2: as equation 1, replacing the gender dummies for the entrepreneur 
and the best-paid employee with two dummies that indicate the enterprises 
that are assumed to be most likely (firms with a female entrepreneur and a 
male best-paid employee) and least likely (firms with a male entrepreneur and 
a female best paid employee) to apply performance-related pay for the best-
paid employee. This will be estimated by a probit regression. The results will 
be used to test hypotheses H3 and H4. 
 
Ideally, we would have liked to estimate these equations separately for manage-
rial and non-managerial employees. Our sample is, however, too small to limit 
our estimations to either subsample. As a second-best solution, we include a 
dummy for the occupational position of the best-paid employee in the equations 
(see e.g. Brown and Medoff, 2003). 
 
Equations 1 and 2 have been estimated with and without sector dummies. The 
results indicate that including sector dummies does not change any of the rele-
vant findings
1, while it reduces the available degrees of freedom considerably 
(the number of observations is limited). We therefore present the estimation re-
sults for these equations without sector dummies. These results are presented in 
Table 7. 
 
1 Estimating model 1 with sector dummies results in 1 significant sector dummy (retail) and re-
duces the significance of the employer characteristics somewhat; estimating model 2 with sector 
dummies results in 1 significant sector dummies (retail) and reduces the significance of the em-
ployer characteristics somewhat; otherwise, no differences occur.  
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Table 7  Probit regressions on the use of performance-related pay (profit-sharing or bo-
nus) for the best-paid employee. 




value  Sign. level 
Parameter 
value  Sign. level  
Firm characteristics         
firm size (ln)  0.067  0.320  0.087  0.184 
firm age (ln)  -0.23**  0.018  -0.22**  0.022 
Employer characteristics         
age (ln)  0.85*  0.077  0.83*  0.082 
experience (ln)  0.04  0.786  0.08  0.637 
phd degree (dummy)  0.58**  0.014  0.63***  0.008 
Female entrepreneur(dummy)  -0.15  0.545  -   
Characteristics best-paid employee         
age (ln)  -0.26  0.505  -0.23  0.555 
tenure (ln)  0.38***  0.001  0.37***  0.001 
Medium education (dummy)  0.24  0.386  0.22  0.43 
high education (dummy)  0.76***  0.009  0.73**  0.012 
Female employee (dummy)  -0.10  0.657  -   
Management position (dummy)  0.52  0.147  0.53  0.141 
Gender comparison employer/employee         
female entrepreneur, male employee 
(dummy) 
-    0.11  0.723 
male entrepreneur, female employee 
(dummy) 
-    0.08  0.728 
Constant  -3.44*  0.065  -3.65**  0.048 
         
Goodness of Fit Measures         
Pseudo R
2  0.1482    0.1471   
Log likelihood  -172.1    -172.3   
Valid Observations  307    307   
  *; **; *** Denote a significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
The results for both equations are very similar: the likelihood that a firm applies 
performance-related pay for its best-paid employee is higher for younger firms, 
for firms with elder and highly educated entrepreneurs, and for employees with 
high tenure and a high educational level. There is no indication that firm size is 
relevant. More important, there is also no indication of any gender effect: con-
cerning the remuneration of the best-paid employee, we find no support for hy-
potheses H1 to H4. Specifically, the results of equation 1 reject hypotheses H1 
and H2: neither the gender of the entrepreneur nor the gender of the best-paid 
employee are related to the probability that the best-paid employee receives 
performance-related pay. Likewise, the results of equation 2 reject hypotheses 
H3 and H4. This follows from the insignificance of the dummies indicating the  
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firms that are most and least likely to apply performance-related pay for the 
best-paid employee. 
4.2  Performance-related pay for the workforce in general 
Regarding the workforce in general, we use a similar approach to test hypothe-
ses H1 to H4. Again, two equations are estimated: 
−  Equation 3: an equation that relates the use of performance-related pay for 
some or all of the employees to firm characteristics, entrepreneurial charac-
teristics (including a gender dummy) and characteristics of the workforce as a 
whole (including the share of male employees). This will be estimated by a 
probit regression. The results will be used to test hypotheses H1 and H2; 
−  Equation 4: as equation 3, replacing the entrepreneurial gender dummy and 
the share of male employees with two dummies that indicate the enterprises 
that are assumed to be most likely (firms with a female entrepreneur and a 
relatively high share of male employees) and least likely (firms with a male 
entrepreneur and a relatively high share of female employees) to apply per-
formance-related pay to the workforce in general. This will be estimated by a 
probit regression. The results will be used to test hypotheses H3 and H4. 
 
The estimation of equation 4 requires that we classify enterprises into three 
categories, based on the gender of the entrepreneur and whether the share of 
(fe)male employees is relatively high or low. The second criterion can be opera-
tionalised in different ways. A straightforward approach is to determine various 
percentiles of the distribution of the share of male employees, and consider the 
lowest/highest percentiles as those with relatively low/high shares of male em-
ployees. The question then remains, how many percentiles to distinguish. An in-
crease in the number of percentiles may increase the differences between the 
lowest and highest percentiles (thus increasing the likelihood of finding statisti-
cally significant differences), but also decreases the number of observations 
within the percentiles (thus decreasing the likelihood of finding statistically sig-
nificant differences). Since this is an explorative study, we have estimated equa-
tion 4 based on the outcomes of using two, three and four percentiles. In this 
paper, we report the outcomes with the highest significance levels for the vari-
ables of interest. 
 
As it turns out, distinguishing four percentiles provided the highest significance 
levels for the two dummy variables indicating enterprises that are most/least 
likely to apply performance-related pay. In this situation, a 'low share' of male 
employees refers to the 25% enterprises with the lowest shares of male employ-
ees (less than 37%), and a 'high share' refers to the 24% enterprises with the 
highest share of male employees (92.5% or more). Combined with the gender of 
the entrepreneur, this results in a group of 61 enterprises for which perform-
ance-related pay is least likely to occur (a male entrepreneur and a low share of 
male employees) and a group of only 6 enterprises for which performance-
related pay is most likely to occur (a female entrepreneur and a high share of 
male employees). 
 
The results are presented in Table 8, again without including sector dummies.  
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Table 8  Probit regressions on presence of performance-related pay for some or all em-
ployees in the workforce. 




value  Sign. level 
Parameter 
value  Sign. level 
Firm characteristics          
firm size (ln)  0.29***  0.068  0.31***  0.000 
firm age (ln)  -0.05  0.571  -0.04  0.623 
Employer characteristics         
age (ln)  0.82*  0.087  0.81*  0.092 
experience (ln)  -0.14  0.384  -0.10  0.503 
phd degree (dummy)  0.09  0.665  0.14  0.497 
Female entrepreneur (dummy)  -0.09  0.703  -   
Workforce characteristics         
share of highly educated employees  0.0089***  0.001  0.0087***  0.001 
share of elder employees  -0.0097**  0.019  -0.0085**  0.034 
share of male employees   0.005**  0.033  -   
Gender comparison employer/workforce         
female entrepreneur, low share female em-
ployees (dummy) 
-    1.02*  0.065 
male entrepreneur, high share female em-
ployees (dummy) 
-    -0.29  0.136 
constant  -3.78**  0.015  -3.9**  0.013 
         
Goodness of Fit Measures         
Pseudo R
2  0.1072    0.1102   
Log likelihood  -187.0    -186.3   
Valid Observations  321    321   
  *; **; *** denote a significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
The results for equations 3 and 4 are very similar: the likelihood that a firm ap-
plies performance-related pay for some (or all) of its employees is higher for lar-
ger firms, and for firms with a higher share of young and highly educated em-
ployees. Notice that these results are different from the results for equations 1 
and 2: instead of firm age, it is firm size that matters now, and employer charac-
teristics no longer seem to be very important. 
 
Equations 3 and 4 still find no support for hypotheses H2 and H4. The lack of 
support for hypothesis H2 contradicts the earlier findings by Roepers and De 
Kok, who found that female entrepreneurs are (ceteris paribus) more likely to 
provide performance-related pay than male entrepreneurs (Roepers and De Kok, 
2007, page 31). Their study, however, included less control variables. In particu-
lar, they did not control for the educational level of the entrepreneur and the age 
and education of the workforce. Once these control variables are included in the 
model, the significant effect of the gender of the entrepreneur disappears.  
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The positive parameter for the share of male employees in equation 3 supports 
hypothesis H1. In addition, the positive dummy variable that indicates firms with 
a female entrepreneur and a low share of female employees offers some support 
for hypothesis H3 (although it should be noted that this parameter is only signifi-
cant at 10%
1). This is consistent with the results by Roepers and De Kok, who 
found a significant positive effect of the interaction between the gender of the 
entrepreneur and the share of male employees (Roepers and De Kok, 2007, page 
31). 
4.3  Gender, performance-related pay and firm performance 
4.3.1 Controlling for workforce characteristics 
To test the final hypothesis, we estimate various equations with the log of the 
entrepreneurial income as dependent variable. 
−  Equation 5: the starting point is an equation that relates the (log of the) in-
come level of the entrepreneur to several firm characteristics, entrepreneurial 
characteristics and workforce characteristics; 
−  Equation 6: as equation 5, including a dummy variable indicating the use of 
performance-related pay for at least some employees; 
−  Equation 7: as equation 5, including a dummy variable indicating a consistent 
pay policy: this is either a combination of performance-related pay and a high 
share of male employees, or a combination of no performance-related pay and 
a high share of female employees. 
 
Estimating equation 7 requires that we identify firms with a consistent pay pol-
icy. This, in turn, requires that we identify firms with a relatively high share of 
(fe)male employees. We use the same method as discussed in the previous sec-
tion, which is based on the percentiles of the distribution of the share of male 
employees. As is the case with equation 4, we find the best results when we use 
four different percentiles. In this case, 93 firms in the sample have a consistent 
pay policy (66 firms with relatively few male employees without performance-
related pay and 27 firms with relatively many male employees with performance-
related pay). The estimation results are reported in Table 9. 
 
According to the results for equations 5, 6 and 7, entrepreneurial income in-
creases with firm size and with the educational level of the entrepreneur as well 
as the employees. Neither the gender of the entrepreneur nor the gender com-
position of the workforce are significantly related to entrepreneurial income. 
There is also no support for hypothesis H5: while the prevalence of performance-
related pay in general is associated with a higher entrepreneurial income (equa-
tion 6), our indicator for a consistent pay policy is not (equation 7). Apparently, 
the effect of performance-related pay on entrepreneurial income does not de-
 
1 In addition, if sector dummies are included, the significance of this parameter becomes less than 
10%.  
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pend on the gender composition of the workforce; at least not in the way that we 
hypothesised
1. 
Table 9  OLS Regression results on log entrepreneurial income (robust estimators) 













firm characteristics             
firm size (ln)  0.25***  0.000  0.24***  0.000  0.26***  0.000 
firm age (ln)  -0.008  0.875  0.022  0.664  -0.009  0.860 
employer characteristics             
age (ln)  0.43  0.261  0.32  0.417  0.54  0.167 
experience (ln)  0.12  0.337  0.15  0.249  0.08  0.505 
phd degree (dummy)  0.34**  0.014  0.31**  0.024  0.31**  0.027 
Female entrepreneur (dummy)  -0.31  0.214  -0.27  0.233  -0.22  0.313 
Workforce characteristics             
share of highly educated employees  0.006***  0.006  0.006***  0.008  0.006***  0.008 
share of elder employees  -0.003  0.360  -0.002  0.452  -0.003  0.380 
share of male employees   -0.000  0.858  -0.001  0.753  -0.003  0.380 
Performance-related pay for some or 
all employees 
-    0.29***  0.009  -   
consistent pay policy  -    -    -0.23  0.137 
Constant  1.38  0.231  1.54  0.192  1.11  0.345 
             
Goodness of Fit Measures             
R
2  0.37    0.41       
Valid Observations  128    128    128   
  *; **; *** denote a significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
4.3.2 Controlling for characteristics of the best-paid employee 
In the previous section, we examined to which extent characteristics of (per-
formance-related pay for) the workforce could explain entrepreneurial income. In 
this section, we focus on characteristics of (performance-related pay for) the 
best-paid employee. This is done by including characteristics of the best-paid 
employee in equations 5 to 7, and replacing the indicators for performance-
related pay for the workforce with comparable indicators for performance-related 
pay for the best-paid employee. This results in equations 8, 9 and 10 (see Table 
10). 
 
1 Hypothesis H5 implies that for firms with a high share of male employees, performance-related 
pay would have a positive effect on entrepreneurial income; for firms with a low share of male 
employees, performance-related pay would have a negative effect on entrepreneurial income.  
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In equation 10, the dummy variable indicating consistent pay policy refers to 11 
firms with a female best-paid employee that receives no performance-related 
pay, and 47 firms with a male best-paid employee that receives performance-
related pay. 
Table 10  Regression results on firm performance (log entrepreneurial income (OLS, ro-
bust estimators), including characteristics best-paid employee 













firm characteristics             
firm size (ln)  0.28***  0.000  0.27***  0.000  0.27***  0.000 
firm age (ln)  -0.02  0.734  -0.02  0.736  0.002  0.975 
employer characteristics             
age (ln)  0.054  0.903  0.03  0.944  0.056  0.895 
experience (ln)  0.24*  0.084  0.24*  0.094  0.20  0.113 
phd degree (dummy)  0.27*  0.052  0.22  0.147  0.29*  0.059 
Female entrepreneur (dummy)  -0.28  0.292  -0.29  0.246  -0.21  0.414 
Workforce characteristics             
share of highly educated employees  0.007***  0.002  0.006**  0.012  0.008***  0.001 
share of elder employees  -0.005  0.192  -0.004  0.274  -0.005  0.187 
share of male employees   0.002  0.318  0.002  0.378  0.000  0.908 
Characteristics best-paid employee             
Female employee (dummy)  0.30  0.166  0.29  0.185  -   
performance-related pay  -    0.15  0.268  -   
consistent pay policy  -    -    -0.13  0.267 
             
Constant  2.38*  0.083  2.44*  0.086     
             
Goodness of Fit Measures             
R
2  0.3769    0.3859       
Valid Observations  117    117    117   
  *; **; *** denote a significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
The results for equations 8, 9 and 10 are similar to the results for equations 5, 6 
and 7: entrepreneurial income increases with firm size and with the educational 
level of the entrepreneur as well as the employees (although the effect of the 
educational level of the entrepreneur is somewhat lower). None of the included 
gender variables have a significant effect (gender of the entrepreneur, gender 
composition of the workforce and gender of the best-paid employee). Also here, 
there is no support for hypothesis H5: our indicator for a consistent pay policy is 
not only not significant, but even has the wrong sign (equation 10). 
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5  Discussion and conclusions 
In this study we have derived five different hypotheses concerning the gender 
effects in performance-related pay amongst small and medium-sized effects. 
These hypotheses are based on two basic assumptions: the willingness of em-
ployers and employees to accept performance-related pay depends (amongst 
others) on their levels of risk aversion, and risk aversion is gender-related. The 
empirical support for our hypotheses is, however, very limited. In this chapter 
we discuss the estimation results and end with the main conclusions. 
5.1  Discussion 
Partial support for the first hypothesis… 
According to the first hypothesis, performance-related pay would be used less for 
female employees than for male employees. We find empirical support for this 
hypothesis, but only regarding the workforce in general: firms with a larger 
share of male employees are more likely to offer performance-related pay to 
their employees. 
 
When we analyse the remuneration of the best-paid employee, we find no rela-
tionship between the employee's gender and the probability that he or she re-
ceived a share of the profit or a bonus. One explanation for this lack of support 
is that the sample size is not large enough; our data set only contains 72 obser-
vations where the best-paid employee is female. 
 
…and no support for the second hypothesis… 
The second hypothesis states that female entrepreneurs are more likely to use 
performance-related pay than male entrepreneurs. There is no support for this 
hypothesis. The results presented by Roepers and De Kok (2007) seem to sup-
port this hypothesis, but additional analysis has shown that this support is the 
result of a missing variable bias: once additional control variables are added to 
the model by Roepers and De Kok (2007), the effect of the gender of the entre-
preneur is no longer significant. 
 
…so no support for the third and fourth hypothesis should be expected 
Hypotheses H3 and H4 are only valid if the first two hypotheses are. If one of the 
first two hypotheses would not be valid, then hypotheses H3 and H4 should also 
be rejected. At a 5% confidence level, this is indeed the case. The fact that we 
find no support for hypotheses H3 and H4 is thus consistent with the lack of sup-
port for the second hypothesis. 
 
No support for the fifth hypothesis regarding entrepreneurial income 
The results of the first four hypotheses are consistent with the standard assump-
tion that firms are risk neutral while individual employees are risk averse. If this 
is the case, we expected to find support for hypothesis H5: The income of the 
entrepreneur is higher when we observe pay policies consistent with efficient risk  
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sharing. We find, however, no support for this hypothesis. Also here, this could 
be due to the limited number of observations (128 or 117 valid observations). 
 
Do we need more data… 
One interpretation of the results of our study, is that the results are largely con-
sistent with the standard assumption that firms are risk neutral while individual 
employees are risk averse. The support is not strong, but this could be explained 
by the relatively limited number of observations. According to this interpretation, 
the main finding of our study is then that we find no support for the expected re-
lationship between the gender of the entrepreneur and the incidence of perform-
ance-related pay. The small size of our sample, however, does not allow for 
strong conclusions. 
 
…or do we need an alternative theory? 
Another interpretation of the results is also possible. The empirical support for 
our hypotheses is so limited, that we should reconsider the two basic assump-
tions that underlie our hypotheses. 
 
The first assumption is that the willingness of employers and employees to ac-
cept performance-related pay depends (amongst others) on their levels of risk 
aversion. This assumption ignores the difference between risk aversion and am-
biguity aversion (Borghans et al., 2009; Machina, 2009). Individuals often find 
themselves in situations where different outcomes may occur. The probabilities 
of these outcomes may either be known or unknown. Risk aversion refers to an 
individual's behaviour in case of know probabilities, while ambiguity aversion re-
fers to an individual's behaviour in case of unknown probabilities. Since the dis-
tribution of the expected performance of employees is not known in advance, the 
incidence of performance-related pay is likely to be related to the ambiguity 
aversion of the employer and employees, rather than their risk aversion. 
 
Borghans et al. (2009) found that risk aversion and ambiguity aversion are em-
pirically distinct individual traits. Regarding risk aversion, they find that women 
are more risk averse than men, and that psychological traits are strongly associ-
ated with risk aversion. Regarding ambiguity aversion, however, they find mark-
edly different results. Men and women show similar marginal valuations of ambi-
guity (with increasing levels of ambiguity), and ambiguity aversion is not related 
to psychological traits. If ambiguity diversion is indeed not gender-related, the 
second basic assumption of our study (risk aversion is gender-related) would not 
apply in the case of ambiguity aversion. 
 
According to this line of argument, differences in risk aversion between men and 
women cannot explain gender differences in the incidence of performance-related 
pay. An alternative explanation for gender differences in the incidence of per-
formance-related pay is that they are partly caused by gender differences in la-
bour force attachment. Various authors have argued that differences in labour 
force attachment between men and women could explain part of the gender 
earnings gap (Kunze, 2005; Nordman and Roubaud, 2005). According to Geddes 
and Heywood (2003), gender differences in labour force attachment may also 
explain differences in the incidence of performance-related pay: on average, 
women have a lower labour force attachment than men, which is in turn related 
to the probability of receiving performance-based pay.  
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5.2  Conclusions 
We have found partial support for the first hypothesis, which states that female 
employees are less likely to receive performance-related pay than male employ-
ees. There is also some support for the third hypothesis, which states that per-
formance-related pay is most likely to occur in firms with a female entrepreneur 
and a high share of male employees. This support is however weak: it is only 
significant at a 10% confidence level, and is furthermore based on the compari-
son of a sample of only 6 firms (with a female entrepreneur and a high share of 
male employees) with the other firms. For the other three hypotheses, there is 
no empirical support. 
 
One interpretation of the results is that they indicate that entrepreneurs are risk 
neutral while employees are risk averse (where female employees are more risk 
averse than male employees). Due to the small sample size, however, this inter-
pretation is only tentative. Additional empirical research on considerable larger 
dataset is required. Perhaps future studies can make use of administrative data 
(e.g. of payrolling companies that target SMEs). 
 
Another interpretation is that the lack of support for our hypotheses suggests 
that we need to reconsider them, including the basic assumptions on which they 
are based. In our study, we have used gender as a proxy for the risk aversion of 
individual entrepreneurs and employees, and assumed that risk aversion (of em-
ployers as well as employees) is in turn related to the incidence of performance-
related pay. However, it can be argued that this assumption is not correct: the 
incidence of performance-related pay may be related to ambiguity aversion 
rather than risk aversion. Gender may however also serve as a proxy for differ-
ences in labour force attachment. Differences in labour force attachment are 
likely to be only relevant for employers, not for employees, which seems consis-
tent with our lack of empirical support for the presence of an entrepreneurial 
gender effect. 
 
For a better understanding of gender effects in remuneration policies, future 
studies should further develop the relationships between performance-related 
pay, risk aversion and ambiguity aversion and labour force attachment, both 
theoretically and empirically. 
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Summary 
In theory, for many small and medium-sized enterprises the introduction of per-
formance-related pay might be beneficial: if implemented properly, it could help 
enterprises in selecting, hiring and motivating the right employees for the right 
jobs. So far, however, performance-related pay in SMEs has received little aca-
demic attention. One of the few studies on this topic is that by Roepers and De 
Kok (2007), who explore determinants of performance-related pay amongst 
SMEs. Amongst others, they found support for the presence of gender effects; 
not only regarding the gender of the employees, but also regarding the gender of 
the entrepreneur. 
 
In this paper we further investigate the gender effect in remuneration policies as 
found in Roepers and de Kok (2007). The central idea of this paper is that female 
and male entrepreneurs make different choices regarding their human resource 
management practices, including remuneration policies. These differences can be 
explained by differences in the risk aversion of male and female employees and 
entrepreneurs. Generally speaking, women are more risk averse than men. This 
suggests that men and women have a different valuation of the risks that are as-
sociated with performance-related pay. We hypothesise that these different 
valuations will result in differences in the incidence of performance-related pay. 
This leads to the following five hypotheses: 
 
−  H1: Performance-related pay is less used for female employees than for male 
employees. 
−  H2: Female entrepreneurs are more likely to use performance-related pay 
than male entrepreneurs. 
−  H3: Performance-related pay is most likely to occur in firms with a female en-
trepreneur and a high share of male employees. 
−  H4: Performance-related pay is least likely to occur in firms with a male en-
trepreneurs and a high share of female employees. 
−  H5: The income of the entrepreneur is higher when we observe pay policies 
consistent with efficient risk sharing. 
 
These hypotheses are tested by estimating various probit and OLS regressions, 
using the results of a telephonic questionnaire amongst 369 Dutch entrepreneurs 
with 1 - 100 employees. 
 
At a significance level of 5%, we find partial support for hypothesis H1, but not 
for any of the other hypotheses. One explanation for these findings is that they 
indicate that employees are indeed risk averse (and men more than women) but 
that employers are not; hypothesis H1 is valid but H2 is not. In this case, hy-
potheses H3 and H4 are no longer valid, so the lack of support for hypotheses H3 
and H4 is consistent with the lack of support for H2. The lack of support for the 
fifth hypothesis may be due to the limited size of our sample (approximately 120 
valid observations were available to test this hypothesis). 
 
Another interpretation is that the lack of support for our hypotheses suggests 
that we need to reconsider them, including the basic assumptions on which they 
are based. We use gender as a proxy for the risk aversion of individual employ-
ees, and assume that risk aversion (of employers as well as employees) is in 
turn related to the incidence of performance-related pay. However, it can be ar- 
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gued that this assumption is not correct: the incidence of performance-related 
pay may be related to ambiguity aversion rather than risk aversion. Gender may 
however also serve as a proxy for differences in labour force attachment. Differ-
ences in labour force attachment are likely to be only relevant for employers, not 
for employees, which seems consistent with our lack of empirical support for the 
presence of an entrepreneurial gender effect. 
 
For a better understanding of gender effects in remuneration policies, future 
studies should further develop the relationships between performance-related 
pay, risk aversion and ambiguity aversion and labour force attachment, both 
theoretically and empirically. 
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1  Introduction 
Strong debate on performance-related pay 
Until a few years ago, performance-related pay was becoming more and more 
accepted and used. This changed dramatically when Lehman Brothers went bank-
rupt in September 2008. In a reaction to the crisis that followed, many claimed 
that the practice of performance-related pay in especially the financial sector 
was one of the main causes for the current crisis. The debate on the advantages 
and disadvantages of performance-related pay (and how it should be designed) 
is still ongoing. 
 
This debate tends to focus on large enterprises, where variable payment can ac-
count for a large share of total payment. The situation in small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) tends to be ignored in this discussion. For various rea-
sons, this is not surprising. First of all, relatively little is known about payment 
systems in SMEs. In 2006, the Amsterdam Centre for Entrepreneurship (ACE) 
and EIM conducted a survey amongst 369 Dutch SMEs regarding their remunera-
tion system. This is still one of the few surveys on this subject that includes 
SMEs. Secondly, the variable share of total payment tends to be relatively small 
in SMEs. Amongst others, the EIM - ACE survey included questions on the pay-
ment practices of the best-paid employee within each enterprise. The results in-
dicate that, within the group of best-paid employees that received some form of 
performance-related pay, the variable share of their wage was on average 8% 
(De Kok et al., 2007). 
 
Previous research: determinants of performance-related pay in SMEs 
Van Praag et al. (2006) argue that many small and medium-sized enterprises 
might benefit from the introduction of performance-related pay: if implemented 
properly, it could help enterprises in selecting, hiring and motivating the right 
employees for the right jobs. So far, however, performance-related pay in SMEs 
has received little academic attention. One of the few studies on this topic is that 
by Roepers and De Kok (2007). Using the EIM - ACE survey, they explore deter-
minants of performance-related pay amongst SMEs. In particular, they examined 
whether the incidence of performance-related pay for employees is related to the 
size and ownership structure of the enterprise and to the gender of the entrepre-
neur and the employees. Their results indicate that each of these variables is in-
deed related to the incidence of performance-related pay: larger firms are more 
likely to provide performance-related pay than smaller firms, and firms with a 
single owner and family firms are less likely to provide performance-related pay 
than firms with multiple owners (that are not related to each other). They also 
found a gender effect. 
 
The gender effect that Roepers and De Kok (2007) found was, however, different 
from what they expected. They expected that both the gender of the entrepre-
neur and the gender composition of the workforce would affect the probability of 
performance-related pay, but that these two effects would be independent of 
each other. Instead, they found a close relationship between these two effects. 
For male entrepreneurs, they found that the use of performance-related pay is 
independent of the gender composition of the work force. For female entrepre- 
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neurs, however, they found that the usage of performance-related pay increases 
with the share of male employees. 
 
Objective of the study 
The role of the gender of the manager or (direct) supervisor on wages of subor-
dinates has been considered before (Cohen and Huffman, 2007; Hultin and 
Szulkin, 2003). Likewise, the relationship between employee gender and per-
formance-related pay has been studied before (Geddes and Heywood, 2003). 
However, as far as we know, the paper by Roepers and De Kok (2007) is the 
only paper that considers both the gender of the entrepreneur and the gender 
composition of the workforce. 
 
In this paper we further investigate the gender effect in remuneration policies as 
found in Roepers and de Kok (2007). The central idea of this paper is that female 
and male entrepreneurs make different choices regarding their human resource 
management practices, including remuneration policies (Mukhtar, 2002; Verheul 
et al, 2002). These differences can be explained by differences in the risk aver-
sion of male and female employees and entrepreneurs. We derive several hy-
potheses on how the interaction between the entrepreneurial gender and the 
gender composition of the workforce might affect the incidence of performance-
related pay. These hypotheses are then tested, using the same dataset as 
Roepers and de Kok (2007). 
 
Outline 
In the next chapter we present the theoretical framework for this study and dis-
cuss the hypotheses that we will test. In chapter three we describe the data that 
we use to test these hypotheses. The results are presented in chapter four. As 
we will see, most of our hypotheses cannot be confirmed. Generally speaking, 
the available data does not support our ideas on how differences in risk aversion 
result in gender differences in the incidence of performance-related pay. Chapter 
five therefore starts with a discussion of possible explanations for our lack of 
positive results. After this discussion the main conclusions of our study are pre-
sented. 
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2  Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
2.1  The general case for performance-related pay 
An employment contract is an example of a relationship between a principal and 
an agent, where the principal delegates work to the agent. In such principal-
agent relationships, two types of problems can occur, related to differences in 
goals and risk aversion between the agent and the principal. The first type of 
problem occurs when the principal and agent have different desires or goals and 
when it is difficult or expensive for the principal to monitor the agent's behav-
iour. This goal conflict introduces the risk of moral hazard: the risk that the 
agent may not provide the level of effort that was agreed upon. In this case, the 
agent is shirking. The second problem arises when the principal and the agent 
have different attitudes toward risk. The principal and the agent may prefer dif-
ferent actions while executing the work, because of their different risk prefer-
ences. (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 
These problems may be (partly) solved by using performance-related pay (for 
example, piece rate payment, commissions, bonuses or profit sharing) as a gov-
ernance mechanism. If designed properly, including performance-related pay as 
part of the contract between the principal and the agent may prevent opportun-
istic agent behaviour. This will occur if the preferences of agents and principals 
are realigned in such a way that the rewards for both depend on the same ac-
tions. In such cases, the conflicts of self interest between principal and agent are 
reduced (Eisenhardt, 1989) and the agent is motivated to provide the efforts de-
sired by the principal. In fact, one of the most important objectives of compen-
sation is to provide proper and effective motivation to employees (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1992). 
 
Performance pay and firm size 
In larger firms, shirking is less easy to detect. This increases the risk that shirk-
ing will actually occur (Chang, 2006). Larger firms therefore have more need for 
governance mechanisms to combat moral hazard and shirking. By using per-
formance-related pay, firms can reduce the risk of shirking, because this re-
moves (or reduces) the potential conflicts of self interest between employer and 
employees. The benefits of performance-related pay are therefore likely to in-
crease with firm size. At the same time, the costs (per employee) of developing 
and maintaining performance-related pay system are likely to decrease with firm 
size: Larger firms have a larger demand for human resources, and therefore a 
larger demand for specific HRM practices. This stimulates standardization and 
formalization of these practices. Most formalized HRM practices require consider-
able development costs. This results in a cost advantage for larger firms, which 
is strengthened by the limited supply of financial resources of many small firms 
(De Kok, Uhlaner and Thurik, 2006). 
 
These arguments suggest that the net benefits of performance-related pay will 
increase with firm size. This is consistent with the finding from previous research  
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that performance-related pay is more common amongst large firms than 
amongst SMEs (Van Praag et al., 2006). 
 
Performance pay and risk aversion 
The realignment of the agent's preferences with those of the principal often re-
quires that certain risks are transferred from the principal to the agent (Eisen-
hardt, 1989). This is also the case with performance-related pay, where the risk 
of under-performance is shared between the principal and the agent. The extent 
to which this actually takes place depends on the actual levels of risk aversion of 
the relevant principal and agents. In agency theory it is often assumed that firms 
are risk neutral (e.g. because firms are owned by different investors with well-
diversified portfolios) while individual employees are risk averse (Chang, 2006; 
Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). This creates a stimulus to provide a fixed wage to 
the risk-averse employees: by transferring most of the income risks of employ-
ees to the firm, the employees are better of while the firm is not affected. It is 
doubtful, however, whether this assumption also applies in the case of SMEs. For 
example, the idea that the firm is owned by different investors with well-
diversified portfolios does not apply to the majority of SMEs. Often, SMEs are 
single owned-managed enterprises. In these cases, the level of risk aversion of 
the firm is basically determined by the risk aversion of the entrepreneur. This, in 
turn, may be related to the entrepreneurs' gender. 
2.2  Gender differences in risk attitude: five hypotheses 
It is well established that the risk attitude of individuals is partly related to their 
gender (Bajtelsmit and Bernasek, 1996; Borghans et al., 2009; Dohmen and 
Falk, 2001). It is however difficult to identify the causes of this gender differ-
ence: it is generally only possible to observe the outcomes of decisions, and not 
the decision-making processes themselves. 
 
Borghans et al. (2009) use experiments to examine possible determinants of risk 
aversion. They find that risk aversion is partly determined by psychological traits 
such as the "big 5"
1. Gender differences in these traits explain only a small part 
of gender differences in risk aversion. In the context of financial decisions, risk 
aversion is also related to wealth: in an absolute sense (the amount of money 
invested in risky assets), risk aversion decreases with wealth (Bajtelsmit and 
Bernasek, 1996). Since women have lower wages than men (both in general and 
for comparable positions), this suggests an indirect gender effect on risk aver-
sion. 
 
If female employees are more risk averse then male employees, they require a 
higher risk premium to accept performance-related pay. When comparing a fixed 
wage offer with a performance-related pay offer with a certain risk premium, fe-
male employees will be more likely to prefer the fixed wage offer. This is con-
firmed by an empirical study by Dohmen and Falk (2001). They find that women 
are more risk averse than men, and that this difference in risk preference ex-
 
1 The big 5 represent the following five basic dimensions of personality: openness, conscientious-
ness, extraversion, agreeableness and neuroticism.  
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plains their attitude towards variable pay: 68% of the 119 male participants of 
their study prefer a variable pay, compared to 44% of the 121 women. 
If female employees require a higher risk premium to accept performance-
related pay, this reduces the expected benefits of performance-related pay for 
the entrepreneur. This, in turn, makes it less likely that performance-related pay 
will occur. Thus, we expect that the share of women in the workforce will have a 
negative effect on the probability that a firm will introduce performance-related 
pay. 
 
The causality may also run in the opposite direction. If performance-related pay 
is actually introduced, this may stimulate the outflow of female employees. This 
will occur if the new wage offer (including both a variable and fixed part) is not 
high enough to cover the demanded risk premium. In addition, the presence of 
performance-related pay can stimulate the inflow of male applicants. Thus, the 
presence of performance-related pay can have a negative effect on the share of 
women in the workforce. 
 
Irrespective of the direction of causality, these arguments suggest a negative 
correlation between the share of women in the workforce and the incidence of 
performance-related pay. This leads to our first hypothesis: 
 
H1: Performance-related pay is less used for female employees than 
for male employees 
 
The gender difference in risk aversion does not only apply to the population in 
general, but also to the population of entrepreneurs. Female entrepreneurs tend 
to be more risk averse than male entrepreneurs (ENSR 1996; Verheul and 
Thurik, 2001). This suggests that (ceteris paribus) female entrepreneurs are 
more likely to transfer some of the company risk onto their employees (Chang, 
2006). This can be done by using performance-related pay. This results in the 
second hypothesis of this study: 
 
H2: Female entrepreneurs are more likely to use performance-related 
pay than male entrepreneurs 
 
This hypothesis is supported by gender differences in management style. Verheul 
(2003) has studied the gender effect of management styles in small firms in the 
Netherlands, and found that female entrepreneurs are more likely to use formal 
HRM practices than male entrepreneurs. She distinguishes between commitment 
and control oriented management. The higher the degree to which procedures 
and regulation are formalized, the higher the degree of control over employees 
and the production process is. She finds that female-led firms have a more con-
trol-oriented type of HRM than male-led firms. This result implies that female en-
trepreneurs can be associated with a higher degree of formalization. This is con-
sistent with a higher usage of performance-related pay. 
 
In contrast, Verheul, Risseeuw and Bartelse (2002) suggest that female entre-
preneurs may be more inclined to use non-pecuniary rewards, such as flexibility 
of working hours, childcare facilities and verbal compliments, to motivate their 
employees. Their relatively high attention for non-pecuniary rewards would imply 
that female entrepreneurs would be less likely to use performance-related pay  
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than male entrepreneurs. However, they do not find significant support for the 
assumptions of less performance-related pay. Therefore the expectation remains 
that female entrepreneurs are more likely to use performance-related pay 
schemes. 
 
The first hypothesis is related to the gender composition of the workforce, while 
the second hypothesis is related to the gender of the entrepreneur. We assume 
that these two effects work independently of each other. In that case, the com-
bination of these hypotheses results in the following two additional hypotheses: 
H3: Performance-related pay is most likely to occur in firms with a 
female entrepreneur and a high share of male employees 
H4: Performance-related pay is least likely to occur in firms with a 
male entrepreneurs and a high share of female employees 
 
As we noted before, it is often assumed that firms are risk neutral while individ-
ual employees are risk averse. If this is the case, we should find empirical sup-
port for hypothesis H1 but not for H2 (and therefore also not for H3 and H4). In 
addition, we expect to find support for another hypothesis, concerning the effect 
of performance-related pay on firm profits. Whether or not the usage of per-
formance-related pay will have a positive effect on profits depends on many dif-
ferent factors. One of these factors is the risk premium that the entrepreneur 
has to offer to the employees, in order to make them accept the new system
1. 
This risk premium is higher for female employees than for male employees. 
Hence, if the share of male employees is relatively high, the expected costs of 
using performance-related pay will be relatively low, making it more likely that 
performance-related pay will be beneficial to the overall profits of the firm. Con-
versely, if the share of female employees is relatively high, profits are likely to 
be higher using fixed wages (wages not related to performance) rather than per-
formance-related pay. Formulated differently: we expect that pay policies that 
are consistent with efficient risk sharing vary with the gender composition of the 
workforce. If the share of female employees is low, efficient pay policies involve 
performance-related pay; if the share of female employees is high, efficient pay 
policies involve fixed wages only. 
 
Our final hypothesis is that firms with an efficient pay policy as defined above 
will generate higher profits than firms with an inefficient pay policy. With small 
firms, it is often difficult to differentiate between the entrepreneur's income and 
the profit of the enterprise. This is especially the case if the enterprise has the 
legal form of a sole proprietorship: in this case, the entrepreneur cannot receive 
a wage, so the entrepreneurial income is part of the generated profits. We there-
fore formulate this hypothesis in terms of entrepreneurial income rather than 
profit. This results in the following hypothesis: 
H5: The income of the entrepreneur is higher when we observe pay 
policies consistent with efficient risk sharing 
 
 
1 Often, the entrepreneur of an SME may have the authority to introduce and use a performance-
related pay system without employee approval. Nevertheless, if the entrepreneur wants to retain 
valuable employees and keep them motivated, it is important that the employees feel that they 
are compensated for the financial risk that comes with performance-related pay.  
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3  Research methodology 
3.1  Questionnaire and sampling framework 
The dataset that we use for this study has previously been used by De Kok et al. 
(2007) and Roepers and de Kok (2007). In this section we give a brief descrip-
tion of the questionnaire and the sampling framework. More details can be found 
in De Kok et al. (2007). 
3.1.1 Questionnaire 
The questionnaire was developed by De Kok et al. (2007) based on prior knowl-
edge, in-house expertise and existing questionnaires. The concept questionnaire 
was tested through several pilot interviews. This resulted in a few adjustments in 
the formulation of the survey questions. The final survey focuses on the remu-
neration of the entrepreneur and the best-paid employee. In addition, the ques-
tionnaire also contains questions regarding structural and personal characteris-
tics of the firm and its employees. 
3.1.2 Sample 
The data has been gathered through a telephone survey in June and July 2006. 
The sample is stratified by size (varying from one to 100 employees on the pay-
roll), sector and age, and consists of 369 Dutch SMEs. Table 1 shows the distri-
bution of the sample by size and age. The questions in the survey were answered 
by the independent entrepreneurs (in case of a single owned firm), the major 
business partner (in case of a partnership), or by the general director (in other 
legal structures). 
Table 1  Sampled firms, by reported firm size and firm age 
Age category* 
Number of employees 
0 - 3 years  4 - 9 years  >= 10 years  Total 
1  8  13  7  28 
2 - 9   18  42  69  129 
10 - 49   11  27  80  118 
50 - 99  15  16  63  94 
Total  52  98  219  369 
  * After imputing missing values for 28 observations. 
  Source: EIM and ACE. 
3.2  Dependent variables 
The first four hypotheses concern the usage of performance-related pay within 
small and medium-sized enterprises. Our data set allows us to use two different 
indicators of performance-related pay by employees: a specific indicator con-
cerning performance-related pay for the best-paid employee in the firm, and an 
indicator concerning the application of performance-related pay for employees in  
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general. The fifth hypothesis concerns the entrepreneurial income, for which we 
use a single measure. In this section we describe the three dependent variables 
that are used in our study. 
 
Use of performance-related pay for the best-paid employee 
The remuneration of employees can consist of various components. To determine 
the composition of the remuneration of the best-paid employee, we asked which 
of the following components were actually received by the best-paid employee 
during 2005: 
−  fixed wage; 
−  profit sharing; 
−  bonus; 
−  options (only in case of a limited liability company); 
−  company car, phone or computer. 
 
Since it is not clear if the usage of a company car, phone or computer is related 
to the performance of the employee, we do not include these remuneration com-
ponents in our measurement for performance-related pay for the best-paid em-
ployee. We also decided not to use information on the usage of options, since 
this was mentioned by only three respondents. The resulting indicator for per-
formance-related pay for the best-paid employee thus indicates whether the 
best-paid employee received a share of the profit or a bonus during 2005. This is 
the case for 32% of our observations. 
 
Use of performance-related pay for some or all employees 
The questionnaire includes a single question on performance-based pay for the 
workforce as a whole, asking whether or not the enterprise makes use of per-
formance-related pay for some or all of its employees. This is the case for 34% 
of our observations. 
 
There is a reasonable overlap with the indicator of performance-related pay for 
the best-paid employee, but it is not very strong. About a third of all enterprises 
that use performance-related pay for at least some employees indicate that their 
best-paid employee did not receive a share of the profits or a bonus. What is 
more problematic is that about a third of the enterprises that reported that their 
best-paid employee received a bonus or participated in profit sharing, answered 
'no' to the question whether at least some of their employees received any per-
formance-related pay. If both indicators would indicate the same type of pay-
ment systems, this would not be possible. Presumably, the difference in the 
wording of the questions resulted in a different interpretation by the respondent 
of the specific remuneration components that should be taken into consideration. 
 
Entrepreneurial income 
The annual income of an entrepreneur can also include various components, 
where the choice for specific components depends (amongst others) on fiscal 
legislation and the legal structure of the enterprise. For example, in the Nether-
lands entrepreneurs can only receive a wage if their enterprise is organised as a 
limited liability company, not in case of a sole proprietorship. 
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In the questionnaire, we asked whether the entrepreneur received any of the fol-
lowing income components (and, if so, the level of that component): 
−  fixed wage (including management fee in case of a limited liability company); 
−  profit sharing. In case of a sole proprietorship or partnership, we first asked if 
the respondent would indicate the profit level; we then asked which part of 
this profit was used for private means. In case of a limited liability company 
we directly asked for the amount of profit received by the respondent; 
−  bonus; 
−  shares (only in case of a limited liability company); 
−  options (only in case of a limited liability company). 
 
Of these income components, shares and options were the least common. This is 
partly due to the fact that these components can only occur in the case of a lim-
ited liability company. However, also within this subset of enterprises shares and 
options do not occur often: 27 respondents received shares as part of their in-
come, 7 respondents received options, and only 3 respondents could indicate the 
value of the received shares or options. We therefore decided to exclude shares 
and options from our definition of entrepreneurial income. Hence, we define en-
trepreneurial income as the sum of the received wage, profit sharing or bonuses 
for 2005. 
 
Information on the entrepreneurial income is available for 170 respondents. Of 
these respondents, 25 reported an income equal to zero, another three respon-
dents reported a total annual income of less than € 10 000,-. At the other end of 
the distribution, three entrepreneurs reported an annual income ranging from 
€ 400 000 to € 700 000. Summary statistics are reported in Table 2. These sta-
tistics show a large gender effect. This will be explored further in the next chap-
ter. 
Table 2  Summary statistics: entrepreneurial income by gender of the entrepreneur 
Variable  Mean  Standard deviation 
Number of valid 
observations 
Income level entrepreneur (x € 1.000):       
    male entrepreneurs  77.8  97.2  155 
    female entrepreneurs  32.8  50.2  15 
    all entrepreneurs  73.9  94.8  170 
  Source: EIM and ACE 
  Notes: 1) income is defined as the sum of wages, profit shares, bonuses or gratuities; 
2) "entrepreneur" refers to the respondent of the questionnaire. This is the CEO or general 
manager of the firm. 
3.3  Independent variables 
Characteristics of the firm 
Relevant firm characteristics include sector, firm size and firm age. Sector is rep-
resented by a standard classification into eight different sectors (manufacturing; 
construction; automotive; wholesale; retail; transport and communication; hotels  
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and restaurants; services) and firm size is represented by the number of em-
ployees of the firm. 
 
Regarding firm age, our dataset allows us to differentiate between the legal age 
and the economic age of the organisations. The legal age is the age of the cur-
rent legal form of the organisation. This is the age that is registered at e.g. the 
Chamber of Commerce. An organisation's economic age indicates how long the 
firm has been economically active. De Kok et al. (2007) show that the legal and 
economic age of firms often differ, in which case the economic age generally ex-
ceeds the legal age. A possible explanation for this might be that the legal struc-
ture of the organisation has changed over time. In this study we control for pos-
sible age effects by including the logarithm of the economic age
1. Not all firms 
provided information regarding their age. For 39 firms, missing values were im-
puted. 
 
Some studies report a strong correlation between firm size and firm age (e.g. 
Heyman, 2007). This could make it difficult to distinguish between size and age 
effects. To check whether this is also the case in our sample, we examined the 
correlation between economical age and number of employees. This correlation is 
0.07; if we exclude firms of 75 years or more, the correlation increases some-
what, but is still only 0.15. We therefore conclude that there is no risk that ef-
fects of firm size and firm age cannot be distinguished from each other. 
 
Characteristics of the entrepreneur 
Available information regarding the entrepreneur includes gender, age, educa-
tional level, tenure and experience. 
 
Women make up 15% of the entrepreneurs in our sample (54 out of 369 entre-
preneurs in total). This share is considerably lower than the share of female en-
trepreneurs in Dutch enterprises: 30% of all Dutch entrepreneurs is female
2. The 
relatively low share of female entrepreneurs in our sample may be due to the 
fact that female entrepreneurs tend to employ fewer employees and work fewer 
hours in their enterprise than male employees. Given that we only included firms 
with employees in our sample and that small firms are underrepresented as 
compared to medium-sized enterprises, this would result in a relative low share 
of female entrepreneurs in our sample. This explanation is consistent with the 
results of an exploratory probit regression, where we relate the gender of the 
entrepreneur to firm size and sector dummies. The results indicate a highly sig-
nificant (p<0.001) negative relationship between firm size and the likelihood that 
an entrepreneur is a woman. 
 
Characteristics of the workforce 
The nature of remuneration policies is often related to basic characteristics of the 
workforce such as gender, age and educational level. For this study we have in-
formation about the gender, age and educational decomposition of the work-
force. Summary statistics are included in Table 3. Notice that the gender of the 
 
1 The age variable included in Table 1 also refers to economic age. 
2 Source: ‘demografische aspecten van ondernemers’ (demographic aspects of entrepreneurs), a 
Dutch dataset available at www.entrepreneurship-sme.eu;   
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entrepreneur is related to the gender of the workforce: with male entrepreneurs, 
the majority of employees is male, while with female entrepreneurs the majority 
of employees is female. 
Table 3  Summary statistics: characteristics of the workforce 
Variable  Mean  Standard deviation 
Number of valid 
observations 
gender decomposition of the workforce  
(percentage male employees): 
     
    Within firms with male entrepreneurs  63.5%  31.6  289 
    Within firms with female entrepreneurs  42.3%  34.4  45 
Within all firms  60.6%  32.8  334 
age decomposition of the workforce:       
   share of employees <= 24  27.1%  27.4  336 
   share of employees 25 - 44  53.8%  27.3  336 
   share of elder employees >=45   19.2%  22.3  336 
educational decomposition of workforce:       
   share of low-educated employees  33.5%  34.3  329 
   share of medium-educated employees  45.1%  33.7  329 
   share of high-educated employees  21.4%  30.4  329 
  Source: EIM and ACE. 
Characteristics of the best-paid employee 
41 Respondents could not (or would not) identify the best-paid employee within 
their organisation. Consequently, these respondents could not provide any in-
formation on the remuneration of these employees. This leaves 328 observations 
which can be used to analyse the structure of the remuneration of the best-paid 
employee. 
 
Relevant characteristics of the best-paid employee include gender, age, educa-
tion, occupational level and tenure of the best-paid employee. Summary statis-
tics are presented in Table 4 (variable means) and Table 5 (valid observations).  
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Table 4  Summary statistics for the best-paid employee: variable means, by gender of 
entrepreneur and gender of best-paid employee 
Variable  All  By gender of entrepreneur 
By gender of  
best-paid employee 
    male  female  male  female 
age of the best-paid employee  39.2  39.8  35.3  39.8  36.9 
educational level: share of best-paid 
employees with high education   40%  41%  30%  41%  35% 
tenure of the best-paid employee 
(years)  6.5  6.8  4.8  7.2  4.1 
occupational level: share of best-paid 
employees with management position   48%  51%  26%  55%  24% 
  Source: EIM and ACE. 
Table 5  Summary statistics for the best-paid employee: variable counts (valid observa-
tions), by gender of entrepreneur and gender of best-paid employee 
Variable  All  By gender of entrepreneur 
By gender of  
best-paid employee 
    male  female  male  female 
age of the best-paid employee  326  279  47  254  72 
educational level: share of best-paid 
employees with high education   327  281  47  255  72 
tenure of the best-paid employee 
(years)  326  280  47  254  72 
occupational level: share of best-paid 
employees with management position   327  280  47  255  72 
  Source: EIM and ACE. 
It is interesting to notice that the characteristics of the best-paid employee are 
not only related to the gender of employee, but also to the gender of the entre-
preneur. To a considerable extent, this is because the gender of the entrepre-
neur and of the best-paid employee often coincide: for 78% of the firms in our 
sample, the entrepreneur and the best-paid employee are of the same gender 
(Table 6). In particular, the large majority of male entrepreneurs has a male 
best-paid employee, while for female entrepreneurs the gender of the best-paid 
employee is evenly distributed: 49% of the female entrepreneurs employ a fe-
male as best-paid employee; for male entrepreneurs, this is only 9%
1. 
 
1 Fisher’s exact test rejects the hypothesis that the gender of the entrepreneur and of the best-
paid employee are independent of each other at a significance level of 0.000.  
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Table 6  Gender of the entrepreneur and the best-paid employee 
Gender best-paid employee 
Gender entrepreneur  Male  Female  Total 
Male  231  49  280 
Female  24  23  47 
Total  255  72  327 
  Source: EIM and ACE. 
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4  Results 
In chapter two we formulated five different hypotheses. Our hypotheses involve 
three different dependent variables: the usage of performance-related pay for 
the best-paid employee in the firm, the usage of performance-related pay for the 
workforce in general and entrepreneurial income (as indicator for firm perform-
ance). The first four hypotheses will be tested separately for performance-
related pay for the best-paid employee and for the workforce in general, while 
the fifth hypothesis will be tested on the entrepreneurial income. In this chapter 
we present the results of our analyses for each of these three dependent vari-
ables. 
4.1  Performance-related pay for the best-paid employee 
To test hypotheses H1 to H4 for the case of the best-paid employee, we estimate 
two equations: 
−  Equation 1: an equation that relates the use of performance-related pay for 
the best-paid employee to firm characteristics, entrepreneurial characteristics 
(including a gender dummy) and characteristics of the best-paid employee 
(including a gender dummy). This will be estimated by a probit regression. 
The results will be used to test hypotheses H1 and H2; 
−  Equation 2: as equation 1, replacing the gender dummies for the entrepreneur 
and the best-paid employee with two dummies that indicate the enterprises 
that are assumed to be most likely (firms with a female entrepreneur and a 
male best-paid employee) and least likely (firms with a male entrepreneur and 
a female best paid employee) to apply performance-related pay for the best-
paid employee. This will be estimated by a probit regression. The results will 
be used to test hypotheses H3 and H4. 
 
Ideally, we would have liked to estimate these equations separately for manage-
rial and non-managerial employees. Our sample is, however, too small to limit 
our estimations to either subsample. As a second-best solution, we include a 
dummy for the occupational position of the best-paid employee in the equations 
(see e.g. Brown and Medoff, 2003). 
 
Equations 1 and 2 have been estimated with and without sector dummies. The 
results indicate that including sector dummies does not change any of the rele-
vant findings
1, while it reduces the available degrees of freedom considerably 
(the number of observations is limited). We therefore present the estimation re-
sults for these equations without sector dummies. These results are presented in 
Table 7. 
 
1 Estimating model 1 with sector dummies results in 1 significant sector dummy (retail) and re-
duces the significance of the employer characteristics somewhat; estimating model 2 with sector 
dummies results in 1 significant sector dummies (retail) and reduces the significance of the em-
ployer characteristics somewhat; otherwise, no differences occur.  
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Table 7  Probit regressions on the use of performance-related pay (profit-sharing or bo-
nus) for the best-paid employee. 




value  Sign. level 
Parameter 
value  Sign. level  
Firm characteristics         
firm size (ln)  0.067  0.320  0.087  0.184 
firm age (ln)  -0.23**  0.018  -0.22**  0.022 
Employer characteristics         
age (ln)  0.85*  0.077  0.83*  0.082 
experience (ln)  0.04  0.786  0.08  0.637 
phd degree (dummy)  0.58**  0.014  0.63***  0.008 
Female entrepreneur(dummy)  -0.15  0.545  -   
Characteristics best-paid employee         
age (ln)  -0.26  0.505  -0.23  0.555 
tenure (ln)  0.38***  0.001  0.37***  0.001 
Medium education (dummy)  0.24  0.386  0.22  0.43 
high education (dummy)  0.76***  0.009  0.73**  0.012 
Female employee (dummy)  -0.10  0.657  -   
Management position (dummy)  0.52  0.147  0.53  0.141 
Gender comparison employer/employee         
female entrepreneur, male employee 
(dummy) 
-    0.11  0.723 
male entrepreneur, female employee 
(dummy) 
-    0.08  0.728 
Constant  -3.44*  0.065  -3.65**  0.048 
         
Goodness of Fit Measures         
Pseudo R
2  0.1482    0.1471   
Log likelihood  -172.1    -172.3   
Valid Observations  307    307   
  *; **; *** Denote a significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
The results for both equations are very similar: the likelihood that a firm applies 
performance-related pay for its best-paid employee is higher for younger firms, 
for firms with elder and highly educated entrepreneurs, and for employees with 
high tenure and a high educational level. There is no indication that firm size is 
relevant. More important, there is also no indication of any gender effect: con-
cerning the remuneration of the best-paid employee, we find no support for hy-
potheses H1 to H4. Specifically, the results of equation 1 reject hypotheses H1 
and H2: neither the gender of the entrepreneur nor the gender of the best-paid 
employee are related to the probability that the best-paid employee receives 
performance-related pay. Likewise, the results of equation 2 reject hypotheses 
H3 and H4. This follows from the insignificance of the dummies indicating the  
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firms that are most and least likely to apply performance-related pay for the 
best-paid employee. 
4.2  Performance-related pay for the workforce in general 
Regarding the workforce in general, we use a similar approach to test hypothe-
ses H1 to H4. Again, two equations are estimated: 
−  Equation 3: an equation that relates the use of performance-related pay for 
some or all of the employees to firm characteristics, entrepreneurial charac-
teristics (including a gender dummy) and characteristics of the workforce as a 
whole (including the share of male employees). This will be estimated by a 
probit regression. The results will be used to test hypotheses H1 and H2; 
−  Equation 4: as equation 3, replacing the entrepreneurial gender dummy and 
the share of male employees with two dummies that indicate the enterprises 
that are assumed to be most likely (firms with a female entrepreneur and a 
relatively high share of male employees) and least likely (firms with a male 
entrepreneur and a relatively high share of female employees) to apply per-
formance-related pay to the workforce in general. This will be estimated by a 
probit regression. The results will be used to test hypotheses H3 and H4. 
 
The estimation of equation 4 requires that we classify enterprises into three 
categories, based on the gender of the entrepreneur and whether the share of 
(fe)male employees is relatively high or low. The second criterion can be opera-
tionalised in different ways. A straightforward approach is to determine various 
percentiles of the distribution of the share of male employees, and consider the 
lowest/highest percentiles as those with relatively low/high shares of male em-
ployees. The question then remains, how many percentiles to distinguish. An in-
crease in the number of percentiles may increase the differences between the 
lowest and highest percentiles (thus increasing the likelihood of finding statisti-
cally significant differences), but also decreases the number of observations 
within the percentiles (thus decreasing the likelihood of finding statistically sig-
nificant differences). Since this is an explorative study, we have estimated equa-
tion 4 based on the outcomes of using two, three and four percentiles. In this 
paper, we report the outcomes with the highest significance levels for the vari-
ables of interest. 
 
As it turns out, distinguishing four percentiles provided the highest significance 
levels for the two dummy variables indicating enterprises that are most/least 
likely to apply performance-related pay. In this situation, a 'low share' of male 
employees refers to the 25% enterprises with the lowest shares of male employ-
ees (less than 37%), and a 'high share' refers to the 24% enterprises with the 
highest share of male employees (92.5% or more). Combined with the gender of 
the entrepreneur, this results in a group of 61 enterprises for which perform-
ance-related pay is least likely to occur (a male entrepreneur and a low share of 
male employees) and a group of only 6 enterprises for which performance-
related pay is most likely to occur (a female entrepreneur and a high share of 
male employees). 
 
The results are presented in Table 8, again without including sector dummies.  
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Table 8  Probit regressions on presence of performance-related pay for some or all em-
ployees in the workforce. 




value  Sign. level 
Parameter 
value  Sign. level 
Firm characteristics          
firm size (ln)  0.29***  0.068  0.31***  0.000 
firm age (ln)  -0.05  0.571  -0.04  0.623 
Employer characteristics         
age (ln)  0.82*  0.087  0.81*  0.092 
experience (ln)  -0.14  0.384  -0.10  0.503 
phd degree (dummy)  0.09  0.665  0.14  0.497 
Female entrepreneur (dummy)  -0.09  0.703  -   
Workforce characteristics         
share of highly educated employees  0.0089***  0.001  0.0087***  0.001 
share of elder employees  -0.0097**  0.019  -0.0085**  0.034 
share of male employees   0.005**  0.033  -   
Gender comparison employer/workforce         
female entrepreneur, low share female em-
ployees (dummy) 
-    1.02*  0.065 
male entrepreneur, high share female em-
ployees (dummy) 
-    -0.29  0.136 
constant  -3.78**  0.015  -3.9**  0.013 
         
Goodness of Fit Measures         
Pseudo R
2  0.1072    0.1102   
Log likelihood  -187.0    -186.3   
Valid Observations  321    321   
  *; **; *** denote a significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
The results for equations 3 and 4 are very similar: the likelihood that a firm ap-
plies performance-related pay for some (or all) of its employees is higher for lar-
ger firms, and for firms with a higher share of young and highly educated em-
ployees. Notice that these results are different from the results for equations 1 
and 2: instead of firm age, it is firm size that matters now, and employer charac-
teristics no longer seem to be very important. 
 
Equations 3 and 4 still find no support for hypotheses H2 and H4. The lack of 
support for hypothesis H2 contradicts the earlier findings by Roepers and De 
Kok, who found that female entrepreneurs are (ceteris paribus) more likely to 
provide performance-related pay than male entrepreneurs (Roepers and De Kok, 
2007, page 31). Their study, however, included less control variables. In particu-
lar, they did not control for the educational level of the entrepreneur and the age 
and education of the workforce. Once these control variables are included in the 
model, the significant effect of the gender of the entrepreneur disappears.  
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The positive parameter for the share of male employees in equation 3 supports 
hypothesis H1. In addition, the positive dummy variable that indicates firms with 
a female entrepreneur and a low share of female employees offers some support 
for hypothesis H3 (although it should be noted that this parameter is only signifi-
cant at 10%
1). This is consistent with the results by Roepers and De Kok, who 
found a significant positive effect of the interaction between the gender of the 
entrepreneur and the share of male employees (Roepers and De Kok, 2007, page 
31). 
4.3  Gender, performance-related pay and firm performance 
4.3.1 Controlling for workforce characteristics 
To test the final hypothesis, we estimate various equations with the log of the 
entrepreneurial income as dependent variable. 
−  Equation 5: the starting point is an equation that relates the (log of the) in-
come level of the entrepreneur to several firm characteristics, entrepreneurial 
characteristics and workforce characteristics; 
−  Equation 6: as equation 5, including a dummy variable indicating the use of 
performance-related pay for at least some employees; 
−  Equation 7: as equation 5, including a dummy variable indicating a consistent 
pay policy: this is either a combination of performance-related pay and a high 
share of male employees, or a combination of no performance-related pay and 
a high share of female employees. 
 
Estimating equation 7 requires that we identify firms with a consistent pay pol-
icy. This, in turn, requires that we identify firms with a relatively high share of 
(fe)male employees. We use the same method as discussed in the previous sec-
tion, which is based on the percentiles of the distribution of the share of male 
employees. As is the case with equation 4, we find the best results when we use 
four different percentiles. In this case, 93 firms in the sample have a consistent 
pay policy (66 firms with relatively few male employees without performance-
related pay and 27 firms with relatively many male employees with performance-
related pay). The estimation results are reported in Table 9. 
 
According to the results for equations 5, 6 and 7, entrepreneurial income in-
creases with firm size and with the educational level of the entrepreneur as well 
as the employees. Neither the gender of the entrepreneur nor the gender com-
position of the workforce are significantly related to entrepreneurial income. 
There is also no support for hypothesis H5: while the prevalence of performance-
related pay in general is associated with a higher entrepreneurial income (equa-
tion 6), our indicator for a consistent pay policy is not (equation 7). Apparently, 
the effect of performance-related pay on entrepreneurial income does not de-
 
1 In addition, if sector dummies are included, the significance of this parameter becomes less than 
10%.  
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pend on the gender composition of the workforce; at least not in the way that we 
hypothesised
1. 
Table 9  OLS Regression results on log entrepreneurial income (robust estimators) 













firm characteristics             
firm size (ln)  0.25***  0.000  0.24***  0.000  0.26***  0.000 
firm age (ln)  -0.008  0.875  0.022  0.664  -0.009  0.860 
employer characteristics             
age (ln)  0.43  0.261  0.32  0.417  0.54  0.167 
experience (ln)  0.12  0.337  0.15  0.249  0.08  0.505 
phd degree (dummy)  0.34**  0.014  0.31**  0.024  0.31**  0.027 
Female entrepreneur (dummy)  -0.31  0.214  -0.27  0.233  -0.22  0.313 
Workforce characteristics             
share of highly educated employees  0.006***  0.006  0.006***  0.008  0.006***  0.008 
share of elder employees  -0.003  0.360  -0.002  0.452  -0.003  0.380 
share of male employees   -0.000  0.858  -0.001  0.753  -0.003  0.380 
Performance-related pay for some or 
all employees 
-    0.29***  0.009  -   
consistent pay policy  -    -    -0.23  0.137 
Constant  1.38  0.231  1.54  0.192  1.11  0.345 
             
Goodness of Fit Measures             
R
2  0.37    0.41       
Valid Observations  128    128    128   
  *; **; *** denote a significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
4.3.2 Controlling for characteristics of the best-paid employee 
In the previous section, we examined to which extent characteristics of (per-
formance-related pay for) the workforce could explain entrepreneurial income. In 
this section, we focus on characteristics of (performance-related pay for) the 
best-paid employee. This is done by including characteristics of the best-paid 
employee in equations 5 to 7, and replacing the indicators for performance-
related pay for the workforce with comparable indicators for performance-related 
pay for the best-paid employee. This results in equations 8, 9 and 10 (see Table 
10). 
 
1 Hypothesis H5 implies that for firms with a high share of male employees, performance-related 
pay would have a positive effect on entrepreneurial income; for firms with a low share of male 
employees, performance-related pay would have a negative effect on entrepreneurial income.  
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In equation 10, the dummy variable indicating consistent pay policy refers to 11 
firms with a female best-paid employee that receives no performance-related 
pay, and 47 firms with a male best-paid employee that receives performance-
related pay. 
Table 10  Regression results on firm performance (log entrepreneurial income (OLS, ro-
bust estimators), including characteristics best-paid employee 













firm characteristics             
firm size (ln)  0.28***  0.000  0.27***  0.000  0.27***  0.000 
firm age (ln)  -0.02  0.734  -0.02  0.736  0.002  0.975 
employer characteristics             
age (ln)  0.054  0.903  0.03  0.944  0.056  0.895 
experience (ln)  0.24*  0.084  0.24*  0.094  0.20  0.113 
phd degree (dummy)  0.27*  0.052  0.22  0.147  0.29*  0.059 
Female entrepreneur (dummy)  -0.28  0.292  -0.29  0.246  -0.21  0.414 
Workforce characteristics             
share of highly educated employees  0.007***  0.002  0.006**  0.012  0.008***  0.001 
share of elder employees  -0.005  0.192  -0.004  0.274  -0.005  0.187 
share of male employees   0.002  0.318  0.002  0.378  0.000  0.908 
Characteristics best-paid employee             
Female employee (dummy)  0.30  0.166  0.29  0.185  -   
performance-related pay  -    0.15  0.268  -   
consistent pay policy  -    -    -0.13  0.267 
             
Constant  2.38*  0.083  2.44*  0.086     
             
Goodness of Fit Measures             
R
2  0.3769    0.3859       
Valid Observations  117    117    117   
  *; **; *** denote a significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
The results for equations 8, 9 and 10 are similar to the results for equations 5, 6 
and 7: entrepreneurial income increases with firm size and with the educational 
level of the entrepreneur as well as the employees (although the effect of the 
educational level of the entrepreneur is somewhat lower). None of the included 
gender variables have a significant effect (gender of the entrepreneur, gender 
composition of the workforce and gender of the best-paid employee). Also here, 
there is no support for hypothesis H5: our indicator for a consistent pay policy is 
not only not significant, but even has the wrong sign (equation 10). 
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5  Discussion and conclusions 
In this study we have derived five different hypotheses concerning the gender 
effects in performance-related pay amongst small and medium-sized effects. 
These hypotheses are based on two basic assumptions: the willingness of em-
ployers and employees to accept performance-related pay depends (amongst 
others) on their levels of risk aversion, and risk aversion is gender-related. The 
empirical support for our hypotheses is, however, very limited. In this chapter 
we discuss the estimation results and end with the main conclusions. 
5.1  Discussion 
Partial support for the first hypothesis… 
According to the first hypothesis, performance-related pay would be used less for 
female employees than for male employees. We find empirical support for this 
hypothesis, but only regarding the workforce in general: firms with a larger 
share of male employees are more likely to offer performance-related pay to 
their employees. 
 
When we analyse the remuneration of the best-paid employee, we find no rela-
tionship between the employee's gender and the probability that he or she re-
ceived a share of the profit or a bonus. One explanation for this lack of support 
is that the sample size is not large enough; our data set only contains 72 obser-
vations where the best-paid employee is female. 
 
…and no support for the second hypothesis… 
The second hypothesis states that female entrepreneurs are more likely to use 
performance-related pay than male entrepreneurs. There is no support for this 
hypothesis. The results presented by Roepers and De Kok (2007) seem to sup-
port this hypothesis, but additional analysis has shown that this support is the 
result of a missing variable bias: once additional control variables are added to 
the model by Roepers and De Kok (2007), the effect of the gender of the entre-
preneur is no longer significant. 
 
…so no support for the third and fourth hypothesis should be expected 
Hypotheses H3 and H4 are only valid if the first two hypotheses are. If one of the 
first two hypotheses would not be valid, then hypotheses H3 and H4 should also 
be rejected. At a 5% confidence level, this is indeed the case. The fact that we 
find no support for hypotheses H3 and H4 is thus consistent with the lack of sup-
port for the second hypothesis. 
 
No support for the fifth hypothesis regarding entrepreneurial income 
The results of the first four hypotheses are consistent with the standard assump-
tion that firms are risk neutral while individual employees are risk averse. If this 
is the case, we expected to find support for hypothesis H5: The income of the 
entrepreneur is higher when we observe pay policies consistent with efficient risk  
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sharing. We find, however, no support for this hypothesis. Also here, this could 
be due to the limited number of observations (128 or 117 valid observations). 
 
Do we need more data… 
One interpretation of the results of our study, is that the results are largely con-
sistent with the standard assumption that firms are risk neutral while individual 
employees are risk averse. The support is not strong, but this could be explained 
by the relatively limited number of observations. According to this interpretation, 
the main finding of our study is then that we find no support for the expected re-
lationship between the gender of the entrepreneur and the incidence of perform-
ance-related pay. The small size of our sample, however, does not allow for 
strong conclusions. 
 
…or do we need an alternative theory? 
Another interpretation of the results is also possible. The empirical support for 
our hypotheses is so limited, that we should reconsider the two basic assump-
tions that underlie our hypotheses. 
 
The first assumption is that the willingness of employers and employees to ac-
cept performance-related pay depends (amongst others) on their levels of risk 
aversion. This assumption ignores the difference between risk aversion and am-
biguity aversion (Borghans et al., 2009; Machina, 2009). Individuals often find 
themselves in situations where different outcomes may occur. The probabilities 
of these outcomes may either be known or unknown. Risk aversion refers to an 
individual's behaviour in case of know probabilities, while ambiguity aversion re-
fers to an individual's behaviour in case of unknown probabilities. Since the dis-
tribution of the expected performance of employees is not known in advance, the 
incidence of performance-related pay is likely to be related to the ambiguity 
aversion of the employer and employees, rather than their risk aversion. 
 
Borghans et al. (2009) found that risk aversion and ambiguity aversion are em-
pirically distinct individual traits. Regarding risk aversion, they find that women 
are more risk averse than men, and that psychological traits are strongly associ-
ated with risk aversion. Regarding ambiguity aversion, however, they find mark-
edly different results. Men and women show similar marginal valuations of ambi-
guity (with increasing levels of ambiguity), and ambiguity aversion is not related 
to psychological traits. If ambiguity diversion is indeed not gender-related, the 
second basic assumption of our study (risk aversion is gender-related) would not 
apply in the case of ambiguity aversion. 
 
According to this line of argument, differences in risk aversion between men and 
women cannot explain gender differences in the incidence of performance-related 
pay. An alternative explanation for gender differences in the incidence of per-
formance-related pay is that they are partly caused by gender differences in la-
bour force attachment. Various authors have argued that differences in labour 
force attachment between men and women could explain part of the gender 
earnings gap (Kunze, 2005; Nordman and Roubaud, 2005). According to Geddes 
and Heywood (2003), gender differences in labour force attachment may also 
explain differences in the incidence of performance-related pay: on average, 
women have a lower labour force attachment than men, which is in turn related 
to the probability of receiving performance-based pay.  
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5.2  Conclusions 
We have found partial support for the first hypothesis, which states that female 
employees are less likely to receive performance-related pay than male employ-
ees. There is also some support for the third hypothesis, which states that per-
formance-related pay is most likely to occur in firms with a female entrepreneur 
and a high share of male employees. This support is however weak: it is only 
significant at a 10% confidence level, and is furthermore based on the compari-
son of a sample of only 6 firms (with a female entrepreneur and a high share of 
male employees) with the other firms. For the other three hypotheses, there is 
no empirical support. 
 
One interpretation of the results is that they indicate that entrepreneurs are risk 
neutral while employees are risk averse (where female employees are more risk 
averse than male employees). Due to the small sample size, however, this inter-
pretation is only tentative. Additional empirical research on considerable larger 
dataset is required. Perhaps future studies can make use of administrative data 
(e.g. of payrolling companies that target SMEs). 
 
Another interpretation is that the lack of support for our hypotheses suggests 
that we need to reconsider them, including the basic assumptions on which they 
are based. In our study, we have used gender as a proxy for the risk aversion of 
individual entrepreneurs and employees, and assumed that risk aversion (of em-
ployers as well as employees) is in turn related to the incidence of performance-
related pay. However, it can be argued that this assumption is not correct: the 
incidence of performance-related pay may be related to ambiguity aversion 
rather than risk aversion. Gender may however also serve as a proxy for differ-
ences in labour force attachment. Differences in labour force attachment are 
likely to be only relevant for employers, not for employees, which seems consis-
tent with our lack of empirical support for the presence of an entrepreneurial 
gender effect. 
 
For a better understanding of gender effects in remuneration policies, future 
studies should further develop the relationships between performance-related 
pay, risk aversion and ambiguity aversion and labour force attachment, both 
theoretically and empirically. 
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Summary 
In theory, for many small and medium-sized enterprises the introduction of per-
formance-related pay might be beneficial: if implemented properly, it could help 
enterprises in selecting, hiring and motivating the right employees for the right 
jobs. So far, however, performance-related pay in SMEs has received little aca-
demic attention. One of the few studies on this topic is that by Roepers and De 
Kok (2007), who explore determinants of performance-related pay amongst 
SMEs. Amongst others, they found support for the presence of gender effects; 
not only regarding the gender of the employees, but also regarding the gender of 
the entrepreneur. 
 
In this paper we further investigate the gender effect in remuneration policies as 
found in Roepers and de Kok (2007). The central idea of this paper is that female 
and male entrepreneurs make different choices regarding their human resource 
management practices, including remuneration policies. These differences can be 
explained by differences in the risk aversion of male and female employees and 
entrepreneurs. Generally speaking, women are more risk averse than men. This 
suggests that men and women have a different valuation of the risks that are as-
sociated with performance-related pay. We hypothesise that these different 
valuations will result in differences in the incidence of performance-related pay. 
This leads to the following five hypotheses: 
 
−  H1: Performance-related pay is less used for female employees than for male 
employees. 
−  H2: Female entrepreneurs are more likely to use performance-related pay 
than male entrepreneurs. 
−  H3: Performance-related pay is most likely to occur in firms with a female en-
trepreneur and a high share of male employees. 
−  H4: Performance-related pay is least likely to occur in firms with a male en-
trepreneurs and a high share of female employees. 
−  H5: The income of the entrepreneur is higher when we observe pay policies 
consistent with efficient risk sharing. 
 
These hypotheses are tested by estimating various probit and OLS regressions, 
using the results of a telephonic questionnaire amongst 369 Dutch entrepreneurs 
with 1 - 100 employees. 
 
At a significance level of 5%, we find partial support for hypothesis H1, but not 
for any of the other hypotheses. One explanation for these findings is that they 
indicate that employees are indeed risk averse (and men more than women) but 
that employers are not; hypothesis H1 is valid but H2 is not. In this case, hy-
potheses H3 and H4 are no longer valid, so the lack of support for hypotheses H3 
and H4 is consistent with the lack of support for H2. The lack of support for the 
fifth hypothesis may be due to the limited size of our sample (approximately 120 
valid observations were available to test this hypothesis). 
 
Another interpretation is that the lack of support for our hypotheses suggests 
that we need to reconsider them, including the basic assumptions on which they 
are based. We use gender as a proxy for the risk aversion of individual employ-
ees, and assume that risk aversion (of employers as well as employees) is in 
turn related to the incidence of performance-related pay. However, it can be ar- 
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gued that this assumption is not correct: the incidence of performance-related 
pay may be related to ambiguity aversion rather than risk aversion. Gender may 
however also serve as a proxy for differences in labour force attachment. Differ-
ences in labour force attachment are likely to be only relevant for employers, not 
for employees, which seems consistent with our lack of empirical support for the 
presence of an entrepreneurial gender effect. 
 
For a better understanding of gender effects in remuneration policies, future 
studies should further develop the relationships between performance-related 
pay, risk aversion and ambiguity aversion and labour force attachment, both 
theoretically and empirically. 
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1  Introduction 
Strong debate on performance-related pay 
Until a few years ago, performance-related pay was becoming more and more 
accepted and used. This changed dramatically when Lehman Brothers went bank-
rupt in September 2008. In a reaction to the crisis that followed, many claimed 
that the practice of performance-related pay in especially the financial sector 
was one of the main causes for the current crisis. The debate on the advantages 
and disadvantages of performance-related pay (and how it should be designed) 
is still ongoing. 
 
This debate tends to focus on large enterprises, where variable payment can ac-
count for a large share of total payment. The situation in small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) tends to be ignored in this discussion. For various rea-
sons, this is not surprising. First of all, relatively little is known about payment 
systems in SMEs. In 2006, the Amsterdam Centre for Entrepreneurship (ACE) 
and EIM conducted a survey amongst 369 Dutch SMEs regarding their remunera-
tion system. This is still one of the few surveys on this subject that includes 
SMEs. Secondly, the variable share of total payment tends to be relatively small 
in SMEs. Amongst others, the EIM - ACE survey included questions on the pay-
ment practices of the best-paid employee within each enterprise. The results in-
dicate that, within the group of best-paid employees that received some form of 
performance-related pay, the variable share of their wage was on average 8% 
(De Kok et al., 2007). 
 
Previous research: determinants of performance-related pay in SMEs 
Van Praag et al. (2006) argue that many small and medium-sized enterprises 
might benefit from the introduction of performance-related pay: if implemented 
properly, it could help enterprises in selecting, hiring and motivating the right 
employees for the right jobs. So far, however, performance-related pay in SMEs 
has received little academic attention. One of the few studies on this topic is that 
by Roepers and De Kok (2007). Using the EIM - ACE survey, they explore deter-
minants of performance-related pay amongst SMEs. In particular, they examined 
whether the incidence of performance-related pay for employees is related to the 
size and ownership structure of the enterprise and to the gender of the entrepre-
neur and the employees. Their results indicate that each of these variables is in-
deed related to the incidence of performance-related pay: larger firms are more 
likely to provide performance-related pay than smaller firms, and firms with a 
single owner and family firms are less likely to provide performance-related pay 
than firms with multiple owners (that are not related to each other). They also 
found a gender effect. 
 
The gender effect that Roepers and De Kok (2007) found was, however, different 
from what they expected. They expected that both the gender of the entrepre-
neur and the gender composition of the workforce would affect the probability of 
performance-related pay, but that these two effects would be independent of 
each other. Instead, they found a close relationship between these two effects. 
For male entrepreneurs, they found that the use of performance-related pay is 
independent of the gender composition of the work force. For female entrepre- 
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neurs, however, they found that the usage of performance-related pay increases 
with the share of male employees. 
 
Objective of the study 
The role of the gender of the manager or (direct) supervisor on wages of subor-
dinates has been considered before (Cohen and Huffman, 2007; Hultin and 
Szulkin, 2003). Likewise, the relationship between employee gender and per-
formance-related pay has been studied before (Geddes and Heywood, 2003). 
However, as far as we know, the paper by Roepers and De Kok (2007) is the 
only paper that considers both the gender of the entrepreneur and the gender 
composition of the workforce. 
 
In this paper we further investigate the gender effect in remuneration policies as 
found in Roepers and de Kok (2007). The central idea of this paper is that female 
and male entrepreneurs make different choices regarding their human resource 
management practices, including remuneration policies (Mukhtar, 2002; Verheul 
et al, 2002). These differences can be explained by differences in the risk aver-
sion of male and female employees and entrepreneurs. We derive several hy-
potheses on how the interaction between the entrepreneurial gender and the 
gender composition of the workforce might affect the incidence of performance-
related pay. These hypotheses are then tested, using the same dataset as 
Roepers and de Kok (2007). 
 
Outline 
In the next chapter we present the theoretical framework for this study and dis-
cuss the hypotheses that we will test. In chapter three we describe the data that 
we use to test these hypotheses. The results are presented in chapter four. As 
we will see, most of our hypotheses cannot be confirmed. Generally speaking, 
the available data does not support our ideas on how differences in risk aversion 
result in gender differences in the incidence of performance-related pay. Chapter 
five therefore starts with a discussion of possible explanations for our lack of 
positive results. After this discussion the main conclusions of our study are pre-
sented. 
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2  Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
2.1  The general case for performance-related pay 
An employment contract is an example of a relationship between a principal and 
an agent, where the principal delegates work to the agent. In such principal-
agent relationships, two types of problems can occur, related to differences in 
goals and risk aversion between the agent and the principal. The first type of 
problem occurs when the principal and agent have different desires or goals and 
when it is difficult or expensive for the principal to monitor the agent's behav-
iour. This goal conflict introduces the risk of moral hazard: the risk that the 
agent may not provide the level of effort that was agreed upon. In this case, the 
agent is shirking. The second problem arises when the principal and the agent 
have different attitudes toward risk. The principal and the agent may prefer dif-
ferent actions while executing the work, because of their different risk prefer-
ences. (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 
These problems may be (partly) solved by using performance-related pay (for 
example, piece rate payment, commissions, bonuses or profit sharing) as a gov-
ernance mechanism. If designed properly, including performance-related pay as 
part of the contract between the principal and the agent may prevent opportun-
istic agent behaviour. This will occur if the preferences of agents and principals 
are realigned in such a way that the rewards for both depend on the same ac-
tions. In such cases, the conflicts of self interest between principal and agent are 
reduced (Eisenhardt, 1989) and the agent is motivated to provide the efforts de-
sired by the principal. In fact, one of the most important objectives of compen-
sation is to provide proper and effective motivation to employees (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1992). 
 
Performance pay and firm size 
In larger firms, shirking is less easy to detect. This increases the risk that shirk-
ing will actually occur (Chang, 2006). Larger firms therefore have more need for 
governance mechanisms to combat moral hazard and shirking. By using per-
formance-related pay, firms can reduce the risk of shirking, because this re-
moves (or reduces) the potential conflicts of self interest between employer and 
employees. The benefits of performance-related pay are therefore likely to in-
crease with firm size. At the same time, the costs (per employee) of developing 
and maintaining performance-related pay system are likely to decrease with firm 
size: Larger firms have a larger demand for human resources, and therefore a 
larger demand for specific HRM practices. This stimulates standardization and 
formalization of these practices. Most formalized HRM practices require consider-
able development costs. This results in a cost advantage for larger firms, which 
is strengthened by the limited supply of financial resources of many small firms 
(De Kok, Uhlaner and Thurik, 2006). 
 
These arguments suggest that the net benefits of performance-related pay will 
increase with firm size. This is consistent with the finding from previous research  
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that performance-related pay is more common amongst large firms than 
amongst SMEs (Van Praag et al., 2006). 
 
Performance pay and risk aversion 
The realignment of the agent's preferences with those of the principal often re-
quires that certain risks are transferred from the principal to the agent (Eisen-
hardt, 1989). This is also the case with performance-related pay, where the risk 
of under-performance is shared between the principal and the agent. The extent 
to which this actually takes place depends on the actual levels of risk aversion of 
the relevant principal and agents. In agency theory it is often assumed that firms 
are risk neutral (e.g. because firms are owned by different investors with well-
diversified portfolios) while individual employees are risk averse (Chang, 2006; 
Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). This creates a stimulus to provide a fixed wage to 
the risk-averse employees: by transferring most of the income risks of employ-
ees to the firm, the employees are better of while the firm is not affected. It is 
doubtful, however, whether this assumption also applies in the case of SMEs. For 
example, the idea that the firm is owned by different investors with well-
diversified portfolios does not apply to the majority of SMEs. Often, SMEs are 
single owned-managed enterprises. In these cases, the level of risk aversion of 
the firm is basically determined by the risk aversion of the entrepreneur. This, in 
turn, may be related to the entrepreneurs' gender. 
2.2  Gender differences in risk attitude: five hypotheses 
It is well established that the risk attitude of individuals is partly related to their 
gender (Bajtelsmit and Bernasek, 1996; Borghans et al., 2009; Dohmen and 
Falk, 2001). It is however difficult to identify the causes of this gender differ-
ence: it is generally only possible to observe the outcomes of decisions, and not 
the decision-making processes themselves. 
 
Borghans et al. (2009) use experiments to examine possible determinants of risk 
aversion. They find that risk aversion is partly determined by psychological traits 
such as the "big 5"
1. Gender differences in these traits explain only a small part 
of gender differences in risk aversion. In the context of financial decisions, risk 
aversion is also related to wealth: in an absolute sense (the amount of money 
invested in risky assets), risk aversion decreases with wealth (Bajtelsmit and 
Bernasek, 1996). Since women have lower wages than men (both in general and 
for comparable positions), this suggests an indirect gender effect on risk aver-
sion. 
 
If female employees are more risk averse then male employees, they require a 
higher risk premium to accept performance-related pay. When comparing a fixed 
wage offer with a performance-related pay offer with a certain risk premium, fe-
male employees will be more likely to prefer the fixed wage offer. This is con-
firmed by an empirical study by Dohmen and Falk (2001). They find that women 
are more risk averse than men, and that this difference in risk preference ex-
 
1 The big 5 represent the following five basic dimensions of personality: openness, conscientious-
ness, extraversion, agreeableness and neuroticism.  
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plains their attitude towards variable pay: 68% of the 119 male participants of 
their study prefer a variable pay, compared to 44% of the 121 women. 
If female employees require a higher risk premium to accept performance-
related pay, this reduces the expected benefits of performance-related pay for 
the entrepreneur. This, in turn, makes it less likely that performance-related pay 
will occur. Thus, we expect that the share of women in the workforce will have a 
negative effect on the probability that a firm will introduce performance-related 
pay. 
 
The causality may also run in the opposite direction. If performance-related pay 
is actually introduced, this may stimulate the outflow of female employees. This 
will occur if the new wage offer (including both a variable and fixed part) is not 
high enough to cover the demanded risk premium. In addition, the presence of 
performance-related pay can stimulate the inflow of male applicants. Thus, the 
presence of performance-related pay can have a negative effect on the share of 
women in the workforce. 
 
Irrespective of the direction of causality, these arguments suggest a negative 
correlation between the share of women in the workforce and the incidence of 
performance-related pay. This leads to our first hypothesis: 
 
H1: Performance-related pay is less used for female employees than 
for male employees 
 
The gender difference in risk aversion does not only apply to the population in 
general, but also to the population of entrepreneurs. Female entrepreneurs tend 
to be more risk averse than male entrepreneurs (ENSR 1996; Verheul and 
Thurik, 2001). This suggests that (ceteris paribus) female entrepreneurs are 
more likely to transfer some of the company risk onto their employees (Chang, 
2006). This can be done by using performance-related pay. This results in the 
second hypothesis of this study: 
 
H2: Female entrepreneurs are more likely to use performance-related 
pay than male entrepreneurs 
 
This hypothesis is supported by gender differences in management style. Verheul 
(2003) has studied the gender effect of management styles in small firms in the 
Netherlands, and found that female entrepreneurs are more likely to use formal 
HRM practices than male entrepreneurs. She distinguishes between commitment 
and control oriented management. The higher the degree to which procedures 
and regulation are formalized, the higher the degree of control over employees 
and the production process is. She finds that female-led firms have a more con-
trol-oriented type of HRM than male-led firms. This result implies that female en-
trepreneurs can be associated with a higher degree of formalization. This is con-
sistent with a higher usage of performance-related pay. 
 
In contrast, Verheul, Risseeuw and Bartelse (2002) suggest that female entre-
preneurs may be more inclined to use non-pecuniary rewards, such as flexibility 
of working hours, childcare facilities and verbal compliments, to motivate their 
employees. Their relatively high attention for non-pecuniary rewards would imply 
that female entrepreneurs would be less likely to use performance-related pay  
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than male entrepreneurs. However, they do not find significant support for the 
assumptions of less performance-related pay. Therefore the expectation remains 
that female entrepreneurs are more likely to use performance-related pay 
schemes. 
 
The first hypothesis is related to the gender composition of the workforce, while 
the second hypothesis is related to the gender of the entrepreneur. We assume 
that these two effects work independently of each other. In that case, the com-
bination of these hypotheses results in the following two additional hypotheses: 
H3: Performance-related pay is most likely to occur in firms with a 
female entrepreneur and a high share of male employees 
H4: Performance-related pay is least likely to occur in firms with a 
male entrepreneurs and a high share of female employees 
 
As we noted before, it is often assumed that firms are risk neutral while individ-
ual employees are risk averse. If this is the case, we should find empirical sup-
port for hypothesis H1 but not for H2 (and therefore also not for H3 and H4). In 
addition, we expect to find support for another hypothesis, concerning the effect 
of performance-related pay on firm profits. Whether or not the usage of per-
formance-related pay will have a positive effect on profits depends on many dif-
ferent factors. One of these factors is the risk premium that the entrepreneur 
has to offer to the employees, in order to make them accept the new system
1. 
This risk premium is higher for female employees than for male employees. 
Hence, if the share of male employees is relatively high, the expected costs of 
using performance-related pay will be relatively low, making it more likely that 
performance-related pay will be beneficial to the overall profits of the firm. Con-
versely, if the share of female employees is relatively high, profits are likely to 
be higher using fixed wages (wages not related to performance) rather than per-
formance-related pay. Formulated differently: we expect that pay policies that 
are consistent with efficient risk sharing vary with the gender composition of the 
workforce. If the share of female employees is low, efficient pay policies involve 
performance-related pay; if the share of female employees is high, efficient pay 
policies involve fixed wages only. 
 
Our final hypothesis is that firms with an efficient pay policy as defined above 
will generate higher profits than firms with an inefficient pay policy. With small 
firms, it is often difficult to differentiate between the entrepreneur's income and 
the profit of the enterprise. This is especially the case if the enterprise has the 
legal form of a sole proprietorship: in this case, the entrepreneur cannot receive 
a wage, so the entrepreneurial income is part of the generated profits. We there-
fore formulate this hypothesis in terms of entrepreneurial income rather than 
profit. This results in the following hypothesis: 
H5: The income of the entrepreneur is higher when we observe pay 
policies consistent with efficient risk sharing 
 
 
1 Often, the entrepreneur of an SME may have the authority to introduce and use a performance-
related pay system without employee approval. Nevertheless, if the entrepreneur wants to retain 
valuable employees and keep them motivated, it is important that the employees feel that they 
are compensated for the financial risk that comes with performance-related pay.  
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3  Research methodology 
3.1  Questionnaire and sampling framework 
The dataset that we use for this study has previously been used by De Kok et al. 
(2007) and Roepers and de Kok (2007). In this section we give a brief descrip-
tion of the questionnaire and the sampling framework. More details can be found 
in De Kok et al. (2007). 
3.1.1 Questionnaire 
The questionnaire was developed by De Kok et al. (2007) based on prior knowl-
edge, in-house expertise and existing questionnaires. The concept questionnaire 
was tested through several pilot interviews. This resulted in a few adjustments in 
the formulation of the survey questions. The final survey focuses on the remu-
neration of the entrepreneur and the best-paid employee. In addition, the ques-
tionnaire also contains questions regarding structural and personal characteris-
tics of the firm and its employees. 
3.1.2 Sample 
The data has been gathered through a telephone survey in June and July 2006. 
The sample is stratified by size (varying from one to 100 employees on the pay-
roll), sector and age, and consists of 369 Dutch SMEs. Table 1 shows the distri-
bution of the sample by size and age. The questions in the survey were answered 
by the independent entrepreneurs (in case of a single owned firm), the major 
business partner (in case of a partnership), or by the general director (in other 
legal structures). 
Table 1  Sampled firms, by reported firm size and firm age 
Age category* 
Number of employees 
0 - 3 years  4 - 9 years  >= 10 years  Total 
1  8  13  7  28 
2 - 9   18  42  69  129 
10 - 49   11  27  80  118 
50 - 99  15  16  63  94 
Total  52  98  219  369 
  * After imputing missing values for 28 observations. 
  Source: EIM and ACE. 
3.2  Dependent variables 
The first four hypotheses concern the usage of performance-related pay within 
small and medium-sized enterprises. Our data set allows us to use two different 
indicators of performance-related pay by employees: a specific indicator con-
cerning performance-related pay for the best-paid employee in the firm, and an 
indicator concerning the application of performance-related pay for employees in  
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general. The fifth hypothesis concerns the entrepreneurial income, for which we 
use a single measure. In this section we describe the three dependent variables 
that are used in our study. 
 
Use of performance-related pay for the best-paid employee 
The remuneration of employees can consist of various components. To determine 
the composition of the remuneration of the best-paid employee, we asked which 
of the following components were actually received by the best-paid employee 
during 2005: 
−  fixed wage; 
−  profit sharing; 
−  bonus; 
−  options (only in case of a limited liability company); 
−  company car, phone or computer. 
 
Since it is not clear if the usage of a company car, phone or computer is related 
to the performance of the employee, we do not include these remuneration com-
ponents in our measurement for performance-related pay for the best-paid em-
ployee. We also decided not to use information on the usage of options, since 
this was mentioned by only three respondents. The resulting indicator for per-
formance-related pay for the best-paid employee thus indicates whether the 
best-paid employee received a share of the profit or a bonus during 2005. This is 
the case for 32% of our observations. 
 
Use of performance-related pay for some or all employees 
The questionnaire includes a single question on performance-based pay for the 
workforce as a whole, asking whether or not the enterprise makes use of per-
formance-related pay for some or all of its employees. This is the case for 34% 
of our observations. 
 
There is a reasonable overlap with the indicator of performance-related pay for 
the best-paid employee, but it is not very strong. About a third of all enterprises 
that use performance-related pay for at least some employees indicate that their 
best-paid employee did not receive a share of the profits or a bonus. What is 
more problematic is that about a third of the enterprises that reported that their 
best-paid employee received a bonus or participated in profit sharing, answered 
'no' to the question whether at least some of their employees received any per-
formance-related pay. If both indicators would indicate the same type of pay-
ment systems, this would not be possible. Presumably, the difference in the 
wording of the questions resulted in a different interpretation by the respondent 
of the specific remuneration components that should be taken into consideration. 
 
Entrepreneurial income 
The annual income of an entrepreneur can also include various components, 
where the choice for specific components depends (amongst others) on fiscal 
legislation and the legal structure of the enterprise. For example, in the Nether-
lands entrepreneurs can only receive a wage if their enterprise is organised as a 
limited liability company, not in case of a sole proprietorship. 
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In the questionnaire, we asked whether the entrepreneur received any of the fol-
lowing income components (and, if so, the level of that component): 
−  fixed wage (including management fee in case of a limited liability company); 
−  profit sharing. In case of a sole proprietorship or partnership, we first asked if 
the respondent would indicate the profit level; we then asked which part of 
this profit was used for private means. In case of a limited liability company 
we directly asked for the amount of profit received by the respondent; 
−  bonus; 
−  shares (only in case of a limited liability company); 
−  options (only in case of a limited liability company). 
 
Of these income components, shares and options were the least common. This is 
partly due to the fact that these components can only occur in the case of a lim-
ited liability company. However, also within this subset of enterprises shares and 
options do not occur often: 27 respondents received shares as part of their in-
come, 7 respondents received options, and only 3 respondents could indicate the 
value of the received shares or options. We therefore decided to exclude shares 
and options from our definition of entrepreneurial income. Hence, we define en-
trepreneurial income as the sum of the received wage, profit sharing or bonuses 
for 2005. 
 
Information on the entrepreneurial income is available for 170 respondents. Of 
these respondents, 25 reported an income equal to zero, another three respon-
dents reported a total annual income of less than € 10 000,-. At the other end of 
the distribution, three entrepreneurs reported an annual income ranging from 
€ 400 000 to € 700 000. Summary statistics are reported in Table 2. These sta-
tistics show a large gender effect. This will be explored further in the next chap-
ter. 
Table 2  Summary statistics: entrepreneurial income by gender of the entrepreneur 
Variable  Mean  Standard deviation 
Number of valid 
observations 
Income level entrepreneur (x € 1.000):       
    male entrepreneurs  77.8  97.2  155 
    female entrepreneurs  32.8  50.2  15 
    all entrepreneurs  73.9  94.8  170 
  Source: EIM and ACE 
  Notes: 1) income is defined as the sum of wages, profit shares, bonuses or gratuities; 
2) "entrepreneur" refers to the respondent of the questionnaire. This is the CEO or general 
manager of the firm. 
3.3  Independent variables 
Characteristics of the firm 
Relevant firm characteristics include sector, firm size and firm age. Sector is rep-
resented by a standard classification into eight different sectors (manufacturing; 
construction; automotive; wholesale; retail; transport and communication; hotels  
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and restaurants; services) and firm size is represented by the number of em-
ployees of the firm. 
 
Regarding firm age, our dataset allows us to differentiate between the legal age 
and the economic age of the organisations. The legal age is the age of the cur-
rent legal form of the organisation. This is the age that is registered at e.g. the 
Chamber of Commerce. An organisation's economic age indicates how long the 
firm has been economically active. De Kok et al. (2007) show that the legal and 
economic age of firms often differ, in which case the economic age generally ex-
ceeds the legal age. A possible explanation for this might be that the legal struc-
ture of the organisation has changed over time. In this study we control for pos-
sible age effects by including the logarithm of the economic age
1. Not all firms 
provided information regarding their age. For 39 firms, missing values were im-
puted. 
 
Some studies report a strong correlation between firm size and firm age (e.g. 
Heyman, 2007). This could make it difficult to distinguish between size and age 
effects. To check whether this is also the case in our sample, we examined the 
correlation between economical age and number of employees. This correlation is 
0.07; if we exclude firms of 75 years or more, the correlation increases some-
what, but is still only 0.15. We therefore conclude that there is no risk that ef-
fects of firm size and firm age cannot be distinguished from each other. 
 
Characteristics of the entrepreneur 
Available information regarding the entrepreneur includes gender, age, educa-
tional level, tenure and experience. 
 
Women make up 15% of the entrepreneurs in our sample (54 out of 369 entre-
preneurs in total). This share is considerably lower than the share of female en-
trepreneurs in Dutch enterprises: 30% of all Dutch entrepreneurs is female
2. The 
relatively low share of female entrepreneurs in our sample may be due to the 
fact that female entrepreneurs tend to employ fewer employees and work fewer 
hours in their enterprise than male employees. Given that we only included firms 
with employees in our sample and that small firms are underrepresented as 
compared to medium-sized enterprises, this would result in a relative low share 
of female entrepreneurs in our sample. This explanation is consistent with the 
results of an exploratory probit regression, where we relate the gender of the 
entrepreneur to firm size and sector dummies. The results indicate a highly sig-
nificant (p<0.001) negative relationship between firm size and the likelihood that 
an entrepreneur is a woman. 
 
Characteristics of the workforce 
The nature of remuneration policies is often related to basic characteristics of the 
workforce such as gender, age and educational level. For this study we have in-
formation about the gender, age and educational decomposition of the work-
force. Summary statistics are included in Table 3. Notice that the gender of the 
 
1 The age variable included in Table 1 also refers to economic age. 
2 Source: ‘demografische aspecten van ondernemers’ (demographic aspects of entrepreneurs), a 
Dutch dataset available at www.entrepreneurship-sme.eu;   
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entrepreneur is related to the gender of the workforce: with male entrepreneurs, 
the majority of employees is male, while with female entrepreneurs the majority 
of employees is female. 
Table 3  Summary statistics: characteristics of the workforce 
Variable  Mean  Standard deviation 
Number of valid 
observations 
gender decomposition of the workforce  
(percentage male employees): 
     
    Within firms with male entrepreneurs  63.5%  31.6  289 
    Within firms with female entrepreneurs  42.3%  34.4  45 
Within all firms  60.6%  32.8  334 
age decomposition of the workforce:       
   share of employees <= 24  27.1%  27.4  336 
   share of employees 25 - 44  53.8%  27.3  336 
   share of elder employees >=45   19.2%  22.3  336 
educational decomposition of workforce:       
   share of low-educated employees  33.5%  34.3  329 
   share of medium-educated employees  45.1%  33.7  329 
   share of high-educated employees  21.4%  30.4  329 
  Source: EIM and ACE. 
Characteristics of the best-paid employee 
41 Respondents could not (or would not) identify the best-paid employee within 
their organisation. Consequently, these respondents could not provide any in-
formation on the remuneration of these employees. This leaves 328 observations 
which can be used to analyse the structure of the remuneration of the best-paid 
employee. 
 
Relevant characteristics of the best-paid employee include gender, age, educa-
tion, occupational level and tenure of the best-paid employee. Summary statis-
tics are presented in Table 4 (variable means) and Table 5 (valid observations).  
18   
Table 4  Summary statistics for the best-paid employee: variable means, by gender of 
entrepreneur and gender of best-paid employee 
Variable  All  By gender of entrepreneur 
By gender of  
best-paid employee 
    male  female  male  female 
age of the best-paid employee  39.2  39.8  35.3  39.8  36.9 
educational level: share of best-paid 
employees with high education   40%  41%  30%  41%  35% 
tenure of the best-paid employee 
(years)  6.5  6.8  4.8  7.2  4.1 
occupational level: share of best-paid 
employees with management position   48%  51%  26%  55%  24% 
  Source: EIM and ACE. 
Table 5  Summary statistics for the best-paid employee: variable counts (valid observa-
tions), by gender of entrepreneur and gender of best-paid employee 
Variable  All  By gender of entrepreneur 
By gender of  
best-paid employee 
    male  female  male  female 
age of the best-paid employee  326  279  47  254  72 
educational level: share of best-paid 
employees with high education   327  281  47  255  72 
tenure of the best-paid employee 
(years)  326  280  47  254  72 
occupational level: share of best-paid 
employees with management position   327  280  47  255  72 
  Source: EIM and ACE. 
It is interesting to notice that the characteristics of the best-paid employee are 
not only related to the gender of employee, but also to the gender of the entre-
preneur. To a considerable extent, this is because the gender of the entrepre-
neur and of the best-paid employee often coincide: for 78% of the firms in our 
sample, the entrepreneur and the best-paid employee are of the same gender 
(Table 6). In particular, the large majority of male entrepreneurs has a male 
best-paid employee, while for female entrepreneurs the gender of the best-paid 
employee is evenly distributed: 49% of the female entrepreneurs employ a fe-
male as best-paid employee; for male entrepreneurs, this is only 9%
1. 
 
1 Fisher’s exact test rejects the hypothesis that the gender of the entrepreneur and of the best-
paid employee are independent of each other at a significance level of 0.000.  
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Table 6  Gender of the entrepreneur and the best-paid employee 
Gender best-paid employee 
Gender entrepreneur  Male  Female  Total 
Male  231  49  280 
Female  24  23  47 
Total  255  72  327 
  Source: EIM and ACE. 
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4  Results 
In chapter two we formulated five different hypotheses. Our hypotheses involve 
three different dependent variables: the usage of performance-related pay for 
the best-paid employee in the firm, the usage of performance-related pay for the 
workforce in general and entrepreneurial income (as indicator for firm perform-
ance). The first four hypotheses will be tested separately for performance-
related pay for the best-paid employee and for the workforce in general, while 
the fifth hypothesis will be tested on the entrepreneurial income. In this chapter 
we present the results of our analyses for each of these three dependent vari-
ables. 
4.1  Performance-related pay for the best-paid employee 
To test hypotheses H1 to H4 for the case of the best-paid employee, we estimate 
two equations: 
−  Equation 1: an equation that relates the use of performance-related pay for 
the best-paid employee to firm characteristics, entrepreneurial characteristics 
(including a gender dummy) and characteristics of the best-paid employee 
(including a gender dummy). This will be estimated by a probit regression. 
The results will be used to test hypotheses H1 and H2; 
−  Equation 2: as equation 1, replacing the gender dummies for the entrepreneur 
and the best-paid employee with two dummies that indicate the enterprises 
that are assumed to be most likely (firms with a female entrepreneur and a 
male best-paid employee) and least likely (firms with a male entrepreneur and 
a female best paid employee) to apply performance-related pay for the best-
paid employee. This will be estimated by a probit regression. The results will 
be used to test hypotheses H3 and H4. 
 
Ideally, we would have liked to estimate these equations separately for manage-
rial and non-managerial employees. Our sample is, however, too small to limit 
our estimations to either subsample. As a second-best solution, we include a 
dummy for the occupational position of the best-paid employee in the equations 
(see e.g. Brown and Medoff, 2003). 
 
Equations 1 and 2 have been estimated with and without sector dummies. The 
results indicate that including sector dummies does not change any of the rele-
vant findings
1, while it reduces the available degrees of freedom considerably 
(the number of observations is limited). We therefore present the estimation re-
sults for these equations without sector dummies. These results are presented in 
Table 7. 
 
1 Estimating model 1 with sector dummies results in 1 significant sector dummy (retail) and re-
duces the significance of the employer characteristics somewhat; estimating model 2 with sector 
dummies results in 1 significant sector dummies (retail) and reduces the significance of the em-
ployer characteristics somewhat; otherwise, no differences occur.  
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Table 7  Probit regressions on the use of performance-related pay (profit-sharing or bo-
nus) for the best-paid employee. 




value  Sign. level 
Parameter 
value  Sign. level  
Firm characteristics         
firm size (ln)  0.067  0.320  0.087  0.184 
firm age (ln)  -0.23**  0.018  -0.22**  0.022 
Employer characteristics         
age (ln)  0.85*  0.077  0.83*  0.082 
experience (ln)  0.04  0.786  0.08  0.637 
phd degree (dummy)  0.58**  0.014  0.63***  0.008 
Female entrepreneur(dummy)  -0.15  0.545  -   
Characteristics best-paid employee         
age (ln)  -0.26  0.505  -0.23  0.555 
tenure (ln)  0.38***  0.001  0.37***  0.001 
Medium education (dummy)  0.24  0.386  0.22  0.43 
high education (dummy)  0.76***  0.009  0.73**  0.012 
Female employee (dummy)  -0.10  0.657  -   
Management position (dummy)  0.52  0.147  0.53  0.141 
Gender comparison employer/employee         
female entrepreneur, male employee 
(dummy) 
-    0.11  0.723 
male entrepreneur, female employee 
(dummy) 
-    0.08  0.728 
Constant  -3.44*  0.065  -3.65**  0.048 
         
Goodness of Fit Measures         
Pseudo R
2  0.1482    0.1471   
Log likelihood  -172.1    -172.3   
Valid Observations  307    307   
  *; **; *** Denote a significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
The results for both equations are very similar: the likelihood that a firm applies 
performance-related pay for its best-paid employee is higher for younger firms, 
for firms with elder and highly educated entrepreneurs, and for employees with 
high tenure and a high educational level. There is no indication that firm size is 
relevant. More important, there is also no indication of any gender effect: con-
cerning the remuneration of the best-paid employee, we find no support for hy-
potheses H1 to H4. Specifically, the results of equation 1 reject hypotheses H1 
and H2: neither the gender of the entrepreneur nor the gender of the best-paid 
employee are related to the probability that the best-paid employee receives 
performance-related pay. Likewise, the results of equation 2 reject hypotheses 
H3 and H4. This follows from the insignificance of the dummies indicating the  
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firms that are most and least likely to apply performance-related pay for the 
best-paid employee. 
4.2  Performance-related pay for the workforce in general 
Regarding the workforce in general, we use a similar approach to test hypothe-
ses H1 to H4. Again, two equations are estimated: 
−  Equation 3: an equation that relates the use of performance-related pay for 
some or all of the employees to firm characteristics, entrepreneurial charac-
teristics (including a gender dummy) and characteristics of the workforce as a 
whole (including the share of male employees). This will be estimated by a 
probit regression. The results will be used to test hypotheses H1 and H2; 
−  Equation 4: as equation 3, replacing the entrepreneurial gender dummy and 
the share of male employees with two dummies that indicate the enterprises 
that are assumed to be most likely (firms with a female entrepreneur and a 
relatively high share of male employees) and least likely (firms with a male 
entrepreneur and a relatively high share of female employees) to apply per-
formance-related pay to the workforce in general. This will be estimated by a 
probit regression. The results will be used to test hypotheses H3 and H4. 
 
The estimation of equation 4 requires that we classify enterprises into three 
categories, based on the gender of the entrepreneur and whether the share of 
(fe)male employees is relatively high or low. The second criterion can be opera-
tionalised in different ways. A straightforward approach is to determine various 
percentiles of the distribution of the share of male employees, and consider the 
lowest/highest percentiles as those with relatively low/high shares of male em-
ployees. The question then remains, how many percentiles to distinguish. An in-
crease in the number of percentiles may increase the differences between the 
lowest and highest percentiles (thus increasing the likelihood of finding statisti-
cally significant differences), but also decreases the number of observations 
within the percentiles (thus decreasing the likelihood of finding statistically sig-
nificant differences). Since this is an explorative study, we have estimated equa-
tion 4 based on the outcomes of using two, three and four percentiles. In this 
paper, we report the outcomes with the highest significance levels for the vari-
ables of interest. 
 
As it turns out, distinguishing four percentiles provided the highest significance 
levels for the two dummy variables indicating enterprises that are most/least 
likely to apply performance-related pay. In this situation, a 'low share' of male 
employees refers to the 25% enterprises with the lowest shares of male employ-
ees (less than 37%), and a 'high share' refers to the 24% enterprises with the 
highest share of male employees (92.5% or more). Combined with the gender of 
the entrepreneur, this results in a group of 61 enterprises for which perform-
ance-related pay is least likely to occur (a male entrepreneur and a low share of 
male employees) and a group of only 6 enterprises for which performance-
related pay is most likely to occur (a female entrepreneur and a high share of 
male employees). 
 
The results are presented in Table 8, again without including sector dummies.  
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Table 8  Probit regressions on presence of performance-related pay for some or all em-
ployees in the workforce. 




value  Sign. level 
Parameter 
value  Sign. level 
Firm characteristics          
firm size (ln)  0.29***  0.068  0.31***  0.000 
firm age (ln)  -0.05  0.571  -0.04  0.623 
Employer characteristics         
age (ln)  0.82*  0.087  0.81*  0.092 
experience (ln)  -0.14  0.384  -0.10  0.503 
phd degree (dummy)  0.09  0.665  0.14  0.497 
Female entrepreneur (dummy)  -0.09  0.703  -   
Workforce characteristics         
share of highly educated employees  0.0089***  0.001  0.0087***  0.001 
share of elder employees  -0.0097**  0.019  -0.0085**  0.034 
share of male employees   0.005**  0.033  -   
Gender comparison employer/workforce         
female entrepreneur, low share female em-
ployees (dummy) 
-    1.02*  0.065 
male entrepreneur, high share female em-
ployees (dummy) 
-    -0.29  0.136 
constant  -3.78**  0.015  -3.9**  0.013 
         
Goodness of Fit Measures         
Pseudo R
2  0.1072    0.1102   
Log likelihood  -187.0    -186.3   
Valid Observations  321    321   
  *; **; *** denote a significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
The results for equations 3 and 4 are very similar: the likelihood that a firm ap-
plies performance-related pay for some (or all) of its employees is higher for lar-
ger firms, and for firms with a higher share of young and highly educated em-
ployees. Notice that these results are different from the results for equations 1 
and 2: instead of firm age, it is firm size that matters now, and employer charac-
teristics no longer seem to be very important. 
 
Equations 3 and 4 still find no support for hypotheses H2 and H4. The lack of 
support for hypothesis H2 contradicts the earlier findings by Roepers and De 
Kok, who found that female entrepreneurs are (ceteris paribus) more likely to 
provide performance-related pay than male entrepreneurs (Roepers and De Kok, 
2007, page 31). Their study, however, included less control variables. In particu-
lar, they did not control for the educational level of the entrepreneur and the age 
and education of the workforce. Once these control variables are included in the 
model, the significant effect of the gender of the entrepreneur disappears.  
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The positive parameter for the share of male employees in equation 3 supports 
hypothesis H1. In addition, the positive dummy variable that indicates firms with 
a female entrepreneur and a low share of female employees offers some support 
for hypothesis H3 (although it should be noted that this parameter is only signifi-
cant at 10%
1). This is consistent with the results by Roepers and De Kok, who 
found a significant positive effect of the interaction between the gender of the 
entrepreneur and the share of male employees (Roepers and De Kok, 2007, page 
31). 
4.3  Gender, performance-related pay and firm performance 
4.3.1 Controlling for workforce characteristics 
To test the final hypothesis, we estimate various equations with the log of the 
entrepreneurial income as dependent variable. 
−  Equation 5: the starting point is an equation that relates the (log of the) in-
come level of the entrepreneur to several firm characteristics, entrepreneurial 
characteristics and workforce characteristics; 
−  Equation 6: as equation 5, including a dummy variable indicating the use of 
performance-related pay for at least some employees; 
−  Equation 7: as equation 5, including a dummy variable indicating a consistent 
pay policy: this is either a combination of performance-related pay and a high 
share of male employees, or a combination of no performance-related pay and 
a high share of female employees. 
 
Estimating equation 7 requires that we identify firms with a consistent pay pol-
icy. This, in turn, requires that we identify firms with a relatively high share of 
(fe)male employees. We use the same method as discussed in the previous sec-
tion, which is based on the percentiles of the distribution of the share of male 
employees. As is the case with equation 4, we find the best results when we use 
four different percentiles. In this case, 93 firms in the sample have a consistent 
pay policy (66 firms with relatively few male employees without performance-
related pay and 27 firms with relatively many male employees with performance-
related pay). The estimation results are reported in Table 9. 
 
According to the results for equations 5, 6 and 7, entrepreneurial income in-
creases with firm size and with the educational level of the entrepreneur as well 
as the employees. Neither the gender of the entrepreneur nor the gender com-
position of the workforce are significantly related to entrepreneurial income. 
There is also no support for hypothesis H5: while the prevalence of performance-
related pay in general is associated with a higher entrepreneurial income (equa-
tion 6), our indicator for a consistent pay policy is not (equation 7). Apparently, 
the effect of performance-related pay on entrepreneurial income does not de-
 
1 In addition, if sector dummies are included, the significance of this parameter becomes less than 
10%.  
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pend on the gender composition of the workforce; at least not in the way that we 
hypothesised
1. 
Table 9  OLS Regression results on log entrepreneurial income (robust estimators) 













firm characteristics             
firm size (ln)  0.25***  0.000  0.24***  0.000  0.26***  0.000 
firm age (ln)  -0.008  0.875  0.022  0.664  -0.009  0.860 
employer characteristics             
age (ln)  0.43  0.261  0.32  0.417  0.54  0.167 
experience (ln)  0.12  0.337  0.15  0.249  0.08  0.505 
phd degree (dummy)  0.34**  0.014  0.31**  0.024  0.31**  0.027 
Female entrepreneur (dummy)  -0.31  0.214  -0.27  0.233  -0.22  0.313 
Workforce characteristics             
share of highly educated employees  0.006***  0.006  0.006***  0.008  0.006***  0.008 
share of elder employees  -0.003  0.360  -0.002  0.452  -0.003  0.380 
share of male employees   -0.000  0.858  -0.001  0.753  -0.003  0.380 
Performance-related pay for some or 
all employees 
-    0.29***  0.009  -   
consistent pay policy  -    -    -0.23  0.137 
Constant  1.38  0.231  1.54  0.192  1.11  0.345 
             
Goodness of Fit Measures             
R
2  0.37    0.41       
Valid Observations  128    128    128   
  *; **; *** denote a significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
4.3.2 Controlling for characteristics of the best-paid employee 
In the previous section, we examined to which extent characteristics of (per-
formance-related pay for) the workforce could explain entrepreneurial income. In 
this section, we focus on characteristics of (performance-related pay for) the 
best-paid employee. This is done by including characteristics of the best-paid 
employee in equations 5 to 7, and replacing the indicators for performance-
related pay for the workforce with comparable indicators for performance-related 
pay for the best-paid employee. This results in equations 8, 9 and 10 (see Table 
10). 
 
1 Hypothesis H5 implies that for firms with a high share of male employees, performance-related 
pay would have a positive effect on entrepreneurial income; for firms with a low share of male 
employees, performance-related pay would have a negative effect on entrepreneurial income.  
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In equation 10, the dummy variable indicating consistent pay policy refers to 11 
firms with a female best-paid employee that receives no performance-related 
pay, and 47 firms with a male best-paid employee that receives performance-
related pay. 
Table 10  Regression results on firm performance (log entrepreneurial income (OLS, ro-
bust estimators), including characteristics best-paid employee 













firm characteristics             
firm size (ln)  0.28***  0.000  0.27***  0.000  0.27***  0.000 
firm age (ln)  -0.02  0.734  -0.02  0.736  0.002  0.975 
employer characteristics             
age (ln)  0.054  0.903  0.03  0.944  0.056  0.895 
experience (ln)  0.24*  0.084  0.24*  0.094  0.20  0.113 
phd degree (dummy)  0.27*  0.052  0.22  0.147  0.29*  0.059 
Female entrepreneur (dummy)  -0.28  0.292  -0.29  0.246  -0.21  0.414 
Workforce characteristics             
share of highly educated employees  0.007***  0.002  0.006**  0.012  0.008***  0.001 
share of elder employees  -0.005  0.192  -0.004  0.274  -0.005  0.187 
share of male employees   0.002  0.318  0.002  0.378  0.000  0.908 
Characteristics best-paid employee             
Female employee (dummy)  0.30  0.166  0.29  0.185  -   
performance-related pay  -    0.15  0.268  -   
consistent pay policy  -    -    -0.13  0.267 
             
Constant  2.38*  0.083  2.44*  0.086     
             
Goodness of Fit Measures             
R
2  0.3769    0.3859       
Valid Observations  117    117    117   
  *; **; *** denote a significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
The results for equations 8, 9 and 10 are similar to the results for equations 5, 6 
and 7: entrepreneurial income increases with firm size and with the educational 
level of the entrepreneur as well as the employees (although the effect of the 
educational level of the entrepreneur is somewhat lower). None of the included 
gender variables have a significant effect (gender of the entrepreneur, gender 
composition of the workforce and gender of the best-paid employee). Also here, 
there is no support for hypothesis H5: our indicator for a consistent pay policy is 
not only not significant, but even has the wrong sign (equation 10). 
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5  Discussion and conclusions 
In this study we have derived five different hypotheses concerning the gender 
effects in performance-related pay amongst small and medium-sized effects. 
These hypotheses are based on two basic assumptions: the willingness of em-
ployers and employees to accept performance-related pay depends (amongst 
others) on their levels of risk aversion, and risk aversion is gender-related. The 
empirical support for our hypotheses is, however, very limited. In this chapter 
we discuss the estimation results and end with the main conclusions. 
5.1  Discussion 
Partial support for the first hypothesis… 
According to the first hypothesis, performance-related pay would be used less for 
female employees than for male employees. We find empirical support for this 
hypothesis, but only regarding the workforce in general: firms with a larger 
share of male employees are more likely to offer performance-related pay to 
their employees. 
 
When we analyse the remuneration of the best-paid employee, we find no rela-
tionship between the employee's gender and the probability that he or she re-
ceived a share of the profit or a bonus. One explanation for this lack of support 
is that the sample size is not large enough; our data set only contains 72 obser-
vations where the best-paid employee is female. 
 
…and no support for the second hypothesis… 
The second hypothesis states that female entrepreneurs are more likely to use 
performance-related pay than male entrepreneurs. There is no support for this 
hypothesis. The results presented by Roepers and De Kok (2007) seem to sup-
port this hypothesis, but additional analysis has shown that this support is the 
result of a missing variable bias: once additional control variables are added to 
the model by Roepers and De Kok (2007), the effect of the gender of the entre-
preneur is no longer significant. 
 
…so no support for the third and fourth hypothesis should be expected 
Hypotheses H3 and H4 are only valid if the first two hypotheses are. If one of the 
first two hypotheses would not be valid, then hypotheses H3 and H4 should also 
be rejected. At a 5% confidence level, this is indeed the case. The fact that we 
find no support for hypotheses H3 and H4 is thus consistent with the lack of sup-
port for the second hypothesis. 
 
No support for the fifth hypothesis regarding entrepreneurial income 
The results of the first four hypotheses are consistent with the standard assump-
tion that firms are risk neutral while individual employees are risk averse. If this 
is the case, we expected to find support for hypothesis H5: The income of the 
entrepreneur is higher when we observe pay policies consistent with efficient risk  
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sharing. We find, however, no support for this hypothesis. Also here, this could 
be due to the limited number of observations (128 or 117 valid observations). 
 
Do we need more data… 
One interpretation of the results of our study, is that the results are largely con-
sistent with the standard assumption that firms are risk neutral while individual 
employees are risk averse. The support is not strong, but this could be explained 
by the relatively limited number of observations. According to this interpretation, 
the main finding of our study is then that we find no support for the expected re-
lationship between the gender of the entrepreneur and the incidence of perform-
ance-related pay. The small size of our sample, however, does not allow for 
strong conclusions. 
 
…or do we need an alternative theory? 
Another interpretation of the results is also possible. The empirical support for 
our hypotheses is so limited, that we should reconsider the two basic assump-
tions that underlie our hypotheses. 
 
The first assumption is that the willingness of employers and employees to ac-
cept performance-related pay depends (amongst others) on their levels of risk 
aversion. This assumption ignores the difference between risk aversion and am-
biguity aversion (Borghans et al., 2009; Machina, 2009). Individuals often find 
themselves in situations where different outcomes may occur. The probabilities 
of these outcomes may either be known or unknown. Risk aversion refers to an 
individual's behaviour in case of know probabilities, while ambiguity aversion re-
fers to an individual's behaviour in case of unknown probabilities. Since the dis-
tribution of the expected performance of employees is not known in advance, the 
incidence of performance-related pay is likely to be related to the ambiguity 
aversion of the employer and employees, rather than their risk aversion. 
 
Borghans et al. (2009) found that risk aversion and ambiguity aversion are em-
pirically distinct individual traits. Regarding risk aversion, they find that women 
are more risk averse than men, and that psychological traits are strongly associ-
ated with risk aversion. Regarding ambiguity aversion, however, they find mark-
edly different results. Men and women show similar marginal valuations of ambi-
guity (with increasing levels of ambiguity), and ambiguity aversion is not related 
to psychological traits. If ambiguity diversion is indeed not gender-related, the 
second basic assumption of our study (risk aversion is gender-related) would not 
apply in the case of ambiguity aversion. 
 
According to this line of argument, differences in risk aversion between men and 
women cannot explain gender differences in the incidence of performance-related 
pay. An alternative explanation for gender differences in the incidence of per-
formance-related pay is that they are partly caused by gender differences in la-
bour force attachment. Various authors have argued that differences in labour 
force attachment between men and women could explain part of the gender 
earnings gap (Kunze, 2005; Nordman and Roubaud, 2005). According to Geddes 
and Heywood (2003), gender differences in labour force attachment may also 
explain differences in the incidence of performance-related pay: on average, 
women have a lower labour force attachment than men, which is in turn related 
to the probability of receiving performance-based pay.  
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5.2  Conclusions 
We have found partial support for the first hypothesis, which states that female 
employees are less likely to receive performance-related pay than male employ-
ees. There is also some support for the third hypothesis, which states that per-
formance-related pay is most likely to occur in firms with a female entrepreneur 
and a high share of male employees. This support is however weak: it is only 
significant at a 10% confidence level, and is furthermore based on the compari-
son of a sample of only 6 firms (with a female entrepreneur and a high share of 
male employees) with the other firms. For the other three hypotheses, there is 
no empirical support. 
 
One interpretation of the results is that they indicate that entrepreneurs are risk 
neutral while employees are risk averse (where female employees are more risk 
averse than male employees). Due to the small sample size, however, this inter-
pretation is only tentative. Additional empirical research on considerable larger 
dataset is required. Perhaps future studies can make use of administrative data 
(e.g. of payrolling companies that target SMEs). 
 
Another interpretation is that the lack of support for our hypotheses suggests 
that we need to reconsider them, including the basic assumptions on which they 
are based. In our study, we have used gender as a proxy for the risk aversion of 
individual entrepreneurs and employees, and assumed that risk aversion (of em-
ployers as well as employees) is in turn related to the incidence of performance-
related pay. However, it can be argued that this assumption is not correct: the 
incidence of performance-related pay may be related to ambiguity aversion 
rather than risk aversion. Gender may however also serve as a proxy for differ-
ences in labour force attachment. Differences in labour force attachment are 
likely to be only relevant for employers, not for employees, which seems consis-
tent with our lack of empirical support for the presence of an entrepreneurial 
gender effect. 
 
For a better understanding of gender effects in remuneration policies, future 
studies should further develop the relationships between performance-related 
pay, risk aversion and ambiguity aversion and labour force attachment, both 
theoretically and empirically. 
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Summary 
In theory, for many small and medium-sized enterprises the introduction of per-
formance-related pay might be beneficial: if implemented properly, it could help 
enterprises in selecting, hiring and motivating the right employees for the right 
jobs. So far, however, performance-related pay in SMEs has received little aca-
demic attention. One of the few studies on this topic is that by Roepers and De 
Kok (2007), who explore determinants of performance-related pay amongst 
SMEs. Amongst others, they found support for the presence of gender effects; 
not only regarding the gender of the employees, but also regarding the gender of 
the entrepreneur. 
 
In this paper we further investigate the gender effect in remuneration policies as 
found in Roepers and de Kok (2007). The central idea of this paper is that female 
and male entrepreneurs make different choices regarding their human resource 
management practices, including remuneration policies. These differences can be 
explained by differences in the risk aversion of male and female employees and 
entrepreneurs. Generally speaking, women are more risk averse than men. This 
suggests that men and women have a different valuation of the risks that are as-
sociated with performance-related pay. We hypothesise that these different 
valuations will result in differences in the incidence of performance-related pay. 
This leads to the following five hypotheses: 
 
−  H1: Performance-related pay is less used for female employees than for male 
employees. 
−  H2: Female entrepreneurs are more likely to use performance-related pay 
than male entrepreneurs. 
−  H3: Performance-related pay is most likely to occur in firms with a female en-
trepreneur and a high share of male employees. 
−  H4: Performance-related pay is least likely to occur in firms with a male en-
trepreneurs and a high share of female employees. 
−  H5: The income of the entrepreneur is higher when we observe pay policies 
consistent with efficient risk sharing. 
 
These hypotheses are tested by estimating various probit and OLS regressions, 
using the results of a telephonic questionnaire amongst 369 Dutch entrepreneurs 
with 1 - 100 employees. 
 
At a significance level of 5%, we find partial support for hypothesis H1, but not 
for any of the other hypotheses. One explanation for these findings is that they 
indicate that employees are indeed risk averse (and men more than women) but 
that employers are not; hypothesis H1 is valid but H2 is not. In this case, hy-
potheses H3 and H4 are no longer valid, so the lack of support for hypotheses H3 
and H4 is consistent with the lack of support for H2. The lack of support for the 
fifth hypothesis may be due to the limited size of our sample (approximately 120 
valid observations were available to test this hypothesis). 
 
Another interpretation is that the lack of support for our hypotheses suggests 
that we need to reconsider them, including the basic assumptions on which they 
are based. We use gender as a proxy for the risk aversion of individual employ-
ees, and assume that risk aversion (of employers as well as employees) is in 
turn related to the incidence of performance-related pay. However, it can be ar- 
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gued that this assumption is not correct: the incidence of performance-related 
pay may be related to ambiguity aversion rather than risk aversion. Gender may 
however also serve as a proxy for differences in labour force attachment. Differ-
ences in labour force attachment are likely to be only relevant for employers, not 
for employees, which seems consistent with our lack of empirical support for the 
presence of an entrepreneurial gender effect. 
 
For a better understanding of gender effects in remuneration policies, future 
studies should further develop the relationships between performance-related 
pay, risk aversion and ambiguity aversion and labour force attachment, both 
theoretically and empirically. 
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1  Introduction 
Strong debate on performance-related pay 
Until a few years ago, performance-related pay was becoming more and more 
accepted and used. This changed dramatically when Lehman Brothers went bank-
rupt in September 2008. In a reaction to the crisis that followed, many claimed 
that the practice of performance-related pay in especially the financial sector 
was one of the main causes for the current crisis. The debate on the advantages 
and disadvantages of performance-related pay (and how it should be designed) 
is still ongoing. 
 
This debate tends to focus on large enterprises, where variable payment can ac-
count for a large share of total payment. The situation in small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) tends to be ignored in this discussion. For various rea-
sons, this is not surprising. First of all, relatively little is known about payment 
systems in SMEs. In 2006, the Amsterdam Centre for Entrepreneurship (ACE) 
and EIM conducted a survey amongst 369 Dutch SMEs regarding their remunera-
tion system. This is still one of the few surveys on this subject that includes 
SMEs. Secondly, the variable share of total payment tends to be relatively small 
in SMEs. Amongst others, the EIM - ACE survey included questions on the pay-
ment practices of the best-paid employee within each enterprise. The results in-
dicate that, within the group of best-paid employees that received some form of 
performance-related pay, the variable share of their wage was on average 8% 
(De Kok et al., 2007). 
 
Previous research: determinants of performance-related pay in SMEs 
Van Praag et al. (2006) argue that many small and medium-sized enterprises 
might benefit from the introduction of performance-related pay: if implemented 
properly, it could help enterprises in selecting, hiring and motivating the right 
employees for the right jobs. So far, however, performance-related pay in SMEs 
has received little academic attention. One of the few studies on this topic is that 
by Roepers and De Kok (2007). Using the EIM - ACE survey, they explore deter-
minants of performance-related pay amongst SMEs. In particular, they examined 
whether the incidence of performance-related pay for employees is related to the 
size and ownership structure of the enterprise and to the gender of the entrepre-
neur and the employees. Their results indicate that each of these variables is in-
deed related to the incidence of performance-related pay: larger firms are more 
likely to provide performance-related pay than smaller firms, and firms with a 
single owner and family firms are less likely to provide performance-related pay 
than firms with multiple owners (that are not related to each other). They also 
found a gender effect. 
 
The gender effect that Roepers and De Kok (2007) found was, however, different 
from what they expected. They expected that both the gender of the entrepre-
neur and the gender composition of the workforce would affect the probability of 
performance-related pay, but that these two effects would be independent of 
each other. Instead, they found a close relationship between these two effects. 
For male entrepreneurs, they found that the use of performance-related pay is 
independent of the gender composition of the work force. For female entrepre- 
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neurs, however, they found that the usage of performance-related pay increases 
with the share of male employees. 
 
Objective of the study 
The role of the gender of the manager or (direct) supervisor on wages of subor-
dinates has been considered before (Cohen and Huffman, 2007; Hultin and 
Szulkin, 2003). Likewise, the relationship between employee gender and per-
formance-related pay has been studied before (Geddes and Heywood, 2003). 
However, as far as we know, the paper by Roepers and De Kok (2007) is the 
only paper that considers both the gender of the entrepreneur and the gender 
composition of the workforce. 
 
In this paper we further investigate the gender effect in remuneration policies as 
found in Roepers and de Kok (2007). The central idea of this paper is that female 
and male entrepreneurs make different choices regarding their human resource 
management practices, including remuneration policies (Mukhtar, 2002; Verheul 
et al, 2002). These differences can be explained by differences in the risk aver-
sion of male and female employees and entrepreneurs. We derive several hy-
potheses on how the interaction between the entrepreneurial gender and the 
gender composition of the workforce might affect the incidence of performance-
related pay. These hypotheses are then tested, using the same dataset as 
Roepers and de Kok (2007). 
 
Outline 
In the next chapter we present the theoretical framework for this study and dis-
cuss the hypotheses that we will test. In chapter three we describe the data that 
we use to test these hypotheses. The results are presented in chapter four. As 
we will see, most of our hypotheses cannot be confirmed. Generally speaking, 
the available data does not support our ideas on how differences in risk aversion 
result in gender differences in the incidence of performance-related pay. Chapter 
five therefore starts with a discussion of possible explanations for our lack of 
positive results. After this discussion the main conclusions of our study are pre-
sented. 
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2  Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
2.1  The general case for performance-related pay 
An employment contract is an example of a relationship between a principal and 
an agent, where the principal delegates work to the agent. In such principal-
agent relationships, two types of problems can occur, related to differences in 
goals and risk aversion between the agent and the principal. The first type of 
problem occurs when the principal and agent have different desires or goals and 
when it is difficult or expensive for the principal to monitor the agent's behav-
iour. This goal conflict introduces the risk of moral hazard: the risk that the 
agent may not provide the level of effort that was agreed upon. In this case, the 
agent is shirking. The second problem arises when the principal and the agent 
have different attitudes toward risk. The principal and the agent may prefer dif-
ferent actions while executing the work, because of their different risk prefer-
ences. (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 
These problems may be (partly) solved by using performance-related pay (for 
example, piece rate payment, commissions, bonuses or profit sharing) as a gov-
ernance mechanism. If designed properly, including performance-related pay as 
part of the contract between the principal and the agent may prevent opportun-
istic agent behaviour. This will occur if the preferences of agents and principals 
are realigned in such a way that the rewards for both depend on the same ac-
tions. In such cases, the conflicts of self interest between principal and agent are 
reduced (Eisenhardt, 1989) and the agent is motivated to provide the efforts de-
sired by the principal. In fact, one of the most important objectives of compen-
sation is to provide proper and effective motivation to employees (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1992). 
 
Performance pay and firm size 
In larger firms, shirking is less easy to detect. This increases the risk that shirk-
ing will actually occur (Chang, 2006). Larger firms therefore have more need for 
governance mechanisms to combat moral hazard and shirking. By using per-
formance-related pay, firms can reduce the risk of shirking, because this re-
moves (or reduces) the potential conflicts of self interest between employer and 
employees. The benefits of performance-related pay are therefore likely to in-
crease with firm size. At the same time, the costs (per employee) of developing 
and maintaining performance-related pay system are likely to decrease with firm 
size: Larger firms have a larger demand for human resources, and therefore a 
larger demand for specific HRM practices. This stimulates standardization and 
formalization of these practices. Most formalized HRM practices require consider-
able development costs. This results in a cost advantage for larger firms, which 
is strengthened by the limited supply of financial resources of many small firms 
(De Kok, Uhlaner and Thurik, 2006). 
 
These arguments suggest that the net benefits of performance-related pay will 
increase with firm size. This is consistent with the finding from previous research  
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that performance-related pay is more common amongst large firms than 
amongst SMEs (Van Praag et al., 2006). 
 
Performance pay and risk aversion 
The realignment of the agent's preferences with those of the principal often re-
quires that certain risks are transferred from the principal to the agent (Eisen-
hardt, 1989). This is also the case with performance-related pay, where the risk 
of under-performance is shared between the principal and the agent. The extent 
to which this actually takes place depends on the actual levels of risk aversion of 
the relevant principal and agents. In agency theory it is often assumed that firms 
are risk neutral (e.g. because firms are owned by different investors with well-
diversified portfolios) while individual employees are risk averse (Chang, 2006; 
Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). This creates a stimulus to provide a fixed wage to 
the risk-averse employees: by transferring most of the income risks of employ-
ees to the firm, the employees are better of while the firm is not affected. It is 
doubtful, however, whether this assumption also applies in the case of SMEs. For 
example, the idea that the firm is owned by different investors with well-
diversified portfolios does not apply to the majority of SMEs. Often, SMEs are 
single owned-managed enterprises. In these cases, the level of risk aversion of 
the firm is basically determined by the risk aversion of the entrepreneur. This, in 
turn, may be related to the entrepreneurs' gender. 
2.2  Gender differences in risk attitude: five hypotheses 
It is well established that the risk attitude of individuals is partly related to their 
gender (Bajtelsmit and Bernasek, 1996; Borghans et al., 2009; Dohmen and 
Falk, 2001). It is however difficult to identify the causes of this gender differ-
ence: it is generally only possible to observe the outcomes of decisions, and not 
the decision-making processes themselves. 
 
Borghans et al. (2009) use experiments to examine possible determinants of risk 
aversion. They find that risk aversion is partly determined by psychological traits 
such as the "big 5"
1. Gender differences in these traits explain only a small part 
of gender differences in risk aversion. In the context of financial decisions, risk 
aversion is also related to wealth: in an absolute sense (the amount of money 
invested in risky assets), risk aversion decreases with wealth (Bajtelsmit and 
Bernasek, 1996). Since women have lower wages than men (both in general and 
for comparable positions), this suggests an indirect gender effect on risk aver-
sion. 
 
If female employees are more risk averse then male employees, they require a 
higher risk premium to accept performance-related pay. When comparing a fixed 
wage offer with a performance-related pay offer with a certain risk premium, fe-
male employees will be more likely to prefer the fixed wage offer. This is con-
firmed by an empirical study by Dohmen and Falk (2001). They find that women 
are more risk averse than men, and that this difference in risk preference ex-
 
1 The big 5 represent the following five basic dimensions of personality: openness, conscientious-
ness, extraversion, agreeableness and neuroticism.  
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plains their attitude towards variable pay: 68% of the 119 male participants of 
their study prefer a variable pay, compared to 44% of the 121 women. 
If female employees require a higher risk premium to accept performance-
related pay, this reduces the expected benefits of performance-related pay for 
the entrepreneur. This, in turn, makes it less likely that performance-related pay 
will occur. Thus, we expect that the share of women in the workforce will have a 
negative effect on the probability that a firm will introduce performance-related 
pay. 
 
The causality may also run in the opposite direction. If performance-related pay 
is actually introduced, this may stimulate the outflow of female employees. This 
will occur if the new wage offer (including both a variable and fixed part) is not 
high enough to cover the demanded risk premium. In addition, the presence of 
performance-related pay can stimulate the inflow of male applicants. Thus, the 
presence of performance-related pay can have a negative effect on the share of 
women in the workforce. 
 
Irrespective of the direction of causality, these arguments suggest a negative 
correlation between the share of women in the workforce and the incidence of 
performance-related pay. This leads to our first hypothesis: 
 
H1: Performance-related pay is less used for female employees than 
for male employees 
 
The gender difference in risk aversion does not only apply to the population in 
general, but also to the population of entrepreneurs. Female entrepreneurs tend 
to be more risk averse than male entrepreneurs (ENSR 1996; Verheul and 
Thurik, 2001). This suggests that (ceteris paribus) female entrepreneurs are 
more likely to transfer some of the company risk onto their employees (Chang, 
2006). This can be done by using performance-related pay. This results in the 
second hypothesis of this study: 
 
H2: Female entrepreneurs are more likely to use performance-related 
pay than male entrepreneurs 
 
This hypothesis is supported by gender differences in management style. Verheul 
(2003) has studied the gender effect of management styles in small firms in the 
Netherlands, and found that female entrepreneurs are more likely to use formal 
HRM practices than male entrepreneurs. She distinguishes between commitment 
and control oriented management. The higher the degree to which procedures 
and regulation are formalized, the higher the degree of control over employees 
and the production process is. She finds that female-led firms have a more con-
trol-oriented type of HRM than male-led firms. This result implies that female en-
trepreneurs can be associated with a higher degree of formalization. This is con-
sistent with a higher usage of performance-related pay. 
 
In contrast, Verheul, Risseeuw and Bartelse (2002) suggest that female entre-
preneurs may be more inclined to use non-pecuniary rewards, such as flexibility 
of working hours, childcare facilities and verbal compliments, to motivate their 
employees. Their relatively high attention for non-pecuniary rewards would imply 
that female entrepreneurs would be less likely to use performance-related pay  
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than male entrepreneurs. However, they do not find significant support for the 
assumptions of less performance-related pay. Therefore the expectation remains 
that female entrepreneurs are more likely to use performance-related pay 
schemes. 
 
The first hypothesis is related to the gender composition of the workforce, while 
the second hypothesis is related to the gender of the entrepreneur. We assume 
that these two effects work independently of each other. In that case, the com-
bination of these hypotheses results in the following two additional hypotheses: 
H3: Performance-related pay is most likely to occur in firms with a 
female entrepreneur and a high share of male employees 
H4: Performance-related pay is least likely to occur in firms with a 
male entrepreneurs and a high share of female employees 
 
As we noted before, it is often assumed that firms are risk neutral while individ-
ual employees are risk averse. If this is the case, we should find empirical sup-
port for hypothesis H1 but not for H2 (and therefore also not for H3 and H4). In 
addition, we expect to find support for another hypothesis, concerning the effect 
of performance-related pay on firm profits. Whether or not the usage of per-
formance-related pay will have a positive effect on profits depends on many dif-
ferent factors. One of these factors is the risk premium that the entrepreneur 
has to offer to the employees, in order to make them accept the new system
1. 
This risk premium is higher for female employees than for male employees. 
Hence, if the share of male employees is relatively high, the expected costs of 
using performance-related pay will be relatively low, making it more likely that 
performance-related pay will be beneficial to the overall profits of the firm. Con-
versely, if the share of female employees is relatively high, profits are likely to 
be higher using fixed wages (wages not related to performance) rather than per-
formance-related pay. Formulated differently: we expect that pay policies that 
are consistent with efficient risk sharing vary with the gender composition of the 
workforce. If the share of female employees is low, efficient pay policies involve 
performance-related pay; if the share of female employees is high, efficient pay 
policies involve fixed wages only. 
 
Our final hypothesis is that firms with an efficient pay policy as defined above 
will generate higher profits than firms with an inefficient pay policy. With small 
firms, it is often difficult to differentiate between the entrepreneur's income and 
the profit of the enterprise. This is especially the case if the enterprise has the 
legal form of a sole proprietorship: in this case, the entrepreneur cannot receive 
a wage, so the entrepreneurial income is part of the generated profits. We there-
fore formulate this hypothesis in terms of entrepreneurial income rather than 
profit. This results in the following hypothesis: 
H5: The income of the entrepreneur is higher when we observe pay 
policies consistent with efficient risk sharing 
 
 
1 Often, the entrepreneur of an SME may have the authority to introduce and use a performance-
related pay system without employee approval. Nevertheless, if the entrepreneur wants to retain 
valuable employees and keep them motivated, it is important that the employees feel that they 
are compensated for the financial risk that comes with performance-related pay.  
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3  Research methodology 
3.1  Questionnaire and sampling framework 
The dataset that we use for this study has previously been used by De Kok et al. 
(2007) and Roepers and de Kok (2007). In this section we give a brief descrip-
tion of the questionnaire and the sampling framework. More details can be found 
in De Kok et al. (2007). 
3.1.1 Questionnaire 
The questionnaire was developed by De Kok et al. (2007) based on prior knowl-
edge, in-house expertise and existing questionnaires. The concept questionnaire 
was tested through several pilot interviews. This resulted in a few adjustments in 
the formulation of the survey questions. The final survey focuses on the remu-
neration of the entrepreneur and the best-paid employee. In addition, the ques-
tionnaire also contains questions regarding structural and personal characteris-
tics of the firm and its employees. 
3.1.2 Sample 
The data has been gathered through a telephone survey in June and July 2006. 
The sample is stratified by size (varying from one to 100 employees on the pay-
roll), sector and age, and consists of 369 Dutch SMEs. Table 1 shows the distri-
bution of the sample by size and age. The questions in the survey were answered 
by the independent entrepreneurs (in case of a single owned firm), the major 
business partner (in case of a partnership), or by the general director (in other 
legal structures). 
Table 1  Sampled firms, by reported firm size and firm age 
Age category* 
Number of employees 
0 - 3 years  4 - 9 years  >= 10 years  Total 
1  8  13  7  28 
2 - 9   18  42  69  129 
10 - 49   11  27  80  118 
50 - 99  15  16  63  94 
Total  52  98  219  369 
  * After imputing missing values for 28 observations. 
  Source: EIM and ACE. 
3.2  Dependent variables 
The first four hypotheses concern the usage of performance-related pay within 
small and medium-sized enterprises. Our data set allows us to use two different 
indicators of performance-related pay by employees: a specific indicator con-
cerning performance-related pay for the best-paid employee in the firm, and an 
indicator concerning the application of performance-related pay for employees in  
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general. The fifth hypothesis concerns the entrepreneurial income, for which we 
use a single measure. In this section we describe the three dependent variables 
that are used in our study. 
 
Use of performance-related pay for the best-paid employee 
The remuneration of employees can consist of various components. To determine 
the composition of the remuneration of the best-paid employee, we asked which 
of the following components were actually received by the best-paid employee 
during 2005: 
−  fixed wage; 
−  profit sharing; 
−  bonus; 
−  options (only in case of a limited liability company); 
−  company car, phone or computer. 
 
Since it is not clear if the usage of a company car, phone or computer is related 
to the performance of the employee, we do not include these remuneration com-
ponents in our measurement for performance-related pay for the best-paid em-
ployee. We also decided not to use information on the usage of options, since 
this was mentioned by only three respondents. The resulting indicator for per-
formance-related pay for the best-paid employee thus indicates whether the 
best-paid employee received a share of the profit or a bonus during 2005. This is 
the case for 32% of our observations. 
 
Use of performance-related pay for some or all employees 
The questionnaire includes a single question on performance-based pay for the 
workforce as a whole, asking whether or not the enterprise makes use of per-
formance-related pay for some or all of its employees. This is the case for 34% 
of our observations. 
 
There is a reasonable overlap with the indicator of performance-related pay for 
the best-paid employee, but it is not very strong. About a third of all enterprises 
that use performance-related pay for at least some employees indicate that their 
best-paid employee did not receive a share of the profits or a bonus. What is 
more problematic is that about a third of the enterprises that reported that their 
best-paid employee received a bonus or participated in profit sharing, answered 
'no' to the question whether at least some of their employees received any per-
formance-related pay. If both indicators would indicate the same type of pay-
ment systems, this would not be possible. Presumably, the difference in the 
wording of the questions resulted in a different interpretation by the respondent 
of the specific remuneration components that should be taken into consideration. 
 
Entrepreneurial income 
The annual income of an entrepreneur can also include various components, 
where the choice for specific components depends (amongst others) on fiscal 
legislation and the legal structure of the enterprise. For example, in the Nether-
lands entrepreneurs can only receive a wage if their enterprise is organised as a 
limited liability company, not in case of a sole proprietorship. 
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In the questionnaire, we asked whether the entrepreneur received any of the fol-
lowing income components (and, if so, the level of that component): 
−  fixed wage (including management fee in case of a limited liability company); 
−  profit sharing. In case of a sole proprietorship or partnership, we first asked if 
the respondent would indicate the profit level; we then asked which part of 
this profit was used for private means. In case of a limited liability company 
we directly asked for the amount of profit received by the respondent; 
−  bonus; 
−  shares (only in case of a limited liability company); 
−  options (only in case of a limited liability company). 
 
Of these income components, shares and options were the least common. This is 
partly due to the fact that these components can only occur in the case of a lim-
ited liability company. However, also within this subset of enterprises shares and 
options do not occur often: 27 respondents received shares as part of their in-
come, 7 respondents received options, and only 3 respondents could indicate the 
value of the received shares or options. We therefore decided to exclude shares 
and options from our definition of entrepreneurial income. Hence, we define en-
trepreneurial income as the sum of the received wage, profit sharing or bonuses 
for 2005. 
 
Information on the entrepreneurial income is available for 170 respondents. Of 
these respondents, 25 reported an income equal to zero, another three respon-
dents reported a total annual income of less than € 10 000,-. At the other end of 
the distribution, three entrepreneurs reported an annual income ranging from 
€ 400 000 to € 700 000. Summary statistics are reported in Table 2. These sta-
tistics show a large gender effect. This will be explored further in the next chap-
ter. 
Table 2  Summary statistics: entrepreneurial income by gender of the entrepreneur 
Variable  Mean  Standard deviation 
Number of valid 
observations 
Income level entrepreneur (x € 1.000):       
    male entrepreneurs  77.8  97.2  155 
    female entrepreneurs  32.8  50.2  15 
    all entrepreneurs  73.9  94.8  170 
  Source: EIM and ACE 
  Notes: 1) income is defined as the sum of wages, profit shares, bonuses or gratuities; 
2) "entrepreneur" refers to the respondent of the questionnaire. This is the CEO or general 
manager of the firm. 
3.3  Independent variables 
Characteristics of the firm 
Relevant firm characteristics include sector, firm size and firm age. Sector is rep-
resented by a standard classification into eight different sectors (manufacturing; 
construction; automotive; wholesale; retail; transport and communication; hotels  
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and restaurants; services) and firm size is represented by the number of em-
ployees of the firm. 
 
Regarding firm age, our dataset allows us to differentiate between the legal age 
and the economic age of the organisations. The legal age is the age of the cur-
rent legal form of the organisation. This is the age that is registered at e.g. the 
Chamber of Commerce. An organisation's economic age indicates how long the 
firm has been economically active. De Kok et al. (2007) show that the legal and 
economic age of firms often differ, in which case the economic age generally ex-
ceeds the legal age. A possible explanation for this might be that the legal struc-
ture of the organisation has changed over time. In this study we control for pos-
sible age effects by including the logarithm of the economic age
1. Not all firms 
provided information regarding their age. For 39 firms, missing values were im-
puted. 
 
Some studies report a strong correlation between firm size and firm age (e.g. 
Heyman, 2007). This could make it difficult to distinguish between size and age 
effects. To check whether this is also the case in our sample, we examined the 
correlation between economical age and number of employees. This correlation is 
0.07; if we exclude firms of 75 years or more, the correlation increases some-
what, but is still only 0.15. We therefore conclude that there is no risk that ef-
fects of firm size and firm age cannot be distinguished from each other. 
 
Characteristics of the entrepreneur 
Available information regarding the entrepreneur includes gender, age, educa-
tional level, tenure and experience. 
 
Women make up 15% of the entrepreneurs in our sample (54 out of 369 entre-
preneurs in total). This share is considerably lower than the share of female en-
trepreneurs in Dutch enterprises: 30% of all Dutch entrepreneurs is female
2. The 
relatively low share of female entrepreneurs in our sample may be due to the 
fact that female entrepreneurs tend to employ fewer employees and work fewer 
hours in their enterprise than male employees. Given that we only included firms 
with employees in our sample and that small firms are underrepresented as 
compared to medium-sized enterprises, this would result in a relative low share 
of female entrepreneurs in our sample. This explanation is consistent with the 
results of an exploratory probit regression, where we relate the gender of the 
entrepreneur to firm size and sector dummies. The results indicate a highly sig-
nificant (p<0.001) negative relationship between firm size and the likelihood that 
an entrepreneur is a woman. 
 
Characteristics of the workforce 
The nature of remuneration policies is often related to basic characteristics of the 
workforce such as gender, age and educational level. For this study we have in-
formation about the gender, age and educational decomposition of the work-
force. Summary statistics are included in Table 3. Notice that the gender of the 
 
1 The age variable included in Table 1 also refers to economic age. 
2 Source: ‘demografische aspecten van ondernemers’ (demographic aspects of entrepreneurs), a 
Dutch dataset available at www.entrepreneurship-sme.eu;   
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entrepreneur is related to the gender of the workforce: with male entrepreneurs, 
the majority of employees is male, while with female entrepreneurs the majority 
of employees is female. 
Table 3  Summary statistics: characteristics of the workforce 
Variable  Mean  Standard deviation 
Number of valid 
observations 
gender decomposition of the workforce  
(percentage male employees): 
     
    Within firms with male entrepreneurs  63.5%  31.6  289 
    Within firms with female entrepreneurs  42.3%  34.4  45 
Within all firms  60.6%  32.8  334 
age decomposition of the workforce:       
   share of employees <= 24  27.1%  27.4  336 
   share of employees 25 - 44  53.8%  27.3  336 
   share of elder employees >=45   19.2%  22.3  336 
educational decomposition of workforce:       
   share of low-educated employees  33.5%  34.3  329 
   share of medium-educated employees  45.1%  33.7  329 
   share of high-educated employees  21.4%  30.4  329 
  Source: EIM and ACE. 
Characteristics of the best-paid employee 
41 Respondents could not (or would not) identify the best-paid employee within 
their organisation. Consequently, these respondents could not provide any in-
formation on the remuneration of these employees. This leaves 328 observations 
which can be used to analyse the structure of the remuneration of the best-paid 
employee. 
 
Relevant characteristics of the best-paid employee include gender, age, educa-
tion, occupational level and tenure of the best-paid employee. Summary statis-
tics are presented in Table 4 (variable means) and Table 5 (valid observations).  
18   
Table 4  Summary statistics for the best-paid employee: variable means, by gender of 
entrepreneur and gender of best-paid employee 
Variable  All  By gender of entrepreneur 
By gender of  
best-paid employee 
    male  female  male  female 
age of the best-paid employee  39.2  39.8  35.3  39.8  36.9 
educational level: share of best-paid 
employees with high education   40%  41%  30%  41%  35% 
tenure of the best-paid employee 
(years)  6.5  6.8  4.8  7.2  4.1 
occupational level: share of best-paid 
employees with management position   48%  51%  26%  55%  24% 
  Source: EIM and ACE. 
Table 5  Summary statistics for the best-paid employee: variable counts (valid observa-
tions), by gender of entrepreneur and gender of best-paid employee 
Variable  All  By gender of entrepreneur 
By gender of  
best-paid employee 
    male  female  male  female 
age of the best-paid employee  326  279  47  254  72 
educational level: share of best-paid 
employees with high education   327  281  47  255  72 
tenure of the best-paid employee 
(years)  326  280  47  254  72 
occupational level: share of best-paid 
employees with management position   327  280  47  255  72 
  Source: EIM and ACE. 
It is interesting to notice that the characteristics of the best-paid employee are 
not only related to the gender of employee, but also to the gender of the entre-
preneur. To a considerable extent, this is because the gender of the entrepre-
neur and of the best-paid employee often coincide: for 78% of the firms in our 
sample, the entrepreneur and the best-paid employee are of the same gender 
(Table 6). In particular, the large majority of male entrepreneurs has a male 
best-paid employee, while for female entrepreneurs the gender of the best-paid 
employee is evenly distributed: 49% of the female entrepreneurs employ a fe-
male as best-paid employee; for male entrepreneurs, this is only 9%
1. 
 
1 Fisher’s exact test rejects the hypothesis that the gender of the entrepreneur and of the best-
paid employee are independent of each other at a significance level of 0.000.  
  19 
Table 6  Gender of the entrepreneur and the best-paid employee 
Gender best-paid employee 
Gender entrepreneur  Male  Female  Total 
Male  231  49  280 
Female  24  23  47 
Total  255  72  327 
  Source: EIM and ACE. 
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4  Results 
In chapter two we formulated five different hypotheses. Our hypotheses involve 
three different dependent variables: the usage of performance-related pay for 
the best-paid employee in the firm, the usage of performance-related pay for the 
workforce in general and entrepreneurial income (as indicator for firm perform-
ance). The first four hypotheses will be tested separately for performance-
related pay for the best-paid employee and for the workforce in general, while 
the fifth hypothesis will be tested on the entrepreneurial income. In this chapter 
we present the results of our analyses for each of these three dependent vari-
ables. 
4.1  Performance-related pay for the best-paid employee 
To test hypotheses H1 to H4 for the case of the best-paid employee, we estimate 
two equations: 
−  Equation 1: an equation that relates the use of performance-related pay for 
the best-paid employee to firm characteristics, entrepreneurial characteristics 
(including a gender dummy) and characteristics of the best-paid employee 
(including a gender dummy). This will be estimated by a probit regression. 
The results will be used to test hypotheses H1 and H2; 
−  Equation 2: as equation 1, replacing the gender dummies for the entrepreneur 
and the best-paid employee with two dummies that indicate the enterprises 
that are assumed to be most likely (firms with a female entrepreneur and a 
male best-paid employee) and least likely (firms with a male entrepreneur and 
a female best paid employee) to apply performance-related pay for the best-
paid employee. This will be estimated by a probit regression. The results will 
be used to test hypotheses H3 and H4. 
 
Ideally, we would have liked to estimate these equations separately for manage-
rial and non-managerial employees. Our sample is, however, too small to limit 
our estimations to either subsample. As a second-best solution, we include a 
dummy for the occupational position of the best-paid employee in the equations 
(see e.g. Brown and Medoff, 2003). 
 
Equations 1 and 2 have been estimated with and without sector dummies. The 
results indicate that including sector dummies does not change any of the rele-
vant findings
1, while it reduces the available degrees of freedom considerably 
(the number of observations is limited). We therefore present the estimation re-
sults for these equations without sector dummies. These results are presented in 
Table 7. 
 
1 Estimating model 1 with sector dummies results in 1 significant sector dummy (retail) and re-
duces the significance of the employer characteristics somewhat; estimating model 2 with sector 
dummies results in 1 significant sector dummies (retail) and reduces the significance of the em-
ployer characteristics somewhat; otherwise, no differences occur.  
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Table 7  Probit regressions on the use of performance-related pay (profit-sharing or bo-
nus) for the best-paid employee. 




value  Sign. level 
Parameter 
value  Sign. level  
Firm characteristics         
firm size (ln)  0.067  0.320  0.087  0.184 
firm age (ln)  -0.23**  0.018  -0.22**  0.022 
Employer characteristics         
age (ln)  0.85*  0.077  0.83*  0.082 
experience (ln)  0.04  0.786  0.08  0.637 
phd degree (dummy)  0.58**  0.014  0.63***  0.008 
Female entrepreneur(dummy)  -0.15  0.545  -   
Characteristics best-paid employee         
age (ln)  -0.26  0.505  -0.23  0.555 
tenure (ln)  0.38***  0.001  0.37***  0.001 
Medium education (dummy)  0.24  0.386  0.22  0.43 
high education (dummy)  0.76***  0.009  0.73**  0.012 
Female employee (dummy)  -0.10  0.657  -   
Management position (dummy)  0.52  0.147  0.53  0.141 
Gender comparison employer/employee         
female entrepreneur, male employee 
(dummy) 
-    0.11  0.723 
male entrepreneur, female employee 
(dummy) 
-    0.08  0.728 
Constant  -3.44*  0.065  -3.65**  0.048 
         
Goodness of Fit Measures         
Pseudo R
2  0.1482    0.1471   
Log likelihood  -172.1    -172.3   
Valid Observations  307    307   
  *; **; *** Denote a significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
The results for both equations are very similar: the likelihood that a firm applies 
performance-related pay for its best-paid employee is higher for younger firms, 
for firms with elder and highly educated entrepreneurs, and for employees with 
high tenure and a high educational level. There is no indication that firm size is 
relevant. More important, there is also no indication of any gender effect: con-
cerning the remuneration of the best-paid employee, we find no support for hy-
potheses H1 to H4. Specifically, the results of equation 1 reject hypotheses H1 
and H2: neither the gender of the entrepreneur nor the gender of the best-paid 
employee are related to the probability that the best-paid employee receives 
performance-related pay. Likewise, the results of equation 2 reject hypotheses 
H3 and H4. This follows from the insignificance of the dummies indicating the  
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firms that are most and least likely to apply performance-related pay for the 
best-paid employee. 
4.2  Performance-related pay for the workforce in general 
Regarding the workforce in general, we use a similar approach to test hypothe-
ses H1 to H4. Again, two equations are estimated: 
−  Equation 3: an equation that relates the use of performance-related pay for 
some or all of the employees to firm characteristics, entrepreneurial charac-
teristics (including a gender dummy) and characteristics of the workforce as a 
whole (including the share of male employees). This will be estimated by a 
probit regression. The results will be used to test hypotheses H1 and H2; 
−  Equation 4: as equation 3, replacing the entrepreneurial gender dummy and 
the share of male employees with two dummies that indicate the enterprises 
that are assumed to be most likely (firms with a female entrepreneur and a 
relatively high share of male employees) and least likely (firms with a male 
entrepreneur and a relatively high share of female employees) to apply per-
formance-related pay to the workforce in general. This will be estimated by a 
probit regression. The results will be used to test hypotheses H3 and H4. 
 
The estimation of equation 4 requires that we classify enterprises into three 
categories, based on the gender of the entrepreneur and whether the share of 
(fe)male employees is relatively high or low. The second criterion can be opera-
tionalised in different ways. A straightforward approach is to determine various 
percentiles of the distribution of the share of male employees, and consider the 
lowest/highest percentiles as those with relatively low/high shares of male em-
ployees. The question then remains, how many percentiles to distinguish. An in-
crease in the number of percentiles may increase the differences between the 
lowest and highest percentiles (thus increasing the likelihood of finding statisti-
cally significant differences), but also decreases the number of observations 
within the percentiles (thus decreasing the likelihood of finding statistically sig-
nificant differences). Since this is an explorative study, we have estimated equa-
tion 4 based on the outcomes of using two, three and four percentiles. In this 
paper, we report the outcomes with the highest significance levels for the vari-
ables of interest. 
 
As it turns out, distinguishing four percentiles provided the highest significance 
levels for the two dummy variables indicating enterprises that are most/least 
likely to apply performance-related pay. In this situation, a 'low share' of male 
employees refers to the 25% enterprises with the lowest shares of male employ-
ees (less than 37%), and a 'high share' refers to the 24% enterprises with the 
highest share of male employees (92.5% or more). Combined with the gender of 
the entrepreneur, this results in a group of 61 enterprises for which perform-
ance-related pay is least likely to occur (a male entrepreneur and a low share of 
male employees) and a group of only 6 enterprises for which performance-
related pay is most likely to occur (a female entrepreneur and a high share of 
male employees). 
 
The results are presented in Table 8, again without including sector dummies.  
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Table 8  Probit regressions on presence of performance-related pay for some or all em-
ployees in the workforce. 




value  Sign. level 
Parameter 
value  Sign. level 
Firm characteristics          
firm size (ln)  0.29***  0.068  0.31***  0.000 
firm age (ln)  -0.05  0.571  -0.04  0.623 
Employer characteristics         
age (ln)  0.82*  0.087  0.81*  0.092 
experience (ln)  -0.14  0.384  -0.10  0.503 
phd degree (dummy)  0.09  0.665  0.14  0.497 
Female entrepreneur (dummy)  -0.09  0.703  -   
Workforce characteristics         
share of highly educated employees  0.0089***  0.001  0.0087***  0.001 
share of elder employees  -0.0097**  0.019  -0.0085**  0.034 
share of male employees   0.005**  0.033  -   
Gender comparison employer/workforce         
female entrepreneur, low share female em-
ployees (dummy) 
-    1.02*  0.065 
male entrepreneur, high share female em-
ployees (dummy) 
-    -0.29  0.136 
constant  -3.78**  0.015  -3.9**  0.013 
         
Goodness of Fit Measures         
Pseudo R
2  0.1072    0.1102   
Log likelihood  -187.0    -186.3   
Valid Observations  321    321   
  *; **; *** denote a significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
The results for equations 3 and 4 are very similar: the likelihood that a firm ap-
plies performance-related pay for some (or all) of its employees is higher for lar-
ger firms, and for firms with a higher share of young and highly educated em-
ployees. Notice that these results are different from the results for equations 1 
and 2: instead of firm age, it is firm size that matters now, and employer charac-
teristics no longer seem to be very important. 
 
Equations 3 and 4 still find no support for hypotheses H2 and H4. The lack of 
support for hypothesis H2 contradicts the earlier findings by Roepers and De 
Kok, who found that female entrepreneurs are (ceteris paribus) more likely to 
provide performance-related pay than male entrepreneurs (Roepers and De Kok, 
2007, page 31). Their study, however, included less control variables. In particu-
lar, they did not control for the educational level of the entrepreneur and the age 
and education of the workforce. Once these control variables are included in the 
model, the significant effect of the gender of the entrepreneur disappears.  
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The positive parameter for the share of male employees in equation 3 supports 
hypothesis H1. In addition, the positive dummy variable that indicates firms with 
a female entrepreneur and a low share of female employees offers some support 
for hypothesis H3 (although it should be noted that this parameter is only signifi-
cant at 10%
1). This is consistent with the results by Roepers and De Kok, who 
found a significant positive effect of the interaction between the gender of the 
entrepreneur and the share of male employees (Roepers and De Kok, 2007, page 
31). 
4.3  Gender, performance-related pay and firm performance 
4.3.1 Controlling for workforce characteristics 
To test the final hypothesis, we estimate various equations with the log of the 
entrepreneurial income as dependent variable. 
−  Equation 5: the starting point is an equation that relates the (log of the) in-
come level of the entrepreneur to several firm characteristics, entrepreneurial 
characteristics and workforce characteristics; 
−  Equation 6: as equation 5, including a dummy variable indicating the use of 
performance-related pay for at least some employees; 
−  Equation 7: as equation 5, including a dummy variable indicating a consistent 
pay policy: this is either a combination of performance-related pay and a high 
share of male employees, or a combination of no performance-related pay and 
a high share of female employees. 
 
Estimating equation 7 requires that we identify firms with a consistent pay pol-
icy. This, in turn, requires that we identify firms with a relatively high share of 
(fe)male employees. We use the same method as discussed in the previous sec-
tion, which is based on the percentiles of the distribution of the share of male 
employees. As is the case with equation 4, we find the best results when we use 
four different percentiles. In this case, 93 firms in the sample have a consistent 
pay policy (66 firms with relatively few male employees without performance-
related pay and 27 firms with relatively many male employees with performance-
related pay). The estimation results are reported in Table 9. 
 
According to the results for equations 5, 6 and 7, entrepreneurial income in-
creases with firm size and with the educational level of the entrepreneur as well 
as the employees. Neither the gender of the entrepreneur nor the gender com-
position of the workforce are significantly related to entrepreneurial income. 
There is also no support for hypothesis H5: while the prevalence of performance-
related pay in general is associated with a higher entrepreneurial income (equa-
tion 6), our indicator for a consistent pay policy is not (equation 7). Apparently, 
the effect of performance-related pay on entrepreneurial income does not de-
 
1 In addition, if sector dummies are included, the significance of this parameter becomes less than 
10%.  
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pend on the gender composition of the workforce; at least not in the way that we 
hypothesised
1. 
Table 9  OLS Regression results on log entrepreneurial income (robust estimators) 













firm characteristics             
firm size (ln)  0.25***  0.000  0.24***  0.000  0.26***  0.000 
firm age (ln)  -0.008  0.875  0.022  0.664  -0.009  0.860 
employer characteristics             
age (ln)  0.43  0.261  0.32  0.417  0.54  0.167 
experience (ln)  0.12  0.337  0.15  0.249  0.08  0.505 
phd degree (dummy)  0.34**  0.014  0.31**  0.024  0.31**  0.027 
Female entrepreneur (dummy)  -0.31  0.214  -0.27  0.233  -0.22  0.313 
Workforce characteristics             
share of highly educated employees  0.006***  0.006  0.006***  0.008  0.006***  0.008 
share of elder employees  -0.003  0.360  -0.002  0.452  -0.003  0.380 
share of male employees   -0.000  0.858  -0.001  0.753  -0.003  0.380 
Performance-related pay for some or 
all employees 
-    0.29***  0.009  -   
consistent pay policy  -    -    -0.23  0.137 
Constant  1.38  0.231  1.54  0.192  1.11  0.345 
             
Goodness of Fit Measures             
R
2  0.37    0.41       
Valid Observations  128    128    128   
  *; **; *** denote a significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
4.3.2 Controlling for characteristics of the best-paid employee 
In the previous section, we examined to which extent characteristics of (per-
formance-related pay for) the workforce could explain entrepreneurial income. In 
this section, we focus on characteristics of (performance-related pay for) the 
best-paid employee. This is done by including characteristics of the best-paid 
employee in equations 5 to 7, and replacing the indicators for performance-
related pay for the workforce with comparable indicators for performance-related 
pay for the best-paid employee. This results in equations 8, 9 and 10 (see Table 
10). 
 
1 Hypothesis H5 implies that for firms with a high share of male employees, performance-related 
pay would have a positive effect on entrepreneurial income; for firms with a low share of male 
employees, performance-related pay would have a negative effect on entrepreneurial income.  
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In equation 10, the dummy variable indicating consistent pay policy refers to 11 
firms with a female best-paid employee that receives no performance-related 
pay, and 47 firms with a male best-paid employee that receives performance-
related pay. 
Table 10  Regression results on firm performance (log entrepreneurial income (OLS, ro-
bust estimators), including characteristics best-paid employee 













firm characteristics             
firm size (ln)  0.28***  0.000  0.27***  0.000  0.27***  0.000 
firm age (ln)  -0.02  0.734  -0.02  0.736  0.002  0.975 
employer characteristics             
age (ln)  0.054  0.903  0.03  0.944  0.056  0.895 
experience (ln)  0.24*  0.084  0.24*  0.094  0.20  0.113 
phd degree (dummy)  0.27*  0.052  0.22  0.147  0.29*  0.059 
Female entrepreneur (dummy)  -0.28  0.292  -0.29  0.246  -0.21  0.414 
Workforce characteristics             
share of highly educated employees  0.007***  0.002  0.006**  0.012  0.008***  0.001 
share of elder employees  -0.005  0.192  -0.004  0.274  -0.005  0.187 
share of male employees   0.002  0.318  0.002  0.378  0.000  0.908 
Characteristics best-paid employee             
Female employee (dummy)  0.30  0.166  0.29  0.185  -   
performance-related pay  -    0.15  0.268  -   
consistent pay policy  -    -    -0.13  0.267 
             
Constant  2.38*  0.083  2.44*  0.086     
             
Goodness of Fit Measures             
R
2  0.3769    0.3859       
Valid Observations  117    117    117   
  *; **; *** denote a significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
The results for equations 8, 9 and 10 are similar to the results for equations 5, 6 
and 7: entrepreneurial income increases with firm size and with the educational 
level of the entrepreneur as well as the employees (although the effect of the 
educational level of the entrepreneur is somewhat lower). None of the included 
gender variables have a significant effect (gender of the entrepreneur, gender 
composition of the workforce and gender of the best-paid employee). Also here, 
there is no support for hypothesis H5: our indicator for a consistent pay policy is 
not only not significant, but even has the wrong sign (equation 10). 
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5  Discussion and conclusions 
In this study we have derived five different hypotheses concerning the gender 
effects in performance-related pay amongst small and medium-sized effects. 
These hypotheses are based on two basic assumptions: the willingness of em-
ployers and employees to accept performance-related pay depends (amongst 
others) on their levels of risk aversion, and risk aversion is gender-related. The 
empirical support for our hypotheses is, however, very limited. In this chapter 
we discuss the estimation results and end with the main conclusions. 
5.1  Discussion 
Partial support for the first hypothesis… 
According to the first hypothesis, performance-related pay would be used less for 
female employees than for male employees. We find empirical support for this 
hypothesis, but only regarding the workforce in general: firms with a larger 
share of male employees are more likely to offer performance-related pay to 
their employees. 
 
When we analyse the remuneration of the best-paid employee, we find no rela-
tionship between the employee's gender and the probability that he or she re-
ceived a share of the profit or a bonus. One explanation for this lack of support 
is that the sample size is not large enough; our data set only contains 72 obser-
vations where the best-paid employee is female. 
 
…and no support for the second hypothesis… 
The second hypothesis states that female entrepreneurs are more likely to use 
performance-related pay than male entrepreneurs. There is no support for this 
hypothesis. The results presented by Roepers and De Kok (2007) seem to sup-
port this hypothesis, but additional analysis has shown that this support is the 
result of a missing variable bias: once additional control variables are added to 
the model by Roepers and De Kok (2007), the effect of the gender of the entre-
preneur is no longer significant. 
 
…so no support for the third and fourth hypothesis should be expected 
Hypotheses H3 and H4 are only valid if the first two hypotheses are. If one of the 
first two hypotheses would not be valid, then hypotheses H3 and H4 should also 
be rejected. At a 5% confidence level, this is indeed the case. The fact that we 
find no support for hypotheses H3 and H4 is thus consistent with the lack of sup-
port for the second hypothesis. 
 
No support for the fifth hypothesis regarding entrepreneurial income 
The results of the first four hypotheses are consistent with the standard assump-
tion that firms are risk neutral while individual employees are risk averse. If this 
is the case, we expected to find support for hypothesis H5: The income of the 
entrepreneur is higher when we observe pay policies consistent with efficient risk  
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sharing. We find, however, no support for this hypothesis. Also here, this could 
be due to the limited number of observations (128 or 117 valid observations). 
 
Do we need more data… 
One interpretation of the results of our study, is that the results are largely con-
sistent with the standard assumption that firms are risk neutral while individual 
employees are risk averse. The support is not strong, but this could be explained 
by the relatively limited number of observations. According to this interpretation, 
the main finding of our study is then that we find no support for the expected re-
lationship between the gender of the entrepreneur and the incidence of perform-
ance-related pay. The small size of our sample, however, does not allow for 
strong conclusions. 
 
…or do we need an alternative theory? 
Another interpretation of the results is also possible. The empirical support for 
our hypotheses is so limited, that we should reconsider the two basic assump-
tions that underlie our hypotheses. 
 
The first assumption is that the willingness of employers and employees to ac-
cept performance-related pay depends (amongst others) on their levels of risk 
aversion. This assumption ignores the difference between risk aversion and am-
biguity aversion (Borghans et al., 2009; Machina, 2009). Individuals often find 
themselves in situations where different outcomes may occur. The probabilities 
of these outcomes may either be known or unknown. Risk aversion refers to an 
individual's behaviour in case of know probabilities, while ambiguity aversion re-
fers to an individual's behaviour in case of unknown probabilities. Since the dis-
tribution of the expected performance of employees is not known in advance, the 
incidence of performance-related pay is likely to be related to the ambiguity 
aversion of the employer and employees, rather than their risk aversion. 
 
Borghans et al. (2009) found that risk aversion and ambiguity aversion are em-
pirically distinct individual traits. Regarding risk aversion, they find that women 
are more risk averse than men, and that psychological traits are strongly associ-
ated with risk aversion. Regarding ambiguity aversion, however, they find mark-
edly different results. Men and women show similar marginal valuations of ambi-
guity (with increasing levels of ambiguity), and ambiguity aversion is not related 
to psychological traits. If ambiguity diversion is indeed not gender-related, the 
second basic assumption of our study (risk aversion is gender-related) would not 
apply in the case of ambiguity aversion. 
 
According to this line of argument, differences in risk aversion between men and 
women cannot explain gender differences in the incidence of performance-related 
pay. An alternative explanation for gender differences in the incidence of per-
formance-related pay is that they are partly caused by gender differences in la-
bour force attachment. Various authors have argued that differences in labour 
force attachment between men and women could explain part of the gender 
earnings gap (Kunze, 2005; Nordman and Roubaud, 2005). According to Geddes 
and Heywood (2003), gender differences in labour force attachment may also 
explain differences in the incidence of performance-related pay: on average, 
women have a lower labour force attachment than men, which is in turn related 
to the probability of receiving performance-based pay.  
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5.2  Conclusions 
We have found partial support for the first hypothesis, which states that female 
employees are less likely to receive performance-related pay than male employ-
ees. There is also some support for the third hypothesis, which states that per-
formance-related pay is most likely to occur in firms with a female entrepreneur 
and a high share of male employees. This support is however weak: it is only 
significant at a 10% confidence level, and is furthermore based on the compari-
son of a sample of only 6 firms (with a female entrepreneur and a high share of 
male employees) with the other firms. For the other three hypotheses, there is 
no empirical support. 
 
One interpretation of the results is that they indicate that entrepreneurs are risk 
neutral while employees are risk averse (where female employees are more risk 
averse than male employees). Due to the small sample size, however, this inter-
pretation is only tentative. Additional empirical research on considerable larger 
dataset is required. Perhaps future studies can make use of administrative data 
(e.g. of payrolling companies that target SMEs). 
 
Another interpretation is that the lack of support for our hypotheses suggests 
that we need to reconsider them, including the basic assumptions on which they 
are based. In our study, we have used gender as a proxy for the risk aversion of 
individual entrepreneurs and employees, and assumed that risk aversion (of em-
ployers as well as employees) is in turn related to the incidence of performance-
related pay. However, it can be argued that this assumption is not correct: the 
incidence of performance-related pay may be related to ambiguity aversion 
rather than risk aversion. Gender may however also serve as a proxy for differ-
ences in labour force attachment. Differences in labour force attachment are 
likely to be only relevant for employers, not for employees, which seems consis-
tent with our lack of empirical support for the presence of an entrepreneurial 
gender effect. 
 
For a better understanding of gender effects in remuneration policies, future 
studies should further develop the relationships between performance-related 
pay, risk aversion and ambiguity aversion and labour force attachment, both 
theoretically and empirically. 
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Summary 
In theory, for many small and medium-sized enterprises the introduction of per-
formance-related pay might be beneficial: if implemented properly, it could help 
enterprises in selecting, hiring and motivating the right employees for the right 
jobs. So far, however, performance-related pay in SMEs has received little aca-
demic attention. One of the few studies on this topic is that by Roepers and De 
Kok (2007), who explore determinants of performance-related pay amongst 
SMEs. Amongst others, they found support for the presence of gender effects; 
not only regarding the gender of the employees, but also regarding the gender of 
the entrepreneur. 
 
In this paper we further investigate the gender effect in remuneration policies as 
found in Roepers and de Kok (2007). The central idea of this paper is that female 
and male entrepreneurs make different choices regarding their human resource 
management practices, including remuneration policies. These differences can be 
explained by differences in the risk aversion of male and female employees and 
entrepreneurs. Generally speaking, women are more risk averse than men. This 
suggests that men and women have a different valuation of the risks that are as-
sociated with performance-related pay. We hypothesise that these different 
valuations will result in differences in the incidence of performance-related pay. 
This leads to the following five hypotheses: 
 
−  H1: Performance-related pay is less used for female employees than for male 
employees. 
−  H2: Female entrepreneurs are more likely to use performance-related pay 
than male entrepreneurs. 
−  H3: Performance-related pay is most likely to occur in firms with a female en-
trepreneur and a high share of male employees. 
−  H4: Performance-related pay is least likely to occur in firms with a male en-
trepreneurs and a high share of female employees. 
−  H5: The income of the entrepreneur is higher when we observe pay policies 
consistent with efficient risk sharing. 
 
These hypotheses are tested by estimating various probit and OLS regressions, 
using the results of a telephonic questionnaire amongst 369 Dutch entrepreneurs 
with 1 - 100 employees. 
 
At a significance level of 5%, we find partial support for hypothesis H1, but not 
for any of the other hypotheses. One explanation for these findings is that they 
indicate that employees are indeed risk averse (and men more than women) but 
that employers are not; hypothesis H1 is valid but H2 is not. In this case, hy-
potheses H3 and H4 are no longer valid, so the lack of support for hypotheses H3 
and H4 is consistent with the lack of support for H2. The lack of support for the 
fifth hypothesis may be due to the limited size of our sample (approximately 120 
valid observations were available to test this hypothesis). 
 
Another interpretation is that the lack of support for our hypotheses suggests 
that we need to reconsider them, including the basic assumptions on which they 
are based. We use gender as a proxy for the risk aversion of individual employ-
ees, and assume that risk aversion (of employers as well as employees) is in 
turn related to the incidence of performance-related pay. However, it can be ar- 
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gued that this assumption is not correct: the incidence of performance-related 
pay may be related to ambiguity aversion rather than risk aversion. Gender may 
however also serve as a proxy for differences in labour force attachment. Differ-
ences in labour force attachment are likely to be only relevant for employers, not 
for employees, which seems consistent with our lack of empirical support for the 
presence of an entrepreneurial gender effect. 
 
For a better understanding of gender effects in remuneration policies, future 
studies should further develop the relationships between performance-related 
pay, risk aversion and ambiguity aversion and labour force attachment, both 
theoretically and empirically. 
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1  Introduction 
Strong debate on performance-related pay 
Until a few years ago, performance-related pay was becoming more and more 
accepted and used. This changed dramatically when Lehman Brothers went bank-
rupt in September 2008. In a reaction to the crisis that followed, many claimed 
that the practice of performance-related pay in especially the financial sector 
was one of the main causes for the current crisis. The debate on the advantages 
and disadvantages of performance-related pay (and how it should be designed) 
is still ongoing. 
 
This debate tends to focus on large enterprises, where variable payment can ac-
count for a large share of total payment. The situation in small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) tends to be ignored in this discussion. For various rea-
sons, this is not surprising. First of all, relatively little is known about payment 
systems in SMEs. In 2006, the Amsterdam Centre for Entrepreneurship (ACE) 
and EIM conducted a survey amongst 369 Dutch SMEs regarding their remunera-
tion system. This is still one of the few surveys on this subject that includes 
SMEs. Secondly, the variable share of total payment tends to be relatively small 
in SMEs. Amongst others, the EIM - ACE survey included questions on the pay-
ment practices of the best-paid employee within each enterprise. The results in-
dicate that, within the group of best-paid employees that received some form of 
performance-related pay, the variable share of their wage was on average 8% 
(De Kok et al., 2007). 
 
Previous research: determinants of performance-related pay in SMEs 
Van Praag et al. (2006) argue that many small and medium-sized enterprises 
might benefit from the introduction of performance-related pay: if implemented 
properly, it could help enterprises in selecting, hiring and motivating the right 
employees for the right jobs. So far, however, performance-related pay in SMEs 
has received little academic attention. One of the few studies on this topic is that 
by Roepers and De Kok (2007). Using the EIM - ACE survey, they explore deter-
minants of performance-related pay amongst SMEs. In particular, they examined 
whether the incidence of performance-related pay for employees is related to the 
size and ownership structure of the enterprise and to the gender of the entrepre-
neur and the employees. Their results indicate that each of these variables is in-
deed related to the incidence of performance-related pay: larger firms are more 
likely to provide performance-related pay than smaller firms, and firms with a 
single owner and family firms are less likely to provide performance-related pay 
than firms with multiple owners (that are not related to each other). They also 
found a gender effect. 
 
The gender effect that Roepers and De Kok (2007) found was, however, different 
from what they expected. They expected that both the gender of the entrepre-
neur and the gender composition of the workforce would affect the probability of 
performance-related pay, but that these two effects would be independent of 
each other. Instead, they found a close relationship between these two effects. 
For male entrepreneurs, they found that the use of performance-related pay is 
independent of the gender composition of the work force. For female entrepre- 
8   
neurs, however, they found that the usage of performance-related pay increases 
with the share of male employees. 
 
Objective of the study 
The role of the gender of the manager or (direct) supervisor on wages of subor-
dinates has been considered before (Cohen and Huffman, 2007; Hultin and 
Szulkin, 2003). Likewise, the relationship between employee gender and per-
formance-related pay has been studied before (Geddes and Heywood, 2003). 
However, as far as we know, the paper by Roepers and De Kok (2007) is the 
only paper that considers both the gender of the entrepreneur and the gender 
composition of the workforce. 
 
In this paper we further investigate the gender effect in remuneration policies as 
found in Roepers and de Kok (2007). The central idea of this paper is that female 
and male entrepreneurs make different choices regarding their human resource 
management practices, including remuneration policies (Mukhtar, 2002; Verheul 
et al, 2002). These differences can be explained by differences in the risk aver-
sion of male and female employees and entrepreneurs. We derive several hy-
potheses on how the interaction between the entrepreneurial gender and the 
gender composition of the workforce might affect the incidence of performance-
related pay. These hypotheses are then tested, using the same dataset as 
Roepers and de Kok (2007). 
 
Outline 
In the next chapter we present the theoretical framework for this study and dis-
cuss the hypotheses that we will test. In chapter three we describe the data that 
we use to test these hypotheses. The results are presented in chapter four. As 
we will see, most of our hypotheses cannot be confirmed. Generally speaking, 
the available data does not support our ideas on how differences in risk aversion 
result in gender differences in the incidence of performance-related pay. Chapter 
five therefore starts with a discussion of possible explanations for our lack of 
positive results. After this discussion the main conclusions of our study are pre-
sented. 
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2  Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
2.1  The general case for performance-related pay 
An employment contract is an example of a relationship between a principal and 
an agent, where the principal delegates work to the agent. In such principal-
agent relationships, two types of problems can occur, related to differences in 
goals and risk aversion between the agent and the principal. The first type of 
problem occurs when the principal and agent have different desires or goals and 
when it is difficult or expensive for the principal to monitor the agent's behav-
iour. This goal conflict introduces the risk of moral hazard: the risk that the 
agent may not provide the level of effort that was agreed upon. In this case, the 
agent is shirking. The second problem arises when the principal and the agent 
have different attitudes toward risk. The principal and the agent may prefer dif-
ferent actions while executing the work, because of their different risk prefer-
ences. (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 
These problems may be (partly) solved by using performance-related pay (for 
example, piece rate payment, commissions, bonuses or profit sharing) as a gov-
ernance mechanism. If designed properly, including performance-related pay as 
part of the contract between the principal and the agent may prevent opportun-
istic agent behaviour. This will occur if the preferences of agents and principals 
are realigned in such a way that the rewards for both depend on the same ac-
tions. In such cases, the conflicts of self interest between principal and agent are 
reduced (Eisenhardt, 1989) and the agent is motivated to provide the efforts de-
sired by the principal. In fact, one of the most important objectives of compen-
sation is to provide proper and effective motivation to employees (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1992). 
 
Performance pay and firm size 
In larger firms, shirking is less easy to detect. This increases the risk that shirk-
ing will actually occur (Chang, 2006). Larger firms therefore have more need for 
governance mechanisms to combat moral hazard and shirking. By using per-
formance-related pay, firms can reduce the risk of shirking, because this re-
moves (or reduces) the potential conflicts of self interest between employer and 
employees. The benefits of performance-related pay are therefore likely to in-
crease with firm size. At the same time, the costs (per employee) of developing 
and maintaining performance-related pay system are likely to decrease with firm 
size: Larger firms have a larger demand for human resources, and therefore a 
larger demand for specific HRM practices. This stimulates standardization and 
formalization of these practices. Most formalized HRM practices require consider-
able development costs. This results in a cost advantage for larger firms, which 
is strengthened by the limited supply of financial resources of many small firms 
(De Kok, Uhlaner and Thurik, 2006). 
 
These arguments suggest that the net benefits of performance-related pay will 
increase with firm size. This is consistent with the finding from previous research  
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that performance-related pay is more common amongst large firms than 
amongst SMEs (Van Praag et al., 2006). 
 
Performance pay and risk aversion 
The realignment of the agent's preferences with those of the principal often re-
quires that certain risks are transferred from the principal to the agent (Eisen-
hardt, 1989). This is also the case with performance-related pay, where the risk 
of under-performance is shared between the principal and the agent. The extent 
to which this actually takes place depends on the actual levels of risk aversion of 
the relevant principal and agents. In agency theory it is often assumed that firms 
are risk neutral (e.g. because firms are owned by different investors with well-
diversified portfolios) while individual employees are risk averse (Chang, 2006; 
Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). This creates a stimulus to provide a fixed wage to 
the risk-averse employees: by transferring most of the income risks of employ-
ees to the firm, the employees are better of while the firm is not affected. It is 
doubtful, however, whether this assumption also applies in the case of SMEs. For 
example, the idea that the firm is owned by different investors with well-
diversified portfolios does not apply to the majority of SMEs. Often, SMEs are 
single owned-managed enterprises. In these cases, the level of risk aversion of 
the firm is basically determined by the risk aversion of the entrepreneur. This, in 
turn, may be related to the entrepreneurs' gender. 
2.2  Gender differences in risk attitude: five hypotheses 
It is well established that the risk attitude of individuals is partly related to their 
gender (Bajtelsmit and Bernasek, 1996; Borghans et al., 2009; Dohmen and 
Falk, 2001). It is however difficult to identify the causes of this gender differ-
ence: it is generally only possible to observe the outcomes of decisions, and not 
the decision-making processes themselves. 
 
Borghans et al. (2009) use experiments to examine possible determinants of risk 
aversion. They find that risk aversion is partly determined by psychological traits 
such as the "big 5"
1. Gender differences in these traits explain only a small part 
of gender differences in risk aversion. In the context of financial decisions, risk 
aversion is also related to wealth: in an absolute sense (the amount of money 
invested in risky assets), risk aversion decreases with wealth (Bajtelsmit and 
Bernasek, 1996). Since women have lower wages than men (both in general and 
for comparable positions), this suggests an indirect gender effect on risk aver-
sion. 
 
If female employees are more risk averse then male employees, they require a 
higher risk premium to accept performance-related pay. When comparing a fixed 
wage offer with a performance-related pay offer with a certain risk premium, fe-
male employees will be more likely to prefer the fixed wage offer. This is con-
firmed by an empirical study by Dohmen and Falk (2001). They find that women 
are more risk averse than men, and that this difference in risk preference ex-
 
1 The big 5 represent the following five basic dimensions of personality: openness, conscientious-
ness, extraversion, agreeableness and neuroticism.  
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plains their attitude towards variable pay: 68% of the 119 male participants of 
their study prefer a variable pay, compared to 44% of the 121 women. 
If female employees require a higher risk premium to accept performance-
related pay, this reduces the expected benefits of performance-related pay for 
the entrepreneur. This, in turn, makes it less likely that performance-related pay 
will occur. Thus, we expect that the share of women in the workforce will have a 
negative effect on the probability that a firm will introduce performance-related 
pay. 
 
The causality may also run in the opposite direction. If performance-related pay 
is actually introduced, this may stimulate the outflow of female employees. This 
will occur if the new wage offer (including both a variable and fixed part) is not 
high enough to cover the demanded risk premium. In addition, the presence of 
performance-related pay can stimulate the inflow of male applicants. Thus, the 
presence of performance-related pay can have a negative effect on the share of 
women in the workforce. 
 
Irrespective of the direction of causality, these arguments suggest a negative 
correlation between the share of women in the workforce and the incidence of 
performance-related pay. This leads to our first hypothesis: 
 
H1: Performance-related pay is less used for female employees than 
for male employees 
 
The gender difference in risk aversion does not only apply to the population in 
general, but also to the population of entrepreneurs. Female entrepreneurs tend 
to be more risk averse than male entrepreneurs (ENSR 1996; Verheul and 
Thurik, 2001). This suggests that (ceteris paribus) female entrepreneurs are 
more likely to transfer some of the company risk onto their employees (Chang, 
2006). This can be done by using performance-related pay. This results in the 
second hypothesis of this study: 
 
H2: Female entrepreneurs are more likely to use performance-related 
pay than male entrepreneurs 
 
This hypothesis is supported by gender differences in management style. Verheul 
(2003) has studied the gender effect of management styles in small firms in the 
Netherlands, and found that female entrepreneurs are more likely to use formal 
HRM practices than male entrepreneurs. She distinguishes between commitment 
and control oriented management. The higher the degree to which procedures 
and regulation are formalized, the higher the degree of control over employees 
and the production process is. She finds that female-led firms have a more con-
trol-oriented type of HRM than male-led firms. This result implies that female en-
trepreneurs can be associated with a higher degree of formalization. This is con-
sistent with a higher usage of performance-related pay. 
 
In contrast, Verheul, Risseeuw and Bartelse (2002) suggest that female entre-
preneurs may be more inclined to use non-pecuniary rewards, such as flexibility 
of working hours, childcare facilities and verbal compliments, to motivate their 
employees. Their relatively high attention for non-pecuniary rewards would imply 
that female entrepreneurs would be less likely to use performance-related pay  
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than male entrepreneurs. However, they do not find significant support for the 
assumptions of less performance-related pay. Therefore the expectation remains 
that female entrepreneurs are more likely to use performance-related pay 
schemes. 
 
The first hypothesis is related to the gender composition of the workforce, while 
the second hypothesis is related to the gender of the entrepreneur. We assume 
that these two effects work independently of each other. In that case, the com-
bination of these hypotheses results in the following two additional hypotheses: 
H3: Performance-related pay is most likely to occur in firms with a 
female entrepreneur and a high share of male employees 
H4: Performance-related pay is least likely to occur in firms with a 
male entrepreneurs and a high share of female employees 
 
As we noted before, it is often assumed that firms are risk neutral while individ-
ual employees are risk averse. If this is the case, we should find empirical sup-
port for hypothesis H1 but not for H2 (and therefore also not for H3 and H4). In 
addition, we expect to find support for another hypothesis, concerning the effect 
of performance-related pay on firm profits. Whether or not the usage of per-
formance-related pay will have a positive effect on profits depends on many dif-
ferent factors. One of these factors is the risk premium that the entrepreneur 
has to offer to the employees, in order to make them accept the new system
1. 
This risk premium is higher for female employees than for male employees. 
Hence, if the share of male employees is relatively high, the expected costs of 
using performance-related pay will be relatively low, making it more likely that 
performance-related pay will be beneficial to the overall profits of the firm. Con-
versely, if the share of female employees is relatively high, profits are likely to 
be higher using fixed wages (wages not related to performance) rather than per-
formance-related pay. Formulated differently: we expect that pay policies that 
are consistent with efficient risk sharing vary with the gender composition of the 
workforce. If the share of female employees is low, efficient pay policies involve 
performance-related pay; if the share of female employees is high, efficient pay 
policies involve fixed wages only. 
 
Our final hypothesis is that firms with an efficient pay policy as defined above 
will generate higher profits than firms with an inefficient pay policy. With small 
firms, it is often difficult to differentiate between the entrepreneur's income and 
the profit of the enterprise. This is especially the case if the enterprise has the 
legal form of a sole proprietorship: in this case, the entrepreneur cannot receive 
a wage, so the entrepreneurial income is part of the generated profits. We there-
fore formulate this hypothesis in terms of entrepreneurial income rather than 
profit. This results in the following hypothesis: 
H5: The income of the entrepreneur is higher when we observe pay 
policies consistent with efficient risk sharing 
 
 
1 Often, the entrepreneur of an SME may have the authority to introduce and use a performance-
related pay system without employee approval. Nevertheless, if the entrepreneur wants to retain 
valuable employees and keep them motivated, it is important that the employees feel that they 
are compensated for the financial risk that comes with performance-related pay.  
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3  Research methodology 
3.1  Questionnaire and sampling framework 
The dataset that we use for this study has previously been used by De Kok et al. 
(2007) and Roepers and de Kok (2007). In this section we give a brief descrip-
tion of the questionnaire and the sampling framework. More details can be found 
in De Kok et al. (2007). 
3.1.1 Questionnaire 
The questionnaire was developed by De Kok et al. (2007) based on prior knowl-
edge, in-house expertise and existing questionnaires. The concept questionnaire 
was tested through several pilot interviews. This resulted in a few adjustments in 
the formulation of the survey questions. The final survey focuses on the remu-
neration of the entrepreneur and the best-paid employee. In addition, the ques-
tionnaire also contains questions regarding structural and personal characteris-
tics of the firm and its employees. 
3.1.2 Sample 
The data has been gathered through a telephone survey in June and July 2006. 
The sample is stratified by size (varying from one to 100 employees on the pay-
roll), sector and age, and consists of 369 Dutch SMEs. Table 1 shows the distri-
bution of the sample by size and age. The questions in the survey were answered 
by the independent entrepreneurs (in case of a single owned firm), the major 
business partner (in case of a partnership), or by the general director (in other 
legal structures). 
Table 1  Sampled firms, by reported firm size and firm age 
Age category* 
Number of employees 
0 - 3 years  4 - 9 years  >= 10 years  Total 
1  8  13  7  28 
2 - 9   18  42  69  129 
10 - 49   11  27  80  118 
50 - 99  15  16  63  94 
Total  52  98  219  369 
  * After imputing missing values for 28 observations. 
  Source: EIM and ACE. 
3.2  Dependent variables 
The first four hypotheses concern the usage of performance-related pay within 
small and medium-sized enterprises. Our data set allows us to use two different 
indicators of performance-related pay by employees: a specific indicator con-
cerning performance-related pay for the best-paid employee in the firm, and an 
indicator concerning the application of performance-related pay for employees in  
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general. The fifth hypothesis concerns the entrepreneurial income, for which we 
use a single measure. In this section we describe the three dependent variables 
that are used in our study. 
 
Use of performance-related pay for the best-paid employee 
The remuneration of employees can consist of various components. To determine 
the composition of the remuneration of the best-paid employee, we asked which 
of the following components were actually received by the best-paid employee 
during 2005: 
−  fixed wage; 
−  profit sharing; 
−  bonus; 
−  options (only in case of a limited liability company); 
−  company car, phone or computer. 
 
Since it is not clear if the usage of a company car, phone or computer is related 
to the performance of the employee, we do not include these remuneration com-
ponents in our measurement for performance-related pay for the best-paid em-
ployee. We also decided not to use information on the usage of options, since 
this was mentioned by only three respondents. The resulting indicator for per-
formance-related pay for the best-paid employee thus indicates whether the 
best-paid employee received a share of the profit or a bonus during 2005. This is 
the case for 32% of our observations. 
 
Use of performance-related pay for some or all employees 
The questionnaire includes a single question on performance-based pay for the 
workforce as a whole, asking whether or not the enterprise makes use of per-
formance-related pay for some or all of its employees. This is the case for 34% 
of our observations. 
 
There is a reasonable overlap with the indicator of performance-related pay for 
the best-paid employee, but it is not very strong. About a third of all enterprises 
that use performance-related pay for at least some employees indicate that their 
best-paid employee did not receive a share of the profits or a bonus. What is 
more problematic is that about a third of the enterprises that reported that their 
best-paid employee received a bonus or participated in profit sharing, answered 
'no' to the question whether at least some of their employees received any per-
formance-related pay. If both indicators would indicate the same type of pay-
ment systems, this would not be possible. Presumably, the difference in the 
wording of the questions resulted in a different interpretation by the respondent 
of the specific remuneration components that should be taken into consideration. 
 
Entrepreneurial income 
The annual income of an entrepreneur can also include various components, 
where the choice for specific components depends (amongst others) on fiscal 
legislation and the legal structure of the enterprise. For example, in the Nether-
lands entrepreneurs can only receive a wage if their enterprise is organised as a 
limited liability company, not in case of a sole proprietorship. 
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In the questionnaire, we asked whether the entrepreneur received any of the fol-
lowing income components (and, if so, the level of that component): 
−  fixed wage (including management fee in case of a limited liability company); 
−  profit sharing. In case of a sole proprietorship or partnership, we first asked if 
the respondent would indicate the profit level; we then asked which part of 
this profit was used for private means. In case of a limited liability company 
we directly asked for the amount of profit received by the respondent; 
−  bonus; 
−  shares (only in case of a limited liability company); 
−  options (only in case of a limited liability company). 
 
Of these income components, shares and options were the least common. This is 
partly due to the fact that these components can only occur in the case of a lim-
ited liability company. However, also within this subset of enterprises shares and 
options do not occur often: 27 respondents received shares as part of their in-
come, 7 respondents received options, and only 3 respondents could indicate the 
value of the received shares or options. We therefore decided to exclude shares 
and options from our definition of entrepreneurial income. Hence, we define en-
trepreneurial income as the sum of the received wage, profit sharing or bonuses 
for 2005. 
 
Information on the entrepreneurial income is available for 170 respondents. Of 
these respondents, 25 reported an income equal to zero, another three respon-
dents reported a total annual income of less than € 10 000,-. At the other end of 
the distribution, three entrepreneurs reported an annual income ranging from 
€ 400 000 to € 700 000. Summary statistics are reported in Table 2. These sta-
tistics show a large gender effect. This will be explored further in the next chap-
ter. 
Table 2  Summary statistics: entrepreneurial income by gender of the entrepreneur 
Variable  Mean  Standard deviation 
Number of valid 
observations 
Income level entrepreneur (x € 1.000):       
    male entrepreneurs  77.8  97.2  155 
    female entrepreneurs  32.8  50.2  15 
    all entrepreneurs  73.9  94.8  170 
  Source: EIM and ACE 
  Notes: 1) income is defined as the sum of wages, profit shares, bonuses or gratuities; 
2) "entrepreneur" refers to the respondent of the questionnaire. This is the CEO or general 
manager of the firm. 
3.3  Independent variables 
Characteristics of the firm 
Relevant firm characteristics include sector, firm size and firm age. Sector is rep-
resented by a standard classification into eight different sectors (manufacturing; 
construction; automotive; wholesale; retail; transport and communication; hotels  
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and restaurants; services) and firm size is represented by the number of em-
ployees of the firm. 
 
Regarding firm age, our dataset allows us to differentiate between the legal age 
and the economic age of the organisations. The legal age is the age of the cur-
rent legal form of the organisation. This is the age that is registered at e.g. the 
Chamber of Commerce. An organisation's economic age indicates how long the 
firm has been economically active. De Kok et al. (2007) show that the legal and 
economic age of firms often differ, in which case the economic age generally ex-
ceeds the legal age. A possible explanation for this might be that the legal struc-
ture of the organisation has changed over time. In this study we control for pos-
sible age effects by including the logarithm of the economic age
1. Not all firms 
provided information regarding their age. For 39 firms, missing values were im-
puted. 
 
Some studies report a strong correlation between firm size and firm age (e.g. 
Heyman, 2007). This could make it difficult to distinguish between size and age 
effects. To check whether this is also the case in our sample, we examined the 
correlation between economical age and number of employees. This correlation is 
0.07; if we exclude firms of 75 years or more, the correlation increases some-
what, but is still only 0.15. We therefore conclude that there is no risk that ef-
fects of firm size and firm age cannot be distinguished from each other. 
 
Characteristics of the entrepreneur 
Available information regarding the entrepreneur includes gender, age, educa-
tional level, tenure and experience. 
 
Women make up 15% of the entrepreneurs in our sample (54 out of 369 entre-
preneurs in total). This share is considerably lower than the share of female en-
trepreneurs in Dutch enterprises: 30% of all Dutch entrepreneurs is female
2. The 
relatively low share of female entrepreneurs in our sample may be due to the 
fact that female entrepreneurs tend to employ fewer employees and work fewer 
hours in their enterprise than male employees. Given that we only included firms 
with employees in our sample and that small firms are underrepresented as 
compared to medium-sized enterprises, this would result in a relative low share 
of female entrepreneurs in our sample. This explanation is consistent with the 
results of an exploratory probit regression, where we relate the gender of the 
entrepreneur to firm size and sector dummies. The results indicate a highly sig-
nificant (p<0.001) negative relationship between firm size and the likelihood that 
an entrepreneur is a woman. 
 
Characteristics of the workforce 
The nature of remuneration policies is often related to basic characteristics of the 
workforce such as gender, age and educational level. For this study we have in-
formation about the gender, age and educational decomposition of the work-
force. Summary statistics are included in Table 3. Notice that the gender of the 
 
1 The age variable included in Table 1 also refers to economic age. 
2 Source: ‘demografische aspecten van ondernemers’ (demographic aspects of entrepreneurs), a 
Dutch dataset available at www.entrepreneurship-sme.eu;   
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entrepreneur is related to the gender of the workforce: with male entrepreneurs, 
the majority of employees is male, while with female entrepreneurs the majority 
of employees is female. 
Table 3  Summary statistics: characteristics of the workforce 
Variable  Mean  Standard deviation 
Number of valid 
observations 
gender decomposition of the workforce  
(percentage male employees): 
     
    Within firms with male entrepreneurs  63.5%  31.6  289 
    Within firms with female entrepreneurs  42.3%  34.4  45 
Within all firms  60.6%  32.8  334 
age decomposition of the workforce:       
   share of employees <= 24  27.1%  27.4  336 
   share of employees 25 - 44  53.8%  27.3  336 
   share of elder employees >=45   19.2%  22.3  336 
educational decomposition of workforce:       
   share of low-educated employees  33.5%  34.3  329 
   share of medium-educated employees  45.1%  33.7  329 
   share of high-educated employees  21.4%  30.4  329 
  Source: EIM and ACE. 
Characteristics of the best-paid employee 
41 Respondents could not (or would not) identify the best-paid employee within 
their organisation. Consequently, these respondents could not provide any in-
formation on the remuneration of these employees. This leaves 328 observations 
which can be used to analyse the structure of the remuneration of the best-paid 
employee. 
 
Relevant characteristics of the best-paid employee include gender, age, educa-
tion, occupational level and tenure of the best-paid employee. Summary statis-
tics are presented in Table 4 (variable means) and Table 5 (valid observations).  
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Table 4  Summary statistics for the best-paid employee: variable means, by gender of 
entrepreneur and gender of best-paid employee 
Variable  All  By gender of entrepreneur 
By gender of  
best-paid employee 
    male  female  male  female 
age of the best-paid employee  39.2  39.8  35.3  39.8  36.9 
educational level: share of best-paid 
employees with high education   40%  41%  30%  41%  35% 
tenure of the best-paid employee 
(years)  6.5  6.8  4.8  7.2  4.1 
occupational level: share of best-paid 
employees with management position   48%  51%  26%  55%  24% 
  Source: EIM and ACE. 
Table 5  Summary statistics for the best-paid employee: variable counts (valid observa-
tions), by gender of entrepreneur and gender of best-paid employee 
Variable  All  By gender of entrepreneur 
By gender of  
best-paid employee 
    male  female  male  female 
age of the best-paid employee  326  279  47  254  72 
educational level: share of best-paid 
employees with high education   327  281  47  255  72 
tenure of the best-paid employee 
(years)  326  280  47  254  72 
occupational level: share of best-paid 
employees with management position   327  280  47  255  72 
  Source: EIM and ACE. 
It is interesting to notice that the characteristics of the best-paid employee are 
not only related to the gender of employee, but also to the gender of the entre-
preneur. To a considerable extent, this is because the gender of the entrepre-
neur and of the best-paid employee often coincide: for 78% of the firms in our 
sample, the entrepreneur and the best-paid employee are of the same gender 
(Table 6). In particular, the large majority of male entrepreneurs has a male 
best-paid employee, while for female entrepreneurs the gender of the best-paid 
employee is evenly distributed: 49% of the female entrepreneurs employ a fe-
male as best-paid employee; for male entrepreneurs, this is only 9%
1. 
 
1 Fisher’s exact test rejects the hypothesis that the gender of the entrepreneur and of the best-
paid employee are independent of each other at a significance level of 0.000.  
  19 
Table 6  Gender of the entrepreneur and the best-paid employee 
Gender best-paid employee 
Gender entrepreneur  Male  Female  Total 
Male  231  49  280 
Female  24  23  47 
Total  255  72  327 
  Source: EIM and ACE. 
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4  Results 
In chapter two we formulated five different hypotheses. Our hypotheses involve 
three different dependent variables: the usage of performance-related pay for 
the best-paid employee in the firm, the usage of performance-related pay for the 
workforce in general and entrepreneurial income (as indicator for firm perform-
ance). The first four hypotheses will be tested separately for performance-
related pay for the best-paid employee and for the workforce in general, while 
the fifth hypothesis will be tested on the entrepreneurial income. In this chapter 
we present the results of our analyses for each of these three dependent vari-
ables. 
4.1  Performance-related pay for the best-paid employee 
To test hypotheses H1 to H4 for the case of the best-paid employee, we estimate 
two equations: 
−  Equation 1: an equation that relates the use of performance-related pay for 
the best-paid employee to firm characteristics, entrepreneurial characteristics 
(including a gender dummy) and characteristics of the best-paid employee 
(including a gender dummy). This will be estimated by a probit regression. 
The results will be used to test hypotheses H1 and H2; 
−  Equation 2: as equation 1, replacing the gender dummies for the entrepreneur 
and the best-paid employee with two dummies that indicate the enterprises 
that are assumed to be most likely (firms with a female entrepreneur and a 
male best-paid employee) and least likely (firms with a male entrepreneur and 
a female best paid employee) to apply performance-related pay for the best-
paid employee. This will be estimated by a probit regression. The results will 
be used to test hypotheses H3 and H4. 
 
Ideally, we would have liked to estimate these equations separately for manage-
rial and non-managerial employees. Our sample is, however, too small to limit 
our estimations to either subsample. As a second-best solution, we include a 
dummy for the occupational position of the best-paid employee in the equations 
(see e.g. Brown and Medoff, 2003). 
 
Equations 1 and 2 have been estimated with and without sector dummies. The 
results indicate that including sector dummies does not change any of the rele-
vant findings
1, while it reduces the available degrees of freedom considerably 
(the number of observations is limited). We therefore present the estimation re-
sults for these equations without sector dummies. These results are presented in 
Table 7. 
 
1 Estimating model 1 with sector dummies results in 1 significant sector dummy (retail) and re-
duces the significance of the employer characteristics somewhat; estimating model 2 with sector 
dummies results in 1 significant sector dummies (retail) and reduces the significance of the em-
ployer characteristics somewhat; otherwise, no differences occur.  
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Table 7  Probit regressions on the use of performance-related pay (profit-sharing or bo-
nus) for the best-paid employee. 




value  Sign. level 
Parameter 
value  Sign. level  
Firm characteristics         
firm size (ln)  0.067  0.320  0.087  0.184 
firm age (ln)  -0.23**  0.018  -0.22**  0.022 
Employer characteristics         
age (ln)  0.85*  0.077  0.83*  0.082 
experience (ln)  0.04  0.786  0.08  0.637 
phd degree (dummy)  0.58**  0.014  0.63***  0.008 
Female entrepreneur(dummy)  -0.15  0.545  -   
Characteristics best-paid employee         
age (ln)  -0.26  0.505  -0.23  0.555 
tenure (ln)  0.38***  0.001  0.37***  0.001 
Medium education (dummy)  0.24  0.386  0.22  0.43 
high education (dummy)  0.76***  0.009  0.73**  0.012 
Female employee (dummy)  -0.10  0.657  -   
Management position (dummy)  0.52  0.147  0.53  0.141 
Gender comparison employer/employee         
female entrepreneur, male employee 
(dummy) 
-    0.11  0.723 
male entrepreneur, female employee 
(dummy) 
-    0.08  0.728 
Constant  -3.44*  0.065  -3.65**  0.048 
         
Goodness of Fit Measures         
Pseudo R
2  0.1482    0.1471   
Log likelihood  -172.1    -172.3   
Valid Observations  307    307   
  *; **; *** Denote a significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
The results for both equations are very similar: the likelihood that a firm applies 
performance-related pay for its best-paid employee is higher for younger firms, 
for firms with elder and highly educated entrepreneurs, and for employees with 
high tenure and a high educational level. There is no indication that firm size is 
relevant. More important, there is also no indication of any gender effect: con-
cerning the remuneration of the best-paid employee, we find no support for hy-
potheses H1 to H4. Specifically, the results of equation 1 reject hypotheses H1 
and H2: neither the gender of the entrepreneur nor the gender of the best-paid 
employee are related to the probability that the best-paid employee receives 
performance-related pay. Likewise, the results of equation 2 reject hypotheses 
H3 and H4. This follows from the insignificance of the dummies indicating the  
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firms that are most and least likely to apply performance-related pay for the 
best-paid employee. 
4.2  Performance-related pay for the workforce in general 
Regarding the workforce in general, we use a similar approach to test hypothe-
ses H1 to H4. Again, two equations are estimated: 
−  Equation 3: an equation that relates the use of performance-related pay for 
some or all of the employees to firm characteristics, entrepreneurial charac-
teristics (including a gender dummy) and characteristics of the workforce as a 
whole (including the share of male employees). This will be estimated by a 
probit regression. The results will be used to test hypotheses H1 and H2; 
−  Equation 4: as equation 3, replacing the entrepreneurial gender dummy and 
the share of male employees with two dummies that indicate the enterprises 
that are assumed to be most likely (firms with a female entrepreneur and a 
relatively high share of male employees) and least likely (firms with a male 
entrepreneur and a relatively high share of female employees) to apply per-
formance-related pay to the workforce in general. This will be estimated by a 
probit regression. The results will be used to test hypotheses H3 and H4. 
 
The estimation of equation 4 requires that we classify enterprises into three 
categories, based on the gender of the entrepreneur and whether the share of 
(fe)male employees is relatively high or low. The second criterion can be opera-
tionalised in different ways. A straightforward approach is to determine various 
percentiles of the distribution of the share of male employees, and consider the 
lowest/highest percentiles as those with relatively low/high shares of male em-
ployees. The question then remains, how many percentiles to distinguish. An in-
crease in the number of percentiles may increase the differences between the 
lowest and highest percentiles (thus increasing the likelihood of finding statisti-
cally significant differences), but also decreases the number of observations 
within the percentiles (thus decreasing the likelihood of finding statistically sig-
nificant differences). Since this is an explorative study, we have estimated equa-
tion 4 based on the outcomes of using two, three and four percentiles. In this 
paper, we report the outcomes with the highest significance levels for the vari-
ables of interest. 
 
As it turns out, distinguishing four percentiles provided the highest significance 
levels for the two dummy variables indicating enterprises that are most/least 
likely to apply performance-related pay. In this situation, a 'low share' of male 
employees refers to the 25% enterprises with the lowest shares of male employ-
ees (less than 37%), and a 'high share' refers to the 24% enterprises with the 
highest share of male employees (92.5% or more). Combined with the gender of 
the entrepreneur, this results in a group of 61 enterprises for which perform-
ance-related pay is least likely to occur (a male entrepreneur and a low share of 
male employees) and a group of only 6 enterprises for which performance-
related pay is most likely to occur (a female entrepreneur and a high share of 
male employees). 
 
The results are presented in Table 8, again without including sector dummies.  
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Table 8  Probit regressions on presence of performance-related pay for some or all em-
ployees in the workforce. 




value  Sign. level 
Parameter 
value  Sign. level 
Firm characteristics          
firm size (ln)  0.29***  0.068  0.31***  0.000 
firm age (ln)  -0.05  0.571  -0.04  0.623 
Employer characteristics         
age (ln)  0.82*  0.087  0.81*  0.092 
experience (ln)  -0.14  0.384  -0.10  0.503 
phd degree (dummy)  0.09  0.665  0.14  0.497 
Female entrepreneur (dummy)  -0.09  0.703  -   
Workforce characteristics         
share of highly educated employees  0.0089***  0.001  0.0087***  0.001 
share of elder employees  -0.0097**  0.019  -0.0085**  0.034 
share of male employees   0.005**  0.033  -   
Gender comparison employer/workforce         
female entrepreneur, low share female em-
ployees (dummy) 
-    1.02*  0.065 
male entrepreneur, high share female em-
ployees (dummy) 
-    -0.29  0.136 
constant  -3.78**  0.015  -3.9**  0.013 
         
Goodness of Fit Measures         
Pseudo R
2  0.1072    0.1102   
Log likelihood  -187.0    -186.3   
Valid Observations  321    321   
  *; **; *** denote a significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
The results for equations 3 and 4 are very similar: the likelihood that a firm ap-
plies performance-related pay for some (or all) of its employees is higher for lar-
ger firms, and for firms with a higher share of young and highly educated em-
ployees. Notice that these results are different from the results for equations 1 
and 2: instead of firm age, it is firm size that matters now, and employer charac-
teristics no longer seem to be very important. 
 
Equations 3 and 4 still find no support for hypotheses H2 and H4. The lack of 
support for hypothesis H2 contradicts the earlier findings by Roepers and De 
Kok, who found that female entrepreneurs are (ceteris paribus) more likely to 
provide performance-related pay than male entrepreneurs (Roepers and De Kok, 
2007, page 31). Their study, however, included less control variables. In particu-
lar, they did not control for the educational level of the entrepreneur and the age 
and education of the workforce. Once these control variables are included in the 
model, the significant effect of the gender of the entrepreneur disappears.  
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The positive parameter for the share of male employees in equation 3 supports 
hypothesis H1. In addition, the positive dummy variable that indicates firms with 
a female entrepreneur and a low share of female employees offers some support 
for hypothesis H3 (although it should be noted that this parameter is only signifi-
cant at 10%
1). This is consistent with the results by Roepers and De Kok, who 
found a significant positive effect of the interaction between the gender of the 
entrepreneur and the share of male employees (Roepers and De Kok, 2007, page 
31). 
4.3  Gender, performance-related pay and firm performance 
4.3.1 Controlling for workforce characteristics 
To test the final hypothesis, we estimate various equations with the log of the 
entrepreneurial income as dependent variable. 
−  Equation 5: the starting point is an equation that relates the (log of the) in-
come level of the entrepreneur to several firm characteristics, entrepreneurial 
characteristics and workforce characteristics; 
−  Equation 6: as equation 5, including a dummy variable indicating the use of 
performance-related pay for at least some employees; 
−  Equation 7: as equation 5, including a dummy variable indicating a consistent 
pay policy: this is either a combination of performance-related pay and a high 
share of male employees, or a combination of no performance-related pay and 
a high share of female employees. 
 
Estimating equation 7 requires that we identify firms with a consistent pay pol-
icy. This, in turn, requires that we identify firms with a relatively high share of 
(fe)male employees. We use the same method as discussed in the previous sec-
tion, which is based on the percentiles of the distribution of the share of male 
employees. As is the case with equation 4, we find the best results when we use 
four different percentiles. In this case, 93 firms in the sample have a consistent 
pay policy (66 firms with relatively few male employees without performance-
related pay and 27 firms with relatively many male employees with performance-
related pay). The estimation results are reported in Table 9. 
 
According to the results for equations 5, 6 and 7, entrepreneurial income in-
creases with firm size and with the educational level of the entrepreneur as well 
as the employees. Neither the gender of the entrepreneur nor the gender com-
position of the workforce are significantly related to entrepreneurial income. 
There is also no support for hypothesis H5: while the prevalence of performance-
related pay in general is associated with a higher entrepreneurial income (equa-
tion 6), our indicator for a consistent pay policy is not (equation 7). Apparently, 
the effect of performance-related pay on entrepreneurial income does not de-
 
1 In addition, if sector dummies are included, the significance of this parameter becomes less than 
10%.  
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pend on the gender composition of the workforce; at least not in the way that we 
hypothesised
1. 
Table 9  OLS Regression results on log entrepreneurial income (robust estimators) 













firm characteristics             
firm size (ln)  0.25***  0.000  0.24***  0.000  0.26***  0.000 
firm age (ln)  -0.008  0.875  0.022  0.664  -0.009  0.860 
employer characteristics             
age (ln)  0.43  0.261  0.32  0.417  0.54  0.167 
experience (ln)  0.12  0.337  0.15  0.249  0.08  0.505 
phd degree (dummy)  0.34**  0.014  0.31**  0.024  0.31**  0.027 
Female entrepreneur (dummy)  -0.31  0.214  -0.27  0.233  -0.22  0.313 
Workforce characteristics             
share of highly educated employees  0.006***  0.006  0.006***  0.008  0.006***  0.008 
share of elder employees  -0.003  0.360  -0.002  0.452  -0.003  0.380 
share of male employees   -0.000  0.858  -0.001  0.753  -0.003  0.380 
Performance-related pay for some or 
all employees 
-    0.29***  0.009  -   
consistent pay policy  -    -    -0.23  0.137 
Constant  1.38  0.231  1.54  0.192  1.11  0.345 
             
Goodness of Fit Measures             
R
2  0.37    0.41       
Valid Observations  128    128    128   
  *; **; *** denote a significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
4.3.2 Controlling for characteristics of the best-paid employee 
In the previous section, we examined to which extent characteristics of (per-
formance-related pay for) the workforce could explain entrepreneurial income. In 
this section, we focus on characteristics of (performance-related pay for) the 
best-paid employee. This is done by including characteristics of the best-paid 
employee in equations 5 to 7, and replacing the indicators for performance-
related pay for the workforce with comparable indicators for performance-related 
pay for the best-paid employee. This results in equations 8, 9 and 10 (see Table 
10). 
 
1 Hypothesis H5 implies that for firms with a high share of male employees, performance-related 
pay would have a positive effect on entrepreneurial income; for firms with a low share of male 
employees, performance-related pay would have a negative effect on entrepreneurial income.  
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In equation 10, the dummy variable indicating consistent pay policy refers to 11 
firms with a female best-paid employee that receives no performance-related 
pay, and 47 firms with a male best-paid employee that receives performance-
related pay. 
Table 10  Regression results on firm performance (log entrepreneurial income (OLS, ro-
bust estimators), including characteristics best-paid employee 













firm characteristics             
firm size (ln)  0.28***  0.000  0.27***  0.000  0.27***  0.000 
firm age (ln)  -0.02  0.734  -0.02  0.736  0.002  0.975 
employer characteristics             
age (ln)  0.054  0.903  0.03  0.944  0.056  0.895 
experience (ln)  0.24*  0.084  0.24*  0.094  0.20  0.113 
phd degree (dummy)  0.27*  0.052  0.22  0.147  0.29*  0.059 
Female entrepreneur (dummy)  -0.28  0.292  -0.29  0.246  -0.21  0.414 
Workforce characteristics             
share of highly educated employees  0.007***  0.002  0.006**  0.012  0.008***  0.001 
share of elder employees  -0.005  0.192  -0.004  0.274  -0.005  0.187 
share of male employees   0.002  0.318  0.002  0.378  0.000  0.908 
Characteristics best-paid employee             
Female employee (dummy)  0.30  0.166  0.29  0.185  -   
performance-related pay  -    0.15  0.268  -   
consistent pay policy  -    -    -0.13  0.267 
             
Constant  2.38*  0.083  2.44*  0.086     
             
Goodness of Fit Measures             
R
2  0.3769    0.3859       
Valid Observations  117    117    117   
  *; **; *** denote a significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
The results for equations 8, 9 and 10 are similar to the results for equations 5, 6 
and 7: entrepreneurial income increases with firm size and with the educational 
level of the entrepreneur as well as the employees (although the effect of the 
educational level of the entrepreneur is somewhat lower). None of the included 
gender variables have a significant effect (gender of the entrepreneur, gender 
composition of the workforce and gender of the best-paid employee). Also here, 
there is no support for hypothesis H5: our indicator for a consistent pay policy is 
not only not significant, but even has the wrong sign (equation 10). 
  
  29 
5  Discussion and conclusions 
In this study we have derived five different hypotheses concerning the gender 
effects in performance-related pay amongst small and medium-sized effects. 
These hypotheses are based on two basic assumptions: the willingness of em-
ployers and employees to accept performance-related pay depends (amongst 
others) on their levels of risk aversion, and risk aversion is gender-related. The 
empirical support for our hypotheses is, however, very limited. In this chapter 
we discuss the estimation results and end with the main conclusions. 
5.1  Discussion 
Partial support for the first hypothesis… 
According to the first hypothesis, performance-related pay would be used less for 
female employees than for male employees. We find empirical support for this 
hypothesis, but only regarding the workforce in general: firms with a larger 
share of male employees are more likely to offer performance-related pay to 
their employees. 
 
When we analyse the remuneration of the best-paid employee, we find no rela-
tionship between the employee's gender and the probability that he or she re-
ceived a share of the profit or a bonus. One explanation for this lack of support 
is that the sample size is not large enough; our data set only contains 72 obser-
vations where the best-paid employee is female. 
 
…and no support for the second hypothesis… 
The second hypothesis states that female entrepreneurs are more likely to use 
performance-related pay than male entrepreneurs. There is no support for this 
hypothesis. The results presented by Roepers and De Kok (2007) seem to sup-
port this hypothesis, but additional analysis has shown that this support is the 
result of a missing variable bias: once additional control variables are added to 
the model by Roepers and De Kok (2007), the effect of the gender of the entre-
preneur is no longer significant. 
 
…so no support for the third and fourth hypothesis should be expected 
Hypotheses H3 and H4 are only valid if the first two hypotheses are. If one of the 
first two hypotheses would not be valid, then hypotheses H3 and H4 should also 
be rejected. At a 5% confidence level, this is indeed the case. The fact that we 
find no support for hypotheses H3 and H4 is thus consistent with the lack of sup-
port for the second hypothesis. 
 
No support for the fifth hypothesis regarding entrepreneurial income 
The results of the first four hypotheses are consistent with the standard assump-
tion that firms are risk neutral while individual employees are risk averse. If this 
is the case, we expected to find support for hypothesis H5: The income of the 
entrepreneur is higher when we observe pay policies consistent with efficient risk  
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sharing. We find, however, no support for this hypothesis. Also here, this could 
be due to the limited number of observations (128 or 117 valid observations). 
 
Do we need more data… 
One interpretation of the results of our study, is that the results are largely con-
sistent with the standard assumption that firms are risk neutral while individual 
employees are risk averse. The support is not strong, but this could be explained 
by the relatively limited number of observations. According to this interpretation, 
the main finding of our study is then that we find no support for the expected re-
lationship between the gender of the entrepreneur and the incidence of perform-
ance-related pay. The small size of our sample, however, does not allow for 
strong conclusions. 
 
…or do we need an alternative theory? 
Another interpretation of the results is also possible. The empirical support for 
our hypotheses is so limited, that we should reconsider the two basic assump-
tions that underlie our hypotheses. 
 
The first assumption is that the willingness of employers and employees to ac-
cept performance-related pay depends (amongst others) on their levels of risk 
aversion. This assumption ignores the difference between risk aversion and am-
biguity aversion (Borghans et al., 2009; Machina, 2009). Individuals often find 
themselves in situations where different outcomes may occur. The probabilities 
of these outcomes may either be known or unknown. Risk aversion refers to an 
individual's behaviour in case of know probabilities, while ambiguity aversion re-
fers to an individual's behaviour in case of unknown probabilities. Since the dis-
tribution of the expected performance of employees is not known in advance, the 
incidence of performance-related pay is likely to be related to the ambiguity 
aversion of the employer and employees, rather than their risk aversion. 
 
Borghans et al. (2009) found that risk aversion and ambiguity aversion are em-
pirically distinct individual traits. Regarding risk aversion, they find that women 
are more risk averse than men, and that psychological traits are strongly associ-
ated with risk aversion. Regarding ambiguity aversion, however, they find mark-
edly different results. Men and women show similar marginal valuations of ambi-
guity (with increasing levels of ambiguity), and ambiguity aversion is not related 
to psychological traits. If ambiguity diversion is indeed not gender-related, the 
second basic assumption of our study (risk aversion is gender-related) would not 
apply in the case of ambiguity aversion. 
 
According to this line of argument, differences in risk aversion between men and 
women cannot explain gender differences in the incidence of performance-related 
pay. An alternative explanation for gender differences in the incidence of per-
formance-related pay is that they are partly caused by gender differences in la-
bour force attachment. Various authors have argued that differences in labour 
force attachment between men and women could explain part of the gender 
earnings gap (Kunze, 2005; Nordman and Roubaud, 2005). According to Geddes 
and Heywood (2003), gender differences in labour force attachment may also 
explain differences in the incidence of performance-related pay: on average, 
women have a lower labour force attachment than men, which is in turn related 
to the probability of receiving performance-based pay.  
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5.2  Conclusions 
We have found partial support for the first hypothesis, which states that female 
employees are less likely to receive performance-related pay than male employ-
ees. There is also some support for the third hypothesis, which states that per-
formance-related pay is most likely to occur in firms with a female entrepreneur 
and a high share of male employees. This support is however weak: it is only 
significant at a 10% confidence level, and is furthermore based on the compari-
son of a sample of only 6 firms (with a female entrepreneur and a high share of 
male employees) with the other firms. For the other three hypotheses, there is 
no empirical support. 
 
One interpretation of the results is that they indicate that entrepreneurs are risk 
neutral while employees are risk averse (where female employees are more risk 
averse than male employees). Due to the small sample size, however, this inter-
pretation is only tentative. Additional empirical research on considerable larger 
dataset is required. Perhaps future studies can make use of administrative data 
(e.g. of payrolling companies that target SMEs). 
 
Another interpretation is that the lack of support for our hypotheses suggests 
that we need to reconsider them, including the basic assumptions on which they 
are based. In our study, we have used gender as a proxy for the risk aversion of 
individual entrepreneurs and employees, and assumed that risk aversion (of em-
ployers as well as employees) is in turn related to the incidence of performance-
related pay. However, it can be argued that this assumption is not correct: the 
incidence of performance-related pay may be related to ambiguity aversion 
rather than risk aversion. Gender may however also serve as a proxy for differ-
ences in labour force attachment. Differences in labour force attachment are 
likely to be only relevant for employers, not for employees, which seems consis-
tent with our lack of empirical support for the presence of an entrepreneurial 
gender effect. 
 
For a better understanding of gender effects in remuneration policies, future 
studies should further develop the relationships between performance-related 
pay, risk aversion and ambiguity aversion and labour force attachment, both 
theoretically and empirically. 
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Summary 
In theory, for many small and medium-sized enterprises the introduction of per-
formance-related pay might be beneficial: if implemented properly, it could help 
enterprises in selecting, hiring and motivating the right employees for the right 
jobs. So far, however, performance-related pay in SMEs has received little aca-
demic attention. One of the few studies on this topic is that by Roepers and De 
Kok (2007), who explore determinants of performance-related pay amongst 
SMEs. Amongst others, they found support for the presence of gender effects; 
not only regarding the gender of the employees, but also regarding the gender of 
the entrepreneur. 
 
In this paper we further investigate the gender effect in remuneration policies as 
found in Roepers and de Kok (2007). The central idea of this paper is that female 
and male entrepreneurs make different choices regarding their human resource 
management practices, including remuneration policies. These differences can be 
explained by differences in the risk aversion of male and female employees and 
entrepreneurs. Generally speaking, women are more risk averse than men. This 
suggests that men and women have a different valuation of the risks that are as-
sociated with performance-related pay. We hypothesise that these different 
valuations will result in differences in the incidence of performance-related pay. 
This leads to the following five hypotheses: 
 
−  H1: Performance-related pay is less used for female employees than for male 
employees. 
−  H2: Female entrepreneurs are more likely to use performance-related pay 
than male entrepreneurs. 
−  H3: Performance-related pay is most likely to occur in firms with a female en-
trepreneur and a high share of male employees. 
−  H4: Performance-related pay is least likely to occur in firms with a male en-
trepreneurs and a high share of female employees. 
−  H5: The income of the entrepreneur is higher when we observe pay policies 
consistent with efficient risk sharing. 
 
These hypotheses are tested by estimating various probit and OLS regressions, 
using the results of a telephonic questionnaire amongst 369 Dutch entrepreneurs 
with 1 - 100 employees. 
 
At a significance level of 5%, we find partial support for hypothesis H1, but not 
for any of the other hypotheses. One explanation for these findings is that they 
indicate that employees are indeed risk averse (and men more than women) but 
that employers are not; hypothesis H1 is valid but H2 is not. In this case, hy-
potheses H3 and H4 are no longer valid, so the lack of support for hypotheses H3 
and H4 is consistent with the lack of support for H2. The lack of support for the 
fifth hypothesis may be due to the limited size of our sample (approximately 120 
valid observations were available to test this hypothesis). 
 
Another interpretation is that the lack of support for our hypotheses suggests 
that we need to reconsider them, including the basic assumptions on which they 
are based. We use gender as a proxy for the risk aversion of individual employ-
ees, and assume that risk aversion (of employers as well as employees) is in 
turn related to the incidence of performance-related pay. However, it can be ar- 
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gued that this assumption is not correct: the incidence of performance-related 
pay may be related to ambiguity aversion rather than risk aversion. Gender may 
however also serve as a proxy for differences in labour force attachment. Differ-
ences in labour force attachment are likely to be only relevant for employers, not 
for employees, which seems consistent with our lack of empirical support for the 
presence of an entrepreneurial gender effect. 
 
For a better understanding of gender effects in remuneration policies, future 
studies should further develop the relationships between performance-related 
pay, risk aversion and ambiguity aversion and labour force attachment, both 
theoretically and empirically. 
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1  Introduction 
Strong debate on performance-related pay 
Until a few years ago, performance-related pay was becoming more and more 
accepted and used. This changed dramatically when Lehman Brothers went bank-
rupt in September 2008. In a reaction to the crisis that followed, many claimed 
that the practice of performance-related pay in especially the financial sector 
was one of the main causes for the current crisis. The debate on the advantages 
and disadvantages of performance-related pay (and how it should be designed) 
is still ongoing. 
 
This debate tends to focus on large enterprises, where variable payment can ac-
count for a large share of total payment. The situation in small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) tends to be ignored in this discussion. For various rea-
sons, this is not surprising. First of all, relatively little is known about payment 
systems in SMEs. In 2006, the Amsterdam Centre for Entrepreneurship (ACE) 
and EIM conducted a survey amongst 369 Dutch SMEs regarding their remunera-
tion system. This is still one of the few surveys on this subject that includes 
SMEs. Secondly, the variable share of total payment tends to be relatively small 
in SMEs. Amongst others, the EIM - ACE survey included questions on the pay-
ment practices of the best-paid employee within each enterprise. The results in-
dicate that, within the group of best-paid employees that received some form of 
performance-related pay, the variable share of their wage was on average 8% 
(De Kok et al., 2007). 
 
Previous research: determinants of performance-related pay in SMEs 
Van Praag et al. (2006) argue that many small and medium-sized enterprises 
might benefit from the introduction of performance-related pay: if implemented 
properly, it could help enterprises in selecting, hiring and motivating the right 
employees for the right jobs. So far, however, performance-related pay in SMEs 
has received little academic attention. One of the few studies on this topic is that 
by Roepers and De Kok (2007). Using the EIM - ACE survey, they explore deter-
minants of performance-related pay amongst SMEs. In particular, they examined 
whether the incidence of performance-related pay for employees is related to the 
size and ownership structure of the enterprise and to the gender of the entrepre-
neur and the employees. Their results indicate that each of these variables is in-
deed related to the incidence of performance-related pay: larger firms are more 
likely to provide performance-related pay than smaller firms, and firms with a 
single owner and family firms are less likely to provide performance-related pay 
than firms with multiple owners (that are not related to each other). They also 
found a gender effect. 
 
The gender effect that Roepers and De Kok (2007) found was, however, different 
from what they expected. They expected that both the gender of the entrepre-
neur and the gender composition of the workforce would affect the probability of 
performance-related pay, but that these two effects would be independent of 
each other. Instead, they found a close relationship between these two effects. 
For male entrepreneurs, they found that the use of performance-related pay is 
independent of the gender composition of the work force. For female entrepre- 
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neurs, however, they found that the usage of performance-related pay increases 
with the share of male employees. 
 
Objective of the study 
The role of the gender of the manager or (direct) supervisor on wages of subor-
dinates has been considered before (Cohen and Huffman, 2007; Hultin and 
Szulkin, 2003). Likewise, the relationship between employee gender and per-
formance-related pay has been studied before (Geddes and Heywood, 2003). 
However, as far as we know, the paper by Roepers and De Kok (2007) is the 
only paper that considers both the gender of the entrepreneur and the gender 
composition of the workforce. 
 
In this paper we further investigate the gender effect in remuneration policies as 
found in Roepers and de Kok (2007). The central idea of this paper is that female 
and male entrepreneurs make different choices regarding their human resource 
management practices, including remuneration policies (Mukhtar, 2002; Verheul 
et al, 2002). These differences can be explained by differences in the risk aver-
sion of male and female employees and entrepreneurs. We derive several hy-
potheses on how the interaction between the entrepreneurial gender and the 
gender composition of the workforce might affect the incidence of performance-
related pay. These hypotheses are then tested, using the same dataset as 
Roepers and de Kok (2007). 
 
Outline 
In the next chapter we present the theoretical framework for this study and dis-
cuss the hypotheses that we will test. In chapter three we describe the data that 
we use to test these hypotheses. The results are presented in chapter four. As 
we will see, most of our hypotheses cannot be confirmed. Generally speaking, 
the available data does not support our ideas on how differences in risk aversion 
result in gender differences in the incidence of performance-related pay. Chapter 
five therefore starts with a discussion of possible explanations for our lack of 
positive results. After this discussion the main conclusions of our study are pre-
sented. 
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2  Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
2.1  The general case for performance-related pay 
An employment contract is an example of a relationship between a principal and 
an agent, where the principal delegates work to the agent. In such principal-
agent relationships, two types of problems can occur, related to differences in 
goals and risk aversion between the agent and the principal. The first type of 
problem occurs when the principal and agent have different desires or goals and 
when it is difficult or expensive for the principal to monitor the agent's behav-
iour. This goal conflict introduces the risk of moral hazard: the risk that the 
agent may not provide the level of effort that was agreed upon. In this case, the 
agent is shirking. The second problem arises when the principal and the agent 
have different attitudes toward risk. The principal and the agent may prefer dif-
ferent actions while executing the work, because of their different risk prefer-
ences. (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 
These problems may be (partly) solved by using performance-related pay (for 
example, piece rate payment, commissions, bonuses or profit sharing) as a gov-
ernance mechanism. If designed properly, including performance-related pay as 
part of the contract between the principal and the agent may prevent opportun-
istic agent behaviour. This will occur if the preferences of agents and principals 
are realigned in such a way that the rewards for both depend on the same ac-
tions. In such cases, the conflicts of self interest between principal and agent are 
reduced (Eisenhardt, 1989) and the agent is motivated to provide the efforts de-
sired by the principal. In fact, one of the most important objectives of compen-
sation is to provide proper and effective motivation to employees (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1992). 
 
Performance pay and firm size 
In larger firms, shirking is less easy to detect. This increases the risk that shirk-
ing will actually occur (Chang, 2006). Larger firms therefore have more need for 
governance mechanisms to combat moral hazard and shirking. By using per-
formance-related pay, firms can reduce the risk of shirking, because this re-
moves (or reduces) the potential conflicts of self interest between employer and 
employees. The benefits of performance-related pay are therefore likely to in-
crease with firm size. At the same time, the costs (per employee) of developing 
and maintaining performance-related pay system are likely to decrease with firm 
size: Larger firms have a larger demand for human resources, and therefore a 
larger demand for specific HRM practices. This stimulates standardization and 
formalization of these practices. Most formalized HRM practices require consider-
able development costs. This results in a cost advantage for larger firms, which 
is strengthened by the limited supply of financial resources of many small firms 
(De Kok, Uhlaner and Thurik, 2006). 
 
These arguments suggest that the net benefits of performance-related pay will 
increase with firm size. This is consistent with the finding from previous research  
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that performance-related pay is more common amongst large firms than 
amongst SMEs (Van Praag et al., 2006). 
 
Performance pay and risk aversion 
The realignment of the agent's preferences with those of the principal often re-
quires that certain risks are transferred from the principal to the agent (Eisen-
hardt, 1989). This is also the case with performance-related pay, where the risk 
of under-performance is shared between the principal and the agent. The extent 
to which this actually takes place depends on the actual levels of risk aversion of 
the relevant principal and agents. In agency theory it is often assumed that firms 
are risk neutral (e.g. because firms are owned by different investors with well-
diversified portfolios) while individual employees are risk averse (Chang, 2006; 
Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). This creates a stimulus to provide a fixed wage to 
the risk-averse employees: by transferring most of the income risks of employ-
ees to the firm, the employees are better of while the firm is not affected. It is 
doubtful, however, whether this assumption also applies in the case of SMEs. For 
example, the idea that the firm is owned by different investors with well-
diversified portfolios does not apply to the majority of SMEs. Often, SMEs are 
single owned-managed enterprises. In these cases, the level of risk aversion of 
the firm is basically determined by the risk aversion of the entrepreneur. This, in 
turn, may be related to the entrepreneurs' gender. 
2.2  Gender differences in risk attitude: five hypotheses 
It is well established that the risk attitude of individuals is partly related to their 
gender (Bajtelsmit and Bernasek, 1996; Borghans et al., 2009; Dohmen and 
Falk, 2001). It is however difficult to identify the causes of this gender differ-
ence: it is generally only possible to observe the outcomes of decisions, and not 
the decision-making processes themselves. 
 
Borghans et al. (2009) use experiments to examine possible determinants of risk 
aversion. They find that risk aversion is partly determined by psychological traits 
such as the "big 5"
1. Gender differences in these traits explain only a small part 
of gender differences in risk aversion. In the context of financial decisions, risk 
aversion is also related to wealth: in an absolute sense (the amount of money 
invested in risky assets), risk aversion decreases with wealth (Bajtelsmit and 
Bernasek, 1996). Since women have lower wages than men (both in general and 
for comparable positions), this suggests an indirect gender effect on risk aver-
sion. 
 
If female employees are more risk averse then male employees, they require a 
higher risk premium to accept performance-related pay. When comparing a fixed 
wage offer with a performance-related pay offer with a certain risk premium, fe-
male employees will be more likely to prefer the fixed wage offer. This is con-
firmed by an empirical study by Dohmen and Falk (2001). They find that women 
are more risk averse than men, and that this difference in risk preference ex-
 
1 The big 5 represent the following five basic dimensions of personality: openness, conscientious-
ness, extraversion, agreeableness and neuroticism.  
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plains their attitude towards variable pay: 68% of the 119 male participants of 
their study prefer a variable pay, compared to 44% of the 121 women. 
If female employees require a higher risk premium to accept performance-
related pay, this reduces the expected benefits of performance-related pay for 
the entrepreneur. This, in turn, makes it less likely that performance-related pay 
will occur. Thus, we expect that the share of women in the workforce will have a 
negative effect on the probability that a firm will introduce performance-related 
pay. 
 
The causality may also run in the opposite direction. If performance-related pay 
is actually introduced, this may stimulate the outflow of female employees. This 
will occur if the new wage offer (including both a variable and fixed part) is not 
high enough to cover the demanded risk premium. In addition, the presence of 
performance-related pay can stimulate the inflow of male applicants. Thus, the 
presence of performance-related pay can have a negative effect on the share of 
women in the workforce. 
 
Irrespective of the direction of causality, these arguments suggest a negative 
correlation between the share of women in the workforce and the incidence of 
performance-related pay. This leads to our first hypothesis: 
 
H1: Performance-related pay is less used for female employees than 
for male employees 
 
The gender difference in risk aversion does not only apply to the population in 
general, but also to the population of entrepreneurs. Female entrepreneurs tend 
to be more risk averse than male entrepreneurs (ENSR 1996; Verheul and 
Thurik, 2001). This suggests that (ceteris paribus) female entrepreneurs are 
more likely to transfer some of the company risk onto their employees (Chang, 
2006). This can be done by using performance-related pay. This results in the 
second hypothesis of this study: 
 
H2: Female entrepreneurs are more likely to use performance-related 
pay than male entrepreneurs 
 
This hypothesis is supported by gender differences in management style. Verheul 
(2003) has studied the gender effect of management styles in small firms in the 
Netherlands, and found that female entrepreneurs are more likely to use formal 
HRM practices than male entrepreneurs. She distinguishes between commitment 
and control oriented management. The higher the degree to which procedures 
and regulation are formalized, the higher the degree of control over employees 
and the production process is. She finds that female-led firms have a more con-
trol-oriented type of HRM than male-led firms. This result implies that female en-
trepreneurs can be associated with a higher degree of formalization. This is con-
sistent with a higher usage of performance-related pay. 
 
In contrast, Verheul, Risseeuw and Bartelse (2002) suggest that female entre-
preneurs may be more inclined to use non-pecuniary rewards, such as flexibility 
of working hours, childcare facilities and verbal compliments, to motivate their 
employees. Their relatively high attention for non-pecuniary rewards would imply 
that female entrepreneurs would be less likely to use performance-related pay  
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than male entrepreneurs. However, they do not find significant support for the 
assumptions of less performance-related pay. Therefore the expectation remains 
that female entrepreneurs are more likely to use performance-related pay 
schemes. 
 
The first hypothesis is related to the gender composition of the workforce, while 
the second hypothesis is related to the gender of the entrepreneur. We assume 
that these two effects work independently of each other. In that case, the com-
bination of these hypotheses results in the following two additional hypotheses: 
H3: Performance-related pay is most likely to occur in firms with a 
female entrepreneur and a high share of male employees 
H4: Performance-related pay is least likely to occur in firms with a 
male entrepreneurs and a high share of female employees 
 
As we noted before, it is often assumed that firms are risk neutral while individ-
ual employees are risk averse. If this is the case, we should find empirical sup-
port for hypothesis H1 but not for H2 (and therefore also not for H3 and H4). In 
addition, we expect to find support for another hypothesis, concerning the effect 
of performance-related pay on firm profits. Whether or not the usage of per-
formance-related pay will have a positive effect on profits depends on many dif-
ferent factors. One of these factors is the risk premium that the entrepreneur 
has to offer to the employees, in order to make them accept the new system
1. 
This risk premium is higher for female employees than for male employees. 
Hence, if the share of male employees is relatively high, the expected costs of 
using performance-related pay will be relatively low, making it more likely that 
performance-related pay will be beneficial to the overall profits of the firm. Con-
versely, if the share of female employees is relatively high, profits are likely to 
be higher using fixed wages (wages not related to performance) rather than per-
formance-related pay. Formulated differently: we expect that pay policies that 
are consistent with efficient risk sharing vary with the gender composition of the 
workforce. If the share of female employees is low, efficient pay policies involve 
performance-related pay; if the share of female employees is high, efficient pay 
policies involve fixed wages only. 
 
Our final hypothesis is that firms with an efficient pay policy as defined above 
will generate higher profits than firms with an inefficient pay policy. With small 
firms, it is often difficult to differentiate between the entrepreneur's income and 
the profit of the enterprise. This is especially the case if the enterprise has the 
legal form of a sole proprietorship: in this case, the entrepreneur cannot receive 
a wage, so the entrepreneurial income is part of the generated profits. We there-
fore formulate this hypothesis in terms of entrepreneurial income rather than 
profit. This results in the following hypothesis: 
H5: The income of the entrepreneur is higher when we observe pay 
policies consistent with efficient risk sharing 
 
 
1 Often, the entrepreneur of an SME may have the authority to introduce and use a performance-
related pay system without employee approval. Nevertheless, if the entrepreneur wants to retain 
valuable employees and keep them motivated, it is important that the employees feel that they 
are compensated for the financial risk that comes with performance-related pay.  
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3  Research methodology 
3.1  Questionnaire and sampling framework 
The dataset that we use for this study has previously been used by De Kok et al. 
(2007) and Roepers and de Kok (2007). In this section we give a brief descrip-
tion of the questionnaire and the sampling framework. More details can be found 
in De Kok et al. (2007). 
3.1.1 Questionnaire 
The questionnaire was developed by De Kok et al. (2007) based on prior knowl-
edge, in-house expertise and existing questionnaires. The concept questionnaire 
was tested through several pilot interviews. This resulted in a few adjustments in 
the formulation of the survey questions. The final survey focuses on the remu-
neration of the entrepreneur and the best-paid employee. In addition, the ques-
tionnaire also contains questions regarding structural and personal characteris-
tics of the firm and its employees. 
3.1.2 Sample 
The data has been gathered through a telephone survey in June and July 2006. 
The sample is stratified by size (varying from one to 100 employees on the pay-
roll), sector and age, and consists of 369 Dutch SMEs. Table 1 shows the distri-
bution of the sample by size and age. The questions in the survey were answered 
by the independent entrepreneurs (in case of a single owned firm), the major 
business partner (in case of a partnership), or by the general director (in other 
legal structures). 
Table 1  Sampled firms, by reported firm size and firm age 
Age category* 
Number of employees 
0 - 3 years  4 - 9 years  >= 10 years  Total 
1  8  13  7  28 
2 - 9   18  42  69  129 
10 - 49   11  27  80  118 
50 - 99  15  16  63  94 
Total  52  98  219  369 
  * After imputing missing values for 28 observations. 
  Source: EIM and ACE. 
3.2  Dependent variables 
The first four hypotheses concern the usage of performance-related pay within 
small and medium-sized enterprises. Our data set allows us to use two different 
indicators of performance-related pay by employees: a specific indicator con-
cerning performance-related pay for the best-paid employee in the firm, and an 
indicator concerning the application of performance-related pay for employees in  
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general. The fifth hypothesis concerns the entrepreneurial income, for which we 
use a single measure. In this section we describe the three dependent variables 
that are used in our study. 
 
Use of performance-related pay for the best-paid employee 
The remuneration of employees can consist of various components. To determine 
the composition of the remuneration of the best-paid employee, we asked which 
of the following components were actually received by the best-paid employee 
during 2005: 
−  fixed wage; 
−  profit sharing; 
−  bonus; 
−  options (only in case of a limited liability company); 
−  company car, phone or computer. 
 
Since it is not clear if the usage of a company car, phone or computer is related 
to the performance of the employee, we do not include these remuneration com-
ponents in our measurement for performance-related pay for the best-paid em-
ployee. We also decided not to use information on the usage of options, since 
this was mentioned by only three respondents. The resulting indicator for per-
formance-related pay for the best-paid employee thus indicates whether the 
best-paid employee received a share of the profit or a bonus during 2005. This is 
the case for 32% of our observations. 
 
Use of performance-related pay for some or all employees 
The questionnaire includes a single question on performance-based pay for the 
workforce as a whole, asking whether or not the enterprise makes use of per-
formance-related pay for some or all of its employees. This is the case for 34% 
of our observations. 
 
There is a reasonable overlap with the indicator of performance-related pay for 
the best-paid employee, but it is not very strong. About a third of all enterprises 
that use performance-related pay for at least some employees indicate that their 
best-paid employee did not receive a share of the profits or a bonus. What is 
more problematic is that about a third of the enterprises that reported that their 
best-paid employee received a bonus or participated in profit sharing, answered 
'no' to the question whether at least some of their employees received any per-
formance-related pay. If both indicators would indicate the same type of pay-
ment systems, this would not be possible. Presumably, the difference in the 
wording of the questions resulted in a different interpretation by the respondent 
of the specific remuneration components that should be taken into consideration. 
 
Entrepreneurial income 
The annual income of an entrepreneur can also include various components, 
where the choice for specific components depends (amongst others) on fiscal 
legislation and the legal structure of the enterprise. For example, in the Nether-
lands entrepreneurs can only receive a wage if their enterprise is organised as a 
limited liability company, not in case of a sole proprietorship. 
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In the questionnaire, we asked whether the entrepreneur received any of the fol-
lowing income components (and, if so, the level of that component): 
−  fixed wage (including management fee in case of a limited liability company); 
−  profit sharing. In case of a sole proprietorship or partnership, we first asked if 
the respondent would indicate the profit level; we then asked which part of 
this profit was used for private means. In case of a limited liability company 
we directly asked for the amount of profit received by the respondent; 
−  bonus; 
−  shares (only in case of a limited liability company); 
−  options (only in case of a limited liability company). 
 
Of these income components, shares and options were the least common. This is 
partly due to the fact that these components can only occur in the case of a lim-
ited liability company. However, also within this subset of enterprises shares and 
options do not occur often: 27 respondents received shares as part of their in-
come, 7 respondents received options, and only 3 respondents could indicate the 
value of the received shares or options. We therefore decided to exclude shares 
and options from our definition of entrepreneurial income. Hence, we define en-
trepreneurial income as the sum of the received wage, profit sharing or bonuses 
for 2005. 
 
Information on the entrepreneurial income is available for 170 respondents. Of 
these respondents, 25 reported an income equal to zero, another three respon-
dents reported a total annual income of less than € 10 000,-. At the other end of 
the distribution, three entrepreneurs reported an annual income ranging from 
€ 400 000 to € 700 000. Summary statistics are reported in Table 2. These sta-
tistics show a large gender effect. This will be explored further in the next chap-
ter. 
Table 2  Summary statistics: entrepreneurial income by gender of the entrepreneur 
Variable  Mean  Standard deviation 
Number of valid 
observations 
Income level entrepreneur (x € 1.000):       
    male entrepreneurs  77.8  97.2  155 
    female entrepreneurs  32.8  50.2  15 
    all entrepreneurs  73.9  94.8  170 
  Source: EIM and ACE 
  Notes: 1) income is defined as the sum of wages, profit shares, bonuses or gratuities; 
2) "entrepreneur" refers to the respondent of the questionnaire. This is the CEO or general 
manager of the firm. 
3.3  Independent variables 
Characteristics of the firm 
Relevant firm characteristics include sector, firm size and firm age. Sector is rep-
resented by a standard classification into eight different sectors (manufacturing; 
construction; automotive; wholesale; retail; transport and communication; hotels  
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and restaurants; services) and firm size is represented by the number of em-
ployees of the firm. 
 
Regarding firm age, our dataset allows us to differentiate between the legal age 
and the economic age of the organisations. The legal age is the age of the cur-
rent legal form of the organisation. This is the age that is registered at e.g. the 
Chamber of Commerce. An organisation's economic age indicates how long the 
firm has been economically active. De Kok et al. (2007) show that the legal and 
economic age of firms often differ, in which case the economic age generally ex-
ceeds the legal age. A possible explanation for this might be that the legal struc-
ture of the organisation has changed over time. In this study we control for pos-
sible age effects by including the logarithm of the economic age
1. Not all firms 
provided information regarding their age. For 39 firms, missing values were im-
puted. 
 
Some studies report a strong correlation between firm size and firm age (e.g. 
Heyman, 2007). This could make it difficult to distinguish between size and age 
effects. To check whether this is also the case in our sample, we examined the 
correlation between economical age and number of employees. This correlation is 
0.07; if we exclude firms of 75 years or more, the correlation increases some-
what, but is still only 0.15. We therefore conclude that there is no risk that ef-
fects of firm size and firm age cannot be distinguished from each other. 
 
Characteristics of the entrepreneur 
Available information regarding the entrepreneur includes gender, age, educa-
tional level, tenure and experience. 
 
Women make up 15% of the entrepreneurs in our sample (54 out of 369 entre-
preneurs in total). This share is considerably lower than the share of female en-
trepreneurs in Dutch enterprises: 30% of all Dutch entrepreneurs is female
2. The 
relatively low share of female entrepreneurs in our sample may be due to the 
fact that female entrepreneurs tend to employ fewer employees and work fewer 
hours in their enterprise than male employees. Given that we only included firms 
with employees in our sample and that small firms are underrepresented as 
compared to medium-sized enterprises, this would result in a relative low share 
of female entrepreneurs in our sample. This explanation is consistent with the 
results of an exploratory probit regression, where we relate the gender of the 
entrepreneur to firm size and sector dummies. The results indicate a highly sig-
nificant (p<0.001) negative relationship between firm size and the likelihood that 
an entrepreneur is a woman. 
 
Characteristics of the workforce 
The nature of remuneration policies is often related to basic characteristics of the 
workforce such as gender, age and educational level. For this study we have in-
formation about the gender, age and educational decomposition of the work-
force. Summary statistics are included in Table 3. Notice that the gender of the 
 
1 The age variable included in Table 1 also refers to economic age. 
2 Source: ‘demografische aspecten van ondernemers’ (demographic aspects of entrepreneurs), a 
Dutch dataset available at www.entrepreneurship-sme.eu;   
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entrepreneur is related to the gender of the workforce: with male entrepreneurs, 
the majority of employees is male, while with female entrepreneurs the majority 
of employees is female. 
Table 3  Summary statistics: characteristics of the workforce 
Variable  Mean  Standard deviation 
Number of valid 
observations 
gender decomposition of the workforce  
(percentage male employees): 
     
    Within firms with male entrepreneurs  63.5%  31.6  289 
    Within firms with female entrepreneurs  42.3%  34.4  45 
Within all firms  60.6%  32.8  334 
age decomposition of the workforce:       
   share of employees <= 24  27.1%  27.4  336 
   share of employees 25 - 44  53.8%  27.3  336 
   share of elder employees >=45   19.2%  22.3  336 
educational decomposition of workforce:       
   share of low-educated employees  33.5%  34.3  329 
   share of medium-educated employees  45.1%  33.7  329 
   share of high-educated employees  21.4%  30.4  329 
  Source: EIM and ACE. 
Characteristics of the best-paid employee 
41 Respondents could not (or would not) identify the best-paid employee within 
their organisation. Consequently, these respondents could not provide any in-
formation on the remuneration of these employees. This leaves 328 observations 
which can be used to analyse the structure of the remuneration of the best-paid 
employee. 
 
Relevant characteristics of the best-paid employee include gender, age, educa-
tion, occupational level and tenure of the best-paid employee. Summary statis-
tics are presented in Table 4 (variable means) and Table 5 (valid observations).  
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Table 4  Summary statistics for the best-paid employee: variable means, by gender of 
entrepreneur and gender of best-paid employee 
Variable  All  By gender of entrepreneur 
By gender of  
best-paid employee 
    male  female  male  female 
age of the best-paid employee  39.2  39.8  35.3  39.8  36.9 
educational level: share of best-paid 
employees with high education   40%  41%  30%  41%  35% 
tenure of the best-paid employee 
(years)  6.5  6.8  4.8  7.2  4.1 
occupational level: share of best-paid 
employees with management position   48%  51%  26%  55%  24% 
  Source: EIM and ACE. 
Table 5  Summary statistics for the best-paid employee: variable counts (valid observa-
tions), by gender of entrepreneur and gender of best-paid employee 
Variable  All  By gender of entrepreneur 
By gender of  
best-paid employee 
    male  female  male  female 
age of the best-paid employee  326  279  47  254  72 
educational level: share of best-paid 
employees with high education   327  281  47  255  72 
tenure of the best-paid employee 
(years)  326  280  47  254  72 
occupational level: share of best-paid 
employees with management position   327  280  47  255  72 
  Source: EIM and ACE. 
It is interesting to notice that the characteristics of the best-paid employee are 
not only related to the gender of employee, but also to the gender of the entre-
preneur. To a considerable extent, this is because the gender of the entrepre-
neur and of the best-paid employee often coincide: for 78% of the firms in our 
sample, the entrepreneur and the best-paid employee are of the same gender 
(Table 6). In particular, the large majority of male entrepreneurs has a male 
best-paid employee, while for female entrepreneurs the gender of the best-paid 
employee is evenly distributed: 49% of the female entrepreneurs employ a fe-
male as best-paid employee; for male entrepreneurs, this is only 9%
1. 
 
1 Fisher’s exact test rejects the hypothesis that the gender of the entrepreneur and of the best-
paid employee are independent of each other at a significance level of 0.000.  
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Table 6  Gender of the entrepreneur and the best-paid employee 
Gender best-paid employee 
Gender entrepreneur  Male  Female  Total 
Male  231  49  280 
Female  24  23  47 
Total  255  72  327 
  Source: EIM and ACE. 
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4  Results 
In chapter two we formulated five different hypotheses. Our hypotheses involve 
three different dependent variables: the usage of performance-related pay for 
the best-paid employee in the firm, the usage of performance-related pay for the 
workforce in general and entrepreneurial income (as indicator for firm perform-
ance). The first four hypotheses will be tested separately for performance-
related pay for the best-paid employee and for the workforce in general, while 
the fifth hypothesis will be tested on the entrepreneurial income. In this chapter 
we present the results of our analyses for each of these three dependent vari-
ables. 
4.1  Performance-related pay for the best-paid employee 
To test hypotheses H1 to H4 for the case of the best-paid employee, we estimate 
two equations: 
−  Equation 1: an equation that relates the use of performance-related pay for 
the best-paid employee to firm characteristics, entrepreneurial characteristics 
(including a gender dummy) and characteristics of the best-paid employee 
(including a gender dummy). This will be estimated by a probit regression. 
The results will be used to test hypotheses H1 and H2; 
−  Equation 2: as equation 1, replacing the gender dummies for the entrepreneur 
and the best-paid employee with two dummies that indicate the enterprises 
that are assumed to be most likely (firms with a female entrepreneur and a 
male best-paid employee) and least likely (firms with a male entrepreneur and 
a female best paid employee) to apply performance-related pay for the best-
paid employee. This will be estimated by a probit regression. The results will 
be used to test hypotheses H3 and H4. 
 
Ideally, we would have liked to estimate these equations separately for manage-
rial and non-managerial employees. Our sample is, however, too small to limit 
our estimations to either subsample. As a second-best solution, we include a 
dummy for the occupational position of the best-paid employee in the equations 
(see e.g. Brown and Medoff, 2003). 
 
Equations 1 and 2 have been estimated with and without sector dummies. The 
results indicate that including sector dummies does not change any of the rele-
vant findings
1, while it reduces the available degrees of freedom considerably 
(the number of observations is limited). We therefore present the estimation re-
sults for these equations without sector dummies. These results are presented in 
Table 7. 
 
1 Estimating model 1 with sector dummies results in 1 significant sector dummy (retail) and re-
duces the significance of the employer characteristics somewhat; estimating model 2 with sector 
dummies results in 1 significant sector dummies (retail) and reduces the significance of the em-
ployer characteristics somewhat; otherwise, no differences occur.  
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Table 7  Probit regressions on the use of performance-related pay (profit-sharing or bo-
nus) for the best-paid employee. 




value  Sign. level 
Parameter 
value  Sign. level  
Firm characteristics         
firm size (ln)  0.067  0.320  0.087  0.184 
firm age (ln)  -0.23**  0.018  -0.22**  0.022 
Employer characteristics         
age (ln)  0.85*  0.077  0.83*  0.082 
experience (ln)  0.04  0.786  0.08  0.637 
phd degree (dummy)  0.58**  0.014  0.63***  0.008 
Female entrepreneur(dummy)  -0.15  0.545  -   
Characteristics best-paid employee         
age (ln)  -0.26  0.505  -0.23  0.555 
tenure (ln)  0.38***  0.001  0.37***  0.001 
Medium education (dummy)  0.24  0.386  0.22  0.43 
high education (dummy)  0.76***  0.009  0.73**  0.012 
Female employee (dummy)  -0.10  0.657  -   
Management position (dummy)  0.52  0.147  0.53  0.141 
Gender comparison employer/employee         
female entrepreneur, male employee 
(dummy) 
-    0.11  0.723 
male entrepreneur, female employee 
(dummy) 
-    0.08  0.728 
Constant  -3.44*  0.065  -3.65**  0.048 
         
Goodness of Fit Measures         
Pseudo R
2  0.1482    0.1471   
Log likelihood  -172.1    -172.3   
Valid Observations  307    307   
  *; **; *** Denote a significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
The results for both equations are very similar: the likelihood that a firm applies 
performance-related pay for its best-paid employee is higher for younger firms, 
for firms with elder and highly educated entrepreneurs, and for employees with 
high tenure and a high educational level. There is no indication that firm size is 
relevant. More important, there is also no indication of any gender effect: con-
cerning the remuneration of the best-paid employee, we find no support for hy-
potheses H1 to H4. Specifically, the results of equation 1 reject hypotheses H1 
and H2: neither the gender of the entrepreneur nor the gender of the best-paid 
employee are related to the probability that the best-paid employee receives 
performance-related pay. Likewise, the results of equation 2 reject hypotheses 
H3 and H4. This follows from the insignificance of the dummies indicating the  
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firms that are most and least likely to apply performance-related pay for the 
best-paid employee. 
4.2  Performance-related pay for the workforce in general 
Regarding the workforce in general, we use a similar approach to test hypothe-
ses H1 to H4. Again, two equations are estimated: 
−  Equation 3: an equation that relates the use of performance-related pay for 
some or all of the employees to firm characteristics, entrepreneurial charac-
teristics (including a gender dummy) and characteristics of the workforce as a 
whole (including the share of male employees). This will be estimated by a 
probit regression. The results will be used to test hypotheses H1 and H2; 
−  Equation 4: as equation 3, replacing the entrepreneurial gender dummy and 
the share of male employees with two dummies that indicate the enterprises 
that are assumed to be most likely (firms with a female entrepreneur and a 
relatively high share of male employees) and least likely (firms with a male 
entrepreneur and a relatively high share of female employees) to apply per-
formance-related pay to the workforce in general. This will be estimated by a 
probit regression. The results will be used to test hypotheses H3 and H4. 
 
The estimation of equation 4 requires that we classify enterprises into three 
categories, based on the gender of the entrepreneur and whether the share of 
(fe)male employees is relatively high or low. The second criterion can be opera-
tionalised in different ways. A straightforward approach is to determine various 
percentiles of the distribution of the share of male employees, and consider the 
lowest/highest percentiles as those with relatively low/high shares of male em-
ployees. The question then remains, how many percentiles to distinguish. An in-
crease in the number of percentiles may increase the differences between the 
lowest and highest percentiles (thus increasing the likelihood of finding statisti-
cally significant differences), but also decreases the number of observations 
within the percentiles (thus decreasing the likelihood of finding statistically sig-
nificant differences). Since this is an explorative study, we have estimated equa-
tion 4 based on the outcomes of using two, three and four percentiles. In this 
paper, we report the outcomes with the highest significance levels for the vari-
ables of interest. 
 
As it turns out, distinguishing four percentiles provided the highest significance 
levels for the two dummy variables indicating enterprises that are most/least 
likely to apply performance-related pay. In this situation, a 'low share' of male 
employees refers to the 25% enterprises with the lowest shares of male employ-
ees (less than 37%), and a 'high share' refers to the 24% enterprises with the 
highest share of male employees (92.5% or more). Combined with the gender of 
the entrepreneur, this results in a group of 61 enterprises for which perform-
ance-related pay is least likely to occur (a male entrepreneur and a low share of 
male employees) and a group of only 6 enterprises for which performance-
related pay is most likely to occur (a female entrepreneur and a high share of 
male employees). 
 
The results are presented in Table 8, again without including sector dummies.  
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Table 8  Probit regressions on presence of performance-related pay for some or all em-
ployees in the workforce. 




value  Sign. level 
Parameter 
value  Sign. level 
Firm characteristics          
firm size (ln)  0.29***  0.068  0.31***  0.000 
firm age (ln)  -0.05  0.571  -0.04  0.623 
Employer characteristics         
age (ln)  0.82*  0.087  0.81*  0.092 
experience (ln)  -0.14  0.384  -0.10  0.503 
phd degree (dummy)  0.09  0.665  0.14  0.497 
Female entrepreneur (dummy)  -0.09  0.703  -   
Workforce characteristics         
share of highly educated employees  0.0089***  0.001  0.0087***  0.001 
share of elder employees  -0.0097**  0.019  -0.0085**  0.034 
share of male employees   0.005**  0.033  -   
Gender comparison employer/workforce         
female entrepreneur, low share female em-
ployees (dummy) 
-    1.02*  0.065 
male entrepreneur, high share female em-
ployees (dummy) 
-    -0.29  0.136 
constant  -3.78**  0.015  -3.9**  0.013 
         
Goodness of Fit Measures         
Pseudo R
2  0.1072    0.1102   
Log likelihood  -187.0    -186.3   
Valid Observations  321    321   
  *; **; *** denote a significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
The results for equations 3 and 4 are very similar: the likelihood that a firm ap-
plies performance-related pay for some (or all) of its employees is higher for lar-
ger firms, and for firms with a higher share of young and highly educated em-
ployees. Notice that these results are different from the results for equations 1 
and 2: instead of firm age, it is firm size that matters now, and employer charac-
teristics no longer seem to be very important. 
 
Equations 3 and 4 still find no support for hypotheses H2 and H4. The lack of 
support for hypothesis H2 contradicts the earlier findings by Roepers and De 
Kok, who found that female entrepreneurs are (ceteris paribus) more likely to 
provide performance-related pay than male entrepreneurs (Roepers and De Kok, 
2007, page 31). Their study, however, included less control variables. In particu-
lar, they did not control for the educational level of the entrepreneur and the age 
and education of the workforce. Once these control variables are included in the 
model, the significant effect of the gender of the entrepreneur disappears.  
  25 
 
The positive parameter for the share of male employees in equation 3 supports 
hypothesis H1. In addition, the positive dummy variable that indicates firms with 
a female entrepreneur and a low share of female employees offers some support 
for hypothesis H3 (although it should be noted that this parameter is only signifi-
cant at 10%
1). This is consistent with the results by Roepers and De Kok, who 
found a significant positive effect of the interaction between the gender of the 
entrepreneur and the share of male employees (Roepers and De Kok, 2007, page 
31). 
4.3  Gender, performance-related pay and firm performance 
4.3.1 Controlling for workforce characteristics 
To test the final hypothesis, we estimate various equations with the log of the 
entrepreneurial income as dependent variable. 
−  Equation 5: the starting point is an equation that relates the (log of the) in-
come level of the entrepreneur to several firm characteristics, entrepreneurial 
characteristics and workforce characteristics; 
−  Equation 6: as equation 5, including a dummy variable indicating the use of 
performance-related pay for at least some employees; 
−  Equation 7: as equation 5, including a dummy variable indicating a consistent 
pay policy: this is either a combination of performance-related pay and a high 
share of male employees, or a combination of no performance-related pay and 
a high share of female employees. 
 
Estimating equation 7 requires that we identify firms with a consistent pay pol-
icy. This, in turn, requires that we identify firms with a relatively high share of 
(fe)male employees. We use the same method as discussed in the previous sec-
tion, which is based on the percentiles of the distribution of the share of male 
employees. As is the case with equation 4, we find the best results when we use 
four different percentiles. In this case, 93 firms in the sample have a consistent 
pay policy (66 firms with relatively few male employees without performance-
related pay and 27 firms with relatively many male employees with performance-
related pay). The estimation results are reported in Table 9. 
 
According to the results for equations 5, 6 and 7, entrepreneurial income in-
creases with firm size and with the educational level of the entrepreneur as well 
as the employees. Neither the gender of the entrepreneur nor the gender com-
position of the workforce are significantly related to entrepreneurial income. 
There is also no support for hypothesis H5: while the prevalence of performance-
related pay in general is associated with a higher entrepreneurial income (equa-
tion 6), our indicator for a consistent pay policy is not (equation 7). Apparently, 
the effect of performance-related pay on entrepreneurial income does not de-
 
1 In addition, if sector dummies are included, the significance of this parameter becomes less than 
10%.  
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pend on the gender composition of the workforce; at least not in the way that we 
hypothesised
1. 
Table 9  OLS Regression results on log entrepreneurial income (robust estimators) 













firm characteristics             
firm size (ln)  0.25***  0.000  0.24***  0.000  0.26***  0.000 
firm age (ln)  -0.008  0.875  0.022  0.664  -0.009  0.860 
employer characteristics             
age (ln)  0.43  0.261  0.32  0.417  0.54  0.167 
experience (ln)  0.12  0.337  0.15  0.249  0.08  0.505 
phd degree (dummy)  0.34**  0.014  0.31**  0.024  0.31**  0.027 
Female entrepreneur (dummy)  -0.31  0.214  -0.27  0.233  -0.22  0.313 
Workforce characteristics             
share of highly educated employees  0.006***  0.006  0.006***  0.008  0.006***  0.008 
share of elder employees  -0.003  0.360  -0.002  0.452  -0.003  0.380 
share of male employees   -0.000  0.858  -0.001  0.753  -0.003  0.380 
Performance-related pay for some or 
all employees 
-    0.29***  0.009  -   
consistent pay policy  -    -    -0.23  0.137 
Constant  1.38  0.231  1.54  0.192  1.11  0.345 
             
Goodness of Fit Measures             
R
2  0.37    0.41       
Valid Observations  128    128    128   
  *; **; *** denote a significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
4.3.2 Controlling for characteristics of the best-paid employee 
In the previous section, we examined to which extent characteristics of (per-
formance-related pay for) the workforce could explain entrepreneurial income. In 
this section, we focus on characteristics of (performance-related pay for) the 
best-paid employee. This is done by including characteristics of the best-paid 
employee in equations 5 to 7, and replacing the indicators for performance-
related pay for the workforce with comparable indicators for performance-related 
pay for the best-paid employee. This results in equations 8, 9 and 10 (see Table 
10). 
 
1 Hypothesis H5 implies that for firms with a high share of male employees, performance-related 
pay would have a positive effect on entrepreneurial income; for firms with a low share of male 
employees, performance-related pay would have a negative effect on entrepreneurial income.  
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In equation 10, the dummy variable indicating consistent pay policy refers to 11 
firms with a female best-paid employee that receives no performance-related 
pay, and 47 firms with a male best-paid employee that receives performance-
related pay. 
Table 10  Regression results on firm performance (log entrepreneurial income (OLS, ro-
bust estimators), including characteristics best-paid employee 













firm characteristics             
firm size (ln)  0.28***  0.000  0.27***  0.000  0.27***  0.000 
firm age (ln)  -0.02  0.734  -0.02  0.736  0.002  0.975 
employer characteristics             
age (ln)  0.054  0.903  0.03  0.944  0.056  0.895 
experience (ln)  0.24*  0.084  0.24*  0.094  0.20  0.113 
phd degree (dummy)  0.27*  0.052  0.22  0.147  0.29*  0.059 
Female entrepreneur (dummy)  -0.28  0.292  -0.29  0.246  -0.21  0.414 
Workforce characteristics             
share of highly educated employees  0.007***  0.002  0.006**  0.012  0.008***  0.001 
share of elder employees  -0.005  0.192  -0.004  0.274  -0.005  0.187 
share of male employees   0.002  0.318  0.002  0.378  0.000  0.908 
Characteristics best-paid employee             
Female employee (dummy)  0.30  0.166  0.29  0.185  -   
performance-related pay  -    0.15  0.268  -   
consistent pay policy  -    -    -0.13  0.267 
             
Constant  2.38*  0.083  2.44*  0.086     
             
Goodness of Fit Measures             
R
2  0.3769    0.3859       
Valid Observations  117    117    117   
  *; **; *** denote a significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
The results for equations 8, 9 and 10 are similar to the results for equations 5, 6 
and 7: entrepreneurial income increases with firm size and with the educational 
level of the entrepreneur as well as the employees (although the effect of the 
educational level of the entrepreneur is somewhat lower). None of the included 
gender variables have a significant effect (gender of the entrepreneur, gender 
composition of the workforce and gender of the best-paid employee). Also here, 
there is no support for hypothesis H5: our indicator for a consistent pay policy is 
not only not significant, but even has the wrong sign (equation 10). 
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5  Discussion and conclusions 
In this study we have derived five different hypotheses concerning the gender 
effects in performance-related pay amongst small and medium-sized effects. 
These hypotheses are based on two basic assumptions: the willingness of em-
ployers and employees to accept performance-related pay depends (amongst 
others) on their levels of risk aversion, and risk aversion is gender-related. The 
empirical support for our hypotheses is, however, very limited. In this chapter 
we discuss the estimation results and end with the main conclusions. 
5.1  Discussion 
Partial support for the first hypothesis… 
According to the first hypothesis, performance-related pay would be used less for 
female employees than for male employees. We find empirical support for this 
hypothesis, but only regarding the workforce in general: firms with a larger 
share of male employees are more likely to offer performance-related pay to 
their employees. 
 
When we analyse the remuneration of the best-paid employee, we find no rela-
tionship between the employee's gender and the probability that he or she re-
ceived a share of the profit or a bonus. One explanation for this lack of support 
is that the sample size is not large enough; our data set only contains 72 obser-
vations where the best-paid employee is female. 
 
…and no support for the second hypothesis… 
The second hypothesis states that female entrepreneurs are more likely to use 
performance-related pay than male entrepreneurs. There is no support for this 
hypothesis. The results presented by Roepers and De Kok (2007) seem to sup-
port this hypothesis, but additional analysis has shown that this support is the 
result of a missing variable bias: once additional control variables are added to 
the model by Roepers and De Kok (2007), the effect of the gender of the entre-
preneur is no longer significant. 
 
…so no support for the third and fourth hypothesis should be expected 
Hypotheses H3 and H4 are only valid if the first two hypotheses are. If one of the 
first two hypotheses would not be valid, then hypotheses H3 and H4 should also 
be rejected. At a 5% confidence level, this is indeed the case. The fact that we 
find no support for hypotheses H3 and H4 is thus consistent with the lack of sup-
port for the second hypothesis. 
 
No support for the fifth hypothesis regarding entrepreneurial income 
The results of the first four hypotheses are consistent with the standard assump-
tion that firms are risk neutral while individual employees are risk averse. If this 
is the case, we expected to find support for hypothesis H5: The income of the 
entrepreneur is higher when we observe pay policies consistent with efficient risk  
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sharing. We find, however, no support for this hypothesis. Also here, this could 
be due to the limited number of observations (128 or 117 valid observations). 
 
Do we need more data… 
One interpretation of the results of our study, is that the results are largely con-
sistent with the standard assumption that firms are risk neutral while individual 
employees are risk averse. The support is not strong, but this could be explained 
by the relatively limited number of observations. According to this interpretation, 
the main finding of our study is then that we find no support for the expected re-
lationship between the gender of the entrepreneur and the incidence of perform-
ance-related pay. The small size of our sample, however, does not allow for 
strong conclusions. 
 
…or do we need an alternative theory? 
Another interpretation of the results is also possible. The empirical support for 
our hypotheses is so limited, that we should reconsider the two basic assump-
tions that underlie our hypotheses. 
 
The first assumption is that the willingness of employers and employees to ac-
cept performance-related pay depends (amongst others) on their levels of risk 
aversion. This assumption ignores the difference between risk aversion and am-
biguity aversion (Borghans et al., 2009; Machina, 2009). Individuals often find 
themselves in situations where different outcomes may occur. The probabilities 
of these outcomes may either be known or unknown. Risk aversion refers to an 
individual's behaviour in case of know probabilities, while ambiguity aversion re-
fers to an individual's behaviour in case of unknown probabilities. Since the dis-
tribution of the expected performance of employees is not known in advance, the 
incidence of performance-related pay is likely to be related to the ambiguity 
aversion of the employer and employees, rather than their risk aversion. 
 
Borghans et al. (2009) found that risk aversion and ambiguity aversion are em-
pirically distinct individual traits. Regarding risk aversion, they find that women 
are more risk averse than men, and that psychological traits are strongly associ-
ated with risk aversion. Regarding ambiguity aversion, however, they find mark-
edly different results. Men and women show similar marginal valuations of ambi-
guity (with increasing levels of ambiguity), and ambiguity aversion is not related 
to psychological traits. If ambiguity diversion is indeed not gender-related, the 
second basic assumption of our study (risk aversion is gender-related) would not 
apply in the case of ambiguity aversion. 
 
According to this line of argument, differences in risk aversion between men and 
women cannot explain gender differences in the incidence of performance-related 
pay. An alternative explanation for gender differences in the incidence of per-
formance-related pay is that they are partly caused by gender differences in la-
bour force attachment. Various authors have argued that differences in labour 
force attachment between men and women could explain part of the gender 
earnings gap (Kunze, 2005; Nordman and Roubaud, 2005). According to Geddes 
and Heywood (2003), gender differences in labour force attachment may also 
explain differences in the incidence of performance-related pay: on average, 
women have a lower labour force attachment than men, which is in turn related 
to the probability of receiving performance-based pay.  
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5.2  Conclusions 
We have found partial support for the first hypothesis, which states that female 
employees are less likely to receive performance-related pay than male employ-
ees. There is also some support for the third hypothesis, which states that per-
formance-related pay is most likely to occur in firms with a female entrepreneur 
and a high share of male employees. This support is however weak: it is only 
significant at a 10% confidence level, and is furthermore based on the compari-
son of a sample of only 6 firms (with a female entrepreneur and a high share of 
male employees) with the other firms. For the other three hypotheses, there is 
no empirical support. 
 
One interpretation of the results is that they indicate that entrepreneurs are risk 
neutral while employees are risk averse (where female employees are more risk 
averse than male employees). Due to the small sample size, however, this inter-
pretation is only tentative. Additional empirical research on considerable larger 
dataset is required. Perhaps future studies can make use of administrative data 
(e.g. of payrolling companies that target SMEs). 
 
Another interpretation is that the lack of support for our hypotheses suggests 
that we need to reconsider them, including the basic assumptions on which they 
are based. In our study, we have used gender as a proxy for the risk aversion of 
individual entrepreneurs and employees, and assumed that risk aversion (of em-
ployers as well as employees) is in turn related to the incidence of performance-
related pay. However, it can be argued that this assumption is not correct: the 
incidence of performance-related pay may be related to ambiguity aversion 
rather than risk aversion. Gender may however also serve as a proxy for differ-
ences in labour force attachment. Differences in labour force attachment are 
likely to be only relevant for employers, not for employees, which seems consis-
tent with our lack of empirical support for the presence of an entrepreneurial 
gender effect. 
 
For a better understanding of gender effects in remuneration policies, future 
studies should further develop the relationships between performance-related 
pay, risk aversion and ambiguity aversion and labour force attachment, both 
theoretically and empirically. 
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Summary 
In theory, for many small and medium-sized enterprises the introduction of per-
formance-related pay might be beneficial: if implemented properly, it could help 
enterprises in selecting, hiring and motivating the right employees for the right 
jobs. So far, however, performance-related pay in SMEs has received little aca-
demic attention. One of the few studies on this topic is that by Roepers and De 
Kok (2007), who explore determinants of performance-related pay amongst 
SMEs. Amongst others, they found support for the presence of gender effects; 
not only regarding the gender of the employees, but also regarding the gender of 
the entrepreneur. 
 
In this paper we further investigate the gender effect in remuneration policies as 
found in Roepers and de Kok (2007). The central idea of this paper is that female 
and male entrepreneurs make different choices regarding their human resource 
management practices, including remuneration policies. These differences can be 
explained by differences in the risk aversion of male and female employees and 
entrepreneurs. Generally speaking, women are more risk averse than men. This 
suggests that men and women have a different valuation of the risks that are as-
sociated with performance-related pay. We hypothesise that these different 
valuations will result in differences in the incidence of performance-related pay. 
This leads to the following five hypotheses: 
 
−  H1: Performance-related pay is less used for female employees than for male 
employees. 
−  H2: Female entrepreneurs are more likely to use performance-related pay 
than male entrepreneurs. 
−  H3: Performance-related pay is most likely to occur in firms with a female en-
trepreneur and a high share of male employees. 
−  H4: Performance-related pay is least likely to occur in firms with a male en-
trepreneurs and a high share of female employees. 
−  H5: The income of the entrepreneur is higher when we observe pay policies 
consistent with efficient risk sharing. 
 
These hypotheses are tested by estimating various probit and OLS regressions, 
using the results of a telephonic questionnaire amongst 369 Dutch entrepreneurs 
with 1 - 100 employees. 
 
At a significance level of 5%, we find partial support for hypothesis H1, but not 
for any of the other hypotheses. One explanation for these findings is that they 
indicate that employees are indeed risk averse (and men more than women) but 
that employers are not; hypothesis H1 is valid but H2 is not. In this case, hy-
potheses H3 and H4 are no longer valid, so the lack of support for hypotheses H3 
and H4 is consistent with the lack of support for H2. The lack of support for the 
fifth hypothesis may be due to the limited size of our sample (approximately 120 
valid observations were available to test this hypothesis). 
 
Another interpretation is that the lack of support for our hypotheses suggests 
that we need to reconsider them, including the basic assumptions on which they 
are based. We use gender as a proxy for the risk aversion of individual employ-
ees, and assume that risk aversion (of employers as well as employees) is in 
turn related to the incidence of performance-related pay. However, it can be ar- 
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gued that this assumption is not correct: the incidence of performance-related 
pay may be related to ambiguity aversion rather than risk aversion. Gender may 
however also serve as a proxy for differences in labour force attachment. Differ-
ences in labour force attachment are likely to be only relevant for employers, not 
for employees, which seems consistent with our lack of empirical support for the 
presence of an entrepreneurial gender effect. 
 
For a better understanding of gender effects in remuneration policies, future 
studies should further develop the relationships between performance-related 
pay, risk aversion and ambiguity aversion and labour force attachment, both 
theoretically and empirically. 
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1  Introduction 
Strong debate on performance-related pay 
Until a few years ago, performance-related pay was becoming more and more 
accepted and used. This changed dramatically when Lehman Brothers went bank-
rupt in September 2008. In a reaction to the crisis that followed, many claimed 
that the practice of performance-related pay in especially the financial sector 
was one of the main causes for the current crisis. The debate on the advantages 
and disadvantages of performance-related pay (and how it should be designed) 
is still ongoing. 
 
This debate tends to focus on large enterprises, where variable payment can ac-
count for a large share of total payment. The situation in small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) tends to be ignored in this discussion. For various rea-
sons, this is not surprising. First of all, relatively little is known about payment 
systems in SMEs. In 2006, the Amsterdam Centre for Entrepreneurship (ACE) 
and EIM conducted a survey amongst 369 Dutch SMEs regarding their remunera-
tion system. This is still one of the few surveys on this subject that includes 
SMEs. Secondly, the variable share of total payment tends to be relatively small 
in SMEs. Amongst others, the EIM - ACE survey included questions on the pay-
ment practices of the best-paid employee within each enterprise. The results in-
dicate that, within the group of best-paid employees that received some form of 
performance-related pay, the variable share of their wage was on average 8% 
(De Kok et al., 2007). 
 
Previous research: determinants of performance-related pay in SMEs 
Van Praag et al. (2006) argue that many small and medium-sized enterprises 
might benefit from the introduction of performance-related pay: if implemented 
properly, it could help enterprises in selecting, hiring and motivating the right 
employees for the right jobs. So far, however, performance-related pay in SMEs 
has received little academic attention. One of the few studies on this topic is that 
by Roepers and De Kok (2007). Using the EIM - ACE survey, they explore deter-
minants of performance-related pay amongst SMEs. In particular, they examined 
whether the incidence of performance-related pay for employees is related to the 
size and ownership structure of the enterprise and to the gender of the entrepre-
neur and the employees. Their results indicate that each of these variables is in-
deed related to the incidence of performance-related pay: larger firms are more 
likely to provide performance-related pay than smaller firms, and firms with a 
single owner and family firms are less likely to provide performance-related pay 
than firms with multiple owners (that are not related to each other). They also 
found a gender effect. 
 
The gender effect that Roepers and De Kok (2007) found was, however, different 
from what they expected. They expected that both the gender of the entrepre-
neur and the gender composition of the workforce would affect the probability of 
performance-related pay, but that these two effects would be independent of 
each other. Instead, they found a close relationship between these two effects. 
For male entrepreneurs, they found that the use of performance-related pay is 
independent of the gender composition of the work force. For female entrepre- 
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neurs, however, they found that the usage of performance-related pay increases 
with the share of male employees. 
 
Objective of the study 
The role of the gender of the manager or (direct) supervisor on wages of subor-
dinates has been considered before (Cohen and Huffman, 2007; Hultin and 
Szulkin, 2003). Likewise, the relationship between employee gender and per-
formance-related pay has been studied before (Geddes and Heywood, 2003). 
However, as far as we know, the paper by Roepers and De Kok (2007) is the 
only paper that considers both the gender of the entrepreneur and the gender 
composition of the workforce. 
 
In this paper we further investigate the gender effect in remuneration policies as 
found in Roepers and de Kok (2007). The central idea of this paper is that female 
and male entrepreneurs make different choices regarding their human resource 
management practices, including remuneration policies (Mukhtar, 2002; Verheul 
et al, 2002). These differences can be explained by differences in the risk aver-
sion of male and female employees and entrepreneurs. We derive several hy-
potheses on how the interaction between the entrepreneurial gender and the 
gender composition of the workforce might affect the incidence of performance-
related pay. These hypotheses are then tested, using the same dataset as 
Roepers and de Kok (2007). 
 
Outline 
In the next chapter we present the theoretical framework for this study and dis-
cuss the hypotheses that we will test. In chapter three we describe the data that 
we use to test these hypotheses. The results are presented in chapter four. As 
we will see, most of our hypotheses cannot be confirmed. Generally speaking, 
the available data does not support our ideas on how differences in risk aversion 
result in gender differences in the incidence of performance-related pay. Chapter 
five therefore starts with a discussion of possible explanations for our lack of 
positive results. After this discussion the main conclusions of our study are pre-
sented. 
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2  Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
2.1  The general case for performance-related pay 
An employment contract is an example of a relationship between a principal and 
an agent, where the principal delegates work to the agent. In such principal-
agent relationships, two types of problems can occur, related to differences in 
goals and risk aversion between the agent and the principal. The first type of 
problem occurs when the principal and agent have different desires or goals and 
when it is difficult or expensive for the principal to monitor the agent's behav-
iour. This goal conflict introduces the risk of moral hazard: the risk that the 
agent may not provide the level of effort that was agreed upon. In this case, the 
agent is shirking. The second problem arises when the principal and the agent 
have different attitudes toward risk. The principal and the agent may prefer dif-
ferent actions while executing the work, because of their different risk prefer-
ences. (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 
These problems may be (partly) solved by using performance-related pay (for 
example, piece rate payment, commissions, bonuses or profit sharing) as a gov-
ernance mechanism. If designed properly, including performance-related pay as 
part of the contract between the principal and the agent may prevent opportun-
istic agent behaviour. This will occur if the preferences of agents and principals 
are realigned in such a way that the rewards for both depend on the same ac-
tions. In such cases, the conflicts of self interest between principal and agent are 
reduced (Eisenhardt, 1989) and the agent is motivated to provide the efforts de-
sired by the principal. In fact, one of the most important objectives of compen-
sation is to provide proper and effective motivation to employees (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1992). 
 
Performance pay and firm size 
In larger firms, shirking is less easy to detect. This increases the risk that shirk-
ing will actually occur (Chang, 2006). Larger firms therefore have more need for 
governance mechanisms to combat moral hazard and shirking. By using per-
formance-related pay, firms can reduce the risk of shirking, because this re-
moves (or reduces) the potential conflicts of self interest between employer and 
employees. The benefits of performance-related pay are therefore likely to in-
crease with firm size. At the same time, the costs (per employee) of developing 
and maintaining performance-related pay system are likely to decrease with firm 
size: Larger firms have a larger demand for human resources, and therefore a 
larger demand for specific HRM practices. This stimulates standardization and 
formalization of these practices. Most formalized HRM practices require consider-
able development costs. This results in a cost advantage for larger firms, which 
is strengthened by the limited supply of financial resources of many small firms 
(De Kok, Uhlaner and Thurik, 2006). 
 
These arguments suggest that the net benefits of performance-related pay will 
increase with firm size. This is consistent with the finding from previous research  
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that performance-related pay is more common amongst large firms than 
amongst SMEs (Van Praag et al., 2006). 
 
Performance pay and risk aversion 
The realignment of the agent's preferences with those of the principal often re-
quires that certain risks are transferred from the principal to the agent (Eisen-
hardt, 1989). This is also the case with performance-related pay, where the risk 
of under-performance is shared between the principal and the agent. The extent 
to which this actually takes place depends on the actual levels of risk aversion of 
the relevant principal and agents. In agency theory it is often assumed that firms 
are risk neutral (e.g. because firms are owned by different investors with well-
diversified portfolios) while individual employees are risk averse (Chang, 2006; 
Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). This creates a stimulus to provide a fixed wage to 
the risk-averse employees: by transferring most of the income risks of employ-
ees to the firm, the employees are better of while the firm is not affected. It is 
doubtful, however, whether this assumption also applies in the case of SMEs. For 
example, the idea that the firm is owned by different investors with well-
diversified portfolios does not apply to the majority of SMEs. Often, SMEs are 
single owned-managed enterprises. In these cases, the level of risk aversion of 
the firm is basically determined by the risk aversion of the entrepreneur. This, in 
turn, may be related to the entrepreneurs' gender. 
2.2  Gender differences in risk attitude: five hypotheses 
It is well established that the risk attitude of individuals is partly related to their 
gender (Bajtelsmit and Bernasek, 1996; Borghans et al., 2009; Dohmen and 
Falk, 2001). It is however difficult to identify the causes of this gender differ-
ence: it is generally only possible to observe the outcomes of decisions, and not 
the decision-making processes themselves. 
 
Borghans et al. (2009) use experiments to examine possible determinants of risk 
aversion. They find that risk aversion is partly determined by psychological traits 
such as the "big 5"
1. Gender differences in these traits explain only a small part 
of gender differences in risk aversion. In the context of financial decisions, risk 
aversion is also related to wealth: in an absolute sense (the amount of money 
invested in risky assets), risk aversion decreases with wealth (Bajtelsmit and 
Bernasek, 1996). Since women have lower wages than men (both in general and 
for comparable positions), this suggests an indirect gender effect on risk aver-
sion. 
 
If female employees are more risk averse then male employees, they require a 
higher risk premium to accept performance-related pay. When comparing a fixed 
wage offer with a performance-related pay offer with a certain risk premium, fe-
male employees will be more likely to prefer the fixed wage offer. This is con-
firmed by an empirical study by Dohmen and Falk (2001). They find that women 
are more risk averse than men, and that this difference in risk preference ex-
 
1 The big 5 represent the following five basic dimensions of personality: openness, conscientious-
ness, extraversion, agreeableness and neuroticism.  
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plains their attitude towards variable pay: 68% of the 119 male participants of 
their study prefer a variable pay, compared to 44% of the 121 women. 
If female employees require a higher risk premium to accept performance-
related pay, this reduces the expected benefits of performance-related pay for 
the entrepreneur. This, in turn, makes it less likely that performance-related pay 
will occur. Thus, we expect that the share of women in the workforce will have a 
negative effect on the probability that a firm will introduce performance-related 
pay. 
 
The causality may also run in the opposite direction. If performance-related pay 
is actually introduced, this may stimulate the outflow of female employees. This 
will occur if the new wage offer (including both a variable and fixed part) is not 
high enough to cover the demanded risk premium. In addition, the presence of 
performance-related pay can stimulate the inflow of male applicants. Thus, the 
presence of performance-related pay can have a negative effect on the share of 
women in the workforce. 
 
Irrespective of the direction of causality, these arguments suggest a negative 
correlation between the share of women in the workforce and the incidence of 
performance-related pay. This leads to our first hypothesis: 
 
H1: Performance-related pay is less used for female employees than 
for male employees 
 
The gender difference in risk aversion does not only apply to the population in 
general, but also to the population of entrepreneurs. Female entrepreneurs tend 
to be more risk averse than male entrepreneurs (ENSR 1996; Verheul and 
Thurik, 2001). This suggests that (ceteris paribus) female entrepreneurs are 
more likely to transfer some of the company risk onto their employees (Chang, 
2006). This can be done by using performance-related pay. This results in the 
second hypothesis of this study: 
 
H2: Female entrepreneurs are more likely to use performance-related 
pay than male entrepreneurs 
 
This hypothesis is supported by gender differences in management style. Verheul 
(2003) has studied the gender effect of management styles in small firms in the 
Netherlands, and found that female entrepreneurs are more likely to use formal 
HRM practices than male entrepreneurs. She distinguishes between commitment 
and control oriented management. The higher the degree to which procedures 
and regulation are formalized, the higher the degree of control over employees 
and the production process is. She finds that female-led firms have a more con-
trol-oriented type of HRM than male-led firms. This result implies that female en-
trepreneurs can be associated with a higher degree of formalization. This is con-
sistent with a higher usage of performance-related pay. 
 
In contrast, Verheul, Risseeuw and Bartelse (2002) suggest that female entre-
preneurs may be more inclined to use non-pecuniary rewards, such as flexibility 
of working hours, childcare facilities and verbal compliments, to motivate their 
employees. Their relatively high attention for non-pecuniary rewards would imply 
that female entrepreneurs would be less likely to use performance-related pay  
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than male entrepreneurs. However, they do not find significant support for the 
assumptions of less performance-related pay. Therefore the expectation remains 
that female entrepreneurs are more likely to use performance-related pay 
schemes. 
 
The first hypothesis is related to the gender composition of the workforce, while 
the second hypothesis is related to the gender of the entrepreneur. We assume 
that these two effects work independently of each other. In that case, the com-
bination of these hypotheses results in the following two additional hypotheses: 
H3: Performance-related pay is most likely to occur in firms with a 
female entrepreneur and a high share of male employees 
H4: Performance-related pay is least likely to occur in firms with a 
male entrepreneurs and a high share of female employees 
 
As we noted before, it is often assumed that firms are risk neutral while individ-
ual employees are risk averse. If this is the case, we should find empirical sup-
port for hypothesis H1 but not for H2 (and therefore also not for H3 and H4). In 
addition, we expect to find support for another hypothesis, concerning the effect 
of performance-related pay on firm profits. Whether or not the usage of per-
formance-related pay will have a positive effect on profits depends on many dif-
ferent factors. One of these factors is the risk premium that the entrepreneur 
has to offer to the employees, in order to make them accept the new system
1. 
This risk premium is higher for female employees than for male employees. 
Hence, if the share of male employees is relatively high, the expected costs of 
using performance-related pay will be relatively low, making it more likely that 
performance-related pay will be beneficial to the overall profits of the firm. Con-
versely, if the share of female employees is relatively high, profits are likely to 
be higher using fixed wages (wages not related to performance) rather than per-
formance-related pay. Formulated differently: we expect that pay policies that 
are consistent with efficient risk sharing vary with the gender composition of the 
workforce. If the share of female employees is low, efficient pay policies involve 
performance-related pay; if the share of female employees is high, efficient pay 
policies involve fixed wages only. 
 
Our final hypothesis is that firms with an efficient pay policy as defined above 
will generate higher profits than firms with an inefficient pay policy. With small 
firms, it is often difficult to differentiate between the entrepreneur's income and 
the profit of the enterprise. This is especially the case if the enterprise has the 
legal form of a sole proprietorship: in this case, the entrepreneur cannot receive 
a wage, so the entrepreneurial income is part of the generated profits. We there-
fore formulate this hypothesis in terms of entrepreneurial income rather than 
profit. This results in the following hypothesis: 
H5: The income of the entrepreneur is higher when we observe pay 
policies consistent with efficient risk sharing 
 
 
1 Often, the entrepreneur of an SME may have the authority to introduce and use a performance-
related pay system without employee approval. Nevertheless, if the entrepreneur wants to retain 
valuable employees and keep them motivated, it is important that the employees feel that they 
are compensated for the financial risk that comes with performance-related pay.  
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3  Research methodology 
3.1  Questionnaire and sampling framework 
The dataset that we use for this study has previously been used by De Kok et al. 
(2007) and Roepers and de Kok (2007). In this section we give a brief descrip-
tion of the questionnaire and the sampling framework. More details can be found 
in De Kok et al. (2007). 
3.1.1 Questionnaire 
The questionnaire was developed by De Kok et al. (2007) based on prior knowl-
edge, in-house expertise and existing questionnaires. The concept questionnaire 
was tested through several pilot interviews. This resulted in a few adjustments in 
the formulation of the survey questions. The final survey focuses on the remu-
neration of the entrepreneur and the best-paid employee. In addition, the ques-
tionnaire also contains questions regarding structural and personal characteris-
tics of the firm and its employees. 
3.1.2 Sample 
The data has been gathered through a telephone survey in June and July 2006. 
The sample is stratified by size (varying from one to 100 employees on the pay-
roll), sector and age, and consists of 369 Dutch SMEs. Table 1 shows the distri-
bution of the sample by size and age. The questions in the survey were answered 
by the independent entrepreneurs (in case of a single owned firm), the major 
business partner (in case of a partnership), or by the general director (in other 
legal structures). 
Table 1  Sampled firms, by reported firm size and firm age 
Age category* 
Number of employees 
0 - 3 years  4 - 9 years  >= 10 years  Total 
1  8  13  7  28 
2 - 9   18  42  69  129 
10 - 49   11  27  80  118 
50 - 99  15  16  63  94 
Total  52  98  219  369 
  * After imputing missing values for 28 observations. 
  Source: EIM and ACE. 
3.2  Dependent variables 
The first four hypotheses concern the usage of performance-related pay within 
small and medium-sized enterprises. Our data set allows us to use two different 
indicators of performance-related pay by employees: a specific indicator con-
cerning performance-related pay for the best-paid employee in the firm, and an 
indicator concerning the application of performance-related pay for employees in  
14   
general. The fifth hypothesis concerns the entrepreneurial income, for which we 
use a single measure. In this section we describe the three dependent variables 
that are used in our study. 
 
Use of performance-related pay for the best-paid employee 
The remuneration of employees can consist of various components. To determine 
the composition of the remuneration of the best-paid employee, we asked which 
of the following components were actually received by the best-paid employee 
during 2005: 
−  fixed wage; 
−  profit sharing; 
−  bonus; 
−  options (only in case of a limited liability company); 
−  company car, phone or computer. 
 
Since it is not clear if the usage of a company car, phone or computer is related 
to the performance of the employee, we do not include these remuneration com-
ponents in our measurement for performance-related pay for the best-paid em-
ployee. We also decided not to use information on the usage of options, since 
this was mentioned by only three respondents. The resulting indicator for per-
formance-related pay for the best-paid employee thus indicates whether the 
best-paid employee received a share of the profit or a bonus during 2005. This is 
the case for 32% of our observations. 
 
Use of performance-related pay for some or all employees 
The questionnaire includes a single question on performance-based pay for the 
workforce as a whole, asking whether or not the enterprise makes use of per-
formance-related pay for some or all of its employees. This is the case for 34% 
of our observations. 
 
There is a reasonable overlap with the indicator of performance-related pay for 
the best-paid employee, but it is not very strong. About a third of all enterprises 
that use performance-related pay for at least some employees indicate that their 
best-paid employee did not receive a share of the profits or a bonus. What is 
more problematic is that about a third of the enterprises that reported that their 
best-paid employee received a bonus or participated in profit sharing, answered 
'no' to the question whether at least some of their employees received any per-
formance-related pay. If both indicators would indicate the same type of pay-
ment systems, this would not be possible. Presumably, the difference in the 
wording of the questions resulted in a different interpretation by the respondent 
of the specific remuneration components that should be taken into consideration. 
 
Entrepreneurial income 
The annual income of an entrepreneur can also include various components, 
where the choice for specific components depends (amongst others) on fiscal 
legislation and the legal structure of the enterprise. For example, in the Nether-
lands entrepreneurs can only receive a wage if their enterprise is organised as a 
limited liability company, not in case of a sole proprietorship. 
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In the questionnaire, we asked whether the entrepreneur received any of the fol-
lowing income components (and, if so, the level of that component): 
−  fixed wage (including management fee in case of a limited liability company); 
−  profit sharing. In case of a sole proprietorship or partnership, we first asked if 
the respondent would indicate the profit level; we then asked which part of 
this profit was used for private means. In case of a limited liability company 
we directly asked for the amount of profit received by the respondent; 
−  bonus; 
−  shares (only in case of a limited liability company); 
−  options (only in case of a limited liability company). 
 
Of these income components, shares and options were the least common. This is 
partly due to the fact that these components can only occur in the case of a lim-
ited liability company. However, also within this subset of enterprises shares and 
options do not occur often: 27 respondents received shares as part of their in-
come, 7 respondents received options, and only 3 respondents could indicate the 
value of the received shares or options. We therefore decided to exclude shares 
and options from our definition of entrepreneurial income. Hence, we define en-
trepreneurial income as the sum of the received wage, profit sharing or bonuses 
for 2005. 
 
Information on the entrepreneurial income is available for 170 respondents. Of 
these respondents, 25 reported an income equal to zero, another three respon-
dents reported a total annual income of less than € 10 000,-. At the other end of 
the distribution, three entrepreneurs reported an annual income ranging from 
€ 400 000 to € 700 000. Summary statistics are reported in Table 2. These sta-
tistics show a large gender effect. This will be explored further in the next chap-
ter. 
Table 2  Summary statistics: entrepreneurial income by gender of the entrepreneur 
Variable  Mean  Standard deviation 
Number of valid 
observations 
Income level entrepreneur (x € 1.000):       
    male entrepreneurs  77.8  97.2  155 
    female entrepreneurs  32.8  50.2  15 
    all entrepreneurs  73.9  94.8  170 
  Source: EIM and ACE 
  Notes: 1) income is defined as the sum of wages, profit shares, bonuses or gratuities; 
2) "entrepreneur" refers to the respondent of the questionnaire. This is the CEO or general 
manager of the firm. 
3.3  Independent variables 
Characteristics of the firm 
Relevant firm characteristics include sector, firm size and firm age. Sector is rep-
resented by a standard classification into eight different sectors (manufacturing; 
construction; automotive; wholesale; retail; transport and communication; hotels  
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and restaurants; services) and firm size is represented by the number of em-
ployees of the firm. 
 
Regarding firm age, our dataset allows us to differentiate between the legal age 
and the economic age of the organisations. The legal age is the age of the cur-
rent legal form of the organisation. This is the age that is registered at e.g. the 
Chamber of Commerce. An organisation's economic age indicates how long the 
firm has been economically active. De Kok et al. (2007) show that the legal and 
economic age of firms often differ, in which case the economic age generally ex-
ceeds the legal age. A possible explanation for this might be that the legal struc-
ture of the organisation has changed over time. In this study we control for pos-
sible age effects by including the logarithm of the economic age
1. Not all firms 
provided information regarding their age. For 39 firms, missing values were im-
puted. 
 
Some studies report a strong correlation between firm size and firm age (e.g. 
Heyman, 2007). This could make it difficult to distinguish between size and age 
effects. To check whether this is also the case in our sample, we examined the 
correlation between economical age and number of employees. This correlation is 
0.07; if we exclude firms of 75 years or more, the correlation increases some-
what, but is still only 0.15. We therefore conclude that there is no risk that ef-
fects of firm size and firm age cannot be distinguished from each other. 
 
Characteristics of the entrepreneur 
Available information regarding the entrepreneur includes gender, age, educa-
tional level, tenure and experience. 
 
Women make up 15% of the entrepreneurs in our sample (54 out of 369 entre-
preneurs in total). This share is considerably lower than the share of female en-
trepreneurs in Dutch enterprises: 30% of all Dutch entrepreneurs is female
2. The 
relatively low share of female entrepreneurs in our sample may be due to the 
fact that female entrepreneurs tend to employ fewer employees and work fewer 
hours in their enterprise than male employees. Given that we only included firms 
with employees in our sample and that small firms are underrepresented as 
compared to medium-sized enterprises, this would result in a relative low share 
of female entrepreneurs in our sample. This explanation is consistent with the 
results of an exploratory probit regression, where we relate the gender of the 
entrepreneur to firm size and sector dummies. The results indicate a highly sig-
nificant (p<0.001) negative relationship between firm size and the likelihood that 
an entrepreneur is a woman. 
 
Characteristics of the workforce 
The nature of remuneration policies is often related to basic characteristics of the 
workforce such as gender, age and educational level. For this study we have in-
formation about the gender, age and educational decomposition of the work-
force. Summary statistics are included in Table 3. Notice that the gender of the 
 
1 The age variable included in Table 1 also refers to economic age. 
2 Source: ‘demografische aspecten van ondernemers’ (demographic aspects of entrepreneurs), a 
Dutch dataset available at www.entrepreneurship-sme.eu;   
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entrepreneur is related to the gender of the workforce: with male entrepreneurs, 
the majority of employees is male, while with female entrepreneurs the majority 
of employees is female. 
Table 3  Summary statistics: characteristics of the workforce 
Variable  Mean  Standard deviation 
Number of valid 
observations 
gender decomposition of the workforce  
(percentage male employees): 
     
    Within firms with male entrepreneurs  63.5%  31.6  289 
    Within firms with female entrepreneurs  42.3%  34.4  45 
Within all firms  60.6%  32.8  334 
age decomposition of the workforce:       
   share of employees <= 24  27.1%  27.4  336 
   share of employees 25 - 44  53.8%  27.3  336 
   share of elder employees >=45   19.2%  22.3  336 
educational decomposition of workforce:       
   share of low-educated employees  33.5%  34.3  329 
   share of medium-educated employees  45.1%  33.7  329 
   share of high-educated employees  21.4%  30.4  329 
  Source: EIM and ACE. 
Characteristics of the best-paid employee 
41 Respondents could not (or would not) identify the best-paid employee within 
their organisation. Consequently, these respondents could not provide any in-
formation on the remuneration of these employees. This leaves 328 observations 
which can be used to analyse the structure of the remuneration of the best-paid 
employee. 
 
Relevant characteristics of the best-paid employee include gender, age, educa-
tion, occupational level and tenure of the best-paid employee. Summary statis-
tics are presented in Table 4 (variable means) and Table 5 (valid observations).  
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Table 4  Summary statistics for the best-paid employee: variable means, by gender of 
entrepreneur and gender of best-paid employee 
Variable  All  By gender of entrepreneur 
By gender of  
best-paid employee 
    male  female  male  female 
age of the best-paid employee  39.2  39.8  35.3  39.8  36.9 
educational level: share of best-paid 
employees with high education   40%  41%  30%  41%  35% 
tenure of the best-paid employee 
(years)  6.5  6.8  4.8  7.2  4.1 
occupational level: share of best-paid 
employees with management position   48%  51%  26%  55%  24% 
  Source: EIM and ACE. 
Table 5  Summary statistics for the best-paid employee: variable counts (valid observa-
tions), by gender of entrepreneur and gender of best-paid employee 
Variable  All  By gender of entrepreneur 
By gender of  
best-paid employee 
    male  female  male  female 
age of the best-paid employee  326  279  47  254  72 
educational level: share of best-paid 
employees with high education   327  281  47  255  72 
tenure of the best-paid employee 
(years)  326  280  47  254  72 
occupational level: share of best-paid 
employees with management position   327  280  47  255  72 
  Source: EIM and ACE. 
It is interesting to notice that the characteristics of the best-paid employee are 
not only related to the gender of employee, but also to the gender of the entre-
preneur. To a considerable extent, this is because the gender of the entrepre-
neur and of the best-paid employee often coincide: for 78% of the firms in our 
sample, the entrepreneur and the best-paid employee are of the same gender 
(Table 6). In particular, the large majority of male entrepreneurs has a male 
best-paid employee, while for female entrepreneurs the gender of the best-paid 
employee is evenly distributed: 49% of the female entrepreneurs employ a fe-
male as best-paid employee; for male entrepreneurs, this is only 9%
1. 
 
1 Fisher’s exact test rejects the hypothesis that the gender of the entrepreneur and of the best-
paid employee are independent of each other at a significance level of 0.000.  
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Table 6  Gender of the entrepreneur and the best-paid employee 
Gender best-paid employee 
Gender entrepreneur  Male  Female  Total 
Male  231  49  280 
Female  24  23  47 
Total  255  72  327 
  Source: EIM and ACE. 
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4  Results 
In chapter two we formulated five different hypotheses. Our hypotheses involve 
three different dependent variables: the usage of performance-related pay for 
the best-paid employee in the firm, the usage of performance-related pay for the 
workforce in general and entrepreneurial income (as indicator for firm perform-
ance). The first four hypotheses will be tested separately for performance-
related pay for the best-paid employee and for the workforce in general, while 
the fifth hypothesis will be tested on the entrepreneurial income. In this chapter 
we present the results of our analyses for each of these three dependent vari-
ables. 
4.1  Performance-related pay for the best-paid employee 
To test hypotheses H1 to H4 for the case of the best-paid employee, we estimate 
two equations: 
−  Equation 1: an equation that relates the use of performance-related pay for 
the best-paid employee to firm characteristics, entrepreneurial characteristics 
(including a gender dummy) and characteristics of the best-paid employee 
(including a gender dummy). This will be estimated by a probit regression. 
The results will be used to test hypotheses H1 and H2; 
−  Equation 2: as equation 1, replacing the gender dummies for the entrepreneur 
and the best-paid employee with two dummies that indicate the enterprises 
that are assumed to be most likely (firms with a female entrepreneur and a 
male best-paid employee) and least likely (firms with a male entrepreneur and 
a female best paid employee) to apply performance-related pay for the best-
paid employee. This will be estimated by a probit regression. The results will 
be used to test hypotheses H3 and H4. 
 
Ideally, we would have liked to estimate these equations separately for manage-
rial and non-managerial employees. Our sample is, however, too small to limit 
our estimations to either subsample. As a second-best solution, we include a 
dummy for the occupational position of the best-paid employee in the equations 
(see e.g. Brown and Medoff, 2003). 
 
Equations 1 and 2 have been estimated with and without sector dummies. The 
results indicate that including sector dummies does not change any of the rele-
vant findings
1, while it reduces the available degrees of freedom considerably 
(the number of observations is limited). We therefore present the estimation re-
sults for these equations without sector dummies. These results are presented in 
Table 7. 
 
1 Estimating model 1 with sector dummies results in 1 significant sector dummy (retail) and re-
duces the significance of the employer characteristics somewhat; estimating model 2 with sector 
dummies results in 1 significant sector dummies (retail) and reduces the significance of the em-
ployer characteristics somewhat; otherwise, no differences occur.  
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Table 7  Probit regressions on the use of performance-related pay (profit-sharing or bo-
nus) for the best-paid employee. 




value  Sign. level 
Parameter 
value  Sign. level  
Firm characteristics         
firm size (ln)  0.067  0.320  0.087  0.184 
firm age (ln)  -0.23**  0.018  -0.22**  0.022 
Employer characteristics         
age (ln)  0.85*  0.077  0.83*  0.082 
experience (ln)  0.04  0.786  0.08  0.637 
phd degree (dummy)  0.58**  0.014  0.63***  0.008 
Female entrepreneur(dummy)  -0.15  0.545  -   
Characteristics best-paid employee         
age (ln)  -0.26  0.505  -0.23  0.555 
tenure (ln)  0.38***  0.001  0.37***  0.001 
Medium education (dummy)  0.24  0.386  0.22  0.43 
high education (dummy)  0.76***  0.009  0.73**  0.012 
Female employee (dummy)  -0.10  0.657  -   
Management position (dummy)  0.52  0.147  0.53  0.141 
Gender comparison employer/employee         
female entrepreneur, male employee 
(dummy) 
-    0.11  0.723 
male entrepreneur, female employee 
(dummy) 
-    0.08  0.728 
Constant  -3.44*  0.065  -3.65**  0.048 
         
Goodness of Fit Measures         
Pseudo R
2  0.1482    0.1471   
Log likelihood  -172.1    -172.3   
Valid Observations  307    307   
  *; **; *** Denote a significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
The results for both equations are very similar: the likelihood that a firm applies 
performance-related pay for its best-paid employee is higher for younger firms, 
for firms with elder and highly educated entrepreneurs, and for employees with 
high tenure and a high educational level. There is no indication that firm size is 
relevant. More important, there is also no indication of any gender effect: con-
cerning the remuneration of the best-paid employee, we find no support for hy-
potheses H1 to H4. Specifically, the results of equation 1 reject hypotheses H1 
and H2: neither the gender of the entrepreneur nor the gender of the best-paid 
employee are related to the probability that the best-paid employee receives 
performance-related pay. Likewise, the results of equation 2 reject hypotheses 
H3 and H4. This follows from the insignificance of the dummies indicating the  
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firms that are most and least likely to apply performance-related pay for the 
best-paid employee. 
4.2  Performance-related pay for the workforce in general 
Regarding the workforce in general, we use a similar approach to test hypothe-
ses H1 to H4. Again, two equations are estimated: 
−  Equation 3: an equation that relates the use of performance-related pay for 
some or all of the employees to firm characteristics, entrepreneurial charac-
teristics (including a gender dummy) and characteristics of the workforce as a 
whole (including the share of male employees). This will be estimated by a 
probit regression. The results will be used to test hypotheses H1 and H2; 
−  Equation 4: as equation 3, replacing the entrepreneurial gender dummy and 
the share of male employees with two dummies that indicate the enterprises 
that are assumed to be most likely (firms with a female entrepreneur and a 
relatively high share of male employees) and least likely (firms with a male 
entrepreneur and a relatively high share of female employees) to apply per-
formance-related pay to the workforce in general. This will be estimated by a 
probit regression. The results will be used to test hypotheses H3 and H4. 
 
The estimation of equation 4 requires that we classify enterprises into three 
categories, based on the gender of the entrepreneur and whether the share of 
(fe)male employees is relatively high or low. The second criterion can be opera-
tionalised in different ways. A straightforward approach is to determine various 
percentiles of the distribution of the share of male employees, and consider the 
lowest/highest percentiles as those with relatively low/high shares of male em-
ployees. The question then remains, how many percentiles to distinguish. An in-
crease in the number of percentiles may increase the differences between the 
lowest and highest percentiles (thus increasing the likelihood of finding statisti-
cally significant differences), but also decreases the number of observations 
within the percentiles (thus decreasing the likelihood of finding statistically sig-
nificant differences). Since this is an explorative study, we have estimated equa-
tion 4 based on the outcomes of using two, three and four percentiles. In this 
paper, we report the outcomes with the highest significance levels for the vari-
ables of interest. 
 
As it turns out, distinguishing four percentiles provided the highest significance 
levels for the two dummy variables indicating enterprises that are most/least 
likely to apply performance-related pay. In this situation, a 'low share' of male 
employees refers to the 25% enterprises with the lowest shares of male employ-
ees (less than 37%), and a 'high share' refers to the 24% enterprises with the 
highest share of male employees (92.5% or more). Combined with the gender of 
the entrepreneur, this results in a group of 61 enterprises for which perform-
ance-related pay is least likely to occur (a male entrepreneur and a low share of 
male employees) and a group of only 6 enterprises for which performance-
related pay is most likely to occur (a female entrepreneur and a high share of 
male employees). 
 
The results are presented in Table 8, again without including sector dummies.  
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Table 8  Probit regressions on presence of performance-related pay for some or all em-
ployees in the workforce. 




value  Sign. level 
Parameter 
value  Sign. level 
Firm characteristics          
firm size (ln)  0.29***  0.068  0.31***  0.000 
firm age (ln)  -0.05  0.571  -0.04  0.623 
Employer characteristics         
age (ln)  0.82*  0.087  0.81*  0.092 
experience (ln)  -0.14  0.384  -0.10  0.503 
phd degree (dummy)  0.09  0.665  0.14  0.497 
Female entrepreneur (dummy)  -0.09  0.703  -   
Workforce characteristics         
share of highly educated employees  0.0089***  0.001  0.0087***  0.001 
share of elder employees  -0.0097**  0.019  -0.0085**  0.034 
share of male employees   0.005**  0.033  -   
Gender comparison employer/workforce         
female entrepreneur, low share female em-
ployees (dummy) 
-    1.02*  0.065 
male entrepreneur, high share female em-
ployees (dummy) 
-    -0.29  0.136 
constant  -3.78**  0.015  -3.9**  0.013 
         
Goodness of Fit Measures         
Pseudo R
2  0.1072    0.1102   
Log likelihood  -187.0    -186.3   
Valid Observations  321    321   
  *; **; *** denote a significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
The results for equations 3 and 4 are very similar: the likelihood that a firm ap-
plies performance-related pay for some (or all) of its employees is higher for lar-
ger firms, and for firms with a higher share of young and highly educated em-
ployees. Notice that these results are different from the results for equations 1 
and 2: instead of firm age, it is firm size that matters now, and employer charac-
teristics no longer seem to be very important. 
 
Equations 3 and 4 still find no support for hypotheses H2 and H4. The lack of 
support for hypothesis H2 contradicts the earlier findings by Roepers and De 
Kok, who found that female entrepreneurs are (ceteris paribus) more likely to 
provide performance-related pay than male entrepreneurs (Roepers and De Kok, 
2007, page 31). Their study, however, included less control variables. In particu-
lar, they did not control for the educational level of the entrepreneur and the age 
and education of the workforce. Once these control variables are included in the 
model, the significant effect of the gender of the entrepreneur disappears.  
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The positive parameter for the share of male employees in equation 3 supports 
hypothesis H1. In addition, the positive dummy variable that indicates firms with 
a female entrepreneur and a low share of female employees offers some support 
for hypothesis H3 (although it should be noted that this parameter is only signifi-
cant at 10%
1). This is consistent with the results by Roepers and De Kok, who 
found a significant positive effect of the interaction between the gender of the 
entrepreneur and the share of male employees (Roepers and De Kok, 2007, page 
31). 
4.3  Gender, performance-related pay and firm performance 
4.3.1 Controlling for workforce characteristics 
To test the final hypothesis, we estimate various equations with the log of the 
entrepreneurial income as dependent variable. 
−  Equation 5: the starting point is an equation that relates the (log of the) in-
come level of the entrepreneur to several firm characteristics, entrepreneurial 
characteristics and workforce characteristics; 
−  Equation 6: as equation 5, including a dummy variable indicating the use of 
performance-related pay for at least some employees; 
−  Equation 7: as equation 5, including a dummy variable indicating a consistent 
pay policy: this is either a combination of performance-related pay and a high 
share of male employees, or a combination of no performance-related pay and 
a high share of female employees. 
 
Estimating equation 7 requires that we identify firms with a consistent pay pol-
icy. This, in turn, requires that we identify firms with a relatively high share of 
(fe)male employees. We use the same method as discussed in the previous sec-
tion, which is based on the percentiles of the distribution of the share of male 
employees. As is the case with equation 4, we find the best results when we use 
four different percentiles. In this case, 93 firms in the sample have a consistent 
pay policy (66 firms with relatively few male employees without performance-
related pay and 27 firms with relatively many male employees with performance-
related pay). The estimation results are reported in Table 9. 
 
According to the results for equations 5, 6 and 7, entrepreneurial income in-
creases with firm size and with the educational level of the entrepreneur as well 
as the employees. Neither the gender of the entrepreneur nor the gender com-
position of the workforce are significantly related to entrepreneurial income. 
There is also no support for hypothesis H5: while the prevalence of performance-
related pay in general is associated with a higher entrepreneurial income (equa-
tion 6), our indicator for a consistent pay policy is not (equation 7). Apparently, 
the effect of performance-related pay on entrepreneurial income does not de-
 
1 In addition, if sector dummies are included, the significance of this parameter becomes less than 
10%.  
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pend on the gender composition of the workforce; at least not in the way that we 
hypothesised
1. 
Table 9  OLS Regression results on log entrepreneurial income (robust estimators) 













firm characteristics             
firm size (ln)  0.25***  0.000  0.24***  0.000  0.26***  0.000 
firm age (ln)  -0.008  0.875  0.022  0.664  -0.009  0.860 
employer characteristics             
age (ln)  0.43  0.261  0.32  0.417  0.54  0.167 
experience (ln)  0.12  0.337  0.15  0.249  0.08  0.505 
phd degree (dummy)  0.34**  0.014  0.31**  0.024  0.31**  0.027 
Female entrepreneur (dummy)  -0.31  0.214  -0.27  0.233  -0.22  0.313 
Workforce characteristics             
share of highly educated employees  0.006***  0.006  0.006***  0.008  0.006***  0.008 
share of elder employees  -0.003  0.360  -0.002  0.452  -0.003  0.380 
share of male employees   -0.000  0.858  -0.001  0.753  -0.003  0.380 
Performance-related pay for some or 
all employees 
-    0.29***  0.009  -   
consistent pay policy  -    -    -0.23  0.137 
Constant  1.38  0.231  1.54  0.192  1.11  0.345 
             
Goodness of Fit Measures             
R
2  0.37    0.41       
Valid Observations  128    128    128   
  *; **; *** denote a significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
4.3.2 Controlling for characteristics of the best-paid employee 
In the previous section, we examined to which extent characteristics of (per-
formance-related pay for) the workforce could explain entrepreneurial income. In 
this section, we focus on characteristics of (performance-related pay for) the 
best-paid employee. This is done by including characteristics of the best-paid 
employee in equations 5 to 7, and replacing the indicators for performance-
related pay for the workforce with comparable indicators for performance-related 
pay for the best-paid employee. This results in equations 8, 9 and 10 (see Table 
10). 
 
1 Hypothesis H5 implies that for firms with a high share of male employees, performance-related 
pay would have a positive effect on entrepreneurial income; for firms with a low share of male 
employees, performance-related pay would have a negative effect on entrepreneurial income.  
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In equation 10, the dummy variable indicating consistent pay policy refers to 11 
firms with a female best-paid employee that receives no performance-related 
pay, and 47 firms with a male best-paid employee that receives performance-
related pay. 
Table 10  Regression results on firm performance (log entrepreneurial income (OLS, ro-
bust estimators), including characteristics best-paid employee 













firm characteristics             
firm size (ln)  0.28***  0.000  0.27***  0.000  0.27***  0.000 
firm age (ln)  -0.02  0.734  -0.02  0.736  0.002  0.975 
employer characteristics             
age (ln)  0.054  0.903  0.03  0.944  0.056  0.895 
experience (ln)  0.24*  0.084  0.24*  0.094  0.20  0.113 
phd degree (dummy)  0.27*  0.052  0.22  0.147  0.29*  0.059 
Female entrepreneur (dummy)  -0.28  0.292  -0.29  0.246  -0.21  0.414 
Workforce characteristics             
share of highly educated employees  0.007***  0.002  0.006**  0.012  0.008***  0.001 
share of elder employees  -0.005  0.192  -0.004  0.274  -0.005  0.187 
share of male employees   0.002  0.318  0.002  0.378  0.000  0.908 
Characteristics best-paid employee             
Female employee (dummy)  0.30  0.166  0.29  0.185  -   
performance-related pay  -    0.15  0.268  -   
consistent pay policy  -    -    -0.13  0.267 
             
Constant  2.38*  0.083  2.44*  0.086     
             
Goodness of Fit Measures             
R
2  0.3769    0.3859       
Valid Observations  117    117    117   
  *; **; *** denote a significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
The results for equations 8, 9 and 10 are similar to the results for equations 5, 6 
and 7: entrepreneurial income increases with firm size and with the educational 
level of the entrepreneur as well as the employees (although the effect of the 
educational level of the entrepreneur is somewhat lower). None of the included 
gender variables have a significant effect (gender of the entrepreneur, gender 
composition of the workforce and gender of the best-paid employee). Also here, 
there is no support for hypothesis H5: our indicator for a consistent pay policy is 
not only not significant, but even has the wrong sign (equation 10). 
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5  Discussion and conclusions 
In this study we have derived five different hypotheses concerning the gender 
effects in performance-related pay amongst small and medium-sized effects. 
These hypotheses are based on two basic assumptions: the willingness of em-
ployers and employees to accept performance-related pay depends (amongst 
others) on their levels of risk aversion, and risk aversion is gender-related. The 
empirical support for our hypotheses is, however, very limited. In this chapter 
we discuss the estimation results and end with the main conclusions. 
5.1  Discussion 
Partial support for the first hypothesis… 
According to the first hypothesis, performance-related pay would be used less for 
female employees than for male employees. We find empirical support for this 
hypothesis, but only regarding the workforce in general: firms with a larger 
share of male employees are more likely to offer performance-related pay to 
their employees. 
 
When we analyse the remuneration of the best-paid employee, we find no rela-
tionship between the employee's gender and the probability that he or she re-
ceived a share of the profit or a bonus. One explanation for this lack of support 
is that the sample size is not large enough; our data set only contains 72 obser-
vations where the best-paid employee is female. 
 
…and no support for the second hypothesis… 
The second hypothesis states that female entrepreneurs are more likely to use 
performance-related pay than male entrepreneurs. There is no support for this 
hypothesis. The results presented by Roepers and De Kok (2007) seem to sup-
port this hypothesis, but additional analysis has shown that this support is the 
result of a missing variable bias: once additional control variables are added to 
the model by Roepers and De Kok (2007), the effect of the gender of the entre-
preneur is no longer significant. 
 
…so no support for the third and fourth hypothesis should be expected 
Hypotheses H3 and H4 are only valid if the first two hypotheses are. If one of the 
first two hypotheses would not be valid, then hypotheses H3 and H4 should also 
be rejected. At a 5% confidence level, this is indeed the case. The fact that we 
find no support for hypotheses H3 and H4 is thus consistent with the lack of sup-
port for the second hypothesis. 
 
No support for the fifth hypothesis regarding entrepreneurial income 
The results of the first four hypotheses are consistent with the standard assump-
tion that firms are risk neutral while individual employees are risk averse. If this 
is the case, we expected to find support for hypothesis H5: The income of the 
entrepreneur is higher when we observe pay policies consistent with efficient risk  
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sharing. We find, however, no support for this hypothesis. Also here, this could 
be due to the limited number of observations (128 or 117 valid observations). 
 
Do we need more data… 
One interpretation of the results of our study, is that the results are largely con-
sistent with the standard assumption that firms are risk neutral while individual 
employees are risk averse. The support is not strong, but this could be explained 
by the relatively limited number of observations. According to this interpretation, 
the main finding of our study is then that we find no support for the expected re-
lationship between the gender of the entrepreneur and the incidence of perform-
ance-related pay. The small size of our sample, however, does not allow for 
strong conclusions. 
 
…or do we need an alternative theory? 
Another interpretation of the results is also possible. The empirical support for 
our hypotheses is so limited, that we should reconsider the two basic assump-
tions that underlie our hypotheses. 
 
The first assumption is that the willingness of employers and employees to ac-
cept performance-related pay depends (amongst others) on their levels of risk 
aversion. This assumption ignores the difference between risk aversion and am-
biguity aversion (Borghans et al., 2009; Machina, 2009). Individuals often find 
themselves in situations where different outcomes may occur. The probabilities 
of these outcomes may either be known or unknown. Risk aversion refers to an 
individual's behaviour in case of know probabilities, while ambiguity aversion re-
fers to an individual's behaviour in case of unknown probabilities. Since the dis-
tribution of the expected performance of employees is not known in advance, the 
incidence of performance-related pay is likely to be related to the ambiguity 
aversion of the employer and employees, rather than their risk aversion. 
 
Borghans et al. (2009) found that risk aversion and ambiguity aversion are em-
pirically distinct individual traits. Regarding risk aversion, they find that women 
are more risk averse than men, and that psychological traits are strongly associ-
ated with risk aversion. Regarding ambiguity aversion, however, they find mark-
edly different results. Men and women show similar marginal valuations of ambi-
guity (with increasing levels of ambiguity), and ambiguity aversion is not related 
to psychological traits. If ambiguity diversion is indeed not gender-related, the 
second basic assumption of our study (risk aversion is gender-related) would not 
apply in the case of ambiguity aversion. 
 
According to this line of argument, differences in risk aversion between men and 
women cannot explain gender differences in the incidence of performance-related 
pay. An alternative explanation for gender differences in the incidence of per-
formance-related pay is that they are partly caused by gender differences in la-
bour force attachment. Various authors have argued that differences in labour 
force attachment between men and women could explain part of the gender 
earnings gap (Kunze, 2005; Nordman and Roubaud, 2005). According to Geddes 
and Heywood (2003), gender differences in labour force attachment may also 
explain differences in the incidence of performance-related pay: on average, 
women have a lower labour force attachment than men, which is in turn related 
to the probability of receiving performance-based pay.  
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5.2  Conclusions 
We have found partial support for the first hypothesis, which states that female 
employees are less likely to receive performance-related pay than male employ-
ees. There is also some support for the third hypothesis, which states that per-
formance-related pay is most likely to occur in firms with a female entrepreneur 
and a high share of male employees. This support is however weak: it is only 
significant at a 10% confidence level, and is furthermore based on the compari-
son of a sample of only 6 firms (with a female entrepreneur and a high share of 
male employees) with the other firms. For the other three hypotheses, there is 
no empirical support. 
 
One interpretation of the results is that they indicate that entrepreneurs are risk 
neutral while employees are risk averse (where female employees are more risk 
averse than male employees). Due to the small sample size, however, this inter-
pretation is only tentative. Additional empirical research on considerable larger 
dataset is required. Perhaps future studies can make use of administrative data 
(e.g. of payrolling companies that target SMEs). 
 
Another interpretation is that the lack of support for our hypotheses suggests 
that we need to reconsider them, including the basic assumptions on which they 
are based. In our study, we have used gender as a proxy for the risk aversion of 
individual entrepreneurs and employees, and assumed that risk aversion (of em-
ployers as well as employees) is in turn related to the incidence of performance-
related pay. However, it can be argued that this assumption is not correct: the 
incidence of performance-related pay may be related to ambiguity aversion 
rather than risk aversion. Gender may however also serve as a proxy for differ-
ences in labour force attachment. Differences in labour force attachment are 
likely to be only relevant for employers, not for employees, which seems consis-
tent with our lack of empirical support for the presence of an entrepreneurial 
gender effect. 
 
For a better understanding of gender effects in remuneration policies, future 
studies should further develop the relationships between performance-related 
pay, risk aversion and ambiguity aversion and labour force attachment, both 
theoretically and empirically. 
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